ॐ

श्रीबादरायणविरचितम्
चतुःसूत्री ब्रह्मसूत्रं शाङ्करभाष्य-रत्नप्रभा टीका सहित

Śrī Bādarāyaṇaviracitam
Catuḥsūtrī Brahmasūtram Śāṅkarabhāṣya
with Ratnaprabhā Ṭīkā

Includes Original Sanskrit text, Ṭīkā, English Translation
with Lucid explanations
based on the talks
by

Swami Bodhatmananda Saraswati
Kailash Ashram Rishikesh

Om Namo Nārāyaṇāya

The *Brahma Sutras* of Bhagavān Veda Vyasa stand as the central pramāṇa of the Vedāntic tradition, presenting the highest vision of the Upaniṣads. Upon this eternal foundation rests the luminous *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* of Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, wherein the non-dual truth of the Self is unfolded with clarity.

The opening section of this great work—the *Catuḥsūtrī*—is of singular importance for every mumukṣu (seeker of liberation). In these four concise sūtras lies the essence of Advaita Vedānta: the inquiry into Brahman, the nature of scriptural authority, the apparent contradictions in śruti, and their ultimate reconciliation. Properly understood, they initiate the seeker into a transformative vision that dissolves the primordial error—adhyāsa, the superimposition of the body-mind upon the Self—and reveal the identity of Ātman and Brahman, the very heart of mokṣa.

This text, therefore, serves as a direct means for the removal of ignorance (avidyā), guiding the seeker from confusion to clarity, from bondage to freedom. In the grand lineage of Advaita, the study of the *Catuḥsūtrī* occupies a revered place as both gateway and compass for deeper contemplation (*manana*) and assimilation (*nididhyāsana*).

The present work is a humble yet earnest offering in this sacred tradition. It brings together the profound Bhāṣya along with the illuminating *Ratnaprabhā ṭīkā* of Ācārya Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, presented in a manner accessible to the modern seeker. While many commentaries exist, they are often either linguistically inaccessible or do not provide a close, word-by-word engagement with both the Bhāṣya and its sub-commentary. This work seeks to bridge that gap.

A few distinctive features of these notes may be highlighted:

- **Transliterated Sanskrit Text**: Both the Bhāṣya and *Ratnaprabhā ṭīkā* are presented in clear transliteration, enabling even beginners in Sanskrit to approach the original with confidence and reverence.

- **Simple and Faithful Exposition**: The explanations aim to preserve the integrity of the original while rendering the ideas in lucid, accessible English.

- **Concise Notes for Clarity**: Key ideas are distilled into short, structured notes to aid quick comprehension without sacrificing depth.

- **Elaboration of Inferences (Anumāna)**: Logical structures and subtle reasonings employed in the Bhāṣya are carefully unpacked for the student.

- **Insights from *Pūrṇānandī ṭīkā***: Select reflections from this revered sub-commentary are included to enrich understanding.

- **Points for Mananam**: Thoughtfully curated reflections, encouraging the seeker to internalize the teachings.

- **Visual Aids**: Certain teachings are presented in tabular formats, offering a consolidated and intuitive grasp of complex ideas.

It is our hope that this work will serve as a gentle yet firm guide for seekers—especially those beginning their journey into Sanskrit and Advaita Vedānta—enabling them to engage deeply with this profound śāstra.

With reverence and gratitude, we bow to the entire Guru-paramparā: to Bhagavān Veda Vyāsa, to Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, to the lineage of illustrious commentators who have illumined this path, and to all teachers and seekers who continue to keep this wisdom alive. We offer our salutations to Bhagavān Abhinava Candreśvara ji and to all those whose dedication, scholarship, and devotion have contributed to the completion of this work, including the compilation of the *Vaiyāsika-Nyāyamālā* ślokas and their meanings.

May this effort, however modest, become a means for deeper inquiry, steady reflection, and ultimately, the recognition of one's true nature as limitless Brahman.

Om Tat Sat

Om śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ
Om śrī gurucaraṇāravindābhyāṃ namaḥ

Notes on Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣyam and Bhāṣyaratnaprabhāvyākhyā

(These notes are based on the discourses of Pujya Swami Bodhatmananda Saraswati on the Brahmasūtra, as available on YouTube. The Tīkā referenced in these talks can be accessed here.)

Table of Contents

Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. 5
- Introduction to the Brahma Sūtras 5
- The Maṅgalācaraṇa (Invocation) (Page 1-2) 5
- Justification for Adhyāsa Bhāṣya (Prologue) 8
- Justification for the First Brahma Sūtra (Page 4) 10
- Pūrvapakṣa: Why is the Sūtra necessary? (Page 5) 11
- Siddhānti's Refutation (Page 7) 14
- Integration of the Sutra and Shastra (Page 8) 16
- Adhyāsa Bhāṣya - Upodghāta (Page 12) 21
- The Response to the Impossibility (from the Bhāṣya) (Page 19) 33
- The Nature of Adhyāsa and the Two Types (Page 27) 48
- Analysis of the Bhāṣya's Definition of Adhyāsa (Page 27) 49
- Practical Application of Adhyāsa using Seer and the Seen (Drg-Dṛśya Viveka) 50
- The Doctrine of Anādi Pravāha (Beginningless Flow) of Adhyāsa (Page 28) 55
- Nitya Jñāna vs. Anitya Jñāna 59
- Tādātmyā Adhyāsa and Saṃsarga Adhyāsa (Two Types of Superimposition) (Page 30) 62
- Structure of the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya and the Lakṣaṇa (Page 31) 64
- Pūrvapakṣa: Impossibility of the Lakṣaṇa, resulting in Anyathā Khyāti (Page 33-34) 70
- The Pañca Khyāti (Five Theories of Error) 71
- Vādi Vipratipatti (Controversies among the Schools) (Page 35) 75
- Conclusion on Adhyāsa Definition (The Advaita View) (Page 37-38) 78
- Summary of Types of Adhyāsa 80
- Differentiating Upādhi, Viśeṣaṇa, and Upalakṣaṇa 83
- The Pūrvapakṣa's (Opponent's) Objection to the Possibility of Adhyāsa on the Ātman (Page 39) 84
- Application of Ascertaining the Nature of Reality to Sādhanā (Spiritual Practice): 90
- Adhyāsa as the Basis for All Transactions (Vyavahāra) (Page 43) 91
- The Proofs for Adhyāsa: Arthāpatti and Anumāna (Page 44) 93
- Adhyāsa as the Root of ALL Activity (Laukika and Vaidika) 95
- Differentiating 'Aham' (I) and 'Mama' (My) 101
- Conclusion of the answer to the praśna and ākṣepa starting with "Katham" 103
- The Formal Logical Argument (Anumāna) (Page 49-50) 107
- Āgama (Scripture) as Proof of Adhyāsa (Page 52-53) 113
- Second Definition of Adhyasa: What is adhyastha and Where? (Page 53) 114
- Reflections on the Witness (Sākṣī) 117
- Reciprocal Superimposition (Anyonyādhyāsa) 119

In Summary: Characteristics of Adhyāsa (Page 56) 119
The Resolution: The Promise of the Sutras 123
Mananam: The Purpose of Upāsanā (Worship/Meditation) 124
Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 1. Sūtra 1. 125
The Second Varṇaka: Agatārthatva (Novelty of the Subject): Jijñāsādhikaraṇam (Page 59) 125
The Third Varṇaka: The Qualified Aspirant (Adhikārī) (Page 60) 128
Mananam: About The Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā 129
Analysis of the Jijñāsā Adhikaraṇa (Via Nyāyamālā) (Page 60) 131
Discussion on the word "Atha" (Page 62) 132
Siddhānta: Final Refutation via Difference in Result/Fruit, Object and the Cause of inquiry (Page 71) 145
Detailed Exposition of the Fourfold Qualifications (Page 74) 151
The Definition and Necessity of 'Ataḥ' (Therefore) (Page 76) 155
Grammatical Analysis of "Brahma Jijñāsā" (Page 77-78) 158
Definition of the Word "Brahma" (Page 79) 160
Debate: Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī vs. Śeṣe Ṣaṣṭhī (Page 79) 160
Analysis of the Word Jijñāsā (Page 83) 166
Mananam: Additional Notes by Bade Mahārāj Jī 170
Grammatical Nuances and Conclusion of Third Varṇaka (Page 84) 172
Introduction to Fourth Varṇaka: The Dilemma of Existence (Prasiddhi) (Page 85) 174
Mananam: Additional Notes by Bade Mahārāj Jī 180
Conclusion of the Brahma-Jijñāsā Sūtra's Meaning (Page 92) 190
Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 2. Sūtra 2. 194
The Second Sūtra's Introduction in the Bhāṣya (Page 98) 194
Analysis of Sūtra 1.1.2.2 (Page 95) 199
The Nature of Causality (Ubhaya-Kāraṇatva) (Page 101) 200
Mananam: Types of Definitions: Swarūpa vs. Taṭastha 201
Grammatical Analysis of "Janmādi" (Page 101-102) 202
Elaborations on "Asya" (The World) (Page 102-103) 203
Elaborations on "Yataḥ" (The Cause) (Page 103) 204
The Opponent’s Stand (Pūrvapakṣa): The Sufficiency of Inference (Page 108-109) 212
The Purpose of the Brahma Sūtras (Page 109-110) 215
Mananam: Reflection on Jñāna Dārḍhyam (Firmness in Knowledge) 221
Correlation with Scripture 222
The Mīmāṃsaka Objection (Page 112) 224
Mananam: The Stages of Wisdom: Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 227
Mananam: Additional Notes by Bade Mahārāj Jī (svakāryātmakam) 243
Subject Matter of Brahma Sūtra (Sūtra 2) (Page 119) 244
Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 3. Sūtra 3. 248
The Invocation (Maṅgalācaraṇa) (Page 124) 248
The Inference for Omniscience (Anumāna) (Page 125) 252
Authorship and Divine Creation (Pauruṣeyatva Debate) (Page 125) 253
Analysis of Sūtra 1.1.3.3 (Page 122) 254
The Nature of the Vedas (Page 128) 263
The Concept of Ānupūrvī 265

The Second Interpretation (Dvitīya Varṇaka): Śāstra as the Evidence for Brahman (Page 130) 266
Second Varṇaka (Second Interpretation) 267
The Necessity of the Third Sūtra (Ākṣepa) (Page 131) 270
Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 4. Sūtra 4. 271
Pūrvapakṣa (Mīmāmsā Objection): The Objection of Uselessness and Dependence 271
Pūrva-pakṣa Analysis 273
Mananam: Additional Points to Reflect on Upāsanā 281
The Discussion on Mantras (Page 138-139) 287
The Siddhānta (Rebuttal): The Validity of Valid Knowledge 292
Analysis of Sūtra 1.1.4.4 293
Determining Purport: The Six Indicators (Ṣaḍ-vidha Liṅga) 299
Case Study: Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Chapter 6) 300
Mananam: Reflections on Sādhanā 307
Mananam: Elaboration of Akhaṇḍārtha (Indivisible Meaning) from Pūrṇānandī Ṭīkā 310
Introduction to the Second Varṇaka (Vṛttikāra Matam) 325
The Linguistic Theory (Logic of Language Learning) (Page 151) 327
The Siddhānta's Objection: Ṣaḍvidha Liṅga 330
The Pūrvapakṣa's Refutation: Reliance on Vṛddha Vyavahāra 331
The Linguistic Argument: Power of Words (Śakti) (Page 153) 334
Mananam: Role of Practice, Purification, and Teaching 337
The Conceptual Difference regarding Phala (Result) 338
The Siddhānta: Refutation and the Autonomy of Knowledge (Page 158) 343
The Divergence of Karma and Brahman-Knowledge (Page 158) 345
The Hierarchy of Bliss 348
The State of Embodiment vs. Bodilessness (Page 162) 351
Two Types of Eternity (Nityatva) (Page 164-165) 358
Mananam: Using the Pūrvapakṣa's View for Reflection 361
Knowledge as a Direct Fruit (Dṛṣṭa-phala) (Page 168-169) 364
The Simultaneity of Vision and Attainment (Page 169-170) 367
The Destruction of the Ignorance-Knot 372
Knowledge is Vastutantra (Object-Dependent), Not Puruṣatantra (Effort-Dependent) (Page 178) 378
The Nature of Scripture: Removal of Superimposed Duality (Page 180) 382
The Four Types of Action-Results (Kriyā-phala) 385
Why Purifying Action Cannot Abide in the Non-Self (Page 184) 390
Scriptural Evidence 393
Epistemological Analysis: Jñāna vs. Mānasī Kriyā (Meditation) (Page 188) 397
The Ontological Distinction Between Jñāna and Dhyāna (Page 190) 400
Mananam: Analogies of Qualitative Difference 410
The Prābhākara View (Mīmāmsā) (Page 195) 413
The Logic of Language Acquisition (Vyutpatti) 416
The Mechanism of Word-Meaning Acquisition (Vyutpatti) 418
The Five-Fold Challenge To Pūrvapakṣa (Page 196) 419
Mananam: The Genius of the Commentators (Tīkākāra) 424
Mention of Ānandagiri Ji 424
Reinterpreting the Mīmāmsā Position: Reconciliation with Śabara-bhāṣya (Page 199-200) 431

Analysis of the Sūtra Criteria: 432
The Nature of Injunctions and Prohibitions 433
Logical Inference for Vedāntic Validity 434
The Evidence of Prohibitions (Niṣedha) (Page 204) 440
Refutation of the "Action" Theory in Prohibition 442
Refuting the "Resolve" (Saṅkalpa) Theory (Page 205) 442
Mananam: Scripture as the Mirror of Knowledge 443
Categorization of Negation: Prasajya-pratiṣedha vs. Paryudāsa 445
Prasajya-pratiṣedha (Absolute Negation) 446
Paryudāsa (Relative Negation/Exclusion) 446
Linguistic Structure: Prakṛti and Pratyaya (Page 206) 446
Defining Indifference (Audāsīnya) (Page 208) 449
Mananam: Two Modes of Connecting the Negative Particle (Nañ) 453
The Core Definition of the Negative Particle (Nañ) (Page 208) 454
Reconciling Vedānta with Mīmāṃsā Masters (Page 210) 457
Mananam: Reflections on Indirect vs. Direct Knowledge 463
Conclusion: Embodiment as Mithyā (Illusory) (Page 213) 468
Mananam: Practical Tip: Meditative Shift 474
The Prābhākara Perspective: Gauṇa vs. Mithyā (Page 214-215) 474
Mananam: Social and Linguistic Example 478
The State of Bodilessness (Aśarīratva) while Alive (Page 216) 480
Mananam: The Nature of Knowledge and Ignorance 485
The Opponent’s Argument: Brahman as a Subsidiary to Injunctions (Page 218) 485
The Purpose of Manana and Nididhyāsana 486
Final Establishment: The Independence of the Science of Brahman 487
The Three Verses of Sūndara Pāṇḍya (Page 221) 491

Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1.

Introduction to the Brahma Sūtras

- **The Title**: The text is named Brahma Sūtra because its principle subject matter is Brahman (the Absolute Reality), making it the principal topic.

- **Definition of Sūtra**: The word Sūtra means "thread" or "aphorism." It is defined by its brevity and comprehensiveness.
    - Quotation: "**alpākṣaraṃ asandigdhaṃ sāravat viśvatomukham| astobhaṃ anavadyaṃ ca sūtraṃ sūtravido viduḥ**" (A sūtra, say the knowers of sūtras, is that which is concise, comprehensive, unambiguous, and flawless.)
- **Shārīraka Bhāṣya**: The Sūtras form the basis for Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya's central commentary, known as the Shārīraka Bhāṣya.
    - **Etymology**: Shārīraka refers to the Ātman (Self) that has identified itself with the body (sharīra), or the ultimate truth (Brahman) that is the subject of the Sūtras, which aim to remove the illusion of body-identification.

The Ratnaprabhā Tīka

- **Name Origin**: The ṭikā on the Shārīraka Bhāṣya is named Bhāṣya Ratnaprabhā.
    - **Meaning**: The Bhāṣya (Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya'commentary) is the Ratnam (jewel). The Ratnaprabhā (the jewel's luster or light) illuminates the meaning of the Bhāṣya, clarifying the text.
- **Authorship:**
    - The primary author is Śrī Aacārya Rāmānanda Sarasvatī.
    - He dedicated the work to his Guru, Govindānanda Sarasvatī. This explains why some commentators attribute the work to the Guru, while others cite the disciple who physically composed it.

The Maṅgalācaraṇa (Invocation) (Page 1-2)

The text begins with an invocation to adhere to tradition and to ensure the successful completion of the work.

Shloka 1: Invocation to Lord Rama

यमिह कारुणिकं शरणं गतोऽप्यरिसहोदर आप महत्पदम्।
तमहमाशु हरिं परमाश्रये जनकजाङ्कमनन्तसुखाकृतिम् ॥ १ ॥

- Deity: Hari (Lord Rāma), the Supreme.
- Epithets: "Janakajāṅkama" (Who is accompanied by Sītā); "Ananta-sukhākṛtim" (Whose form is infinite bliss).
- The Act of Compassion: Rāma is praised for his extreme compassion ("kāruṇikam").

    - He granted the Mahat Padam (supreme state—both the kingdom of Lanka and Mokśa) to Vibhiṣaṇa, the "ari-sahodaram" (brother of the enemy, Rāvaṇa), immediately upon his surrender.
- The word **āpa** (obtained), as in the line "the enemy's brother obtained the supreme state" (**ari sahodara āpa mahat padam**), is grammatically justified as the Perfect Tense (Liṭ Lakāra) form of the root āp (to obtain).

Shloka 2: Invocation to Lord Shiva (Kāśikeśa)

श्रीगौर्या सकलार्थदं निजपदाम्भोजेन मुक्तिप्रदं प्रौढं विघ्नवनं हरन्तमनघं श्रीढुण्ढितुण्डासिना ।
वन्दे चर्मकपालिकोपकरणैर्वैराग्यसौख्यात्परं नास्तीति प्रदिशन्तमन्तविधुरं श्रीकाशिकेशं शिवम् ॥ २ ॥

- Deity: Śiva (The Auspicious One), the Lord of Kāśi (Varanasi).
- The Means (Instrumental Case): The Lord is the Ordinary Cause, but his companions and accoutrements are the Extraordinary Causes for the disciple's success:
    1. Through the goddess Gauri (Śrī Gauryā) (Pārvatī, Annapūrṇā) Bestower of all material needs/ends (Sakalārthadam).
    2. Through His own "Nija-padāmbhojena" (lotus feet): "Muktipradam" (Bestower of Liberation).
    3. Through Lord Gaṇeśa (the one with the trunk): "Prauḍhaṃ-vighna-vanam harantam" (Remover of the dense forest of obstacles), essential for prolonged study.
    4. Through His implements ("Carma-kapālikopakaranaiḥ"—elephant skin, skull bowls): The Lord preaches (pradiśantam) "Vairāgya-saukhyāt param nāsti" (There is no greater bliss than that of detachment/renunciation).
- Lord Shiva's Nature: "Anta-vidhuram" (Limitless).
- Note: Dependence on these secondary causes does not diminish Īśvara's (God's) essential independence, just as a human cook remains the doer despite needing wood and vessels.
- The word **Amboja** (lotus) in the phrase "by his own lotus feet" (**Nija Padām Bhojena**) is derived from the phrase "born in water" (ambasi jāyate) using a specific grammatical rule (Saptamyām Janer ḍa).

Shloka 3: Invocation to Goddess Sarasvatī

यत्कृपालवमात्रेण मूको भवति पण्डितः । वेदशास्त्रशरीरां तां वाणीं वीणाकरां भजे ॥ ३ ॥

- Deity: Vāṇī/Sarasvatī, who holds the Vīṇā ("vīṇā-karām bhaje").
- Epithet: "Veda-śāstra-śarīrā" (Whose body is the Vedas and the Śāstras).
- Blessing: "Yat-kṛpā-lava-mātreṇa mūko bhavati paṇḍitaḥ" (By even a fraction of whose grace, the mute/ignorant becomes learned). The verse also implies that the paṇḍita (overly learned) can attain maunam (silence/Brahmanishtha) through her grace.

Shloka 4: Guru Paramparā (Lineage)

कामाक्षीदत्तदुग्धप्रचुरसुरनुतप्राज्यभोज्याधिपूज्यश्रीगौरीनायकाभित्प्रकटनशिवरामार्यलब्धात्मबोधैः ।
श्रीमद्गोपालगीर्भिः प्रकटितपरमाद्वैतभासास्मितास्यश्रीमद्गोविन्दवाणीचरणकमलगो निर्वृतोऽहं यथालिः ॥ ४ ॥

This verse confirms the authorship and honors the teacher lineage:

- Lineage: Śivarāmārya (Supreme Guru) → Gopāla Giriḥ (Parama Guru) → Govindānanda Vāṇī (Guru) → Rāmānanda (Author).
- The Source of Knowledge: The Supreme Guru, Śivarāmārya, attained Self-realization through the nectar (knowledge) granted by Kāmākṣi (the deity of Kānchī).
- The Author's Humility: The author, Rāmānanda, declares himself a "bee" at the lotus feet of his Guru, Govindānanda Vāṇī, confirming his discipleship and the dedication of the text to his teacher.
- **The Unity of Deities (Abheda):** The name **Śiva-Rāma** signifies the non-difference between the Lords Śiva and Rāma. This unity is established by recognizing the implied meaning (**Lakṣyārtha)** and discarding the limiting adjuncts (**Upādhi**). This shows Bhagavāna ādi śaṅkarācārya's commitment to the **Brahman** as the singular reality.
- **Gopāla Giri's State:** The ācārya **Gopālānanda Sarasvatī** demonstrated his realization of **Paramādvaita Bhāsa** (the light of supreme non-duality) through his demeanor. This is described as his "face smiled, shining the light of Supreme Non-Duality" (**prakaṭita paramādvaita bhāsā smitāsya**), which is taken as the sign of liberation while living (**Jīvanmukti)**.
- **The Author's Humility:** The author, **Rāmānanda**, expresses his discipleship by comparing himself to a bee at the lotus feet of his Guru, **Govindānanda Sarasvatī**. This signifies the attainment of the "bliss of liberation" (Nirvṛtti).

Shloka 5, 6 and 7: Purpose of the Commentary (Ratnaprabhā)
श्रीशङ्करं भाष्यकृतं प्रणम्य व्यासं हरिं सूत्रकृतं च वच्मि ।

श्रीभाष्यतीर्थे परहंसतुष्ट्यै वाग्जालबन्धच्छिदमभ्युपायम् ॥ ५ ॥

विस्तृतग्रन्थवीक्षायामलसं यस्य मानसम् । व्याख्या तदर्थमारब्धा भाष्यरत्नप्रभाभिधा ॥ ६ ॥

श्रीमच्छारीरकं भाष्यं प्राप्य वाक्शुद्धिमाप्नुयात् । इति श्रमो मे सफलो गङ्गां रथ्योदकं यथा ॥ ७ ॥

The **Ratnaprabhā Tika** is intended to elaborate on and clarify the profound **Bhāṣya** (Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya's commentary) for students.

- **Simplifying the Text:** The ṭikā is designed for students "whose mind is lazy in going through vast texts" (**vistṛta grantha vikṣāyām alasam yasya mānasam**). It provides an accessible explanation.
- **Cutting the Net of Confusion:** The **Bhāṣya** is compared to a holy river (tīrtha) where Paramahaṃsas (sages) study. The ṭikā's purpose is to cut through the confusing and illogical arguments presented by rival schools.
    - **Quotation:** "I am stating the means to cut the net of words/arguments" (**vāg-jāla bandh chidam abhyupāyam vacmi**).
- **The Author's Humility:** The author compares his own effort (the **Ratnaprabhā**) to ordinary street water (Rathyodakam), which becomes purified and successful only by joining the **Gaṅgā** (the supremely pure **Bhāṣya)**.

Shloka 8: Establishment of the Fourfold Requisites (Anubandha Chatuṣṭaya)

यदज्ञानसमुद्भूतमिन्द्रजालमिदं जगत् । सत्यज्ञानसुखानन्तं तदहं ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ॥ ८ ॥

Bhāṣyakara establishes the four prerequisites for the study of the Brahma Sūtra in a single verse:

- **Meaning:** "From the ignorance of which [Brahman] this entire net of the world is born, that Brahman is Satya-Jñāna-Sukha-Anantam [Existence-Consciousness-Bliss-Infinite] and is fearless."
    - **Subject Matter (Viṣaya): Brahman**, defined by both its **Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa** (Essential Definition: Satya-Jñāna-Sukha-Anantam) and its **Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa** (Accidental Definition: the source of the world, or the substratum whose ignorance causes the world).
    - **Goal (Prayojana):** Attaining the bliss of that Satya-Jñāna-Sukha-Anantam and **Nirbhayatā** (fearlessness).
    - **Qualified Student (Adhikārin):** The one who seeks this supreme goal of Sukha and Nirbhayatā.
    - **Connection (Sambandha):** The **Pratipādya-Pratipādaka Bhāva** (the relationship between the taught object—Brahman—and the teaching text—the commentary).

Justification for Adhyāsa Bhāṣya (Prologue)

The commentator addresses the apparent disjunction between three key texts, which the commentary must reconcile by establishing **Ekavākyatā** (unity of purpose).

- **The Three Parts:**
    1. **Śruti (Scripture):** The primary injunction is to hear, reflect, and meditate on the Self ("**Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ**").
    2. **Sūtra (Aphorism):** The Brahma Sūtra begins with the inquiry: "**Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā**" (Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman).
    3. **Bhāṣya (Commentary):** Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya begins with the extensive discussion on **Adhyāsa** (Superimposition of Self and Non-Self).

- **The Conclusion:** The Adhyāsa Bhāṣya is not a random beginning, but the necessary introduction (**Upodghāta)** that serves as the foundation for the Sūtra. The Sūtra then formally guides the inquiry mandated by the Śruti (scripture). The commentary's opening section is dedicated to showing the harmony among the Śruti, Sūtra, and Adhyāsa Bhāṣya.

The Introduction to Śravaṇa Vidhi (Injunction to Hear) (Page 3)

इह खलु 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः'(श्र.ब्रा. ११-५७) इति नित्याध्ययनविधिनाधीतसाङ्गस्वाध्याये 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व' (तै.उ. ३ । १ । १), 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' (छा.उ. ८ । ७ । १), 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः' (बृ.उ. २ । ४ । ५) इति श्रवणविधिरुपलभ्यते ।

The first line of the commentary establishes the foundation for the entire inquiry.

1. Meaning of the Core Phrase

- **Iha (here)** means "**vedānte**" (in Vedānta).
- **Śravaṇa vidhi upalabhyate** means the **injunction to hear** (Vedānta) **is available**.
- The complete meaning is: **In Vedānta, the injunction to hear is established** through a series of scriptural statements.

2. The Nitya Adhyayana Vidhi (The Daily Study Injunction)

- **Svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ** (One's own Veda must be studied) contains the suffix **tavya**, which denotes a **vidhi** (injunction).
- This study is designated as **Nitya Karma** (a daily, mandatory ritual) because there is **no specific associated material result** (phala abhāvāt).
- **Adhīta sāṅga svādhyāya** is a **Bahuvrīhi Samāsa** (possessive compound) meaning: "The person by whom the Veda, along with its **Aṅgas** (auxiliary disciplines, like phonetics, grammar, meter, etc.), has been studied."

3. The Scriptural Basis for Inquiry (Jijñāsā)

The injunction to inquire is supported by three key scriptural statements:

Source	Statement	Context/Meaning
Taittirīya Upaniṣad	**Tad vijijñāsasva** (That [Brahman] one must seek to know).	This is a passage from the Bhṛguvalli of the **Taittirīya Upaniṣad**.
Chāndogya Upaniṣad	**So'nveṣṭavyaḥ savijijñāsitavyaḥ** (He [the Self] must be sought and desired to be known).	A statement by Prajāpati to Indra and others.
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad	**Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ** (Verily, the Self must be seen and heard).	The advice given by Yājñavalkya to his wife Maitreyī.

All terms vijijñāsasva, anveṣṭavyaḥ, and draṣṭavyaḥ are related to the **Brahma Jijñāsā** (desire to know Brahman) mentioned in the first Sūtra. They serve as the **Viṣaya Vākyas** (subject statements) for the Sūtra.

The Purpose of the Inquiry (Vicāra) and the Rule of Exclusion (Page 3-4)

तस्यार्थः अमृतत्वकामेनाद्वैतात्मविचार एव वेदान्तवाक्यैः कर्तव्य इति । तेन काम्येन नियमविधिनार्थादेव भिन्नात्मशास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः, वैदिकानां पुराणादिप्राधान्यं वा निरस्यत इति वस्तुगतिः ।

The commentator then clarifies the necessity and object of this inquiry.

1. The Aim of Vedāntic Inquiry

The essence of the above scriptural injunctions is:

- **Amṛtatva kāmena** (By one who desires **immortality/liberation**), **advaita ātma vicāra eva** (only the inquiry into the non-dual Self) must be done.
- **Vedānta vākyaiḥ eva** (Only through the **Vedāntic declarations**) should this inquiry be conducted.

2. The Injunction of Exclusion (Niyama Vidhi)

This injunction establishes a **Niyama Vidhi** (injunction of exclusion), which simultaneously achieves two exclusions:

- **Exclusion 1: Non-Vedāntic Texts:** It rejects the primacy of **Purāṇas** and other auxiliary texts (purāṇa ādi prādhānyam). Because these contain some non-dualistic ideas, a student may get caught in the **Dvaita** (dualistic) narratives and miss the essential core of **Vairāgya** (dispassion).
- **Exclusion 2: Dualistic Doctrines (purāṇa):** It rejects adherence to **Bhinna-ātma Śāstra Pravṛtti** (study of doctrines that posit a separate or dual Self). Since the goal is liberation (Amṛtatva), which is achieved only by realizing non-duality, one must restrict their focus to **Advaita Ātma Vicāra**.

Justification for the First Brahma Sūtra (Page 4)

तत्र कश्चिदिह जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वानुष्ठितयज्ञादिभिर्नितान्तविमलस्वान्तो ‘अस्य श्रवणविधेः को विषयः, किं फलम् , कोऽधिकारी, कः सम्बन्धः’ इति जिज्ञासते । तं जिज्ञासुमुपलभमानो भगवान्बादरायणस्तदनुबन्धचतुष्टयं श्रवणात्मकशास्त्रारम्भप्रयोजकं न्यायेन निर्णेतुमिदं सूत्रं रचयाञ्चकार ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ (ब्र.सू. १ । १ । १) इति ॥

The commentary proceeds to link the qualifications of the student to the composition of the first Sūtra.

1. The Qualified Seeker (Adhikārin)

The commentary describes the ideal student:

- **Iha janmani janmāntare vā anuṣṭhita yajñādi** (One who, in this life or in previous lives, has performed mandatory rites and duties like **Yajñas**).
- **Nitānta vimala svānta** (Whose **svānta** or inner-mind is **absolutely purified**).
    - This purity is characterized by **Vairāgya** (dispassion) towards the cycle of rebirth (samsara).

2. The Rise of the Inquiry (Jijñāsā)
Such a qualified student will naturally raise the fundamental questions about the **Śravaṇa Vidhi** (injunction to hear):

1. **Ko viṣayaḥ?** (What is the **subject matter**?)
2. **Kim phalam?** (What is the **fruit/goal**?)
3. **Ko adhikārī?** (Who is the **qualified person**?)
4. **Kaḥ sambandhaḥ?** (What is the **connection**?)

This constitutes the **Anubandha Chatuṣṭaya** (Fourfold Requisites).

3. The Sūtras' Composition by Veda Vyāsa (Bādarāyaṇa)

- **Tam jijñāsum upalabhamāno Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇaḥ** (Lord Bādarāyaṇa, perceiving that seeker [who had the desire to know]).
    - Bādarāyaṇa is called **Bhagavān** because he is endowed with the six attributes of greatness, including the origin and dissolution of the universe, and knowledge and ignorance.
- Lord Bādarāyaṇa, seeing the need to systematize the answers to the **Anubandha Chatuṣṭaya** through logic and discussion (**nyāyena nirṇetum**), **composed this Sūtra**: "**Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā**" (Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman).
- **Racayāñcakāra:** Composed the Sūtra (**Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā**).
- The **nyāya** (logic/method of discussion) used for decision-making is the **Adhikaraṇa** system, defined by five parts:
    - **Viṣaya** (Subject Statement)
    - **Viśaya** (Doubt/Question)
    - **Pūrvapakṣa** (Prima Facie View)
    - **Uttarapakṣa** (Established Conclusion)
    - **Saṅgati** (Consistency/Coherence)
- **Anubandha Catuṣṭaya Viśeṣaṇa:** The Anubandha Catuṣṭaya is described as the **śravaṇātmaka śāstra ārambha prayojakam** (that which causes the initiation of the Śāstra whose nature is hearing).
    - **Śravaṇātmaka Śāstra:** The scripture is fundamentally sound/word-based (**śabdātmaka**), but it is called **śravaṇātmaka** because its purpose is to instruct the seeker to engage in **Śravaṇa** (hearing/studying the texts).
- This composition of the first Sūtra serves to coordinate two sets of texts:
    1. **Scriptural Injunctions: Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ**, **vijijñāsasva**, etc.
    2. **The Brahma Sūtra:** Starting with **Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā**,
       both of which instruct inquiry into the Ātman/Brahman

Pūrvapakṣa: Why is the Sūtra necessary? (Page 5)

नन्वनुबन्धजातं विधिसन्निहितार्थवादवाक्यैरेव ज्ञातुं शक्यम् ।

The opponent (Pūrvapakṣa) begins by arguing that the first Sūtra is **redundant and unnecessary** (a waste of a precious few words).

The Opponent's Argument

- **Objection: Nanu anubandha jātaṁ vidhi sannihita arthavāda vākyaiḥ eva jñātuṁ śakyam.** (The entire group of Anubandhas can be known simply from the **Arthavāda Vākyas** associated with the **Vidhi Vākyas**.)
    - **Vidhi Sannihita Arthavāda:** These are commendatory statements (Arthavāda) whose meaning is incomplete on their own but become meaningful when placed near a primary injunction (Vidhi Vākya), forming a single sentence (**ekavākyatā**).
    - **The Mīmāṁsaka View:** The Mīmāṁsakas (proponents of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā) generally hold that sentences not containing an explicit command (Vidhi) are merely **Arthavāda** (commendatory) and lack independent authority. For them, **Tattvamasi** and **Ahaṁ**

Brahmāsmi are simply **Arthavāda** because they lack a clear Vidhi (injunction/command).

Evidence for Anitya (Impermanence) and Vairāgya (Dispassion)

तथाहि - 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते' (छा. उ. ८ । १ । ६) इति श्रुत्या 'यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम्' इति न्यायवत्या 'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' (क. उ. १ । २ । १८) 'यो वै भूमा तदमृतम्' (छा.उ. ७ । २४ । १) 'अतोऽन्यदार्तम्' (बृ.उ. ३-४-२) इत्यादि श्रुत्या च भूमात्मा नित्यस्ततोऽन्यदनित्यमज्ञानस्वरूपमिति विवेको लभ्यते । कर्मणा कृष्यादिना चितः सम्पादितः सस्यादिर्लोकः - भोग्य इत्यर्थः । विपश्चिन्नित्यज्ञानस्वरूपः । 'परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान्ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन' (मु.उ. १ । २ । १२), 'आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति' (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । ५) इत्यादिश्रुत्यानात्ममात्रे देहेन्द्रियादिसकलपदार्थजाते वैराग्यं लभ्यते । परीक्ष्यानित्यत्वेन निश्चित्य, अकृतो मोक्षः कृतेन कर्मणा नास्तीति कर्मतत्फलेभ्यो वैराग्यं प्राप्नुयादित्यर्थः । 'शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितः श्रद्धावित्तो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्' (बृ.उ. ४ । ४ । २३) इति श्रुत्या शमादिषट्कं लभ्यते । 'समाहितो भूत्वा' इति काण्वपाठः । उपरतिः सन्न्यासः । 'न स पुनरावर्तते' (कालाग्निरु. २, छा.उ. ८।१५।१) इति स्वयञ्ज्योतिरानन्दात्मकमोक्षस्य नित्यत्वश्रुत्या मुमुक्षा लभ्यते । तथा च विवेकादिविशेषणवानधिकारीति ज्ञातुं शक्यम् ।

The Pūrvapakṣa offers scriptural evidence to show that the requisites (Vairāgya, etc., which define the **Adhikārī** or qualified student) are already known through clear scriptural declarations without the Sūtra:

Requisite Established	Scriptural Passage	Implication / Logic
Viveka (Discrimination)	**Tad yathā iha karma citaḥ lokaḥ kṣīyate evam amutra puṇya citaḥ lokaḥ kṣīyate (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.1.6)** (Just as the results of karma here perish, so too do the worlds earned by merit there perish).	The Nyāya (logic) is Yat kṛtakam tad anityam (Whatever is created is impermanent), showing that all results of ritual work are subject to decay. This leads to the discrimination between the Nitya (eternal Self) and the Anitya (impermanent non-Self).
Vairāgya (Dispassion)	**Parīkṣya lokān karma citān brāhmaṇo nirvedaṁ āyāt (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 1.2.12)** (Having examined the worlds gained by karma, a seeker should arrive at dispassion).	The seeker realizes the defects in all worldly attainments: they are Anitya (impermanent), duḥkha miśrita (mixed with suffering), and atṛpti karā (incapable of providing lasting satisfaction).
Mumukṣutva (Desire for Mokṣa)	**Na sa punar āvartate** (He does not return again)**. (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.15.1)**	This implies that the goal is the Svayaṁ-jyoti Ānandātmaka Mokṣa (Self-effulgent, Bliss-nature liberation), which is Nitya (eternal), thus motivating the desire for liberation.

Śamādi Ṣaṭka Sampatti (Sixfold Virtues)	**Śānto dānta uparataḥ titikṣuḥ samāhitaḥ śraddhā-bhūto ātmany evātmānaṁ paśyet** (One who is calm, controlled, withdrawn, enduring, and endowed with faith, should see the Self in the Self). **(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.23)**	This directly lists the virtues necessary for the Adhikārī (qualified student).

Justification for using the Rātrisatra Nyāya

यथा 'य एता रात्रीरुपयन्ति' इति रात्रिसत्रविधौ 'प्रतितिष्ठन्ति' इत्यर्थवादस्थप्रतिष्ठाकामस्तद्वत् |

The Pūrvapakṣa cites the **Rātrisatra Nyāya** (a maxim from Pūrva Mīmāṁsā) to strengthen the argument regarding the **Adhikārī** (qualified student):

- **Yathā Ya etā rātrīr upayanti iti rātrisattra vidhau pratiṣṭhanti iti arthavādastha pratiṣṭhā kāmaḥ tadvat:** Just as, in the injunction concerning the Rātrisattra sacrifice (where no fruit is mentioned), the commendatory statement (**arthavāda**) "one attains stability (**pratiṣṭhā**)" makes the **pratiṣṭhā-kāmaḥ** (one desiring stability) the qualified agent (Adhikārī) for that sacrifice.
- **Application:** Similarly, the qualities of the Adhikārī (Viveka, Vairāgya, etc.) are evident from the various **Śrutis** (Vedic statements) mentioned previously, without needing a separate Sūtra.

Determining the Viṣaya (Subject Matter)

तथा 'श्रोतव्यः' (बृ.उ. २ । ४ । ५) इत्यत्र प्रत्ययार्थस्य नियोगस्य प्रकृत्यर्थो विचारो विषयः विचारस्य वेदान्ता विषय इति शक्यं ज्ञातुम् , 'आत्मा द्रष्टव्यः' इत्यद्वैतात्मदर्शनमुद्दिश्य 'श्रोतव्यः' इति विचारविधानात् । न हि विचारः साक्षाद्दर्शनहेतुः, अप्रमाणत्वात् , अपि तु प्रमाणविषयत्वेन । प्रमाणं चाद्वैतात्मनि वेदान्ता एव, 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषम्' (बृ.उ. ३।९ । २६) , 'वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः' (मु.उ. ३ । २ । ६) इति श्रुतेः । वेदान्तानां च प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मैक्यं विषयः, 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. उ. ६ । ८ । ७), 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' (बृ.उ. १ । ४ । १०) इति श्रुतेः ।

The Pūrvapakṣa then argues that the **Viṣaya** (subject matter) can also be determined from śruti:

- **Śrotavya iti atra pratyayārthasya niyogasya prakṛtyarthaḥ vicāraḥ viṣayaḥ:** In the word **śrotavyaḥ** (must be heard), the meaning of the suffix (**pratyaya**, tavyat) is an injunction (**Niyoga**), and the meaning of the root (**prakṛti**, śṛ) is **Vicāra** (inquiry/deliberation).
    - Therefore, **Śrotavyaḥ** implies an **injunction to deliberate** on the Self.
- **Vicārasya Vedāntāḥ viṣayaḥ iti śakyaṁ jñātuṁ:** It can be known that the **Vedāntas** are the subject of this deliberation.
- **Vedāntānām Pratyak Brahma-aikyaṁ viṣayaḥ:** The subject matter of the Vedāntas is the **non-difference of the individual Self (Pratyag-Ātman) and Brahman**.
    - This is known from key mahāvākyas (great sayings) like **Tattvamasi** (That you are) and **Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi** (I am Brahman).

Determining the Prayojana (Purpose/Result)

एवं विचारविधेः फलमपि ज्ञानद्वारा मुक्तिः, 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' (छा.उ. ७ । १ । ३), 'ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मु.उ. ३ । २ । ९) इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

- **Evaṁ vicāra vidheḥ phalam jñāna dvārā muktiḥ:** The fruit of this injunction to deliberate (Vicāra Vidhi) is **liberation (Mukti) through knowledge (Jñāna)**.
- **Śruti Pramāṇa:** This is supported by Śrutis such as:
    - **Tarati śokaṁ ātmavit:** (The knower of the Self crosses over sorrow.)
        - This implies, by **Arthāpatti** (presumption), that sorrow (samsāra) is unreal (**mithyā**) because it is removable by right knowledge.
    - **Brahmavit brahmaiva bhavati:** (The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman itself.)
        - This implies that Brahman is not a new attainment but the already existing nature of the Self, obscured by ignorance.

Determining the Sambandha (Connection)

तथा सम्बन्धोऽप्यधिकारिणा विचारस्य कर्तव्यतारूपः, फलस्य प्राप्यतारूप इति यथायोग्यं सुबोधः ।

- The connection is straightforward and easily known:
    1. **Adhikāriṇaḥ vicārasya kartavyatā rūpaḥ:** The qualified student is obligated to perform the inquiry.
    2. **Phalasya prāpyatā rūpaḥ:** The qualified student is the recipient of the fruit (liberation).

तस्मादिदं सूत्रं व्यर्थमिति चेत् ।

- **Tasmāt idaṁ sūtraṁ vyartham iti cet:** Therefore, this first Sūtra is useless

thus concludes the Pūrvapakṣa.

Siddhānti's Refutation (Page 7)

न, तासामधिकार्यादिश्रुतीनां स्वार्थे तात्पर्यनिर्णायकन्यायसूत्राभावे किं विवेकादिविशेषणवानधिकारी उतान्यः, किं वेदान्ताः पूर्वतन्त्रेण गतार्था अगतार्था वा, किं ब्रह्म प्रत्यगभिन्नं न वा, किं मुक्तिः स्वर्गादिवल्लोकान्तरम् , आत्मस्वरूपा वेति संशयानिवृत्तेः ।

The Siddhāntin (Vedāntin) argues that the Sūtra is **essential** because without it, the seeker will be plagued by doubt (**Saṁśaya**) regarding the Śrutis.

Refuting the Pūrvapakṣa

- **Tāsām adhikāryādi śrutīnāṁ svārthe tātparya nirṇāyaka nyāya sūtrābhāve:** Without the Sūtra, which is the **Nyāya Sūtra** (Sūtra containing the logic) that determines the true import (**Tātparya**) of these Śrutis concerning the Adhikārī and other requisites...
- ...The following doubts cannot be resolved:

Area of Doubt	The Conflicting Views/Doubt (Saṁśaya)	Purpose of Sūtra
Adhikārī (Agent)	**Kim vivekādi viśeṣaṇavān adhikārī uta anyaḥ?** (Is the qualified agent one endowed with discrimination, etc., or someone else?)	To decisively establish the specific qualifications required.
Gatārthatva (Redundancy)	**Kiṁ vedāntāḥ pūrva tantreṇa gatārthāḥ agārthāḥ vā?** (is Vedānta already fully taught by the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā (Karma-kāṇḍa), or are they not?)	To establish that Vedānta is a distinct and necessary inquiry (by proving Dharma and Brahman are different).
Viṣaya (Subject)	**Kiṁ brahma pratyag abhinnam na vā?** (Is Brahman non-different from the individual self (Pratyag-Ātman), or is it different?)	To resolve the confusion between Advaita and Dvaita views expressed in the Upanishads.
Prayojana (Fruit)	**Kiṁ muktiḥ svargādivat lokāntaram ātma svarūpā vā?** (Is liberation merely the attainment of another world like heaven, or is it the realization of one's own true nature?)	To negate the idea of a temporary, attained result and establish liberation as eternal Self-realization.

Conclusion: The Sūtra is Necessary

तस्मादागमवाक्यैरापाततः प्रतिपन्नाधिकार्यादिनिर्णयार्थमिदं सूत्रमावश्यकम् ।

Tasmāt āgama vākyaiḥ āpātataḥ pratipanna adhikāryādi nirṇayārthaṁ idaṁ sūtraṁ āvaśyakam: Therefore, though the requisites are generally understood (**āpātataḥ pratipanna**) from the **Āgama Vākyas** (scriptural statements), the Sūtra is **necessary** to arrive at a **definite, reasoned conclusion** (**nirṇayārthaṁ**) about the Adhikārī, etc.

तदुक्तं प्रकाशात्मश्रीचरणैः - 'अधिकार्यादीनामागमिकत्वेऽपि न्यायेन निर्णयार्थमिदं सूत्रम्' इति । येषां मते श्रवणे विधिर्नास्ति तेषामविहितश्रवणेऽधिकार्यादिनिर्णयानपेक्षणात्सूत्रं व्यर्थमित्यापततीत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन ॥

Prakāśātma's View: The **Vivaraṇakāra** (commentator) Prakāśātma confirms: **Adhikāryādīnām āgamikatve api nyāyena nirṇayārtham idaṁ sūtraṁ iti** (Even though the requisites are known from scripture, this Sūtra is for their determination by **Nyāya**).

Bhāmatī View

The text briefly mentions the **Bhāmatī** school (Vācaspati Miśra's view), where the **Śravaṇa Vidhi** (injunction to hear) is **not accepted**.

- Since they do not accept an injunction for Śravaṇa, the determination of the Adhikārī, etc., as necessary for a commanded action, would also seem unwarranted.
- The text dismisses this: **Teṣāṁ avihita śravaṇa adhikāryādi nirṇaya anapekṣaṇāt sūtraṁ vyarthaṁ iti āpatati iti alaṁ prasaṅgena** (For those who don't accept an enjoined hearing, the Sūtra would appear useless, but we need not pursue this digression now).

Integration of the Sutra and Shastra (Page 8)

तथा चास्य सूत्रस्य श्रवणविध्यपेक्षिताधिकार्यादिश्रुतिभिः स्वार्थनिर्णयायोत्थापितत्वाद्धेतुहेतुमद्भावः श्रुतिसङ्गतिः, शास्त्रारम्भहेत्वनुबन्धनिर्णायकत्वेनोपोद्घातत्वाच्छास्त्रादौ सङ्गतिः, अधिकार्यादिश्रुतीनां स्वार्थे समन्वयोक्तेः समन्वयाध्यायसङ्गतिः, 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि' (छा.उ. ६ । ८ । ७) इत्यादिश्रुतीनां सर्वात्मत्वादिस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां विषयादौ समन्वयोक्तेः पादसङ्गतिः, एवं सर्वसूत्राणां श्रुत्यर्थनिर्णायकत्वाच्छ्रुतिसङ्गतिः, तत्तदध्याये तत्तत्पादे च समानप्रमेयत्वेन सङ्गतिरूहनीया ।

The analysis first establishes the essential connection (Saṅgati) between the **First Sūtra** and the scriptural injunctions (**Śruti**) as well as the entire treatise (**Vedānta Śāstra**).

A. Sūtra and Śruti: Cause and Effect

The Sūtra is connected to the injunctions for study (like Ātma vā are dṛaṣṭavyaḥ and Śrotavyaḥ) through the **Hetu-Hetumat Bhāva Saṅgati** (Relation of Cause and Effect):

Element	Sanskrit Term	Role	Explanation
Cause	**Hetu**	**Śrutis**	The scriptural texts provide preliminary knowledge (Āpātataḥ Jñāna) of the Adhikari (qualified student) and other requisites.
Effect	**Hetumat**	**Sūtra**	The Sūtra's purpose is to act as the logical framework (Nyāya) to confirm the Svārtha Nirṇaya (true import) of the Śrutis and definitively settle doubts.

B. Sūtra and Śāstra: Introductory Connection

The Sūtra's connection to the entire Vedānta Śāstra is that of **Upodghāta Saṅgati** (Introductory Context):

- **Upodghāta** is defined as the preliminary deliberation necessary to succeed in the main undertaking (Cintayāṃ prakṛta siddhyartham).
- The Sūtra establishes the **Anubandha Catuṣṭaya** (Fourfold Requisites), providing the necessary foundation—the student, subject, purpose, and connection—before the primary subject of **Jīva-Brahma-Aikya** (Identity of the individual and Brahman) can be systematically addressed.

C. Sutra and the Chapters/Sections (Pādas)

प्रमेयं च कृत्स्नशास्त्रस्य ब्रह्म । अध्यायानां तु समन्वयाविरोधसाधनफलानि । तत्र प्रथमपादस्य स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां श्रुतीनां समन्वयः प्रमेयः । द्वितीयतृतीययोरस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानाम् । चतुर्थपादस्य पदमात्रसमन्वय इति भेदः । अस्याधिकरणस्य प्राथम्यान्नाधिकरणसङ्गतिरपेक्षिता ॥

The Sūtra also introduces the organizational structure of the entire Brahma Sutra:

Chapter/Section	Name	Subject
Chapter 1	Samanvaya Adhyāya	Coordinates all Śrutis to show their sole purpose is teaching **Brahman**.
Pāda 1	Spaṣṭa Brahma Liṅga	Analyzes texts that **clearly** indicate Brahman (e.g., Sarvātmatvam).
Pāda 2 & 3	Aspaṣṭa Brahma Liṅga	Analyzes texts where the subject is **ambiguous** (e.g., could refer to Jīva or Prāṇa).
Pāda 4	Pada Mātra Samanvaya	Resolves the meaning of **single, ambiguous terms** (Padamātra) such as **Avyakta** (the unmanifest).

Pūrvapakṣa: Argument for the Sūtra's Redundancy (Page 9)

अथाधिकरणमारच्यते - 'श्रोतव्यः' (बृ.उ. २ । ४ । ५) इति विहितश्रवणात्मकं वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रं विषयः । तत्किमारब्धव्यं न वेति विषयप्रयोजनसम्भवासम्भवाभ्यां संशयः । तत्र नाहं ब्रह्मेति भेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षेण कर्तृत्वाकर्तृत्वादिविरुद्धधर्मवत्त्वलिङ्गकानुमानेन च विरोधेन ब्रह्मात्मनोरैक्यस्य विषयस्यासम्भवात् , सत्यबन्धस्य ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिरूपफलासम्भवान्नारम्भणीयमिति प्राप्ते,

The Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's View) argues that the Vedanta Śāstra should **not be commenced** (Na Ārambhaṇīyam) because its subject and goal are impossible.

A. Impossibility of the Subject (Viṣaya)

The identity of the Jīva (individual) and Brahman (Jīva-Brahma-Aikya) is rejected based on established means of knowledge:

1. **Pratyakṣa (Perception):** The direct perception "I am not Brahman" (**Na Aham Brahma**) establishes a clear **Bheda** (difference).
2. **Anumāna (Inference):** The Jīva and Brahman are inferred to be distinct because they possess **Viruddha Dharma** (contradictory attributes):
    - The Jīva has **Kartṛtva** (agency/doership), while Brahman has **Akartṛtva** (non-agency).
    - This contradiction is like darkness and light (**Tamas-Prakāśavat**) and proves their non-identity.
    - **Conclusion:** The subject of the Shastra is therefore **Asambhava** (impossible).

B. Impossibility of the Purpose (Prayojana)

- **Jñāna-Mokṣa Rejection:** Liberation (**Mokṣa**)—the cessation of bondage through knowledge is impossible because bondage (**Bandha**) is perceived to be **real** (**Satya**

Bandhasya). A real entity cannot be removed by mere knowledge. Some action is needed to remove a real entity, for example removing dirt from a surface.
- **Conclusion:** Since the subject and purpose are both impossible, the Shastra is deemed useless and should not be studied.

Siddhānti's Interpretation of the Sūtra (Page 10)

सिद्धान्तः 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति । अत्र श्रवणविधिसमानार्थत्वाय 'कर्तव्या' इति पदमध्याहर्तव्यम् । अध्याहृतं च भाष्यकृता 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या' इति ।

The Siddhāntin (Vedāntin) replies by establishing the correct interpretation of the Sūtra to overcome the objections by the opponent.

The Injunction (Adhyāhāra)

The Sūtra must be understood as an injunction for action:

- **Sūtra:** Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā.
- **Implied Word:** The word **Kartavyā** (should be done) must be supplied (Adhyāhāra) to ensure the Sūtra aligns with the injunction in the Shrutis.
- **Full Meaning:** "Therefore, the inquiry into Brahman should be performed."

Resolving the Problem of Commandable Action

तत्र प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थयोर्ज्ञानेच्छयोः कर्तव्यत्वानन्वयात्प्रकृत्या फलीभूतं ज्ञानमजहल्लक्षणयोच्यते । प्रत्ययेनेच्छासाध्यो विचारो जहल्लक्षणया । तथा च ब्रह्मज्ञानाय विचारः कर्तव्य इति सूत्रस्य श्रौतोऽर्थः सम्पद्यते ।

The term **Jijñāsā** (desire to know) is a **desire** and cannot be commanded. This is resolved using **Lakṣaṇā** (figurative indication):

- **Jijñāsā** is composed of:
    1. **Prakṛti** (Root Jñā): **Jñāna** (knowledge).
    2. **Pratyaya** (Suffix San): **Icchā** (desire).
- **Resolution:** Since neither knowledge nor desire can be commanded, the terms must figuratively indicate a commandable action:
    1. **Prakṛti (Jñāna):** Taken by **Ajahad-Lakṣaṇā** (without abandoning the primary meaning) to mean the **Phalibhūta Jñāna** (the resultant knowledge) of Brahman is immediate knowledge that is the remover of ignorance.
    2. **Pratyaya (Icchā):** Taken by **Jahad-Lakṣaṇā** (abandoning the primary meaning) to mean the **Icchā-sādhya Vicāra** (the deliberation or inquiry which is the means to the desired knowledge).

Resulting Meaning: The Sūtra's practical import is: **Brahma Jñānāya Vicāraḥ Kartavyaḥ** (The inquiry/deliberation for the sake of Brahman-knowledge must be performed). The Sūtra is therefore a command to perform the **Vicāra** (inquiry/deliberation), an act which is fully commandable.

Validation of the Śāstra's Purpose (Prayojana) (Page 11)

तत्र ज्ञानस्य स्वतःफलत्वायोगात्प्रमातृत्वकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वात्मकानर्थनिवर्तकत्वेनैव फलत्वं वक्तव्यम् । तत्रानर्थस्य सत्यत्वे ज्ञानमात्रान्निवृत्त्ययोगादध्यस्तत्वं वक्तव्यमिति बन्धस्याध्यस्तत्वमर्थात्सूचितम् ।

The Advaita system is justified by demonstrating that the purpose (Mokṣa) is achieved only if the bondage is **superimposed** (**Adhyasta**), a conclusion arrived at through **Arthāpatti** (Presumption).

A. The Nature of the Fruit (Phala)

- **Knowledge is not the fruit per se**: **Jñānasya svataḥ phalatvā ayogāt** (Knowledge cannot be the fruit by itself because knowledge is not opposed to ignorance. It is Consciousness reflected in brahmākāravṛtti Phala) that removes the ignorance).
- **The true fruit is: Anartha-nivartakatvam** (the cessation of evil/falsehood). The **Anartha** is identified as the illusory notions of **Pramātṛtva** (being the knower), **Kartṛtva** (being the agent), and **Bhoktṛtva** (being the enjoyer).

B. Proof of Bondage as Adhyasta (Superimposed)

- **Argument:** If the **Anartha** (bondage/evil) were **Satya** (real), **Jñāna-mātra-nivṛtti-ayogāt** (it would be impossible for it to be removed merely by knowledge).
- **Arthāpatti:** Since the **Śruti** clearly states that knowledge does remove the bondage, it must be concluded that the bondage is **Adhyasta** (superimposed/illusory).
- **Significance of Adhyasta:** The term **Adhyasta** implies a **Nūna-sattā** (lower order of reality) compared to the substratum (like the serpent in the rope). It must have **Traikālika Atyantābhāva** (absolute non-existence in all three periods of time) in the Brahman. This makes the bondage **Jñāna-nivartya** (removable by knowledge).

Inference (Anumāna) to Prove the Śāstra's Validity (Page 11)

तच्च शास्त्रस्य विषयप्रयोजनवत्त्वसिद्धिहेतुः ।

The Vedāntin uses a series of **Anumānas** (logical inferences) to establish that the Vedānta Śāstra is necessary and effective.

A. The Śāstra Must Be Commenced

तथाहि शास्त्रमारब्धव्यम् , विषयप्रयोजनवत्त्वात् , भोजनादिवत् |

- **Conclusion (Sādhya): Śāstram Ārabdhavyam** (The Śāstra must be commenced).
- **Reason (Hetu): Viṣaya-Prayojanavattvāt** (Because it possesses a subject and a purpose).
- **Example (Dṛṣṭānta): Bhojanādivat** (Like eating, which has the subject of food and the purpose of satisfying hunger).

B. The Śāstra Is Purposive

शास्त्रं प्रयोजनवत् , बन्धनिवर्तकज्ञानहेतुत्वात् , रज्जुरियमित्यादिवाक्यवत् । बन्धो ज्ञाननिवर्त्योऽध्यस्तत्वात् , रज्जुसर्पवत् । इति प्रयोजनसिद्धिः ।

This establishes the **Prayojanavattvam** (possessing a purpose) of the Śāstra:

- **Conclusion: Śāstram Prayojanavat** (The Śāstra possesses a purpose).
- **Reason: Bandha-nivartaka-jñāna-hetutvāt** (Because it is the cause of the knowledge that removes bondage).
- **Example: Rajjuriyam ityādi vākyavat** (Like the statement, "This is a rope," which removes the ignorance-induced-fear caused by the superimposed serpent).

C. The Jīva Is Identical to Brahman (Proof of Viṣaya)

एवमर्थाद्ब्रह्मज्ञानाज्जीवगतानर्थभ्रमनिवृत्तिं फलं सूत्रयन् जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यं विषयमप्यर्थात्सूचयति, अन्यज्ञानादन्यत्र भ्रमानिवृत्तेः । जीवो ब्रह्माभिन्नः, तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्याध्यासाश्रयत्वात् । यदित्थं तत्तथा, यथा शुक्त्यभिन्न इदमंश इति विषयसिद्धिहेतुरध्यासः । इत्येवं विषयप्रयोजनवत्त्वाच्छास्त्रमारम्भणीयमिति। ।

The core subject, **Jīva-Brahma-Aikya**, is established by inference, again relying on the concept of **Adhyāsa**:

- **Arthāpatti (Precursor):** Since **anyajñānāt anyatra bhramanivṛttiḥ nā** (the knowledge of one thing does not remove the delusion pertaining to another), the fact that Brahman's **Jñāna** removes the Jīva's ignorance (**Anartha)** proves their identity.

Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya’ and the commentators use **Anumāna** (inference) to establish that the Vedānta Śāstra is worthy of commencement (Ārambhaṇīyam), due to it possessing both a valid subject and a purpose.

Component	Sanskrit Terminology	Explanation
Pūrvapakṣa View	Bandhasya Satyattvam	If bondage (Bandha) is real (Satya), it cannot be removed by mere knowledge (Jñānāt Anivṛttaḥ). Liberation (Mukti) must therefore be achieved by other means (Upāyāntara Sādhyā), like rituals or meditation.
Siddhānta View	Jñānādeva Muktiḥ	Liberation is achieved only by knowledge (Jñānādeva Muktiḥ). This is possible because bondage is mithyā (false/superimposed).

Inference (Anumāna)	Śāstram Prayojanavat	Assertion: The Śāstra is possessing a purpose (Prayojanavat). Reason: Because it is the source of knowledge that removes bondage (Bandha Nivartaka Jñāna Hetutvam).

The central subject of the Śāstra is the non-difference between the individual self and Brahman (Jīva-Brahma Aikyam). This is now proved using logic.

Component	Sanskrit Terminology	Explanation
Core Assertion (Pratijñā)	Jīvo Brahmābhinnaḥ	The Jīva (individual soul) is non-different from Brahman.
Reason (Hetu)	Tad-jñāna Nivartya Adhyāsa Āśrayatvāt	Because the Jīva is the locus (Āśraya) of the superimposition (Adhyāsa) that is removed by the knowledge of That (Brahman). (If the Jīva's afflictions were real, Jīva could not be Brahman, hence the affliction must be superimposed).
Invariable Concomitance (Vyāpti)	Yadim Tat Tathā	"Whatever is so, is so" (Yad Yad Tad Jñāna Nivartya Adhyāsa Āśrayam, Tad Tad Tad Abhinnaṁ). This means: Whatever is the locus of an illusion removable by a specific knowledge, is non-different from the object of that knowledge.
Example (Dṛṣṭānta)	Sūkti Abhinna Idam Aṁśaḥ	Like the 'this' part of the shell illusion (Sūkti Abhinna Idam Aṁśaḥ). The 'this' part (locus) is where the silver illusion is superimposed; since the illusion is removed by shell-knowledge, the 'this' part is non-different from the shell.
Conclusion	Viṣaya Siddhi Hetuḥ Adhyāsaḥ	The possibility of Jīva-Brahma Aikyam (Subject) is contingent upon the unreality of afflictions, meaning Adhyāsa is the cause of the Subject's establishment.

Adhyāsa Bhāṣya - Upodghāta (Page 12)

इति सर्वं मनसि निधाय ब्रह्मसूत्राणि व्याख्यातुकामो भगवान् भाष्यकारः सूत्रेण विचारकर्तव्यतारूपश्रौतार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्यार्थात्सूत्रितं विषयप्रयोजनवत्वमुपोद्घातत्वात्तत्सिद्धिहेत्वध्यासाक्षेप समाधानभाष्याभ्यां प्रथमं वर्णयति - युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोरिति ।

The Bhāṣyakāra, having established the Sūtra's duty of inquiry by Anyathā Anupapatti (or **Arthāpatti,** implication as shown above), then describes the subject-purpose of the Sūtra—which is an Upoghāta—by the Adhyāsa Ākṣepa Samādhāna.

आक्षेपभाष्यम् -

युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम् , तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः — इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् ।

The first Sūtra (Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā) is deemed an **Upodghāta** (introductory justification) for the entire Śāstra. The Adhyāsa Bhāṣya is required to justify the necessity of this Sūtra.

A. Connecting the Sutra and the Bhāṣya

- **Sūtra's Role:** The Sūtra establishes the **injunction of inquiry** (Vicāra Kartavyatā Rūpa Śrautārtha). Without the Sūtra, the **Śruti's meaning is unestablished** (Anyathā Anupapattyā).
- **Adhyāsa Bhāṣya's Role:** The Sūtra (as Upoghāta) implicitly demands the establishment of its **Subject and Purpose** (Viṣaya Prayojanavattvam). The **Adhyāsa Bhāṣya** provides this establishment.
- **Bhāṣya's Structure:** The Bhāṣyakāra first presents the **Ākṣepa** (Objection - the existence of Adhyāsa up to Su-tarām Itaretara Bhāvānupapattiḥ) and then the **Samādhāna** (Resolution).

B. Addressing Objections to the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya

एतेन सूत्रार्थास्पर्शित्वादध्यासग्रन्थो न भाष्यमिति निरस्तम् , आर्थिकार्थस्पर्शित्वात् ॥ यत्तु मङ्गलाचरणाभावादव्याख्येयमिदं भाष्यमिति, तन्न । 'सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः' इत्यन्तभाष्यरचनार्थं तदर्थस्य सर्वोपप्लवरहितस्य विज्ञानघनप्रत्यगर्थस्य तत्त्वस्य स्मृतत्वात् । अतो निर्दोषत्वादिदं भाष्यं व्याख्येयम् ॥

Two key objections are raised against the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya:

Objection (Pūrvapakṣa)	**Siddhanti Reply**	**Reason (Hetu)**
1. **Not a proper Bhāṣya:** The Adhyāsa Grantha does not directly interpret the words of the Sūtra (e.g., Athāto) and therefore does not touch the meaning of the Sūtra (Sūtrārtha Asparśitvāt).	The Bhāṣya touches the meaning indirectly (Ārthika Artha Sparśitvāt). It establishes the Subject and Purpose, which are essential implicit meanings of the introductory Sūtra.	**आर्थिकार्थ-स्पर्शित्वात् (Because it touches the implicit meaning).**

2. **No Maṅgalācaraṇa:** The Bhāṣya is unfit for exposition (Avyākhyeyam) due to the lack of a formal invocation (Maṅgalācaraṇa Abhāvāt).	The Bhāṣya contains Maṅgalācaraṇa. The opening lines, which speak of the Self (Ātman) as the locus of the I-notion (Asmat Pratyaya Gocara), which is free from all afflictions (Sarvopadrava Rahitasya Vijñāna Ghana), constitute the remembrance of the Supreme Reality (Tattvasya Smṛtatvāt).	"तस्य स्मृतत्वात्..." (Because of the remembrance of That [Tattva]).

Pūrvapakṣa on the Genesis of Illusion (Bhrama) (Page 13)

लोके शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति भ्रमः, सत्यरजते इदं रजतमित्यधिष्ठानसामान्यारोप्यविशेषयोरैक्यप्रमाहितसंस्कारजन्यो दृष्ट इत्यत्राप्यात्मन्यनात्माहङ्काराध्यासे पूर्वप्रमा वाच्या, सा चात्मानात्मनोर्वास्तवैक्यमपेक्षते, न हि तदस्ति । तथाहि आत्मानात्मानावैक्यशून्यौ, परस्परैक्यायोग्यत्वात् , तमःप्रकाशवत् ।

In the world, the illusion of silver in a shell is seen to be caused by the impression created by a valid cognition of identity.

The Pūrvapakṣa raises an objection challenging the very possibility of the **Adhyāsa** between the Self (Ātman) and Non-Self (Anātman):

- **Laukika Dṛṣṭānta (Worldly Example):** In the world, an illusion (Bhrama)—like silver in a shell—is seen to be **caused by the impressions** (Saṁskāra Janyaḥ) from a **prior valid cognition** (Pramāhita Saṁskāra).
- **Mechanism of Illusion:** Illusion requires a prior **valid, real experience** (Vyāvahārika Jñāna)—for example, seeing real silver—where the **general locus** (Adhiṣṭhāna Sāmānya) 'this' (Idam) is identified with the **superimposed specific object** (Āropya Viśeṣa) 'silver' (Rajatam).
- **Objection:** For the Adhyāsa of the **Self** (Ātman) and **Non-Self** (Anātman) to occur, there must be a **prior valid cognition** (Pramā) of their identity to create the necessary Saṁskāra. Since the Ātman and Anātman are completely distinct, such a Pramā is impossible, and therefore **Adhyāsa cannot occur**.

The Impossibility of Ātman-Anātman Adhyāsa

The opponent asserts that the necessary precondition (Vāstava Aikya Pramā) for Adhyāsa on the Self is non-existent, making the entire premise of the Bhāṣya flawed.

- **The Locus and the Superimposed:**
  - **Anātman** is represented primarily by the **Ahaṅkāra** (Ego/Ego-sense), which acts as the chief factor and the representative of the entire material world (Jagat Mithyātva).
  - The illusion involves the superimposition of this Anātman (Ego) onto the Ātman (Self).

- **Rejection of Identity:** Ātman and Anātman are **devoid of identity** (**Aikya Śūnya**) because they are **mutually unfit for identity** (**Paraspara Aikya Ayogyatvāt**).
- **The Analogy:** They are fundamentally opposed, like **Darkness and Light** (**Tamas Prakāśavat**). Just as one cannot conceive of identity between light and darkness, one cannot conceive of identity between the Self and the non-Self.

The Threefold Opposition (Virodha)

इति मत्वा हेतुभूतं विरोधं वस्तुतः प्रतीतितो व्यवहारतश्च साधयति - युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोरिति ।

The opponent substantiates the opposition between Ātman and Anātman on three levels:

1. **Real Opposition (Vastutaḥ):** They possess inherently contradictory characteristics (e.g., pure consciousness vs. inert matter).
2. **Cognitive Opposition (Pratītitaḥ):** The Self is cognized as the **Subject** or **Pratyak** (Internal), while the non-Self is cognized as the **Object** or **Parāk** (External).
3. **Empirical Opposition (Vyavahārataḥ):** In everyday life, we clearly distinguish between 'I' (Aham) and external objects like 'pot' (Ghaṭa); the Self is never understood as the non-Self.

The Grammatical and Semantic Debates (Page 14)

न च 'प्रत्ययोत्तरपदयोश्च'(पा०सू० ७-२-९८) इति सूत्रेण 'प्रत्यये उत्तरपदे च परतो युष्मदस्मदोर्मपर्यन्तस्य त्वमादेशौ स्तः' इति विधानात् , त्वदीयं मदीयं त्वत्पुत्रो मत्पुत्र इतिवत् 'त्वन्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोः' इति स्यादिति वाच्यम् । 'त्वमावेकवचने'(पा०सू० ७-२-९७) इत्येकवचनाधिकारात् । अत्र च युष्मदस्मदोरेकार्थवाचित्वाभावादनात्मनां युष्मदर्थानां बहुत्वादस्मदर्थचैतन्यस्याप्युपाधितो बहुत्वात् ॥

The Bhāṣya's phrasing "**Yuṣmad Asmat Pratyaya Gocara**" (Object of the You- and I-notion) leads to two critical objections regarding its grammatical and semantic validity.

A. Objection to Yuṣmad/Asmad (Pāṇini's Rule)

- **The Rule:** Pāṇini's Sūtra (7.2.98, preceded by 7.2.97) dictates that when Yuṣmad (you) and Asmad (I) are followed by a suffix or a second member of a compound, their stem changes from Yuṣm and Asm to **Tvat** and **Mat** (or Tad and Mad). Therefore, the Bhāṣya should read "**Tvat Mat Pratyaya Gocara**."
- **Siddhanti's Reply (The Singular Restriction):** The rule is restricted by the preceding Sūtra (**TvamāvEkavacane**) to apply only when the words are used in the **singular number**.
    - Here, Yuṣmad (the non-Self) refers to the **manifold Anātman** (Ego, body, senses, etc.), thus implying a **plural sense** (Bahuvacana).
    - Asmad (the Self) is also considered manifold due to the multitude of **limiting adjuncts (Upādhi)** across different individuals.
    - Since the context is plural, the **Tvat/Mat** rule does not apply, and **Yuṣmad/Asmad** is correct.

B. Objection to the Compound's Breakdown

नन्वेवं सति कथमत्र भाष्ये विग्रहः । न च यूयमिति प्रत्ययो युष्मत्प्रत्ययः, वयमिति प्रत्ययोऽस्मत्प्रत्ययस्तद्गोचरयोरिति विग्रह इति वाच्यम् , शब्दसाधुत्वेऽप्यर्थासाधुत्वात् ।

- **Pūrvapakṣa's Proposed Compound:** The opponent suggests the compound should be analyzed as: "**Yūyaṁ Iti Pratyayaḥ Yuṣmat Pratyayaḥ**, **Vayam Iti Pratyayaḥ Asmat Pratyayaḥ**; **Tad GocaraYoḥ**" (The notion 'you all' is the Yuṣmad notion, the notion 'we' is the Asmad notion, and the objects of these notions).
- **Siddhanti's Rejection (Semantic Inadequacy):** This analysis is rejected because while it achieves **"grammatical correctness"** (**Śabda Sādhutve'pi**), it leads to **"semantic incorrectness"** (**Arthāsādhutvāt**).
    - **Principle:** When interpreting Vedānta texts, mere grammatical validity is insufficient; the interpretation must align with the intended purport (Tātparya) of the tradition and lead to the goal of liberation.

The Purpose of Bhāṣya's Phrasing (Page 14)

न ह्यहङ्काराद्यनात्मनो यूयमिति प्रत्ययविषयत्वमस्तीति चेत् , न । गोचरपदस्य योग्यतापरत्वात् । चिदात्मा तावदस्मत्प्रत्ययययोग्यः, तत्प्रयुक्तसंशयादिनिवृत्तिफलभाक्त्वात् , 'न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात्' इति भाष्योक्तेश्च । यद्यप्यहङ्कारादिरपि तद्योग्यस्तथापि चिदात्मनः सकाशादत्यन्तभेदसिद्ध्यर्थं युष्मत्प्रत्ययययोग्य इत्युच्यते ॥

The Siddhanti establishes the precise philosophical significance of the Bhāṣya's terms:

- **Definition of Asmat (I) Gocara:** The **Cidātmā** (Pure Consciousness) is deemed **Asmat Pratyaya Yogya** (fit to be the object of the 'I' notion).
    - **Reasoning:** The Cidātmā is qualified for the 'I' notion because it is the **locus whose knowledge removes doubt and error** related to the Self (**Tat Prayukta Saṃśayādi Nivṛtti Phala Bhāgāt**), unlike an inert object like a pot (Ghaṭavat) which is rejected as an example (Vyātirekeṇa).
- **Definition of Yuṣmad (You) Gocara:** The **Ahaṅkāra** (Ego), though sometimes referred to as 'I' (Aham), is deliberately called **Yuṣmat Pratyaya Yogya** (fit for the 'you' notion).
    - **Purpose:** This terminology is used specifically to establish the **extreme difference** (**Atyanta Bheda Siddhyartham**) between the Cidātmā and the Ahaṅkāra.
- **Vedānta's Focus:** The primary goal of Vedānta is **Absolute Cessation of Sorrow** (Ātyantika Duḥkha Nivṛtti). The root of all sorrow, desire, and affliction (Kāma, Krodha, etc.) is the failure to distinguish between the **Cidātmā** and the **Ahaṅkāra**. By targeting this precise **Ātman-Ahaṅkāra Adhyāsa**, the Bhāṣya identifies the core problem that the Śāstra must solve.

Alternative View (Narasiṁhāśrama) (Page 15)

आश्रमश्रीचरणास्तु टीकायोजनायामेवमाहुः 'सम्बोध्यचेतनो युष्मत्पदवाच्यः, अहङ्कारादिविशिष्टचेतनोऽस्मत्पदवाच्यः, तथा च युष्मदस्मदोः स्वार्थे प्रयुज्यमानयोरेव त्वमादेशनियमो न लाक्षणिकयोः, 'युष्मदस्मदोः षष्ठीचतुर्थीद्वितीयास्थयोर्वानावौ'(पा०सू० ८-१-२०) इति सूत्रासाङ्गत्यप्रसङ्गात् । अत्र शब्दलक्षकयोरिव चिन्मात्रजडमात्रलक्षकयोरपि न त्वमादेशो लक्षकत्वाविशेषात्' इति ।

One tradition (e.g., Āśrama Śrī Caraṇāḥ) gives an alternative interpretation concerning the Vachyartha (primary/literal meaning) and Lakshyartha (implied meaning) of the two terms, often found in commentaries like the **Panchapadika Tīka**:

A. The Concept of Śabda-Lakṣa (Implication of the Word)

- **Standard Meaning (Vācyārtha):** Normally, the power (Śakti) of a word rests in its **meaning** (artha). For example, the word **Gaṅgā** primarily denotes the **water flow** (Pravāha).
- **Implication for the Word:** To denote the **word itself** (the sound/signifier) rather than its meaning, implication (Lakṣaṇā) must be used.
    - Example: If one needs to refer to the **word Gaṅgā** (the letters/sound) and not the water flow, one must use Lakṣaṇā. Similarly, **Yuṣmad** and **Asmad** are used to denote the **prātipadika** (stem form of the word) itself.
- **Application in Pāṇini:** When Pāṇini uses **Yuṣmad** and **Asmad** in the Sūtra (Yuṣmadasmadoh...), he is referring to the words as **Śabda-Lakṣa** (implied words), not their primary meanings (**tvam** and **aham**).
    - Since the terms are used in an implicative sense, the **Tvama-Ādeśa** (substitution of t and m) does **not** apply.

B. Application in the Bhāṣya

- The **Bhāṣyakāra** uses **Yuṣmad** and **Asmad** to imply the ultimate realities:
    - **Asmad (I):** Implies **Chinmātra** (Pure Consciousness).
    - **Yuṣmad (You):** Implies **Jaḍamātra** (Matter/Non-Self).
- Because these terms are used in a **Lakṣaṇā** (implicative sense) to denote the ultimate realities, just as in Pāṇini's rule, the **Tvama-Ādeśa** is again rejected.

This division establishes the **Ātma** (Self) and **Anātma** (non-Self) as **Atyanta Vilakṣaṇa** (absolutely distinct/opposite), which is central to the concept of adhyāsa (superimposition) being fundamentally flawed.

Addressing the Tvamādesh Rule and Panini Sūtra (Page 15)

यदि तयोः शब्दबोधकत्वे सत्येव त्वमादेशाभाव इत्यनेन सूत्रेण ज्ञापितं तदास्मिन्भाष्ये युष्मत्पदेन युष्मच्छब्दजन्यप्रत्ययययोग्यः परागर्थो लक्ष्यते, अस्मच्छब्देन अस्मच्छब्दजन्यप्रत्ययययोग्यः प्रत्यगात्मा । तथा च लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकतया शब्दोऽपि बोध्यत इति न त्वमादेशः । न च पराक्त्वप्रत्यक्त्वयोरेव लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वम् , न शब्दयोग्यत्वांशस्य, गौरवादिति वाच्यम् । पराक्प्रतीचोर्विरोधस्फुरणार्थं विरुद्धशब्दयोग्यत्वस्यापि वक्तव्यत्वात् ।

The discussion pivots to a Pūrva Pakṣa (opponent's view) based on Pāṇini’s grammar and the Tvamādesh (the substitution of 't' for Yuṣmad and 'm' for Asmad) rule.

A. The Pūrvapakṣa Objection

The opponent argues that in the adhyasa bhashya, where Yuṣmad and Asmad are used, the rule Tvamau-eka-vachane or similar rules should apply, causing the words to be **'tvat'** and **'mat'** (tva and m) respectively.

B. The Siddhanti’s Response

The Siddhanti responds using a key grammatical distinction and a reference to Pāṇini:

1. **Rule Restriction:** The Tvamaadesh rule is only applicable when Yuṣmad and Asmad are used in their **Svaarthe Prayujyamanayoho** (literal/primary meaning - Vachyartha). When they are used in the Lakshana (implied meaning), the Tvamaadesh rule **does not apply**.
2. **Pāṇini's Usage as Proof:**

    - **Quotation:** Yuṣmadasmadoh Shashthi-chaturthi-dvitiyayoh vaan naav (Pāṇini 7.2.86)
    - **Reasoning:** This Pāṇini Sūtra grants optional **'vaam'** and **'nau'** (vaam and nau) substitutions in the shashthi, chaturthi, and dvitiya cases of Yuṣmad and Asmad. If the Tvamaadesh were mandatory in all instances, Pāṇini would have used **'tad-madoh'** (Tad-madoh) instead of **'Yuṣmadasmadoh'** (Yuṣmadasmadoh) in the Sūtra itself. Pāṇini's own use of the full terms indicates that the substitution is **not universal**.
3. **Extending Lakshana to Words:** The Siddhanti further clarifies that the Lakshana (implied meaning) here is Shabda-Laksh (implied through the word) as the terms point to **Chinmatra** (pure consciousness) and **Jada-matra** (matter/non-self). This is equivalent to Pāṇini's use, which is also a type of shabda-lakshana.

The Rejection of Idam (This) (Page 16)

अत एवेदमस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोरिति वक्तव्येऽपीदंशब्दोऽस्मदर्थे लोके वेदे च बहुशः, इमे वयमास्महे, इमे विदेहाः, अयमहमस्मीति च प्रयोगदर्शनान्नास्मच्छब्दविरोधीति मत्वा युष्मच्छब्दः प्रयुक्तः, इदंशब्दप्रयोगे विरोधास्फूर्तेः ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** then suggests that instead of Yuṣmad to denote the non-Self (Prak-artha), the more common term **Idam** (Idam) should have been used, as Idam is often used for matter/object (Jada-prapancha).

A. Siddhanti's Response (Focus on Opposition)

The Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya rejects this:

- **Idam's Ambiguity:** The term Idam is **not exclusively opposed** to Asmad (I/Self). The text notes that Idam is often seen used in the sense of Asmad in the Loka (world/common usage) and the Vedas.
    - **Example (Laukik):** Ime vayam aasmahe (These people—referring to 'we'—are seated).
    - **Example (Vaidik):** Ayam Aham Asmi (This I am).
- **Need for Viruddha Shabda (Opposite Term):** The purpose of the Adhyasa Bhashya is to demonstrate **Atyanta Virodha** (absolute opposition) between the Self and non-Self, proving that the superimposition is only a bhranti (error) and can be removed by knowledge (jnana).
- **Yuṣmad's Superiority: Yuṣmad** inherently possesses the strongest sense of Virodha (opposition) to Asmad. Using Yuṣmad best conveys the necessary **Viruddha Shabda Yogyatva** (the quality of being a suitable opposite word) that demonstrates the three types of opposition (object, knowledge, and word usage).

Rejection of Asmat First and Eka-Shesha (Page 16)

एतेन चेतनवाचित्वादस्मच्छब्दः पूर्वं प्रयोक्तव्यः 'अभ्यर्हितं पूर्वं' इति न्यायात् , 'त्यदादीनि सर्वैर्नित्यम्'(पा०सू० १-२-७२) इति सूत्रेण विहित एकशेषश्च स्यादिति निरस्तम् । 'युष्मदस्मदोः' इति सूत्र इवात्रापि पूर्वनिपातैकशेषयोरप्राप्तेः, एकशेषे विवक्षितविरोधास्फूर्तेश्च ।

The final part of the discussion rejects two more objections using the precedent set by Pāṇini.

A. Objection 1: Order of Terms (Pūrva-Nipaata)

- **Pūrva Paksha:** The term Asmad (Self) should be named first because it is **Abhyahitam Pūrvam** (the revered/superior entity first), as the Self is Chetana-vaachitvaat (denoted by consciousness).

B. Objection 2: Ellipsis (Eka-Shesha)

- **Pūrvapakṣa:** The use of two words (Yuṣmad and Asmad) is unnecessary. The rule Tyadaadinim... or similar rules should allow for **Eka-Sheshas Syaat** (ellipsis/using one term to stand for both), like pitarau (parents).

C. Siddhanti's Rejection

- **Reasoning:** The Siddhanti dismisses both objections because **Pāṇini himself used Yuṣmad first and did not apply Eka-Shesha** in the Sūtras like Yuṣmadasmadoh... and Yuṣmadasmadoranaadesh... The tradition follows this usage.
- **The Virodha Factor:** Furthermore, Eka-Shesha is not suitable because **Vivakshita Virodha-asphurte** (clear absence of opposition) would result if only one word was used. Two distinct words are needed to powerfully communicate the absolute opposition between Aatma and Anaatma.

The View of the Vriddhas (Earlier Acharyas) (Page 16)

वृद्धास्तु 'युष्मदर्थादनात्मनो निष्कृष्य शुद्धस्य चिद्धातोरध्यारोपापवादन्यायेन ग्रहणं द्योतयितुमादौ युष्मद्ग्रहणम् ' इत्याहुः ।

The text concludes by citing a view of the Vriddhas (Earlier Acharyas/before Bhagavāna ādi śaṅkarācārya traditions) concerning the Adhyasa process:

- **The Yuṣmad Term First:** The use of Yuṣmad (non-Self/Anātman) first is significant.
- **Process Indication:** It signifies the process of **Adhyāropa-Apavāda-Nyāya** (the method of superimposition and subsequent negation). One must first **niṣkṛṣya** (extract/distinguish) the **Shuddhas Chito** (pure consciousness) from the Yuṣmad **Anātmannah** (non-Self) to realize the Self.
- **The Adhyāropa-Apavāda Process:** This is the primary method of Vedānta instruction:
    - **Adhyāropa (Superimposition):** The process begins with the manifested **effect** (Kārya), which is the **Jagat** (world/non-Self).
        - Analogy: Seeing a **pot** (Ghaṭa).
    - **Apavāda (Negation/Sublation):** The process ends by negating the effect's reality and realizing the substratum, which is **Brahman** (Chinmātra).
        - Process: The pot (effect) is first realized to be non-different from the clay (cause), and then the clay loses its status as "cause" because the "effect" is sublated. This leaves only the single, non-dual Existence, which is Brahman (neither cause nor effect).
- **The Order:** Since the empirical world (**Yuṣmad**) is what is initially experienced (not the pure Brahman), the process of discrimination (Viveka) must begin with the **Yuṣmad** (non-Self) and conclude with **Asmad** (Self). Thus, the order is **Yuṣmad-Asmad**.
- The Self is never available alone but is always found **along with** the non-Self (Anātman), necessitating the act of **Viveka** (discrimination) to extract it.

The Threefold Opposition (Tridhā Virodha) (Page 17)

तत्र युष्मदस्मत्पदाभ्यां पराक्प्रत्यक्त्वेनात्मानात्मनोर्वस्तुतो विरोध उक्तः । प्रत्ययपदेन प्रतीतितो विरोध उक्तः । प्रतीयत इति प्रत्ययोऽहङ्कारादिरनात्मा दृश्यतया भाति । आत्मा तु प्रतीतित्वात्प्रत्ययः स्वप्रकाशतया भाति । गोचरपदेन व्यवहारतो विरोध उक्तः । युष्मदर्थः प्रत्यगात्मतिरस्कारेण कर्ताहमित्यादिव्यवहारगोचरः, अस्मदर्थस्त्वनात्मप्रविलापेन, अहं ब्रह्मेति व्यवहारगोचर इति त्रिधा विरोधः स्फुटीकृतः ।

The **Bhāṣyakāra** aims to establish the **absolute distinction** (atyantābhedānupapatti) between **Yuṣmad** and **Asmad** on three levels:

A. Vastutaḥ Virodha (Real/Literal Opposition)

- This is the opposition simply by **designation** (Nāma Kathana).
- **Yuṣmad** denotes the **Parāk** (external/objective) entity, and **Asmad** denotes the **Pratyak** (internal/subjective) entity.

B. Pratīti Virodha (Cognitive/Apprehension Opposition)

- This is the opposition at the level of **Jñāna** (knowledge).
    - **Anātman** (Non-Self) is the **Pratiyate** (object of apprehension), known as **Dṛśyatayā Bhāti** (appears as the seen/object).
    - **Ātman** (Self) is the **Pratītiḥ** (the very consciousness/apprehension), known as **Svaprakāśatayā Bhāti** (appears as self-luminous).

C. Vyavahārataḥ Virodha (Empirical/Behavioral Opposition)

- This is the opposition in the **usage** of the terms in daily life (through the ego, **Gocara**).
    - **Yuṣmad** (Non-Self) is the object of **Karta** (Ahaṅkāra) behavior: **Kartā Aham** (I am the doer/agent)—This involves the **disregard** (tiraskāra) of the true Self.
    - **Asmad** (Self) is the object of the **Jñānin**'s behavior: **Aham Brahma** (I am Brahman)—This involves the **sublation** (pravilāpana) of the non-Self.

Itaretara Bhāva (Mutual Identification) and its Rejection (Page 17)

युष्मच्चास्मच्च युष्मदस्मदी, ते एव प्रत्ययौ च तौ गोचरौ चेति युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरौ, तयोस्त्रिधा विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतरभावोऽत्यन्ताभेदस्तादात्म्यं वा तदनुपपत्तौ सिद्धायामित्यन्वयः ।

The discussion leads to the final statement that the two cannot have a mutual identification (Itaretara Bhāva) or exchange of characteristics.

A. The Two Meanings of Itaretara Bhāva (Mutual Identity)

The mutual identification is rejected in two ways:

1. **Atyanta Abheda (Absolute Non-difference):** The two become absolutely one (Yuṣmad is exactly Asmad), which is impossible due to their opposed natures.
2. **Tādātmya (Identity-in-difference):** A relationship where there is **bheda-sahiṣṇu abheda** (non-difference that tolerates difference), such as the relationship between a substance and its quality (like a white pot).

B. Rejection of Tādātmya

ऐक्यासम्भवेऽपि शुक्लो घट इतिवत्तादात्म्यं किं न स्यादित्यत आह - विषयविषयिणोरिति ।
चिज्जडयोर्विषयविषयित्वाद्दीपघटयोरिव न तादात्म्यमिति भावः । युष्मदस्मदी पराप्रत्यग्वस्तुनी, ते एव प्रत्ययश्च गोचरश्चेति वा विग्रहः ।

- The **Siddhānti** rejects **Tādātmya** because the Self and Non-Self are in a **Viṣaya-Viṣayi** (object-subject) relationship, which makes them fundamentally distinct as **Cit-Jaḍa** (Consciousness and Matter).
    - Analogy: **Dīpa-Ghaṭavat** (Like a Lamp and a Pot). The **Cit** (Consciousness) is the illuminator (prakāśaka), and the **Jaḍa** (Matter/object) is the illuminated (prakāśya). An illuminator and the illuminated object can never share Tādātmya.

C. The Inability of the Self to be an Object

अत्र प्रत्ययगोचरपदाभ्यामात्मानात्मनोः प्रत्यक्पराग्भावे चिदचित्त्वं हेतुरुक्तस्तत्र हेतुमाह - विषयविषयिणोरिति । अनात्मनो ग्राह्यत्वादचित्त्वम् , आत्मनस्तु ग्राहकत्वाच्चित्त्वं वाच्यम् । अचित्त्वे स्वस्य स्वेन ग्रहस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधेनासम्भवादप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तेरित्यर्थः । यथेष्टं वा हेतुहेतुमद्भावः ।

(आक्षेपभाष्यम् - युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम् , तद्धर्माणामपि सुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः — इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् ।)

The text further confirms that the **Ātman** (Self) must be the **Grāhaka** (apprehender/subject) and cannot be the **Grāhya** (apprehended/object) because this would lead to the **contradiction of action and agency** (Karma-kartṛtva Virodha).

- **Quotation:** "Atyanta nipuṇo'pi naṭaḥ svasya skṃdham āroḍhuṃ na śaknoti" (Even an extremely skilled acrobat cannot climb upon his own shoulders).
- The Self, being the subject/consciousness, cannot become the object of its own action without losing its nature, which would lead to the **destruction of consciousness** (Acitvam). This impossibility proves the Self must remain the ever-present subject.

D. The Karma-Kartṛtva Virodha (Contradiction of Being Both Agent and Object)

The text relies on a Mīmāṁsā/Nyāya definition to assert that the Self cannot perceive itself:

- **The Principle:** The Self cannot be both the **Kartṛ** (agent of the action) and the **Karma** (object of the action) simultaneously within the same action. This is the **Karma-Kartṛtva Virodha** (Contradiction of Agent and Object).
- **Nyāya Definition of Karma:** Para-samaveta-kriyā-janya Phalaśālitvam (being the locus of the result generated by the action inherent in another).
    - Example: In "Rāma goes to the village," the action (going) is in Rāma, but the result (union with the next location, the village) resides in the village, making the village the Karma.

- **Application to Self:** For the **Ātman** to perceive itself, it would have to be the **Grāhaka** (perceiving agent) and the **Grāhya** (perceived object). This is impossible because an entity cannot be the object of its own action.
- **Conclusion:** The Self cannot grasp itself; hence, there is an **Asaṃbhāva** (impossibility) of the Self grasping itself.

Term (Sanskrit)	Definition (Sanskrit/ Etymology)	English Meaning	Notes
Kartṛtvam (कर्तृत्वम्)	kriyāśrayatvam	Agency or Doership (being the subject/locus of action).	The state of being a Kartṛ (doer).
Karmatvam (कर्मत्वम्)	Para samaveta kriyā-janya phala-shālitvam	Object-ness (being the object/locus of result).	The state of being the locus (shālitvam) of a result (phala) produced by an action (kriyā) residing in another (para samaveta). Phala-shālitvam means being the possessor/locus of the fruit (tat-vān).

Summary of definition of the Ātman and Anātman

The fundamental, contradictory natures of the Self (Ātman) and the non-Self (Anātman) are explained this far as follows:

Entity	Sanskrit Term	Nature	Role
Non-Self	**Anātman**	**A-cit** (Non-conscious/inert)	**Grāhya** (Apprehendable/Object)
Self	**Ātman**	**Cit** (Conscious)	**Grāhaka** (Apprehender/Subject)

The opposition between these two entities—Subject and Object, Conscious and Inert—is the core reason why their superimposition is philosophically challenged.

Pūrvapakṣa: Impossibility of Adhyāsa (Superimposition) (Page 18-19)

नन्वेवमात्मानात्मनोः पराक्प्रत्यक्त्वेन, चिदचित्त्वेन, ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वेन च विरोधात्तमःप्रकाशवदैक्यस्य तादात्म्यस्य वानुपपत्तौ सत्याम् , तत्प्रमित्यभावेनाध्यासाभावेऽपि तद्धर्माणां चैतन्यसुखजाड्यदुःखादीनां विनिमयेनाध्यासोऽस्त्वित्यत आह - तद्धर्माणामपीति ।

The opponent (Pūrvapakṣa) uses the inherent conflict between the Self and the non-Self to argue against the possibility of Adhyāsa (Superimposition).

Argument 1: Impossibility of Connection between Dharmin

तयोरात्मानात्मनोर्धर्मास्तद्धर्मास्तेषामपीतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः ।

The fundamental difference and contradiction (e.g., **Tamas-Prakāśavat Virodhāt**) means that the two substrata (Dharmin)—the Ātman and Anātman—cannot have any real relationship:

1. There can be no **Tādātmya** (identity or non-absolute non-difference, defined as bheda-sahiṣṇu abheda), since their natures are opposite.
2. There can be no **saṃsargaḥ** (contact/conjunction) between them, especially since the **Ātman** is Asaṅga (unattached) and devoid of any attribute that would enable connection.

Argument 2: Impossibility of Reciprocal Superimposition (Itaretara Bhāva)

इतरत्र धर्म्यन्तरे इतरेषां धर्माणां भावः संसर्गस्तस्यानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः ।न हि धर्मिणोः संसर्गं विना धर्माणां विनिमयो अस्ति । स्फटिके लोहितवस्तुसान्निध्याल्लौहित्यधर्मसंसर्गः । असङ्गात्मधर्मिणः केनाप्यसंसर्गाद्धर्मिसंसर्गपूर्वको धर्मसंसर्गः कुतस्त्य इत्यभिप्रेत्योक्तं - सुतरामिति ।

Since the Dharmin (the Self and non-Self) cannot connect, their respective attributes (**Dharma**) cannot be exchanged either.

- **Dharma of Ātman:** Consciousness (Caitanya) and Bliss (Sukha).
- **Dharma of Anātman:** Inertia (Jāḍya) and Pain (Duhkha).
- **Itaretara Bhāva:** This means the superimposition of the Dharmas of one entity onto the other's Dharmin (e.g., inertia is superimposed on the Self).
- **Refutation (by Pūrvapakṣa/Ekadeśī): Na dharmiṇoḥ saṁsargaṁ vinā dharmāṇāṁ vinimayaḥ asti** (Without the contact of the substrata, there can be no exchange of attributes).
    - Analogy: The red color (dharma) of a hibiscus flower is superimposed on a crystal (dharmin) only if the two are placed in proximity (sānnidhya).
    - Since the Ātman is **Asaṅga-ātman** (unattached Self), its contact with anything is impossible (kenāpi asaṅsargāt), which makes the contact of its Dharmas equally impossible.
    - **Conclusion (Sūtaram Anupapatti):** Therefore, the reciprocal superimposition (Itaretara Bhāva) of the Dharmas is **even more impossible** (**sutarām anupapattiḥ**).

Argument 3: Lack of Prerequisites for Adhyāsa

नन्वात्मानात्मनोस्तादात्म्यस्य तद्धर्मसंसर्गस्य चाभावेऽप्यध्यासः किं न स्यादित्यत आह - इत्यत इति ।

इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् ।

The Pūrvapakṣa then attacks the very notion of Adhyāsa by denying its cause:

- **Nanu ātma-anātmanoḥ tādatmya-saṁsargayoś ca abhāve adhyāsaḥ kiṁ na syāt?** (If Tādātmya and **saṁsarga** (contact) are impossible, why shouldn't Adhyāsa (superimposition) still occur?)
- **The Final Argument:** Adhyāsa requires a **Pramāṇa-janya Saṁskāra** (residuum left by valid cognition) as its cause.
    - Since a true connection (Tādātmya or saṁsarga) between the Self and non-Self is impossible, there can be no **Pramā** (valid cognition) of such a connection.
    - **Tathā ca pramā-janya-saṁskārasya adhyāsa-hetoḥ abhāvāt** (Thus, due to the lack of the cause of Adhyāsa, which is the residuum generated by valid cognition), Adhyāsa cannot be proved.

This entire line of reasoning sets up the problem for Śaṅkarācārya's **Adhyāsa Bhāṣya**, which immediately follows this section to establish the nature and possibility of superimposition.

The Response to the Impossibility (from the Bhāṣya) (Page 19)

इत्युक्तरीत्या तादात्म्याद्यभावेन तत्प्रमाया अभावादतः प्रमाजन्यसंस्कारस्याध्यासहेतोरभावात् 'अध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्' इत्यन्वयः ।

- The Bhāṣya proceeds to assert the existence of Adhyāsa regardless of the logical contradictions: **Ato asmat pratyaya gocare viṣayiṇi cidātmke yuṣmat pratyaya gocarasa viṣayasya taddharmāṇāṃ ca adhyāsaḥ, tadviparyayeṇa viṣayiṇas taddharmeṇāṁ ca viṣaye adhyāsaḥ iti mithyā iti bhavituṁ yuktam** (Therefore, the superimposition of the object [non-Self] and its attributes on the Self, which is the Subject, and vice-versa, is right to be called mithyā [false or indeterminable]).

The Two Meanings of Mithyā (False/Untrue) (Page 19)

मिथ्याशब्दो द्व्यर्थः अपह्नववचनः, अनिर्वचनीयतावचनश्चेति । अत्र चापह्नवार्थः ।

The word **Mithyā (मिथ्या)** is **Dvvarthaḥ** (possessing two meanings):

1. **Apahnava-vacanaḥ (Apahnava-vachana): Negation** or **Denial**.
    - It implies rejection, removal (apanayana), or declaring something null/void (vyartha).
2. **Anirvacanīyatā-vacanaḥ (Anirvachaniyata-vachana): Indescribability**.
    - It refers to something that cannot be defined as absolutely **Sat** (real), absolutely **Asat** (unreal), or as both Sat and Asat.

- **Meaning in Context:** In the phrase "Adhyāso Mithyā", the word **Mithyā** is used in the sense of **Apahnava (Denial)**. The **Pūrvapakṣa** uses it to dismiss the concept of Adhyāsa as futile or baseless talk.

The Scope of Denial

ननु कुत्र कस्याध्यासोऽपह्नूयत इत्याशङ्क्य, आत्मन्यनात्मतद्धर्माणामनात्मन्यात्मतद्धर्माणामध्यासो निरस्यत इत्याह - अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचर इत्यादिना ।

The denial applies to two types of superimposition:

1. **Ātmani Anātma-tad-dharmāṇām adhyāsaḥ:** Superimposition of the **Non-Self** and **its attributes** (like agency, body, etc.) upon the **Self (Ātman)**.

2. **Anātmani Ātma-tad-dharmāṇām adhyāsaḥ:** Superimposition of the **Self** and **its attributes** (like pure consciousness, Chaitanya) upon the **Non-Self (Anātman)**.

The Self (Ātman) and the Non-Self (Anātman) Distinction (Page 20)

अहमितिप्रत्ययययोग्यत्वं बुद्ध्यादेरप्यस्तीति मत्वा तत आत्मानं विवेचयति - विषयिणीति । बुद्ध्यादिसाक्षिणीत्यर्थः । साक्षित्वे हेतुः - चिदात्मक इति ।

The Issue of the 'I' Cognition (Aham-Pratyaya)

- **Pūrvapakṣa:** The cognition of 'I' (**Aham iti pratīti**) is applicable to the **Buddhi** (intellect) and **Ahaṁkāra** (ego) as well. Therefore, how can the Ātman be exclusively defined by 'I'-cognition?
- **Siddhānta (Vedānta) Response (Differentiation):** The Ātman is defined by special characteristics:
    - **Viṣayiṇi (The Subject):** Not merely an object. The word is derived from viṣaya + ini (possessing subjects).
    - **Buddyādi-sākṣiṇi** (The **Witness** of the intellect, etc.).
    - **Cidātmake (Of the nature of Consciousness):** This is the **reason (hetu)** for the Ātman being the Witness.

अहमिति भासमाने चिदंशात्मनीत्यर्थः । युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्येति । त्वङ्कारयोग्यस्य । इदमर्थस्येति यावत् । नन्वहमिति भासमानबुद्ध्यादेः कथमिदमर्थत्वमित्यत आह - विषयस्येति । साक्षिभास्यस्येत्यर्थः ।
साक्षिभास्यत्वरूपलक्षणयोगाद्बुद्ध्यादेर्घटादिवदिदमर्थत्वं न प्रतिभासत इति भावः ।

The Non-Self (Anātman) as 'This' (Idam Arthatvam)

- The **Non-Self** (Ahaṁkāra/Buddhi) is categorized as the object of **Yuṣmat-pratyaya** ('You' cognition) and subsequently **Idam-arthaḥ** ('This' object).
- **Pūrvapakṣa Doubt:** How can the Buddhi/Ahaṁkāra, which is experienced as **'I' (Aham)**, be classified as **'This' (Idam)**?
- **Siddhānta Answer:** The Buddhi/Ahaṁkāra is categorized as **Idam** because it is **Sākṣi-bhāṣyaḥ** (that which is illuminated/revealed by the **Witness**).
    - **Reason:** It cannot be **Pramātṛ-bhāṣyaḥ** (illuminated by the agent of knowledge) due to the **Karta-Karma Virodhāt** (contradiction of the same entity being both the agent and the object).
    - Since the Ahaṁkāra is revealed by the Ātman/Sākṣi, it falls into the category of the **Seen/Object (Idam)**, even though it appears as 'I' in empirical usage.

The Argument from Inferential Fallacies (Anumāna-doṣa) (Page 20)

अथवा यदात्मनो मुख्यं सर्वान्तरत्वरूपं प्रत्यक्त्वं प्रतीतित्वं ब्रह्मास्मीति व्यवहारगोचरत्वं चोक्तं तदसिद्धम् , अहमिति प्रतीयमानत्वात् , अहङ्कारवदित्याशङ्क्याह - अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचर इति ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** asserts that the Ātman's qualities—such as being the chief, the innermost, and pure immediate awareness (**Pratyaktvam**) and being the object of the **"Aham Brahmāsmi"** experience—are **unestablished (asiddham)**.

Pūrvapakṣa's Inference (Anumāna)

- **Pakṣa (Subject):** Ātman (The Self)
- **Sādhya (Thesis to be proved):** Not of the nature of Pratyaktva (i.e., not pure immediate awareness).
- **Hetu (Reason):** Because of being cognized as 'I' (**Aham iti pratīyamānatvāt**).
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example):** Like the **Ahaṁkāra** (Ego/Intellect). (The Ahaṁkāra is cognized as 'I' but is clearly not Pratyaktva).

Vvāpti (Rule):

> **Yatra yatra aham iti pratīyamānatvam tatra tatra na pratyaktvam** (Wherever there is the characteristic of being cognized as 'I' (Aham), there is no **Pratyaktvam** [the nature of being the innermost, immediate Self]).

Application/Illustration:

> The Ego (**Ahaṁkāra**) is manifested as 'I' (Aham), but it is not the **Pratyak Ātman** (innermost Self). Therefore, the **Ātman** (Self) also, even though manifested as 'I' (Aham), will not be the **Pratyak** (innermost Self). (This conclusion is the flawed outcome intended by **Pūrvapakṣa**'s argument.)

Siddhānta's Refutation (Analyzing the Hetu)

अस्मच्चासौ प्रत्ययश्चासौ गोचरश्च तस्मिन्नित्यर्थः । अहंवृत्तिव्यङ्ग्यस्फुरणत्वं स्फुरणविषयत्वं वा हेतुः । आद्ये दृष्टान्ते हेत्वसिद्धिः । द्वितीये तु पक्षे तदसिद्धिरित्यात्मनो मुख्यं प्रत्यक्त्वादि युक्तमिति भावः ।

The Vedāntin refutes this by showing the **Hetu** (reason) is flawed, asking the **Pūrvapakṣa** to clarify the meaning of the Hetu, **"Aham iti pratīyamānatvam"**:

Interpretation of the Hetu	Fallacy (Doṣa)	Explanation
Aham-vṛtti-vyaṅgyatvam (That which is manifested by the 'I' thought-modification)	**Sādhana-Vaikalya** (Deficiency in the Means)	This definition of the 'I' cognition does not apply to the Dṛṣṭānta (Ahaṁkāra). The Ahaṁkāra is not pure consciousness manifested by the vṛtti.
Sphuraṇa-viṣayatvam (That which is an object of the ultimate Consciousness/Illumination)	**Svarūpa-Asiddhi** (Unestablished in the Subject)	This definition of the 'I' cognition does not apply to the Pakṣa (Ātman). The Ātman, being the Illuminator itself, cannot be an object (viṣaya) of illumination.

Conclusion: Since the **Pūrvapakṣa**'s reason is flawed (either in the example or in the subject), their inference is invalid. Thus, the attributes of the Ātman, such as **Pratyaktva** and being the **innermost Self**, remain **established (yuktam)**.

The **Pūrvapakṣa** Objection: Ātman is not the Subject (Page 20-21)

ननु यदात्मनो विषयित्वं तदसिद्धम् , अनुभवामीति शब्दवत्वात् , अहङ्कारवदित्यत आह - विषयिणीति ।

The discussion resumes with a **Pūrvapakṣa** objection concerning the nature of the **Ātman** (Self), arguing that it is not a true subject (Viṣayin).

Pūrvapakṣa's Inference (Anumāna)

The **Pūrvapakṣa** attempts to prove that the Ātman is not the true Subject (Viṣayin), similar to how the **Ahaṅkāra** is often mistaken for the Subject but is ultimately an object.

- **Pratijñā (Thesis):** The Ātman is not the Subject (Ātmā na Viṣayi).
- **Hetu (Reason):** Because it is the object of knowledge generated by the word 'Anubhavāmi' (the knowledge being: "I experience myself").
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example):** Like the **Ahaṅkāra**.
- **Vyāpti (Invariable Concomitance/Rule):** Wherever an entity is the object of word-generated cognition (śabda-janya-jñāna), it is not the true Subject (Viṣayin).
- **Application:**
    1. The **Ahaṅkāra** is the object of 'Aham Anubhavāmi' (I experience). Since it is the object, it is not the true Subject.
    2. The **Ātman** is also the object of 'Aham Anubhavāmi'. Therefore, the Ātman is also not the true Subject.

Siddhānta's Refutation: Vācya vs. Lakṣya

वाच्यत्वं लक्ष्यत्वं वा हेतुः । नाद्यः, पक्षे तदसिद्धेः । नान्त्यः, दृष्टान्ते तद्वैकल्यादिति भावः ।

Siddhānta (Vedānta) refutes the Hetu by asking whether the Self is the **direct meaning (Vācya)** or the **implied meaning (Lakṣya)** of the word 'Anubhavāmi':

If the Hetu is defined as:	**Doṣa (Fallacy)**	**Explanation**
Vācyatvam (Being the direct meaning of the word)	**Svarūpāsiddhi** (Unestablished in the Subject)	The Self (Ātman) is not the direct meaning of 'Aham' or 'Anubhavāmi'. The Self is the implied meaning (Lakṣya). Hence, the Hetu does not reside in the Subject (Ātman).
Lakṣyatvam (Being the implied meaning of the word)	**Sādhana-Vaikalya** (Deficiency in the Example)	The Ahaṅkāra (Dṛṣṭānta) is the direct meaning (Vācya) of 'Aham', not the implied meaning. Hence, the Hetu does not reside in the Dṛṣṭānta.

Conclusion: Since the **Pūrvapakṣa**'s reason (Hetu) fails under scrutiny, the premise that **the Ātman is not the Subject** is rejected.

Refutation of the Analogy of Deha-Ahaṅkāra Adhyāsa (Page 21)

देहं जानामीति देहाहङ्कारयोर्विषयविषयित्वेऽपि मनुष्योऽहमित्यभेदाध्यासवदात्माहङ्कारयोरप्यभेदाध्यासः स्यादित्यत आह - चिदात्मक इति । तयोर्जाड्याल्पत्वाभ्यां सादृश्यादध्यासेऽपि चिदात्मन्यनवच्छिन्ने जडाल्पाहङ्कारादेर्नाध्यास इति भावः ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** introduces a new analogy to support Adhyāsa between Subject and Object.

- **Pūrvapakṣa Argument:** Just as there is a superimposition of identity (**Abheda Adhyāsa**) between the **Deha** (Body) and **Ahaṅkāra** (Ego) in the form **"Aham Manuṣyaḥ"** (I am a man), even though they are Subject-Object (Viṣayi-Viṣaya) in some sense, similarly, Adhyāsa must occur between **Ātman** and **Ahaṅkāra** (**Ātma-Ahaṅkārayorapi Abheda Adhyāsaḥ**).
- **Siddhānta's Refutation:** The analogy is faulty due to a fundamental lack of **Sādṛśya** (similarity).
    - **The Problem:** The **Deha** and **Ahaṅkāra** are both **Jāḍya** (insentient/inert) and **Alpatvam** (limited/finite). Due to this similarity, Adhyāsa between them is plausible.
    - **The Contrast:** The **Ātman** is **Cidātman** (pure consciousness) and **Anavacchinna** (unlimited/infinite). The **Ahaṅkāra** is **Jaḍa** (inert) and **Alpa** (limited).
    - **Conclusion:** Due to this extreme contradiction (atyanta virodha), Adhyāsa (specifically Tādātmya or identity-superimposition) between the **Ātman** and the **Ahaṅkāra** is impossible.

Second **Pūrvapakṣa** Inference: Ego's Pratyaktva (Innermost Nature) (Page 21)

अहमिति भास्यत्वादात्मवदहङ्कारस्यापि प्रत्यक्त्वादिकं मुख्यमेव, ततः पूर्वोक्तपराक्त्वाद्यसिद्धिरित्याशङ्क्याह - युष्मदिति । अहंवृत्तिभास्यत्वमहङ्कारे नास्ति कर्तृकर्मत्वविरोधात् , चिद्भास्यत्वं चिदात्मनि नास्तीति हेत्वसिद्धिः । अतो बुद्ध्यादेः प्रतिभासतः प्रत्यक्त्वेऽपि पराक्त्वादिकं मुख्यमेवेति भावः ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** again attempts to equate the Ego with the Self's nature.

- **Pūrvapakṣa Argument: Ahaṁkārasyāpi Pratyaktvādikam Mukhyam** (The **Pratyaktva** [innermost nature] of the **Ahaṁkāra** is also primary/real).
- **Inference:**
    - **Pakṣa:** Ahaṁkāra (Ego)
    - **Sādhya:** Pratyaktvam is primary (Mukhyam Pratyaktvam)
    - **Hetu:** Because it is manifested as 'I' (Aham iti bhāṣyatvāt)
    - **Dṛṣṭānta:** Like the **Ātman**.
    - **Conclusion:** Therefore, Siddhānta's view that the Ahaṅkāra is **Parāk** (external/not the innermost Self) is unestablished (asiddham).

Siddhānti's Refutation

Siddhānta dismantles the Hetu once more, re-establishing the fundamental difference:

- **Absence of Illumination in Ego:** The **Ahaṁkāra** does not possess the characteristic of being illuminated by the Aham-Vṛtti (the 'I' thought-modification) in the same way the **Ātman** does.

- **Reason:** This is due to the **Karta-Karma Virodhāt** (contradiction of agency and object-ness). The Ego, being inert, cannot be the agent of knowledge (illuminator) and the object of knowledge (illuminated) simultaneously.
- **Result:** The **Pratyaktvam** (innermost nature) that appears in the **Buddhyādi** (Ego/Intellect) is **Gauṇa** (secondary/illusory), not **Mukhya** (primary/real). The true, primary nature of the Ego is **Parāk** (external).

Analysis of Viṣaya (Object) (Page 21)

युष्मत्पराक्तच्चासौ प्रतीयत इति प्रत्ययश्चासौ कर्तृत्वादिव्यवहारगोचरश्च तस्येति विग्रहः । तस्य हेयत्वार्थमाह - विषयस्येति । षिञ् बन्धने । विसिनोति बध्नाति इति विषयस्तस्येत्यर्थः ।

The ṭīkā returns to define the nature of the object that is to be renounced.

- **Viṣaya (The Object):** Derived from the root **śī bandhane** (to bind). **Viṣiṇoti badhnāti iti Viṣayaḥ** (That which specifically binds is the Viṣaya).
    - **Implication:** This is the object that binds the soul to Samsara (the cycle of rebirth).

Final Affirmation of Adhyāsa Refutation
आत्मन्यनात्मतद्धर्माध्यासो मिथ्या भवतु, अनात्मन्यात्मतद्धर्माध्यासः किं न स्यात् , अहं स्फुरामि सुखीत्याद्यनुभवादित्याशङ्क्याह - तद्विपर्ययेणेति ।

(इत्यतः अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् ।)

The **Pūrvapakṣa** raises one last objection: If the Adhyāsa of the **Non-Self on the Self** is denied, why can there be Adhyāsa of the **Self on the Non-Self**?

तस्मादनात्मनो विपर्ययो विरुद्धस्वभावश्चैतन्यम् । इत्थम्भावे तृतीया । चैतन्यात्मना विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च योऽहङ्कारादौ विषयेऽध्यासः स मिथ्येति नास्तीति भवितुं युक्तम् , अध्याससामग्र्यभावात् । न ह्यत्र पूर्वप्रमाहितसंस्कारः सादृश्यमज्ञानं वास्ति ।

- **Siddhānta:** The Adhyāsa of the Self's attributes (Consciousness) on the Non-Self (Ahaṁkāra) is also denied (**Mithyā/Nāsti**).
    - The **Anātman** has a nature **contrary (viparyaya)** to the Ātman, namely **Caitanya** (Consciousness), which is its distinguishing feature (lakṣaṇa).
    - Because the **Anātman** (Ahaṁkāra) is fundamentally contrary to the **Caitanya-Ātman**, superimposition between them is also impossible.
- **Final Cause of Denial:** The entire process of Adhyāsa is impossible due to the **Adhyāsa Sāmagrī Abhāva** (absence of the necessary causal factors for superimposition).
    - **Adhyāsa Sāmagrī (Causal Factors):**
        1. Pūrva-Pramā-hita Saṁskāra (Prior impressions from valid knowledge)
        2. Sādṛśyam (Similarity)
        3. Ajñānam (Ignorance)

Why the Causal Factors are Absent in Ātman

निरवयवनिर्गुणस्वप्रकाशात्मनि गुणावयवसादृश्यस्य चाज्ञानस्य चायोगात् ॥

The Self (**Ātman**) is described as **Niravayava** (partless), **Nirguṇa** (attributeless), and **Svaprakāśa** (self-luminous).

- **Pramāhita Saṁskāra:** The Anātman (Non-Self) and Ātman are diametrically opposed and have not previously been correctly perceived together; thus, no unifying Pramā-janya Saṁskāra exists.
- **Sādṛśyam:** There is no similarity (**Guṇa-Avayava Sādṛśyam**) between the **Nirguṇa** (attributeless) Ātman and the **Saguṇa** (with attributes) Anātman. (Example: A rope resembles a snake [Sādṛśya is length/longness], but not a silver piece.)
- **Ajñānam:** Ignorance is impossible in a **Svaprakāśa Ātman** (self-luminous Self). The Self, being pure knowledge, cannot be enveloped by ignorance.

Interpreting the Self's Attributes (Dharmas) (Page 22)

नन्वात्मनो निर्गुणत्वे तद्धर्माणामिति भाष्यं कथमिति चेत् , उच्यते । बुद्धिवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तं चैतन्यं ज्ञानम् , विषयाभेदेनाभिव्यक्तं स्फुरणम् , शुभकर्मजन्यवृत्तिव्यक्तमानन्द इत्येवं वृत्त्युपाधिकृतभेदात् ज्ञानादीनामात्मधर्मत्वव्यपदेशः । तदुक्तं टीकायां ‘आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्मा अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यत्वात्पृथगिवावभासन्ते’ इति ।

Pūrvapakṣa Objection: If the Ātman is **Nirguṇa** (attributeless), why does the Bhāṣya use the phrase **"Tat-dharmāṇām"** (the attributes of the Self) regarding Adhyāsa?

Siddhānta's Answer: The attributes (like knowledge, bliss, sphuraṇa) are not inherent to the Self but are merely **conventional designations** based on the modifying medium (vṛtti upādhi).

Locus of Expression	Expressed Self-Nature	Conventional Name	Meaning
Buddhi Vṛtti (Intellect Modification)	Manifested Consciousness	**Jñānam** (Knowledge)	Denotes specific, non-eternal knowledge.
Viṣaya Abheda (Non-difference from the Object)	Manifested Consciousness	**Sphuraṇam** (Shining/Illumination)	The Self-Luminous Consciousness revealing an object (e.g., ghaṭo sphurati - the pot shines/is known).
Śubha Karma-janya Vṛtti (Modification from good deeds)	Manifested Consciousness	**Ānandam** (Bliss)	Denotes the Bliss aspect of the Self.

Jñānādīnāma ātmadharmatva vyapadeśaḥ (The designation of names like Knowledge, Illumination, and Bliss as attributes of the Self) is merely a **conventional usage** (Vyapadeśaḥ), arising from the **Vṛtti-upādhi-kṛta bheda** (differences created by the limiting adjunct of the mental modification).

This is echoed in the Pañcapādikā verse: "Bliss, object-ness, eternality, and consciousness are qualities, yet **Aprthak Caitanāyāt** (non-separate from Consciousness), they appear to be separate."

Pūrvapakṣa Reassertion: Karma is Real (Page 22-23)

अतो निर्गुणब्रह्मात्मत्वमते, अहं करोमीति प्रतीतेरर्थस्य चाध्यासत्वायोगात्प्रमात्वं सत्यत्वं च अहं नर इति सामानाधिकरण्यस्य गौणत्वमिति मतमास्थेयम् । तथा च बन्धस्य सत्यतया ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिरूपफलासम्भवाद्बद्धमुक्तयोर्जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यायोगेन विषयासम्भवात् शास्त्रं नारम्भणीयमिति पूर्वपक्षभाष्यतात्पर्यम् ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** uses the Self's **Nirguṇatva** (attributeless nature) to argue against the Adhyāsa of doership.

- **Argument:** If the Ātman is **Nirguṇa-Brahmātman**, the notion of Adhyāsa (Superimposition) is irrelevant. Therefore, the common experience **"Aham Karomi"** (I am the doer) has **Pramātva** (valid knowledge) and **Satyatva** (truth).
- **Action is Real:** The doership (Kartṛtvam) must belong to the **Ahaṅkāra** or **Ātman** (as per other schools), but it is a **primary (Mukhya) truth**.
- **Gauṇatvam (Secondary Status):** Experiences like **"Aham Naraḥ"** (I am a man - relation to the body) are considered **Gauṇa** (secondary/metaphorical), while **"Aham Kartā"** (I am the doer - relation to the Ego) is **Mukhya** (primary).

Implications for Liberation (Mokṣa)
If doership (Kartṛtvam) and bondage (Bandha) are **Satya** (real):

- **Phaḷāsaṁbhavāt: Mokṣa** (Liberation) through **Jñāna** (Knowledge) becomes impossible. If bondage is real, only action or direct removal could end it, not mere knowledge (which removes only illusory bondage).
- **Viṣayāsambhavāt:** The central subject of the Brahma Sūtras—the **unity of the bound Jīva and the free Brahman** (**Baddha-muktayor Jīva-Brahmaṇor Aikyam**)—is rendered impossible since a truly bound Jīva cannot be identical to the eternally free Brahman.
- **Conclusion:** The **Śāstram Na Ārambhaṇīyam** (The scriptures should not be started/written) because the subject and purpose are both impossible. This is the ultimate **Bhāṣya Tātparyam** (intent of the **Pūrvapakṣa** section).

Siddhānta's Reply: The "YUKTAM" in the Bhāṣya (Page 23)

युक्तग्रहणात्पूर्वपक्षस्य दुर्बलत्वं सूचयति ।

Siddhānta begins its reply by focusing on the word **"Yuktam"** (proper/appropriate) in the phrase "Mithyā iti bhavitum **yuktam**".

- **Indication of Weakness:** The use of **"Yuktam"** (**"should be"**) by the **Pūrvapakṣa** suggests the weakness (Durbalatvam) of their position. They can only argue that Adhyāsa **should not** happen, not that it **does not** happen.

- **Acceptance of the Premise:** Vedānta agrees: Adhyāsa **should not** be present in the self-luminous Ātman.
- **The Reality of Experience:** However, **Tathāpi** (nevertheless), the **Naisargika Loka Vyavahāra** (natural worldly usage) of "Aham idam, Mama idam" (I am this, this is mine) still occurs. This is the experience of **Adhyāsa**.

Refuting the Pūrvapakṣa's Alternatives (Page 23)

तथाहि किमध्यासस्य नास्तित्वमयुक्तत्वादभानाद्वा कारणाभावाद्वा ? आद्य इष्ट इत्याह - तथापीति । एतदनुरोधादादौ यद्यपीति पठितव्यम् । अध्यासस्यासङ्गस्वप्रकाशात्मन्ययुक्तत्वमलङ्कार इति भावः । न द्वितीय इत्याह - अयमिति ।

आक्षेप-समाधान भाष्य - तथाप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्येतरेतराविवेकेन अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य 'अहमिदम्' 'ममेदम्' इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ॥

Siddhānta counters the Pūrvapakṣa's three possible reasons for the absence of Adhyāsa:

1. **Ayuktatvāt (Because it is improper):**
    - **Siddhānta:** This is **Iṣṭa** (desired/agreed upon). The impropriety is not a defect but an **Alaṅkāra** (an ornament/proof) that Adhyāsa must be removed by **Jñāna** (Knowledge).
2. **Abhānāt (Because it is not experienced):**
    - **Siddhānta:** This is **Asiddham** (unestablished). Adhyāsa is directly experienced (**Pratyakṣa Anubhava**) as **"Aham Ajñaḥ"** (I am ignorant), **"Aham Kartā"** (I am the doer), and **"Aham Manuṣyaḥ"** (I am a man) through the association with the Kośas (sheaths).
3. **Kāraṇa Abhāvāt (Absence of cause):** (Already addressed in Section "Why the Causal Factors are Absent in Ātman**"**)

Why Experiences of Doership are Illusory (Page 23-24)

"अज्ञः कर्ता मनुष्योऽहम" इति प्रत्यक्षानुभवादध्यासस्याभानमसिद्धमित्यर्थः । न चेदं प्रत्यक्षं कर्तृत्वादौ प्रमेति वाच्यम् । अपौरुषेयतया निर्दोषेण, उपक्रमादिलिङ्गावधृततात्पर्येण च "तत्वमसि" (छां. ६.८.७-१६) इत्यादिवाक्येनाकर्तृत्वब्रह्मत्वबोधनेनास्य भ्रमत्वनिश्चयात् ।

Siddhānta concludes that the apparent direct experience (**Pratyakṣa Anubhava**) of doership ("Aham Kartā") is **not Pramā** (not valid knowledge).

- **Vedic Invalidation (Bādha):** These experiences are **sublated (Bādha)** by the **Apauruṣeya** (impersonal, non-humanly authored) and **Nirdoṣa** (flawless) scriptures, such as the **Tattvam Asi** (That Thou Art) statements.

The Four Defects (Doṣas) of Human Cognition

Human-derived knowledge (Pauruṣeya Jñāna) is considered defective because the human agent is prone to four specific cognitive and operational errors.

1. **Bhrama (भ्रम) - Illusion:** Error of perception or cognition; mistaking one thing for another (e.g., mistaking a **rope for a snake** or shell for silver). The senses receive faulty input, or the intellect misinterprets the sensory data.

2. **Pramāda (प्रमाद) - Carelessness/Inadvertence:** A slip of the mind due to inattention, distraction, or carelessness. It occurs when the mind is unable to properly focus or retrieve correct information. For example, reading a word incorrectly in a text or speaking an incorrect fact due to a lapse in memory or attention, even when the correct information is available.

3. **Karaṇāpāṭava (करणापाटव) - Imperfection of Instruments:** The inherent weakness or non-acuity (apāṭava) of the instruments (karaṇa), which include the **senses (Indriyas)**, the **mind (Manas)**, and the **internal organ (Antaḥkaraṇa)**. The senses are limited and can weaken (e.g., poor eyesight, dull hearing). When the instruments of knowledge are not sharp, the resulting knowledge is bound to be flawed or incomplete.

4. **Vipralipsā (विप्रलिप्सा) - The Desire to Deceive:** The intention or desire to deceive others, often motivated by personal bias, attachment (Rāga), or aversion (Dveṣa). A person knowingly distorts information, interprets scripture/facts selectively, or makes false claims driven by personal agenda or prejudice. The text notes this can lead different scholars to interpret the same scripture differently due to their own intellectual biases, leading to the formation of different schools of thought.

Determining the True Meaning (Tātparya Nirṇaya)

Since only the Vedas are flawless, they must be the authority for certain knowledge. Siddhānta relies on **Vedic statements** (like Tattvam Asi) to invalidate experiential errors.

Even within the Vedas, different statements might seem to convey different meanings (some supporting ritual, some supporting knowledge). How do we determine the true intent (**Tātparya**)?

Upakramādi Liṅgam: The true meaning of a Vedic passage must be ascertained by utilizing the six factors of interpretation (**Ṣaḍ-vidha Liṅgam**), collectively called **Upakramādi Liṅgam** (Factors beginning with the initial statement).

उपक्रमोपसम्हारौ अभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् । अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्य निर्णये ॥
upakramopasamhārau abhyāso'pūrvatā phalam | arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparya nirṇaye ||

Upakrama: The opening/initial statement of the text.
Upasaṁhāra: The concluding statement of the text.
Abhyāsa: Repetition of the central theme.
Apūrvatā: Novelty; the subject cannot be known through any other means.
Artha-vāda: Eulogy or condemnation (supportive statements).
Upapatti: Consistency/demonstration through reasoning.

Conclusion: The **Tattvam Asi** (That Thou Art) statement, when its true intent is determined **Upakramādi Liṅgāvagat Tātparyeṇa** (by means of the import ascertained by the Upakramādi factors), establishes the non-doership (**Akartṛtva**) of **Brahman**. This flawless, Vedic realization is used to invalidate the human experience of **"Aham Kartā"** (I am the doer) as mere **Bhrama** (illusion).

Refuting the Primacy of Direct Perception (Pratyakṣa) (Page 24)

न च ज्येष्ठप्रत्यक्षविरोधादागमज्ञानस्यैव बाध इति वाच्यम् , देहात्मवादप्रसङ्गात् , “मनुष्योऽहम” इति प्रत्यक्षविरोधेन ‘अथायमशरीरः’(बृ०उ० ४-४-७) इत्यादिश्रुत्या देहादन्यात्मासिद्धेः । तस्मादिदं रजतमितिवत्सामानाधिकरण्यप्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रमत्वशङ्काकलङ्कितस्य नागमात्प्राबल्यमित्यास्थेयम् ।

The Pūrvapakṣa raises an objection based on the logical strength of direct perception.

The Objection: Pratyakṣa as the "Elder" (Jyeṣṭha) Proof

- **Argument:** Direct perception (**Pratyakṣa**) is the **Jyeṣṭha Pramāṇa** (elder/superior proof) because it is **Asañjāta Virodhi** (one whose contradiction has not yet arisen). Empirical knowledge (of pots, people, duality, etc.) begins without any initial contradiction. Therefore, if the Vedas (**Āgama**) teach non-duality (advaita) which contradicts the perception of duality (dvaita), the **Vedas must be sublated (bādha)** by the elder, primary proof (Pratyakṣa).

Vedānta's Counter-Argument: The Dehātmavāda Prasaṅga

- **The Problem with Primacy:** Siddhānta (Vedānta) argues that if one accepts the **Jyeṣṭha Pratyakṣa** as having authority over the Vedas, it leads to the undesirable consequence of **Dehātmavāda Prasaṅga** (the body-as-self doctrine).
- **Consequence:** If "I am the doer" is true simply because it's the "elder" perception, then **"I am the body"** (Manuṣyo’ham) is also true. This validates the **Cārvāka** (materialist) view, rendering all Vedic injunctions regarding a post-mortem soul (Dehātirikta Ātman) useless.
    - Specifically, Vedic statements like **"Athāyam aśarīraḥ..."** (Now, this Self is bodiless...) which establishes the Self as distinct from the body, would be invalidated.

Pratyakṣa is Tainted (Kalaṅkita)

Siddhānta asserts that the chronological order (being "elder") does not imply validity, because the first perception can be an illusion.

- **Analogy:** Just as the perception **"Idam Rajatam"** (This is silver) is chronologically prior but is **Kalankita** (tainted) by the possibility of illusion, the perception of duality or doership is also tainted.
- **Conclusion:** Knowledge that is **susceptible to illusion** (**Bhramatva Śaṅkā**) cannot override the non-illusory, flawless knowledge provided by the Vedas. Therefore, **Pratyakṣa** does not possess superior authority (**Prābalyam**) over **Āgama**.

Defining Jyeṣṭhatvam (Superiority) (Page 24-25)

किञ्च ज्येष्ठत्वं पूर्वभावित्वं वा आगमज्ञानं प्रत्युपजीव्यत्वं वा ? आद्ये न प्राबल्यम् , ज्येष्ठस्यापि रजतभ्रमस्य पश्चाद्भाविना शुक्तिज्ञानेन बाधदर्शनात् । न द्वितीयः । आगमज्ञानोत्पत्तौ प्रत्यक्षादिमूलवृद्धव्यवहारे सङ्गतिग्रहद्वारा, शब्दोपलब्धिद्वारा च प्रत्यक्षादेर्व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यस्योपजीव्यत्वेऽपि तात्त्विकप्रामाण्यस्यानपेक्षितत्वात् , अनपेक्षितांशस्यागमेन बाधसम्भवादिति ।

Siddhānta analyzes what the term **Jyeṣṭhatvam** (superiority/primacy) means:

Interpretation of Jyeṣṭhatvam	Result	Reasoning
Pūrva Bhāvitvam (Being chronologically prior)	**Na Prābalyam** (No superiority)	Chronological precedence alone doesn't grant strength. The later, correct knowledge (e.g., "This is a shell") always sublates the earlier, illusory knowledge (e.g., "This is silver").
Āgama-Jñānam Prati Upajīvyatvam (Being the sub-stratum for Vedic knowledge)	**Taatvikāprāmāṇyat** (Not absolutely valid)	Pratyakṣa is Upajīvya (relied upon) only for Vyāvahārika Prāmāṇya (conventional validity)—like hearing the word "Ghaṭa" (pot) and associating it with a perceived object. However, its claims regarding the ultimate nature of reality (Tātvika Prāmāṇya) are Anapekṣitat (unnecessary) for the Vedas.

Conclusion: The Vedas can sublate (**Bādha**) the irrelevant aspects (**Anapekṣitāṁśa**) of Pratyakṣa's claims without invalidating its necessary conventional role (e.g., the sound of the bell is heard, but its specific meaning—for prayer or a meal—is determined by **Śabda Pramāṇa**, not the sensory perception itself).

Refuting the Pūrvapakṣa Argument “Knowledge can destroy reality” (Page 25)

यत्तु क्षणिकयागस्य श्रुतिबलात्कालान्तरभाविफलहेतुत्ववत् ‘तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः’(मु०उ० ३-२-८) इति श्रुतिबलात्सत्यस्यापि ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिसम्भवादध्यासवर्णनं व्यर्थमिति, तन्न । ज्ञानमात्रनिवर्त्यस्य क्वापि सत्यत्वादर्शनात् , सत्यस्य चात्मनो निवृत्त्यदर्शनाच्च, अयोग्यतानिश्चये सति सत्यबन्धस्य ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिश्रुतेर्बोधकत्वायोगात् ।

The Pūrvapakṣa attempts to find a loophole: if the world is real (Satya), it can still be destroyed by knowledge, provided the scripture says so.

Pūrvapakṣa Argument: Knowledge Can Destroy Reality

- **Analogy of Yāga (Sacrifice):** A momentary sacrifice (Kṣaṇika Yāga) that is performed now yields a result (heaven, Svarga) only in the distant future (Kālāntara Bhāvi Phala). This happens solely by the power of the **Śruti** (Vedas).
- **Application:** Similarly, the world (Nāma-Rūpa) is **Satya** (real). The scripture **"Vidyvān Nāma-Rūpād Vimuktaḥ"** (The knower is liberated from name and form) proves that

liberation from the real world is possible **solely by Jñāna**, by the strength of **Śruti** alone. Therefore, arguing that the world is illusory (**Adhyasta**) is **Vyartham** (futile/unnecessary).

Vedānta's Final Reply: Knowledge Destroys only Illusion

- **Jñāna Kills Only Mithyā:** Siddhānta counters: **Jñāna Mātra Nivartasya Kvāpi Satyatvādarśanāt** (That which is removed by knowledge alone is nowhere seen to be real).
    - If a thing is removed by knowledge, it **must** have been illusory (**Mithyā**). If the world (Nāma-Rūpa) is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, it was never real.
    - If the world were truly **Satya**, its cessation would require some other means (like the exhaustion of karma—Karma Kṣaya), not just knowledge.
- **The Impossibility of Ātman Cessation:** If something is **Satya** (real), it can never cease to exist. **Satyasya Ātmano Nivṛtti Adarśanāt** (The cessation of the real Self is not seen). If the Self were to cease, there would be no cognizer left—a logical absurdity (**Jagat-Andhatā Prasaṅga**).
- **Incompetence (Ayogyatā):** The **Śruti** (scripture) cannot assert the impossible. Since a **Satya Bandha** (real bondage) is inherently **Ayogya** (unqualified) for removal by mere knowledge, the statements regarding knowledge-based liberation prove that the bondage itself is **Mithyā** (illusory).

Countering the Setu (Bridge) Analogy

न च सेतुदर्शनात्सत्यस्य पापस्य नाशदर्शनान्नायोग्यतानिश्चय इति वाच्यम् , तस्य श्रद्धानियमादिसापेक्षज्ञाननाश्यत्वात् ।

- **Pūrvapakṣa:** The destruction of real **Pāpa** (sin) is seen through the mere sight of the **Setu** (Rāma Setu/Bridge) at Rameśvaram. This proves knowledge/sight can destroy reality.
- **Siddhānta:** This is false. The destruction of sin is not from mere sight. It is **Śraddhā-Niyamādi Sāpekṣa Jñāna-Nāśat** (destruction requiring knowledge conditioned by faith, rules, and expiation). The entire process (**Prāyaścitta**) is not mere sight but a structured, difficult path meant to crush the **Ahaṅkāra** (ego), proving that the **Pāpa-Nāśa** (destruction of sin) is a complex, qualified process, not a simple refutation of the rule that "knowledge destroys only illusion."

Establishing the Necessity of Adhyāsa (Page 25-26)

बन्धस्य च 'नान्यः पन्था' (श्वे ३.८) इति श्रुत्या ज्ञानमात्रान्निवृत्तिप्रतीतेः, अतः श्रुतज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वनिर्वाहार्थमध्यस्तत्वं वर्णनियम् । किं च ज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यस्य किं नाम सत्यत्वम् , न तावदज्ञानाजन्यत्वम् । 'मायां तु प्रकृतिम्' (श्वे ४.१०) इति श्रुतिविरोधान्मायाविद्ययोरैक्यात् । नापि स्वाधिष्ठाने स्वाभावशून्यत्वं 'अस्थूलम्' (बृ ३.८.८) इत्यादिनिषेधश्रुतिविरोधात् । नापि ब्रह्मवद्बाधायोग्यत्वम् , ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिश्रुतिविरोधात् । अथ व्यवहारकाले बाधशून्यत्वम् , तर्हि व्यावहारिकमेव सत्यत्वमित्यागतमध्यस्तत्वम् । तच्च श्रुत्यर्थे योग्यता ज्ञानार्थं वर्णनीयमेव, यागस्यापूर्वद्वारत्ववत् ।न च तदन्यत्वाधिकरणे (ब्र.सू २.१.१४) तस्य वर्णनात्पौनरुक्त्यम् , तत्रोक्ताध्यासस्यैव प्रवृत्त्यङ्गविषयादिसिद्ध्यर्थमादौ स्मार्यमाणत्वादिति दिक् ॥

The discussion moves to conclusively proving why **Adhyāsa** (illusion/superimposition) must be accepted by Vedānta, countering the Pūrvapakṣa claim that the world (Saṁsāra) is real (Satya) but still destroyed by knowledge.

The Argument from Scripture (Śruti)

- **The Injunction for Knowledge:** Śrutis like the **Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad** state: **"Nānyāḥ Panthā Vidyate'yanāya"** (There is no other path for going to liberation) and **"Tameva Viditvā Ati Mṛtyum eti"** (Only by knowing Him (the Self) does one cross over death).
- **Implication:** This establishes that **Jñāna-mātra Nivṛtti** (cessation/removal by mere knowledge) is the only means to end bondage (**Bandha**).

The Logical Proof for Adhyāsatva (Illusoriness)

- **Rule of Cessation:** That which is removed by mere knowledge is never seen to be ultimately real. **Jñāna-mātra Nivartasya Kvāpi Satyatvādarśanāt.** (If knowledge removes it, it must be Mithyā).
- **Conclusion:** To uphold the **Śrutau Jñāna-Nivartatva Nirvāhārtham** (for the sake of ensuring the validity of the scriptural statement regarding knowledge being the remover), **Bandha** (bondage/Saṁsāra) must be understood as **Adhyasta** (superimposed/illusory). Therefore, the **Adhyāsa-Varṇanam** (description of Superimposition) is absolutely necessary.

The Analogy of Apūrva (Unseen Power)

- **The Problem in Mīmāṁsā:** The Pūrvapakṣa cited that a momentary sacrifice (Kṣaṇika Yāga) can grant a future result (Heaven) **Śruti Balāt** (by the strength of the Veda). The Yāga ends immediately; how can it cause a distant result?
- **The Solution (Mīmāṁsā):** To establish the **Śrutārtha Yogyatā** (fitness of the scriptural statement's meaning), an unseen intermediate factor called **Apūrva** (or Vyāpāra - function) is posited. The Yāga creates **Apūrva**, which acts as the **Dvāra** (door/means) to the future result.
- **The Application (Vedānta):** Similarly, for the Śruti **"Vidvān Nāma-Rūpād Vimuktaḥ"** (The Knower is liberated from Name and Form) to be logical, **Adhyāsa** must be posited as the logical antecedent. The world (**Nāma-Rūpa**) must be **Adhyasta** (illusory) for it to be removed by knowledge.

Refuting Definitions of Reality (Satyatva)
Siddhānta challenges the Pūrvapakṣa to define the **Satyatva** (reality) of **Bandha** (bondage) that could still be removed by knowledge. All three attempts fail:

Pūrvapakṣa Definition of Satyatva	**Vedānta's Refutation**	**Conclusion**
1. **Ajñāna Ajanyatvam** (Non-origination from Ignorance)	**Māyā Tu Prakṛtiṁ Vidyāt** (Māyā is the material cause) is a Śruti that affirms the world/bondage originates from **Māyā/Avidyā** (Ignorance)**.**	Bondage is **Ajñāna-janya** (born of Ignorance), hence **Mithyā**, not ultimately real.
2. **Sva-Adhiṣṭhāne Sva-Abhāva Śūnyatvam** (Absence of its non-existence in its own substratum)	This definition of **Satyatva** is contradicted by **Niṣedha Śrutis** (negating scriptures) like **Asthūlam, Anaṇu** (not gross, not subtle). These Śrutis negate all attributes (like bondage) in the **Ātman** (the substratum), proving their non-existence there.	Bondage is **Sva-Abhāva Adhikaraṇe Bhāsamānatvam** (appears where it does not exist), hence Mithyā.
3. **Brahmavat Bādhāyogyatvam** (Incapability of being sublated, like Brahman)	This is contradicted by the **Jñāna-Nivṛtti Śruti** (scripture stating removal by knowledge). If bondage were eternally unsublatable, the entire scripture on liberation would be pointless.	Bondage is sublatable and therefore **not Satya like Brahman**.

Conclusion on Bondage's Status
Since ultimate reality is negated, bondage is established to have only **Vyāvahārika Satyatvam** (conventional reality).

- **Yadi Vyāvahārika Satyatvam** (If conventional reality is accepted), then **Āgatam Adhyastatvam** (illusoriness is established). Conventional reality is, by definition, an **Adhyāsa** in the light of ultimate reality.

The Nature of Adhyāsa and the Two Types (Page 27)

अध्यासं द्वेधा दर्शयति - लोकव्यवहार इति । लोक्यते मनुष्योऽहमित्यभिमन्यत इति लोकोऽर्थाध्यासः, तद्विषयो व्यवहारोऽभिमान इति ज्ञानाध्यासो दर्शितः ।

The Bhāṣya describes Adhyāsa as the superimposition of the Self's attributes/nature onto the Non-Self, and vice versa.

Two Types of Adhyāsa
The term **Adhyāsa** (अधि + अस्, adhi - upon, as - to throw/place) is analyzed through its grammatical derivations:

Type of Adhyāsa	Example & Application
1. Arthādhyāsa (Object/Content Superimposition) **Grammatical Derivation (Vyutpatti):** Adhyasyate iti Adhyāsaḥ (Ghañ suffix in Karma - object) **Description:** The superimposition of the object (Artha) itself.	The snake (the object) is superimposed on the rope. The external world (Deha, Ahaṅkāra, Viṣaya), which is essentially the Non-Self, is superimposed onto the Self (Consciousness). This is referred to by the term Loka in Loka-Vyavahāra. Lokyate (is seen/perceived) is the Loka which points to the object that is seen (e.g., the body, the world).
2. Jñānādhyāsa (Knowledge Superimposition) **Grammatical Derivation (Vyutpatti):** Adhyasanam Adhyāsaḥ (Ghañ suffix in Bhāva - action/process) **Description:** The superimposition of knowledge (Jñāna) or cognition.	The cognition of the snake (Sarpa-Jñāna) is superimposed on the Consciousness conditioned by the rope. The illusory self-notion, the Abhimāna (sense of self-identity) or knowledge, such as "Manuṣyo'ham" (I am a man) or "Aham Kartā" (I am the doer), is superimposed onto the Self. This is referred to by the term Vyavahāra (behavior/cognition) in Loka-Vyavahāra.

The Scope of Loka Vyavahāra (Worldly Usage)
The term **Naisargiko'yam Loka-Vyavahāraḥ** (This natural worldly usage) mentioned in the Bhāṣya is understood to encompass both types of Adhyāsa.

It is a **Madhyama-Pada Lopī Samāsa** (a compound where an intermediate word is dropped). Loka Sahitaḥ Vyavahāraḥ (Usage connected with the world/object).

Primacy (Gauṇatva/Pradhānatva): Both happen simultaneously, but their prominence changes based on the context or the Sādhaka's focus:

- **Arthādhyāsa** is dominant when the focus is on the object (e.g., "The pot exists").
- **Jñānādhyāsa** is dominant when the focus is on subjective cognition (e.g., "The knowledge/sense of 'I am the doer' exists").

Analysis of the Bhāṣya's Definition of Adhyāsa (Page 27)

द्विविधाध्यासस्वरूपलक्षणमाह - अन्योन्यस्मिन् इत्यादिना धर्मधर्मिणोः इत्यन्तेन । जाड्यचैतन्यादिधर्माणां धर्मिणावहङ्कारात्मानौ, तयोरत्यन्तं भिन्नयोरितरेतरभेदाग्रहेणान्योन्यस्मिन् अन्योन्यतादात्म्यमन्योन्यधर्मांश्च व्यत्यासेनाध्यस्य लोकव्यवहार इति योजना ।

तथाप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्येतरेतराविवेकेन अत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य 'अहमिदम्' 'ममेदम्' इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ॥

The defining sentence of the Bhāṣya is meticulously analyzed to show how it encapsulates the entire phenomenon of superimposition.

A. The Substratum and Superimposition

- **Dharmiṇoḥ (The two Substratums):** Refers to the two entities involved in the superimposition—**Ahaṁkāra** (Ego/Non-Self) and **Ātman** (Self/Consciousness). This is a Dual-Number (Dvivacana) form.
- **Dharma-Dharmi-Adhyāsa (Attribute and Substratum Superimposition):**
    - **Anyonyasmin Anyonyātmakatā:** The superimposition of the **nature of one (Ātmatā)** onto the **other (Anyasmin)** (e.g., the Self's nature is superimposed onto the Ego, making it seem sentient; the Ego's nature is superimposed onto the Self, making it seem mortal/doer). This is **Dharmi-Adhyāsa**.
    - **Anyonyadharmāṁśca:** The superimposition of the **attributes (Dharmas)** of one onto the other (e.g.,
    - . This is **Dharma-Adhyāsa**.

B. The Cause of Adhyāsa

- **Atyanta Viviktau:** The two substratums(Self and Non-Self) are **Atyanta Vivikta** (absolutely distinct).
    - **Necessity of Atyanta (Absolutely):** This strong qualifier is used to prevent the definition from applying to cases like **Pratyabhijñā** (recognition, e.g., "This man is that same Devadatta"). In recognition, 'this' and 'that' are distinct states, but the underlying entity is the same and thus not "absolutely" distinct.
- **Itara Bheda Agrahaṇam (Non-apprehension of their mutual difference):** Although absolutely distinct, the distinction is not apprehended (the rope-snake confusion). This non-apprehension is the root cause.
- **Mithyā Jñāna Nimittaḥ (Caused by false knowledge):** The ultimate causal factor is **Avidyā** (Ignorance), which is the source of the false knowledge that leads to the superimposition.

C. The Result of Adhyāsa

- **Satya-Anṛte Mithunīkṛtya:** By uniting the **Satya** (The Real, i.e., the Self) and the **Anṛta** (The Unreal, i.e., the Non-Self).
- **Lokavyavahāraḥ:** The resulting natural worldly usage, expressed as "**Aham idam mama idam**" (I am this, this is mine), which covers both the illusory knowledge (Jñānādhyāsa) and the illusory object (Arthādhyāsa).
    - **Vyavahāra** here includes all four types of worldly interaction: **Abhijñā** (cognition), **Abhivadana** (verbal expression), **Hānopādāna** (acceptance and rejection), and **Artha Kriyā Kāritvam** (practical activity).

Practical Application of Adhyāsa using Seer and the Seen (Dṛg-Dṛśya Viveka)

Swamiji uses the text Dṛg-Dṛśya Viveka (Discrimination between the Seen and the Seer) to illustrate how the principle of **Adhyāsa** (superimposition) is realized in practice.

1. Distinguishing the External Seen (Bāhya Dṛśya)

- **Initial Stage:** The gross, external object (**Ghaṭa** - pot, etc.) is identified as the **Dṛśya** (the seen).
- **The Seer (Dṛṣṭā):** The Self (Ātman/Consciousness) is identified as the **Dṛṣṭā** (the seer).
- **Goal:** To establish the discrimination (**Viveka**) between the external object and the consciousness that perceives it.

2. Distinguishing the Internal Seen (Antar Dṛśya)

- **Advanced Stage:** The realization deepens to include internal phenomena.
- **Internal Dṛśya:** The subtle psychological states and modifications of the internal organ (**Antaḥkaraṇa Vṛttis**) are identified as the **Dṛśya**. This includes:
    - **Jñāna Vṛttis:** Cognitions like Ghaṭā-kāra Vṛtti (pot-shaped mental modification).
    - **Emotional Vṛttis:** Desire (Kāma), doubt (Vicikitsā), resolve (Saṅkalpa), sorrow (Śoka), etc.
- **The Seer (Dṛṣṭā):** The Consciousness remains the unchanging seer of these mental states.
- **Goal:** To remove the superimposition of the mental states onto the Self, recognizing that **I am not the thoughts or emotions; I am their witness.**

3. Application to the Body and Ego (Deha and Ahaṁkāra)

- **The Body (Deha) as Dṛśya (Arthādhyāsa):**
    - The physical body is treated as a gross object, similar to a pot (**Ghaṭa Sadṛśya**), and is merely **Adhyasta** (superimposed) on Consciousness.
    - The delusion is the **Ahaṁ Deha** (I am the body) notion.
    - The outside world is also **Adhyasta** because, ultimately, everything is Brahman (**Caitanya**), and seeing anything else (Pot, Sun, etc.) is an error (**Arthādhyāsa** - object superimposition).
- **The Self-Sense (Ahaṁ Vṛtti) as Dṛśya (Jñānādhyāsa):**
    - The subtle internal cognition **"Ahaṁ Deha"** or **"Ahaṁ Manuṣya"** (the feeling of identity with the body/man) is the **Jñānādhyāsa** (knowledge superimposition).
    - The goal is to view this Ahaṁ Vṛtti itself as the **Yuṣmat-Pratyaya** (the Non-Self/Ego), which must be discarded, and the **Asmat-Pratyaya** (the Self) must be realized as the eternal, non-doing witness.

The Essential Role of Manana (Contemplation)

Swamiji highlights the challenge faced by most students and the means to overcome them.

1. The Challenge: Lack of Dṛśyatva Awareness

- **The Problem:** When one looks at an object, the immediately dominant cognition is its attribute (**Ghaṭatva** - pot-ness), not its illusory nature (**Mithyātva**) or its being seen (**Dṛśyatva** - seen-ness).
- **Result:** The conviction that the world is an **Adhyāsa** remains purely theoretical and does not transform the individual's experience.

2. The Solution: Deep Contemplation (Manana)

- **Manana is necessary:** Mere **Śravaṇa** (hearing the teachings) is insufficient.
- **The Story of the Gokarṇa and Dhundhukārī (Bhāgavata Mahātmya):**
    - Many people heard the recitation (Śravaṇa), but only Dhundhukārī achieved liberation because he engaged in intense **Manana** (contemplation) and applied the teaching.
    - **Conclusion:** The difference in result (**Phala Bheda**) between listeners is due to the lack of dedicated, focused **Manana**.
- **Practice of Manana:**
    - **Simulated Teaching:** One must study with the intensity and focus required to teach the material oneself the next day.
    - **Concentrated Effort:** Since one cannot devote intense contemplation to every Grantha, the student should choose one core text (like the **Brahma Sūtras**) and constantly contemplate its contents, especially the intricate arguments like those found in the **Adhyāsa Bhāṣya**.

3. Necessity of Spiritual Effort (Sādhanā)

- **The Reality Check:** The student must recognize that they are not an "exceptional authority" (**Viśeṣa Adhikārī**) ready for instant realization.
- **Sustained Effort:** Liberation requires sustained, dedicated effort and concentration on the subtle truths of non-duality.
- **Goal:** To constantly reflect on the teachings so that the subtle nature of the Self, the world as **Dṛśya**, and the fact of **Adhyāsa** becomes an ever-present reality, leading to steady progress (**Sādhana-Sampatti ko badhāte raho** - keep augmenting the wealth of your spiritual means).

Adhyasa Swarūpa Lakshana (Essential Definition)

- **The Core Definition:**
  अन्योन्यस्मिन अन्योन्यात्मकताम् (Anyonyasmin Anyonyātmakatāṁ)
    - The essence of Adhyasa is the **appearance of the nature of one thing in another**; the appearance of one entity in the other.
- **Elaboration:**
    - Seeing **A in B** and **B in A**.
    - Superimposing the **qualities (dharma) of B onto A**, and vice versa.
    - Anyonyātmakatāṁ (reciprocal identity) is also referred to as Anyonya Tādātmyam (reciprocal identity/non-difference).

Justification of the word Atyanta (Utterly/Extremely) (Page 27)

अतः सोऽयमिति प्रमाया नाध्यासत्वम् , तदिदमर्थयोः कालभेदेन कल्पितभेदेऽप्यत्यन्तभेदाभावादिति वक्तुमत्यन्तेत्युक्तम् ।

The definition of Adhyasa is often given in relation to the superimposition of properties belonging to two entities that are **utterly distinct (atyanta vivikta)**.

- **The Issue of Pratyabhijñā (Recognition):**
    - The cognition "**So'yaṁ Devadattaḥ**" (This is that Devadatta) involves an element of time-based distinction: 'That' refers to an earlier time/place; 'This' refers to the present time/place.
    - Despite this Kalpa-bheda (imagined difference due to time/space), Advaita Vedanta **does not** consider recognition (pratyabhijñā) as Adhyasa (superimposition).

- **Justification for Atyanta:**

- Though 'That' and 'This' in recognition are distinct in their **adjuncts (upādhi)** (time/place), they are **not utterly distinct** in their **essential nature (svarūpa)**. The substratum (Devadatta) is the same.
- The distinction is merely **Kalpita Bheda** (imagined difference), **not Atyanta Bheda** (utter distinction).
- Therefore, the term **Atyanta** (utterly) is necessary to exclude recognition (pratyabhijñā) from the definition of Adhyasa.

Necessity of Dharmādhyāsa (Superimposition of Qualities) (Page 27-28)

न च धर्मितादात्म्याध्यासे धर्माध्याससिद्धेः 'धर्मांश्च' इति व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् , अन्धत्वादीनामिन्द्रियधर्माणां धर्म्यध्यासास्फुटत्वेऽप्यन्धोऽहमिति स्फुटोऽध्यास इति ज्ञापनार्थत्वात् । सत्यमनिदं चैतन्यं तस्यानात्मनि संसर्गमात्राध्यासो न स्वरूपस्य । अनृतं युष्मदर्थः तस्य स्वरूपतोऽप्यध्यासात्तयोर्मिथुनीकरणमध्यास इति न शून्यतेत्यर्थः ॥

- **Pūrvapakṣa:**
  - Why mention **Anyonya Dharmas** (reciprocal qualities)?
  - If there is **Dharmi Tādātmya Adhyāsa** (superimposition of the identity of the two substrata), then **Dharmādhyāsa** (superimposition of qualities) will follow automatically. The former is sufficient.

- **Siddhānta (Conclusion):**
  - **No, it is necessary to mention Dharmādhyāsa.**
  - **Reason: Dharmādhyāsa is often more explicit than Dharmi Adhyāsa.**
    - **Dharmi Adhyāsa (Substratum Superimposition):** The superimposition of the body/sense organ (dharmi) onto the Self (e.g., Aham Chakṣuḥ - "I am the eye") is often **not prominent (asphuṭa)**.
    - **Dharmādhyāsa (Quality Superimposition):** The superimposition of the qualities (dharma) of the body/sense organ onto the Self (e.g., **Aham Andhaḥ** - "I am blind"; **Sthūlo'ham** - "I am fat") is **very prominent (sphuṭa)** in common experience.
  - Bhagavāna ādi Śaṅkarācārya mentioned both to draw attention to the most explicit manifestation of superimposition in daily life (Aham Andhaḥ).

Refutation of the Śūnyavāda (Nihilism) Objection

- **Pūrvapakṣa (Objection):**
  - If the **Ātman** (Self) is superimposed onto the **Anātman** (Non-Self) and the **Anātman** is superimposed onto the **Ātman**, then **both are superimposed (adhyasta)**.
  - If both are unreal/superimposed, then the result is **Śūnyavāda** (the doctrine that everything is void/non-existent).

- **Siddhānta (Conclusion):**
  - **The superimposition is between the Satya (Reality/Truth) and the Anṛta (Untruth/Unreality), not between two unreal entities.**

- **सत्य अनृते मिथुनी कृत** (Satyam Anṛte Mithunī Kṛta)
- The Ātman is **Satya** (Real/Self-established/Witness-Consciousness). The Anātman (Jagat/Ego) is **Anṛta** (Unreal/Superimposed).
- **Only the blending/juxtaposition (mithunīkaraṇa) of the two is the Adhyasa, not the non-existence of both.**

Adhyāsa (Superimposition) Concepts: Clarifying the Mix-up

Adhyāsa	Superimposition on the Other	Reason
Ātman (Self) on the Anātman (Not-Self)	Only **Samsarga** (**Samsarga-mātra-adhyāsa** - superimposition of connection only). This is the feeling that "This body is mine," or "This wealth is mine," where the ownership is falsely established.	The **Ātman** is Asanga (unattached) and Svatas-Siddha (Self-established). Its nature (svarūpa) is never superimposed. The Not-Self is never truly identified as the intrinsic essence of the Self; the Self remains transcendent, even when mistakenly related to the Not-Self. This distinction maintains the purity of the Ātman.
Anātman (Anṛta / Not-Self) on Ātman (Self)	**Svarūpa** (superimposition of the form/nature itself): Mistaking the essence of the Self to be the Not-Self, leading to the belief, "I am the body." The Self's nature is mistakenly perceived as having the nature of the transient, finite Not-Self. **Samsarga** (superimposition of the connection): Mistaking the attributes of the Not-Self (like kartṛtva - doership, bhoktṛtva - enjoyership, sukha - happiness) as belonging to the Self, leading to the feeling, "I am the doer" or "I am happy/sad."	The **Anātman** (e.g., Ego/Mind) is unreal/illusory. It requires the Reality (Ātman) to lend it both its svarūpa (illusory existence) and its samsarga (illusory connection).

The Doctrine of Anādi Pravāha (Beginningless Flow) of Adhyāsa (Page 28)

नन्वध्यासमिथुनीकरणलोकव्यवहारशब्दानामेकार्थत्वेऽध्यस्य मिथुनीकृत्येति पूर्वकालत्ववाचिक्त्वाप्रत्ययादेशस्य ल्यपः कथं प्रयोग इति चेन्न, अध्यासव्यक्तिभेदात् । तत्र पूर्वपूर्वाध्यासस्योत्तरोत्तराध्यासं प्रति संस्कारद्वारा पूर्वकालत्वेन हेतुत्वद्योतनार्थं

ल्यपः प्रयोगः । तदेव स्पष्टयति - नैसर्गिक इति । प्रत्यगात्मनि हेतुहेतुमद्भावेनाध्यासप्रवाहोऽनादिरित्यर्थः । ननु प्रवाहस्यावस्तुत्वात् , अध्यासव्यक्तीनां सादित्वात् , कथमनादित्वमिति चेत् । उच्यते अध्यासत्वावच्छिन्नव्यक्तीनां मध्येऽन्यतमया व्यक्त्या विनाऽदिकालस्यावर्तनं कार्यानादित्वमित्यङ्गीकारात् । एतेन कारणाभावादिति कल्पो निरस्तः, संस्कारस्य निमित्तस्य नैसर्गिकपदेनोक्तत्वात् ।

The Use of the Suffixes Lyap and Tvā:

  - The Bhāshya uses the forms **Adhyasya** and **Mithunī Kṛtya**, which employ the suffix Lyap (an equivalent of Tvā), typically denoting an **action completed earlier (pūrvakāla)**.
  - **Objection**: Since Adhyasa, Mithunīkaraṇa, and Lokavyavahāra (empirical activity) all mean the same thing, why use the Lyap suffix suggesting a sequence?
  - **Answer**: The use of Lyap here is to indicate the **causal sequence (hetu-hetu-mat bhāva)** in the **individuals (vyakti)** of Adhyasa.

- **Chain of Superimposition (The Anādi Pravāha)**:
  - **The Individual Instance (Vyakti):** Each specific act of delusion, whether it's the identification of **Kartṛtva (doership)**, **Bhoktṛtva (enjoyership)**, or any specific **Rāga-dveṣa (attachment/aversion)**, is an **Adhyāsatva Avacchinna Vyakti**. These individual instances are sādi (have a beginning and an end). The various 'individuals' or links in the chain of superimposition are distinct steps and are causally related.
  - **Prior Adhyasa (Pūrva Pūrva Adhyāsa)** is the cause of the **Subsequent Adhyasa (Uttara Uttara Adhyāsa)** through the medium of **Sanskaras (subtle impressions)**.
  - **Example Chain**:
    Prior Bhoktṛtva (experiencing) creates Rāga/Dveṣa (impressions) which creates Kartṛtva (action) which results into Current Bhoktṛtva (experiencing)
  - The Lyap suffix highlights that the **prior state of Adhyasa** is the **cause (hetu)** for the existence of the **latter state of Adhyasa**.

- **Resolution on Anāditva (Beginninglessness)**:
  - **Objection**: A flow (pravāha) is not an independent substance. The individual links (vyakti) in the chain are created (sādi). How can the flow be beginningless (anādi)?
  - **Conclusion**: The **Anāditva (beginninglessness)** of Adhyasa is accepted in the sense of **Kārya Anāditvam** (the **beginninglessness of the effect/process**).
  - **Justification**: There has been **no time (anādi kāla)** where **at least one** individual link of Adhyasa was **not present**. The flow of one link leading to another has been ceaseless.

Thus **Siddhānta** refutes the objection raised by the **Pūrvapakṣa** earlier (on Page 8 of the ṭīkā "तथाहि किमध्यासस्य नास्तित्वमयुक्तत्वादभानाद्वा कारणाभावाद्वा?") as **Kāraṇa Abhāvāt** (Absence of cause) **of Adhyasa.**

Pramā vs. Anubhava and the Lāghava Principle (Page 29)

न च पूर्वप्रमाजन्य एव संस्कारो हेतुरिति वाच्यम् , लाघवेन पूर्वानुभवजन्यसंस्कारस्य हेतुत्वात् । अतः पूर्वाध्यासजन्यः संस्कारोऽस्तीति सिद्धम् ।

This section deals with the source of the **Saṃskāra (impression)** needed to fuel adhyāsa, establishing that a prior valid experience is not required for a current error.

- **The Requirement:** For an error like seeing a snake in a rope (rajju-sarpa), an impression of a **real snake** must exist. For the world (jagat) to be superimposed on Brahman, where is the initial impression of a **real, separate world** gained?
- **The Simplification (Lāghava):** The text employs the principle of Lāghava (simplicity/parsimony) to resolve this.
    - It is **not** necessary that the impression must be Pramā-janya (born of valid knowledge).
    - An impression can be Anubhava-janya (born of any experience), which includes **Ayathārtha Anubhava** (erroneous experience or bhrama).
- **The Implication:** A previous **mistake (bhrama)** is sufficient to generate the saṃskāra (impression), which causes the **next mistake**. This means the entire chain of superimposition is self-sustaining and powered by its own errors, removing the need to find an impossible 'first valid experience' of the world separate from Brahman. The chain is thus proven to be **Anādi** (beginningless).

Mithyā Jñāna Nimittaḥ: The Dual Nature of Avidyā (Page 29)

अध्यासस्योपादानमाह - मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्त इति । मिथ्या च तदज्ञानं च मिथ्याज्ञानं तन्निमित्तमुपादानं यस्य स तन्निमित्तः । तदुपादानक इत्यर्थः । अज्ञानस्योपादानत्वेऽपि संस्फुरदात्मतत्वावरकतया दोषत्वेनाहङ्काराध्यासकर्तुरीश्वरस्योपाधित्वेन संस्कारकालकर्मादिनिमित्तपरिणामित्वेन च निमित्तत्वमिति द्योतयितुं निमित्तपदम् ।

Ṭīkākāra now dives into the definition of the root cause, **Avidyā (Ignorance/Māyā)**, and its dual role as both the **Material Cause** and the **Efficient Cause**.

- **Mithyā Jñāna Defined:** The commentator analyzes the compound as Mithyā ca tad Ajñānam ca (That which is **false/indefinable** and also **Ignorance**).
    1. **Mithyā (Aniṛvacanīyam):** Avidyā is Mithyā because it is **Aniṛvacanīyam** (indefinable). It cannot be defined as Real (Sat), Unreal (Asat), or Both (Sat-Asat), thus avoiding any contradiction with Brahman.
- **Nimitta as Upādāna:** The term **Nimitta** (efficient cause) in the core aphorism is taken as an **Upalakṣaṇa** (indicator) for the **Upādāna Kāraṇa (Material Cause)**.
    1. **The Essence:** The material cause of adhyāsa is primarily **Mithyā Jñāna** (Avidyā).
- **Avidyā as Efficient Cause (Nimitta):** Avidyā is not only the material cause; it also acts as the efficient cause in three ways, which the commentator details:
    1. **Doṣatva (As a Defect):** Avidyā's power to **obscure the Self's nature (Āvaraṇa Śakti)** acts as the fundamental defect (doṣa).

2. **Īśvara's Upādhitva (As Adjunct to God):** Avidyā serves as the limiting condition (Upādhi) for **Īśvara** (God, the universal controller). This Upādhi is the reason Īśvara, as the general cause, can facilitate the specific **Ahaṅkāra-Adhyāsa** (ego-superimposition) in individuals.
3. **Pariṇāmitva (As the Basis of Conditions):** Avidyā transforms into the necessary specific conditions: **Saṃskāra** (impressions), **Kāla** (time), and **Karma** (destiny), which serve as the immediate, particular causes for specific adhyāsa instances.

The Self-Luminous Ātman and the Owl Analogy (Page 29)

प्रकाशात्मन्यसङ्गे कथमविद्यासङ्गः, संस्कारादिसामग्र्यभावात् , इति शङ्कानिरासार्थं मिथ्यापदम् । प्रचण्डमार्तण्डमण्डले पेचकानुभवसिद्धान्धकारवत् , अहमज्ञ इत्यनुभवसिद्धमज्ञानं दुरपह्नवम् , कल्पितस्याधिष्ठानास्पर्शित्वात् , नित्यस्वरूपज्ञानस्याविरोधित्वाच्चेति ।

The text now addresses the highest-level paradox: If the Self (Ātman) is self-luminous and unattached, how can it be affected by ignorance (avidyā)?

- **The Twin Objection (śaṃkā dvayam):**
  - How can **Avidyā** exist in the **Sva-prakāśa** (Self-Luminous) Self?
  - How can Avidyā have **Saṅga** (attachment/connection) to the **Asaṅga** (Unattached) Self?
- **The Resolution (Mithyā Padam):** The word **Mithyā** is used precisely to negate the notion that Avidyā is a **real** object or a **real** defect of the Self.
- **The Owl Analogy (Pecaka Anubhava):** The commentator provides the powerful analogy of the owl.
  - Just as the owl **experiences darkness** even when the sun is at its brightest, the individual **experiences ignorance** ("**Aham Ajñaḥ**"—**I am ignorant**).
  - The existence of Ajñāna is a fact of **direct, subjective experience (Anubhava Siddha)** that cannot be intellectually refuted. Since it is experienced, it exists for the jīva; since the Self is Sva-prakāśa, that ignorance must be **Mithyā** (sublatable/false) and not real.
  - **Ajñāna is Durapahnavam** (cannot be denied/removed by logic).

The Unattached Nature of Ātman: The **ātman** remains **asaṅga** (unattached) to **avidyā** (**ajñāna**) or **adhyāsa** (superimposition) because:

- **Kalpitasya adhiṣṭhāna asparśitvāt**: The superimposed (**kalpita**) object (like **ahaṅkāra**) can never touch or affect the **adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum, the **ātman**).
- **Nitya svarūpa jñānasya avirodhitvāc**: The nature of eternal knowledge (Brahman) does not contradict the presence of **ajñāna**.

Nitya Jñāna vs. Anitya Jñāna

Nature of Knowledge (Jñāna):

- **Nitya Jñāna (Eternal Knowledge):** This is **Brahman**—the **nitya-jñāna-svarūpa** (the very nature of eternal knowledge). This is the **mukhya** (primary) meaning of **jñāna**.
- **Anitya Jñāna (Transient Knowledge):** This is the **vṛtti jñāna** (knowledge as modification of thought), like **ghaṭa-jñāna** (pot-knowledge), which is the reflection of **caitanya** (consciousness) on the antaḥkaraṇa. This is **aupacārika** (formal/secondary) knowledge.

Removal of Ajñāna:

- **Ajñāna** is destroyed only by **anitya jñāna** (transient knowledge), specifically the **brahmākāra vṛtti** (the mental modification that takes the form of Brahman with Brahman as the **viṣaya**).
- **Nitya Jñāna** cannot destroy **ajñāna** because:
    - **Brahman** is the **āśraya** (locus) of **ajñāna** (in the **Vivaraṇa** view).
    - **Nitya Jñāna** is the **prakāśaka** (illuminator) of **ajñāna** ("**aham ajñaḥ**").

Locus (āśraya) and Object (viṣaya) of Avidyā: The famous statement from **Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka** is quoted:

आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचितिरेव केवला।
पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचरः ॥१.३१९

āśrayatvaviṣayatvabhāginī nirvibhāgacitireva kevalā|
pūrvasiddhatamaso hi paścimo nāśrayo bhavati nāpi gocaraḥ || 1.319

The indivisible (**nir-vibhāga**) consciousness (**citiḥ**) alone (**kevalā**) is the locus (**āśrayatva**) and the object (**viṣayatva**) of ignorance. The Consciousness that is conditioned by adjuncts (**upahita cetana**), being itself a product (**paścimo)** of ignorance, can be neither the substratum nor the object (**nāśrayo bhavati nāpi gocaraḥ)** of the already existent ignorance **(pūrvasiddhatamaso)**.

Definition (Lakṣaṇa) of Ajñāna (Page 30)

यद्वा अज्ञानं ज्ञानाभाव इति शङ्कानिरासार्थं मिथ्यापदम् । मिथ्यात्वे सति साक्षाज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वमज्ञानस्य लक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानपदेनोक्तम् । ज्ञानेनेच्छाप्रागभावः साक्षान्निवर्त्यत इति वदन्तं प्रति मिथ्यात्वे सतीत्युक्तम् । अज्ञाननिवृत्तिद्वारा ज्ञाननिवर्त्यबन्धेऽतिव्याप्तिनिरासाय साक्षादिति ।

- The qualification of **ajñāna** with **mithyā** asserts it as **bhāva-rūpa** (a positive entity), rejecting the Nyāya view of it as mere **jñāna abhāva** (non-existence).

1. Mithyātve sati sākṣāt jñāna nivartyatvam

- Mithyātve Sati (Being Mithyā): Added to prevent ativyāpti (over-application) to icchā prāg-abhāva (prior non-existence of desire). The prāg-abhāva is abhāva-rūpa (non-existent), and thus not mithyā.
- **Sākṣāt Jñāna Nivartyatvam** (Directly removable by knowledge): Added to prevent **ativyāpti** to **ajñāna-kārya** (effects of ignorance) like **bandha** (bondage) or **rajju-sarpa** (rope-snake).
- **Bandha** is **jñāna-nivṛtya** (removed by knowledge) only **indirectly** (**ajñāna nivṛtti dvāra**), whereas **ajñāna** itself is removed **sākṣāt** (directly).

2. Anādi upādānatve sati mithyātvaṃ (Alternative Lakṣaṇa) (Page 30)

अनाद्युपादानत्वे सति मिथ्यात्वं वा लक्षणम् । ब्रह्मनिरासार्थं मिथ्यात्वमिति । मृदादिनिरासार्थमनादीति । अविद्यात्मनोः सम्बन्धनिरासार्थमुपादानत्वे सतीति ।

- **Mithyātvaṃ** (**Being Mithyā**): Excludes **Brahman**, which is **anādi** and **upādāna**, but not **mithyā** (it is **satyam**).
- **Anādi** (**Beginningless**): Excludes **mṛttikā** (clay) and other **vyāvahārika upādāna** (empirical material causes), which are **mithyā** and **upādāna** but are **not anādi**.
- **Upādānatve Sati** (**Being a Material Cause**): Excludes the **saṃbandha** (relationship/yoga) between **avidyā** and **ātman** (**avidyā-citoryogaḥ**). This relationship is **anādi** and **mithyā** but is a **nimitta-kāraṇa** (efficient cause), not the **upādāna-kāraṇa** (material cause).

Six beginningless (anādi) according to Vedanta

जीव ईशो विशुद्धाचित् तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा | अविद्या तच्चितोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः ||

jīva īśo viśuddhācit tathā jīveśayorbhidā |
avidyā taccitoryogaḥ ṣaḍasmākamanādayaḥ ||

The jīva (individual soul), īśvara (the Supreme Lord), the pure Consciousness (Brahman), the difference between the jīva and Ishvara, avidya (ignorance), and the connection between avidya and Consciousness - these six, according to us (followers of Vedanta), are beginningless (without a beginning in time).

Reinforcing Adhyāsa (Superimposition) (Page 30)

सम्प्रति अध्यासं द्रढयितुमभिलषति - अहमिदं ममेदमिति । आध्यात्मिककार्याध्यासेष्वहमिति प्रथमोऽध्यासः । न चाधिष्ठानारोप्यांशद्वयानुपलम्भात् नायमध्यास इति वाच्यम् , अयो दहतीतिवदहमुपलभ इति दृग्दृश्यांशयोरुपलम्भात् ।

- **Aham idam mamedam**: This **naisargika loka-vyavahāra** (natural common usage) is the proof for **adhyāsa**.
- **Kārya Adhyāsa** and **Kāraṇa Adhyāsa**:
    - **Kāraṇa Adhyāsa** (Causal Superimposition): The **adhyāsa** of **avidyā** on **ātman**.
    - **Kārya Adhyāsa** (Effectual Superimposition): **Aham** (**ahaṅkāra**/Ego) is the **prathama adhyāsa** (first superimposition/effect of **ajñāna**).
- **Implied Dual Elements in Adhyāsa**:
    - The objection that **Aham** cannot be **adhyāsa** because it lacks the dual elements **adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum) and **āropya** (superimposed element) is refuted by analogy:
    - **Analogy: Ayō dahati** (The iron burns) implies both the iron (**ayas**) and the fire (**agni**).
    - **Application: Aham upalabhē** (I perceive) implies the presence of the **dṛk aṃśa** (the Seer/Subject, **ātman**) and the **dṛśya aṃśa** (the Seen/Object, the **bhogya saṃghāta** or the complex of objects of enjoyment).

Resolution on Aham (I-ness) Adhyāsa

- **Pūrvapakṣī's Query**: In the adhyāsa "**Aham** manuṣya" (I am a man) or just "**Aham**" (I-ness), which is a kārya adhyāsa (effect superimposition), where is the second element (the āropya part) found?
- **The Siddhānta (Conclusion) Example**: The example is given:
    - **Ayo dahati itivat aham upalabhe iti dṛgdṛśyāṃśayorupalambhāt**
    - Just as "I hear" (where the self is not the actual hearer but identifies with the ear), in "I experience" (aham upalabhe), the experience is of the seen element (dṛśya), which is the **ego** (ahaṅkāra).
    - **Interpretation**: "**Aham upalabhe**" means "I am experiencing the **ego** (ahaṅkāra)."
- **Classification of Adhyāsa**:
    - Avidyā (Ignorance) is the **Kāraṇa Adhyāsa** (Causal Superimposition).
    - Ahaṅkāra (Ego) Adhyāsa is the **Kārya Adhyāsa** (Effect Superimposition), as the ego is the first product (prathama vikāra) of Avidyā.
- **Conjungtion of Ātman and Ahaṅkāra**:
    - “चिदात्मादि अहंकार संपृक्ततया अवभासते अहंकारोऽपि चिदात्मनि संवलिततया अवभासते” **“cidātmādi ahaṃkāra saṃpṛktatayā avabhāsate ahaṃkāro'pi cidātmani saṃvalitatayā avabhāsate”**

- **Meaning**: The luminous Self (cidātman) is always perceived with the ego (ahaṅkāra), and the ego is perceived as mingled with the luminous Self.
- The two (**Self** and **Ego**) are always together in the waking and dream states. In deep sleep (suṣupti), the Ego is absent, but the **Consciousness** (Caitanya) **Self** remains.
- Thus, even in "**Aham upalabhe**" there are two elements:
  - The Seer (**dṛk**): **Ātman** (Self)
  - The Seen (**dṛśya**): **Ahaṅkāra** (Ego)

Tādātmyā Adhyāsa and Saṃsarga Adhyāsa (Two Types of Superimposition) (Page 30)

इदं पदेन भोग्यः सङ्घात उच्यते । अत्राहमिदमित्यनेन मनुष्योऽहमिति तादात्म्याध्यासो दर्शितः । ममेदं शरीरमिति संसर्गाध्यासः ॥

- The term **idam** (this) is taken from the example given in the Bhāṣya (commentary): "**Aham idam**" (I am this) and "**Mama idam**" (This is mine).
- The term **idam** refers to the **aggregate of enjoyable objects** (bhogya saṅghāta), which is the **gross body** (sthūla śarīra) and everything beyond it.

Siddhānta clarifies how two types of adhyāsa are shown in the common experience:

Type of Adhyāsa	Statement	Elements Superimposed	Description
Tādātmya Adhyāsa (Identity)	**Aham manuṣyaḥ /Aham idam** (I am a man)	The Self (**Ātman**) and the Body (**Śarīra**) are seen as one.	Identity (**tādātmya**) is shown.
Saṃsarga Adhyāsa (Contact/Connection)	**Mama idam śarīram** (This body is mine)	The Self's ownership (**mama**) of the Body (**śarīra**) is shown.	Connection (**saṃsarga**) is shown.

A. Elaboration on Tādātmya Adhyāsa

- **Tādātmya Adhyāsa** means unity (**abheda**) that tolerates difference (**bheda sahiṣṇu abheda**).
  - There is an element of difference (**bheda**) and an element of non-difference (**abheda**).

- **Example**: The use of a quality (**guṇa**) with a substance (**dravya**) in the same grammatical case (**sāmānādhikaraṇya**).
    - **Pītaḥ paṭaḥ** (Yellow cloth):
        - **Abheda Aṃśa** (Element of Non-Difference): **Pītaḥ** (yellow) and **paṭaḥ** (cloth) are used in **sāmānādhikaraṇya** (same case). **Pītaḥ** here means "**pīta-vān**" (possessing yellowness), implying unity with the cloth.
    - **Paṭasya rūpaṃ pītam** (The color of the cloth is yellow):
        - **Bheda Aṃśa** (Element of Difference): The use of the possessive sixth case (**ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti - paṭasya**) shows **difference** (**bheda**), as the cloth (**paṭa**) is distinct from the color (**pīta**). The relationship (**sambandha**) always exists between two distinct entities.

B. Elaboration on Saṃsarga Adhyāsa

- Saṃsarga Adhyāsa is the superimposition of a **connection** or **relationship** (sambandha).
- The relationship of **"mine"** (mama) with the body (śarīra) is superimposed, even though in reality, there is **no actual relationship** between the pure Self and the body.

Resolution of the Pūrvapakṣī's Objection (Page 31)

ननु देहात्मनोस्तादात्म्यमेव संसर्ग इति तयोः को भेद इति चेत् , सत्यम् । सत्तैक्ये सति मिथो भेदस्तादात्म्यम् । तत्र मनुष्योऽहमित्यैक्यांशभानं ममेदमिति भेदांशरूपसंसर्गभानमिति भेदः ।

Pūrvapakṣī: Isn't the tādātmya (identity) between the body (deha) and the Self (ātman) the same as saṃsarga (connection)? What is the difference between the two?

Siddhānta: **Satyam** (It is true) – the two are related, but the focus is different.

- **Lakṣaṇa of Tādātmya**: **Sattaikye sati mitho bheda tādātmyam**
    - When there is **unity of locus** (**Sattaikye** - understood as sāmānādhikaraṇya or sharing the same locus) and **mutual difference** (mitho bheda), that is tādātmya.
    - **Illustration in Adhyāsa**:
        - **Manuṣyaḥ aham**: Here, the **unity** element (aikyāṃśa) is more prominent.
        - **Mama idam**: Here, the **difference** element (bhedāṃśa) is more prominent, indicating a relationship (sambandha), hence saṃsarga.
- Both "**Aham idam**" and "**Mama idam**" are adhyasta (superimposed) and are established by our common experience (anubhava siddha).

Conclusion (Upasaṃhāra) and Rationale for the Śāstra (Page 31)

एवं सामग्रीसत्त्वादनुभवसत्त्वादध्यासोऽस्तीत्यतो ब्रह्मात्मैक्ये विरोधाभावेन विषयप्रयोजनयोः सत्त्वात्शास्त्रमारम्भणीयमिति सिद्धान्तभाष्यतात्पर्यम् ।

The ṭīkākāra concludes the section, establishing the need for the study of Brahma Sūtra.

Since the **requisite conditions** (sāmagrī - including anubhava-janya-saṃskāra / impression from experience) are present, and the **experience** (anubhava - i.e., aham idam, mama idam) is evident, **superimposition** (adhyāsa) **exists**. Therefore, due to the **absence of contradiction** in the **unity of Brahman and Ātman** (brahmātmaikya virodhābhāvena), and the **presence of the subject matter** (viṣaya) and **goal** (prayojana), the study of **scripture** (śāstra) **must be begun**. This is the purport of the Siddhānta Bhāṣya.

Why does the Adhyāsa establish Brahma-Ātmaikya (Unity)?

- The existence of adhyāsa proves that the entire universe (brahmāṇḍa) is **superimposed** and thus **false** (mithyā).
- If everything other than the **Ātman** is superimposed, there is **no real limiting adjunct** (paricchedaka) of the **Ātman** (neither in space, time, nor substance).
- Since **Ātman** is not limited, it is **infinite** (ananta). The definition of **Brahman** is the **infinite**. Therefore, **Ātman is Brahman**, and there is **no contradiction** (avirodha) in their unity.

Subject and Goal (Viṣaya and Prayojana)

- **Viṣaya (Subject Matter)**: The established **unity of Brahman and Ātman**.
- **Prayojana (Goal)**: The **removal of bondage** (bandha nivṛtti). Since bondage is **false** (mithyā - due to adhyāsa), it can be removed merely by **knowledge** (jñāna), which the śāstra imparts.

Structure of the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya and the Lakṣaṇa (Page 31)

एवं च सूत्रेणार्थात्सूचिते विषयप्रयोजने प्रतिपाद्य तद्धेतुमध्यासं लक्षणसम्भावनाप्रमाणैः साधयितुं लक्षणं पृच्छति - आहेति ।

- The structure of the bhāṣya is based on the requirement for establishing any entity: **Lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyāṃ vastu siddhiḥ** (An entity is established by its definition and proof). Here, **possibility** (sambhāvanā) is also included to counter the Pūrvapakṣī.
- Thus, the sūtra (**Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā**) through postulation (arthāt) suggests the subject and goal. To establish adhyāsa, which is the cause of both, by **definition** (lakṣaṇa), **possibility** (sambhāvanā), and **proof** (pramāṇa), the definition is now requested.

Asking for the Lakṣaṇa

किंलक्षणकोऽध्यास इत्याह । पूर्ववादीत्यर्थः । अस्य शास्त्रस्य तत्त्वनिर्णयप्रधानत्वेन वादकथात्वद्योतनार्थमाहेति परोक्तिः ।

The question is raised using the particle **Āha** (he said/says), which in the context of the śāstra is taken as a **parokti** (someone else's statement, e.g., a śiṣya or pūrvavādī).

- **Āha**: **Ko**yaṃ **adhyāso** nāma **iti** (What is this thing called adhyāsa?)
- **Kiṃ lakṣaṇo adhyāsaḥ** (What characteristic/definition does adhyāsa possess?)

The Three Divisions of the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya

‘आह’ इत्यादि ‘कथं पुनःप्रत्यगात्मनि’ इत्यतः प्रागध्यासलक्षणपरं भाष्यम् । तदारभ्य सम्भावनापरम् । "तमेतमविद्याख्यम्" इत्यारभ्य "सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः" इत्यन्तं प्रमाणपरमिति विभागः ।

Division	Sanskrit Section (Starting and Ending Point)	Purpose
1. **Lakṣaṇa** (Definition)	From “**Āha**” up to “**ekaścandraḥ sadvitīyavaditi**”.	Establishes the Definition of Adhyāsa.
2. **Sambhāvanā** (Possibility)	From “**kathaṃ punaḥ**” up to “**aṇumātreṇāpi sa na sambadhyate**”.	Establishes the Possibility of Adhyāsa.
3. **Pramāṇa** (Proof)	From “**tametamavidyākhyam**” up to “**sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ**” .	Establishes the Proof of Adhyāsa based on universal experience.

Lakṣaṇa of Adhyāsa (Page 32)

लक्षणमाह - उच्यते - स्मृतिरूप इति । अध्यास इत्यनुषङ्गः ।

अध्यासलक्षणम् - “आह — कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति । उच्यते — स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः ।”

The definition is then presented by the Bhāṣyakāra (commentator):

- **Smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ**
- **Full Statement with Anuṣaṅga (close connection)**: **Smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ adhyāsaḥ** (The superimposition is the appearance of a previously perceived object in another place, in the form of a recollection).

Overview of the Lakṣaṇa Terms

- **Pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ (Appearance of a Previously Perceived Object)**
  - **Avabhāsyate iti Avabhāsaḥ** (The object that appears/is illuminated) - **Rajata** (Silver), the superimposed **object** (artha). This is **Arthādhyāsa** (Object Superimposition).
  - **Avabhāsanam Avabhāsaḥ** (The act of appearing/illumination) - The **knowledge** (jñāna) of silver. This is **Jñānādhyāsa** (Knowledge Superimposition).
- **Smṛti-rūpaḥ (In the form of recollection)**
  - **Smaryate iti Smṛtiḥ** (That object which is recollected) - The **object** (Arthādhyāsa).
  - **Smaraṇaṃ Smṛtiḥ** (The knowledge that is recollected) - The **knowledge** (Jñānādhyāsa).

- **Paratra (In another place)**
    - **Paratra** is the key word, meaning **in an unsuitable locus** (ayogya adhikaraṇa).
    - The silver (rajata) is appearing in the shell (śukti), an inappropriate location where it does not and cannot exist.

अत्र परत्रावभास इत्येव लक्षणम्, शिष्टं पदद्वयं तदुपपादनार्थम् । तथाहि अवभास्यत इत्यवभासो रजताद्यर्थः तस्यायोग्यमधिकरणं परत्रपदार्थः ।

Key Constituents of the Definition

- **Principal Terms (Mukhya Padāni):**
    - **परत्र (paratra):** "Onto something else" (the substratum or locus).
    - **अवभास (avabhāsaḥ):** "Superimposition" or "Appearance" (the superimposed object).
- **Substantiating Terms (Upapādaka):** These terms support the primary definition.
    - **स्मृति रूपः (smṛti rūpaḥ):** "In the form of memory."
    - **पूर्व दृष्टः (pūrva dṛṣṭaḥ):** "Previously perceived."
- **Elaboration on अवभासः (avabhāsaḥ):**
    - **Subject (Viṣaya):** When derived in the passive voice (avabhāsyate), it denotes the **artha** or **viṣaya** (the object, the superimposed content). This is the **adhyasta viṣaya** (superimposed object), e.g., the silver in the shell-silver illusion.
    - **Knowledge (Jñāna):** When denoting the nature of the appearance (avabhāsanam), it refers to the **jñāna** (knowledge). Since the object does not exist in the locus, the knowledge of it is called **avidyā vṛtti** (a modification of Nescience). This is **jñānādhyāsa** (superimposition of knowledge).
- **Elaboration on परत्र (paratra):**
    - The term **paratra** refers to the **adhikaraṇam** (locus/substratum), which is specified as an **ayogyam adhikaraṇam** (unfit/incompetent locus).
    -

The Unfit Locus (Adhikaraṇasya Ayogyatvam) (Page 11)

अधिकरणस्यायोग्यत्वमारोप्यात्यन्ताभावत्वं तद्वत्वं वा ।

The Question of Unfitness

Question: What constitutes the unfitness (**ayogya-tva**) of the locus (**adhikaraṇa**)?

Two Definitional Options

These options reflect the difference between the **Mīmāṃsaka (Bhāṭṭa)** school and the **Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika** school regarding the nature of **Abhāva** (absence).

1. **Mīmāṃsaka/Bhāṭṭa View (Advaita Accepted):**
    - **आरोप्य अत्यंताभावत्वम् (āropya atyantābhāvatvam)**
    - Unfitness is the nature of being the absolute absence (**atyantābhāva**) of the superimposed thing (**āropya**).

- **Concept: Absence (abhāva) is identical with the locus (adhikaraṇa)**. Example: The rope (**rajju**) is the absolute absence of the snake (**sarpa atyantābhāva**).

2. **Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View:**
   - **तद्वत्वम् (tad-vat-tvam)**, meaning **आरोप्य अत्यंताभाववत्त्वम् (āropya atyantābhāvavattvam)**
   - Unfitness is the **nature of possessing (vattva) the absolute absence** of the superimposed thing.
   - **Concept:** Absence is distinct from the locus. The ground (**bhūtalam**) possesses the absence of a pot (**ghaṭābhāva-vat**) but is not the absence itself.

Vedānta Siddhānta: Vedāntins accept the **Bhāṭṭa** view for transactional reality (**vyavahāra**).(As per the commonly accepted aphorism "व्यवहारे तु भाट्टाः" - "vyavahāre tu bhāṭṭāḥ")

The Refined Definition of Adhyasta-tva (Page 32)

तथा चैकावच्छेदेन स्वसंसृज्यमाने स्वात्यन्ताभाववति अवभास्यत्वमध्यस्तत्वमित्यर्थः । इदं च साद्यनाद्यध्याससाधारणं लक्षणम् ।

The refined definition of **adhyastatva** (the nature of being superimposed) is:

Translation: The nature of being superimposed (**adhyastatvam**) is the appearance (**avabhāsyatva**) of a thing (**sva**) in a locus that possesses the absolute absence (**sva-atyantābhāva-vatī**) of that very thing, occurring **simultaneously** (**sva-saṃsṛjyamāne**) and under a **single condition/delimiter** (**eka-avacchedena**).

- **Core Part: (svātyantābhāvavati avabhāsyatvam adhyastatvam)**
  - **Example (Shell-Silver): Rajata** (silver) is adhyasta and has **adhyastatva** because it appears and has the appearance (**avabhāsyatva**) in the shell (**śukti**) which possesses the absolute absence of silver (**sva atyantābhāva-vati**).

Sādi and Anādi Adhyāsa
The provided definition is applicable to both types of superimposition:

1. **Sādi Adhyāsa (With Beginning):** Has a discernible beginning.
   - **Examples: Śukti-rajata** (shell-silver), **rajju-sarpa** (rope-snake).
2. **Anādi Adhyāsa (Beginning-less):** Has no beginning.
   - **Examples: Avidyā** (Nescience) and **Ahaṃkāra** (Egoity) – the superimposition of the ahaṃkāra onto the ātmā (Self).
   - **Locus of Ahaṃkāra: Ātmatva-avacchedena** (the Self-as-delimited by Self-ness).

- The ahaṃkāra itself is **arthādhyāsa** (superimposition of the object), and the knowledge of the ahaṃkāra is **jñānādhyāsa** (superimposition of knowledge).

Refinement Terms and Their Purpose (Nirāsa - Averting Flaws)

संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिनिरासायैकावच्छेदेनेति । संयोगस्य स्वसंसृज्यमाने वृक्षे स्वात्यन्ताभाववत्यवभास्यत्वेऽपि स्वात्यन्ताभावयोर्मूलाग्रावच्छेदकभेदान्नातिव्याप्तिः । पूर्वं स्वाभाववति भूतले पश्चादानीतो घटो भातीति घटेऽतिव्याप्तिनिरासाय स्वसंसृज्यमान इति पदम् , तेन स्वाभावकाले प्रतियोगिसंसर्गस्य विद्यमानतोच्यते इति नातिव्याप्तिः । भूत्वावच्छेदेनावभास्यगन्धेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्वात्यन्ताभाववतीति पदम् । शुक्ताविदन्त्वावच्छेदेन रजतसंसर्गकालेऽत्यन्ताभावोऽस्तीति नाव्याप्तिः ।

Refinement Term	Flaw Averted	Philosophical Concept	Explanation
एकावच्छेदेन (ekāvacchedena)	**Ativyāpti** (Over-application) to **saṃyoga** (conjunction).	**Avyāpya-vṛtti** (non-pervading entities)**.**	A single tree (locus) can have kapi saṃyoga (monkey conjunction) in the branch (śākhā-avaccheda) and absence of conjunction in the root (mūla-avaccheda). This term ensures we only consider a single condition/delimiter for both presence and absence.
स्वसंसृज्यमाने (svasaṃsṛjyamāne)	**Ativyāpti** (Over-application) to a Pot on the ground (**bhūtale ghaṭa**).	Simultaneity of appearance and absence.	If a pot is absent now but brought later, its later appearance is not considered mithyā (false). This term means the object must appear at the very moment it is absolutely absent.
स्व अत्यंताभाववति (sva-atyantābhāva-vati)	**Ativyāpti** to **Gandha** (Odor) in **Pṛthivī** (Earth).	Restricting absence to the object's own nature (sva).	Odor (Gandha) pervades Earth (Pṛthivī). Without sva, the definition could apply to Odor appearing in Earth, which is the locus of the atyantābhāva of ākaśa (space), erroneously making Odor mithyā. Sva restricts the absence to the object's own absence.

Pūrvapakṣa: Impossibility of the Lakṣaṇa, resulting in Anyathā Khyāti (Page 33-34)

नन्वस्य लक्षणस्यासम्भवः, शुक्तौ रजतस्य सामग्र्यभावेन संसर्गासत्वात् । न च स्मर्यमाणसत्यरजतस्यैव परत्र शुक्तावबभास्यत्वेनाध्यस्तत्वोक्तिरिति वाच्यम् , अन्यथाख्यातिप्रसङ्गादित्यत आह - स्मृतिरूप इति ।

The opponent (**Pūrvapakṣa**) argues that the definition is impossible (**Asambhava**) because the shell (**śukti**) lacks the causal material (**sāmagrī abhāvena**) for silver's connection (**saṃsarga**), thus there is no real connection (**saṃsarga asattvāt**).

Objection: You should not say that the superimposed entity is merely the appearance (**avabhāsa**) of a true (previously seen) object (**smaryamāna satya rajatasya**) in another place (**paratra**), because doing so would lead to the acceptance of **Anyathā Khyāti** (**otherwise perception**).

- **Significance:** The debate centers on the theory of error (**Khyāti**):
    - **Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: Anyathā Khyāti** (Error is perceiving the property of one object where it belongs to another).
    - **Vedānta Siddhānta: Anirvacanīya Khyāti** (Error is the perception of an indescribable entity that is neither truly existent nor non-existent).

The Advaita-Siddhānta uses the term **स्मृति रूप (smṛti rūpa)** in the definition precisely to counter **Anyathā Khyāti** and defend its own theory of **Anirvacanīya Khyāti**. It indicates that the illusory silver is **similar** to the remembered silver, not identical nor the actual remembered silver perceived via **jñāna lakṣaṇā sannikarṣa**.

The Pañca Khyāti (Five Theories of Error)

The **Khyātis** are the classical Indian philosophical debates concerning the nature of **error (bhrama)**, specifically addressing the illusion of perceiving a snake in a rope (**rajju-sarpa**) or silver in a shell (**śukti-rajata**).

The five major theories are listed in the verse:

आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा ।
तथाऽनिर्वचनख्यातिरित्येतत्ख्यातिपञ्चकम् ॥

ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā |
tathā'nirvacanakhyātirityetatkhyātipañcakam ||

Dārśanikas	Khyāti	Reasoning for the falsity of silver which appears in the shell
Tārkikas, Kaumārilas	Anyathākhyāti	Impossibility of perceived existence in another place
Vijñānavādins	Ātmakhyāti	Impossibility of perceived existence in the intellect
Śūnyavādins	Asatkhyāti	Impossibility of experience if there is nothingness
Prābhākaras	Akhyāti	Impossibility of negation if it exists in the absence of delusion
Vedāntins	Anirvacanīyakhyāti	Perceived yet negated (not real, unreal, or both) therefore the shell-silver is indescribable

Elaboration of the Upapādaka Terms **(Page 34)**

Analysis of "Smṛti Rūpaḥ" (Having the Form of Memory)

स्मर्यते इति स्मृतिः सत्यरजतादिः तस्य रूपमिव रूपमस्येति स्मृतिरूपः । स्मर्यमाणसदृश इत्यर्थः । सादृश्योक्त्या स्मर्यमाणादारोप्यस्य भेदात् , नान्यथाख्यातिरित्युक्तं भवति ।

- Derivation of **"Smṛti"**:
  - **"Smaryate iti smṛtiḥ"** (That which is remembered is **smṛti**).
  - The term **"smṛti"** here refers to the **object of memory** (smaraṇasya viṣayaḥ), which is the **"satya rajata ādi"** (real silver, etc.) experienced elsewhere.

- Meaning of **"Smṛti Rūpaḥ"**:
    - It is an **Upamāna Pūrvapada Bahuvrīhi** compound: **"tasya rūpam iva rūpam asya iti smṛti rūpaḥ"** (That whose form is like the form of the object of memory is **smṛti rūpaḥ**).
    - **Interpretation:** The superimposed object (illusory silver) is **"smaryamāṇa sadṛśaḥ"** (similar to the object of memory, i.e., real silver).
- **Countering Anyathā Khyāti**:
    - The **"sādṛśya"** (similarity) mentioned by the term **"smṛti rūpaḥ"** implies **difference**: **"smaryamānāt āropyasya bhedāt"** (because the superimposed object is different from the object of memory). This confirms that the Vedantin's view is not **anyathā khyāti**.

Analysis of "Pūrva Dṛṣṭa" (Previously Experienced)

सादृश्यमुपपादयति - पूर्वदृष्टेति । दृष्टं दर्शनम् , संस्कारद्वारा पूर्वदर्शनादवभास्यत इति पूर्वदृष्टावभासः । तेन संस्कारजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्मर्यमाणारोप्ययोः सादृश्यमुक्तं भवति, स्मृत्यारोपयोः संस्कारजन्यत्वात् ।

- Derivation of **"Dṛṣṭa"**:
    - **"Dṛṣṭam darśanam"** (Seeing is the act of cognition—**jñānam**), derived using the **lyuṭ** suffix.
- Meaning of **"Pūrva Dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ"**:
    - It specifies the **cause** of the illusory appearance: **"pūrva darśanāt saṃskāra dvārā avabhāsate iti pūrva dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ"** (That which appears through the **saṃskāra** (residual trace) due to prior cognition/experience).
    - **The Sādṛśya (Similarity):** The similarity between the object of memory (**smaryamāṇa**) and the superimposed object (**āropya**) is defined as being the object of cognition generated by **saṃskāra**: **"saṃskāra janya jñāna viṣayatvam smaryamāṇa āropyayoḥ sādṛśyam uktam bhavati"**.

Distinction between Smṛti (Memory) and Āropa (Illusion) (Page 34-35)

न च संस्कारजन्यत्वादारोपस्य स्मृतित्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् , दोषसम्प्रयोगजन्यत्वस्यापि विवक्षितत्वेन संस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वाभावात् । अत्र सम्प्रयोगशब्देन अधिष्ठानसामान्यज्ञानमुच्यते, अहङ्काराध्यासे इन्द्रियसम्प्रयोगालाभात् । एवं च दोषसम्प्रयोगसंस्कारबलाच्छुक्त्यादौ रजतमुत्पन्नमस्तीति परत्रावभास्यत्वलक्षणमुपपन्नमिति स्मृतिरूपपूर्वदृष्टपदाभ्यामुपपादितम् ।

- Both memory and illusion are **saṃskāra janya** (generated by **saṃskāra**). The text asks why illusion (**āropa**) isn't considered memory (**smṛti**), which would lead to the **"smṛtitvāpatti"** objection.
- **The Difference:**
    - **Smṛti** is **"saṃskāra mātra janya"** (generated only by **saṃskāra**).
    - **Āropa** (illusion) is **not** saṃskāra mātra janya because it requires two additional factors: **"doṣa saṃprayoga janyatvasya api vivakṣitatvāt"** (due to the necessity of being generated by defect and contact as well).
- **The Additional Factors for Āropa**:

    - **Doṣa** (Defect): Defects in the eyes, other sense organs, or external conditions (e.g., poor light).
    - **Saṃprayoga** (Contact): Here, it means the **"adhiṣṭhāna sāmānya jñānam"** (the general knowledge of the substratum).
        - Example: For the shell/silver illusion, one must have the general knowledge: **"atra kiñcit asti"** (Something exists here—the **sattā** or existence aspect).
- **Application to Superimposition of the Ego (Ahaṅkārādhyāsa):**
    - The general knowledge of the substratum (the Self/ **Ātman**) is still available, even though **"indriya saṃprayoga alābhāt"** (sense-contact is not available).
    - The Self is known as **"sākṣāt aparokṣa"** (directly manifest), making the **Adhyāsa** of the ego onto the Self possible.
- **Conclusion:** The definition is sound: The appearance in a different entity (**"paratra avabhāsaḥ"**) is substantiated through the power of the three causes: **"evaṃ ca doṣa saṃprayoga saṃskāra balāt śuktyadau rajatam utpannam asti iti paratra avabhāsyatva lakṣaṇam upapannam"** (Thus, by the power of defect, contact, and **saṃskāra**, silver is produced in the shell, and the definition of **paratra avabhāsyatva** is established).

Alternative Interpretations (Page 35)

अन्ये तु ताभ्यां दोषादित्रयजन्यत्वं कार्याध्यासलक्षणमुक्तमित्याहुः ।

Alternative 1 (Anye Tu): Focuses on **kāryādhyāsa** (effect-superimposition).

- **Definition: "doṣaditraya janyatvam kāryādhyāsa lakṣaṇam uktam"** (The effect-superimposition is defined as being generated by the trio of causes (**doṣa, saṃprayoga, saṃskāra**)).

अपरे तु स्मृतिरूपः स्मर्यमाणसदृशः, सादृश्यं च प्रमाणाजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्मृत्यारोपयोः प्रमाणाजन्यत्वात् । पूर्वदृष्टपदतज्जातीयपरम् , अभिनवरजतादेः पूर्वदृष्टत्वाभावात् ।

Alternative 2 (Apare Tu): Defining **Arthādhyāsa** (Object Superimposition).

- **Interpretation: "pūrva dṛṣṭa padam tajjātīya param"** (The term **pūrva dṛṣṭa** refers to something of the same class/genus).
- **Smṛti Rūpa** is interpreted as "**smaryamāna sadṛśa**" (similar to what is remembered). **Smaryamāna** (**smaryamāna**) is the **viṣaya** (object/entity) that is superimposed (e.g., the silver).
- **Reasoning:** The illusory silver is **"abhinava rajata"** (newly produced) and thus lacks **"pūrva dṛṣṭatva abhāva"** (absence of being previously experienced). Therefore, **"pūrva dṛṣṭa"** must mean something that shares the same **jāti** (e.g., silverness) as the object previously seen in the market (**haṭṭa**).
- The knowledge that constitutes **smṛti** (memory) and **āropa** (superimposition) is not generated by valid means of knowledge (**pramāṇa**).

- **Quote: "Smṛty āropayoḥ pramāṇājanyatvāt"** (Because memory and superimposition are not produced by **pramāṇa**).

Refining the Definition of Prātītika Adhyāsa (Apparent Superimposition)

तथा च प्रमाणाजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वे सति पूर्वदृष्टजातीयत्वं प्रातीतिकाध्यासलक्षणं ताभ्यामुक्तम् ।
परत्रावभासशब्दाभ्यामध्यासमात्रलक्षणं व्याख्यातमेव ।

- **The term Pūrvadṛṣṭa (pūrvadṛṣṭa):** The word **pūrvadṛṣṭa** (previously perceived) is meant to convey "**tajjātīya param**" (of that class/species).
    - **Reason:** "**Abhinava rajatādeḥ pūrvadṛṣṭatva abhāvācca**". The newly superimposed silver (**abhinava rajatādeḥ**) was not literally **pūrvadṛṣṭa** (seen before).
- **Refined Definition (as stated by "apare tu" some others):**
    - "**tathā ca pramāṇājanyajñānaviṣayatve sati pūrvadṛṣṭajātīyatvaṃ prātītikādhyāsalakṣaṇaṃ tābhyāmuktam** " (Thus, being the object of knowledge not generated by **pramāṇa**, while also belonging to the class of what was previously perceived—this is stated by those two (**smṛti rūpa** and **pūrvadṛṣṭa**) to be the definition of **prātītika adhyāsa**).
    - **Condition 1:** The object must be the **viṣaya** (object) of knowledge not produced by **pramāṇa** (**pramāṇājanya jñāna viṣayatva**).
    - **Condition 2:** The object must be of the class of what was previously perceived (**pūrvadṛṣṭa jātīyatva**).
- **The Adhyāsa Mātra (Mere Superimposition) Definition:**
    - "**Paratra avabhāsa śabdābhyām adhyāsa mātra lakṣaṇaṁ vyākhyātam eva**". The words "**paratra avabhāsa**" (appearance elsewhere) by themselves serve as the definition of **adhyāsa mātra** (superimposition in general).

Avoiding Ativyāpti (Over-extension) of the Definition
तत्र स्मर्यमाणगङ्गादौ अभिनवघटे चातिव्याप्तिनिरासाय प्रमाणेत्यादि पदद्वयमित्याहुः ।

"**Tatra smaryamāṇa gaṅgādau abhinava ghaṭe ca ativyāpti nirāsāya pramāṇa ityādi padadvayam**" (There, in the case of the remembered **Gaṅgā**, etc., and the new pot, to negate over-extension, the two terms starting with **pramāṇa**, etc., are added).

- **The Problem of Ativyāpti:** If only "**paratra avabhāsa**" is the definition, it would apply to cases that are not **adhyāsa**.
- **Example 1: Smaryamāṇa Gaṅgā (Remembered Ganga):**
    - When one remembers the **Gaṅgā** from yesterday, it is the object of knowledge not produced by **pramāṇa** (memory is not a **pramāṇa**).
    - However, it is not **tajjātīya** (of that class); it is the exact same object. The term **jātīya** is used when two individuals are distinct but belong to the same species (e.g., two different pots). The common belief is that it is the same **Gaṅgā**.
    - **How the Refined Definition Guards Against Over-extension:** The second condition, **pūrvadṛṣṭa jātīyatvaṁ**, prevents the definition from applying to **smaryamāṇa gaṅgā**.

- **Example 2: Abhinava Ghaṭa (abhinava ghaṭa - Newly made pot):**
    - A newly made pot belongs to the class of previously seen pots (**pūrvadṛṣṭa jātīya**).
    - However, seeing a newly made pot is **pramāṇa-janya** (produced by valid perception), not **pramāṇa-ajanya**.
    - **How the Refined Definition Guards Against Over-extension:** The first condition, **pramāṇājanya jñāna viṣayatvaṁ**, prevents the definition from applying to **abhinava ghaṭa**.
- **Conclusion:** The two added conditions (**pramāṇa-ajanya** and **pūrvadṛṣṭa jātīya**) are necessary to restrict the definition of **adhyāsa** correctly.

Applying Adhyāsa Lakṣaṇaṃ to Arthādhyāsa and Jñānādhyāsa

तत्रार्थाध्यासे स्मर्यमाणसदृशः परत्र पूर्वदर्शनादवभास्यत इति योजना । ज्ञानाध्यासे तु स्मृतिसदृशः परत्र पूर्वदर्शनादवभास इति वाक्यं योजनीयमिति सङ्क्षेपः ।

- **Arthādhyāsa** (Object Superimposition): **"Smaryamāṇa sadṛśaḥ paratra pūrvadarśanāt avabhāsyate"** (Similar to what is remembered, on something else, due to previous perception, it appears (**avabhāsyate** - a verbal form, denoting the object)).
    - **Avabhāsyate**: Means "it is manifested/appears." The resulting object/entity is emphasized.
- **Jñānādhyāsa** (Knowledge Superimposition): **"Smṛti sadṛśaḥ paratra pūrvadarśanāt avabhāsanam"** (Similar to memory, on something else, due to previous perception, is the manifestation (**avabhāsanam** - a nominal form, denoting the act/knowledge)).
    - **Avabhāsanam**: Means "the act of manifestation/the appearance." The resulting knowledge/act of appearing is emphasized.
- **Key Differentiating Term: Smaryamāṇa** (remembered) for **arthādhyāsa** and **smṛti** (memory) for **jñānādhyāsa**.

Vādi Vipratipatti (Controversies among the Schools) (Page 35)

ननु अध्यासे वादिविप्रतिपत्तेः कथमुक्तलक्षणसिद्धिरित्याशङ्क्याधिष्ठानारोप्यस्वरूपविवादेऽपि परत्र परावभास इति लक्षणे संवादाद्युक्तिभिः सत्याधिष्ठाने मिथ्यार्थावभाससिद्धेः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त इदं लक्षणमिति मत्वा अन्यथात्मख्यातिवादिनोर्मतमाह - तं केचिदिति ।

तं केचित् अन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यास इति वदन्ति । केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रम इति । अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामाचक्षते । सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति । तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः — शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते, एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति ॥

- The various philosophical schools (**vādī**) have disagreements (**vipratipatti**) regarding the nature of **adhyāsa**.
    - **Objection**: **"Nanu adhyāse vādi vipratipatteḥ"** (But since there is controversy among the schools regarding **adhyāsa**...).
- **Nature of the Controversy:** The disagreement primarily concerns the nature of the **adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum/locus) and the **āropya** (superimposed object).

    - **Controversy 1 (Reality):** Is the **adhiṣṭhāna** Satya (real) or **Mithyā** (illusory)? (e.g., **Śūnyavādin** - Nihilists - would say both are illusory).
    - **Controversy 2 (Consciousness):** Is the **adhiṣṭhāna Jaḍa** (insentient) or **Caitanya** (sentient)? (e.g., **Vedāntins** say the **Ātman** is the true sentient substratum).
    - **Controversy 3 (Location):** Is the **adhiṣṭhāna** in an external location (**deśāntara-niṣṭha**) or within the intellect (**buddhi**)? (e.g., **Vijñānavādin** - Idealists - say the **buddhi** is the substratum).
- **Vedānta's Stance: Vedānta** states that regardless of these controversies **paratra parāvabhāsa** (the appearance of one thing on another) is accepted by all schools.
    - "**Paratra parāvabhāsaḥ iti lakṣaṇe saṁvādādi yuktibhiḥ satyādhiṣṭhāne mithyārthāvabhāsa siddheḥ sarvatantra siddhānte idaṁ lakṣaṇam**" (Even with the controversy on the nature of the **adhiṣṭhāna** and **āropya**, since the appearance of the illusory object on a real substratum is established by arguments like consensus (**saṁvāda**), the definition **paratra parāvabhāsaḥ** is accepted as the tenet of all schools (**sarvatantra siddhānta**)).

Other Khyātis (Theories of Error) - Ātmakhyāti and Anyathākhyāti (Page 36)

केचिदन्यथाख्यातिवादिनोऽन्यत्र शुक्त्यादावन्यधर्मस्य स्वावयवधर्मस्य देशान्तरस्थरूप्यादेरध्यास इति वदन्ति । आत्मख्यातिवादिनस्तु बाह्यशुक्त्यादौ बुद्धिरूपात्मनो धर्मस्य रजतस्याध्यासः, आन्तरस्य रजतस्य बहिर्वदवभास इति वदन्तीत्यर्थः ।

1. Anyathākhyāti (The Otherwise-Apprehension - Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika):

- **Proponents: Nyāya** and **Vaiśeṣika** schools.
- **Definition: Anyatra anyadharmaḥ adhyāsaḥ** (The superimposition of the property of one thing onto another).
- They say that the property (**dharma**) of the silver (e.g., its glittering quality) that exists in a different place (**deśāntara-stha**) is mistakenly seen on the shell (**śukti**).

2. Ātmakhyāti (Self-Apprehension - Yogācāra Bauddha):

- **Proponents: Kṣaṇika Vijñānavādin** (Momentary Idealists).
- **Definition: "Āntarasya rajatasya bahirvat avabhāsaḥ"** (The internal silver appears as if it is external). The external shell is the substratum, but the silver is the superimposition of a property of the **buddhi**-form **ātman** (self/mind).
- **"Bāhya śuktyādau buddhi rūpātmano dharmasya rajatasyādhyāsaḥ"** (Superimposition of the silver, which is a property of the **buddhi**-form self/mind, onto the external shell, etc.).

3. Akhyāti (Non-Apprehension - Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā) (Page 36-37)
अख्यातिमतमाह - केचिदिति । यत्र यस्याध्यासो लोकसिद्धस्तयोरर्थयोस्तद्धियोश्च भेदाग्रहे सति तन्मूलो भ्रमः, इदं रूप्यमिति विशिष्टव्यवहार इति वदन्तीत्यर्थः । तैरपि विशिष्टव्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या विशिष्टभ्रान्तेः स्वीकार्यत्वात् , परत्र परावभाससम्मतिरिति भावः ।

- **Proponents: Prābhākara Mīmāṁsaka**.
- **Definition: Yatra yad adhyāsastad vivekāgraha nibandhano bhramaḥ** (The error (**bhrama**) is caused by the non-apprehension (**viveka-agraha**) of the distinction between the locus (**yatra**) and the superimposed (**yad adhyāsa**)).
- The error is not an illusion (**bhrama**) but a failure of discrimination (**bheda-agraha**).
    - **Two Types of Real Knowledge Occur:**
        1. **Pratyakṣa** (Perception): The perception of the shell (**śukti**) as "this" (**idam**).
        2. **Smaraṇa** (Memory): The memory of silver (**rajata**).
    - **The Error:** One fails to distinguish these two separate types of knowledge, leading to the practical (mis)judgment: "**idaṁ rūpyam**" (This is silver). There is no illusion, only **non-apprehension of the difference** (**bheda-agraha**).
- Despite denying a single false perception, Prābhākara accepts the specific behavior (running to pick up the 'silver') and verbal assertion ("**Idam rūpyam**" - This is silver).
- **Justification:** This specific behavior is inexplicable otherwise (**viśiṣṭa vyavahāra anyathānupattyā**). The behavior necessitates the acceptance of a composite (but not false) cognition ("This-is-silver") in the mind.
- **Pramāṇa (Source of Knowledge): Arthāpatti** (Postulation) is the proof here. The behavior of affirming "**Idam Rūpyam**" (This is silver) is otherwise impossible without a failure to distinguish (**viśiṣṭa bhrānteḥ svīkāryatvāt**), thereby validating the concept of **Vivekāgraha**.

4. Asatkhyāti (Apprehension of the Non-Existent)

शून्यमतमाह - अन्ये त्विति । तस्यैवाधिष्ठानस्य शुक्त्यादेर्विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनां विपरीतो विरुद्धो धर्मो यस्य तद्भावस्तस्य रजतादेरत्यन्तासतः कल्पनामाचक्षत इत्यर्थः ।

(विपरीतधर्मकल्पना - विरुद्धः अत्यन्तासत्वरूपः धर्मः रजतादि यस्य शुक्त्यादेः सः विरुद्धधर्मः तस्य विरुद्धधर्मस्य शुक्त्यादेर्भावो रजतादिः तस्य रजतादेरित्यर्थः |)

- **Proponents: Mādhyamika Śūnyavādins** (Buddhist Nihilists) who categorize Mithyā (false/illusory) as Asat (non-existent). **From Bhāṣya: anye tu yatra yad adhyāsastasya viparīta dharmatva kalpanām ācakṣate** (Others describe that, where one is superimposed upon the other, it is the imagination of a contrary characteristic of the substratum).
- **Core Idea:** All phenomena (including the object and the substratum) are ultimately **Śūnya** (void/non-existent) or **Asat**. The error is the apprehension of a totally non-existent entity.
- The substratum (e.g., **śukti** - shell) is itself unreal (asat), and upon it is superimposed a quality (**viparīta dharma**) that is even more unreal (e.g., **rajata** - silver).
    - The **śukti** has **saṃvṛti satya** (conventional reality/empirical existence), which allows for some artha-kriyākāritvam (capacity to produce an effect/action).
    - The **rajata** (the superimposed object) is **atyanta asat rūpa dharma** (a quality of absolutely non-existent form), with no artha-kriyākāritvam.

    - The error is thus the imagination of the absolutely non-existent silver upon the conventionally real shell.
- Although everything is ultimately Asat (void), the **Śūnyavādins** maintain a distinction between **saṃvṛti satya** (conventional truth) and **pāramārthika satya** (ultimate truth, which is **Śūnya**). Their moral and ritualistic life, like adherence to **Dharmādharma** (merit and demerit), is conducted within the realm of **saṃvṛti satya**.

Conclusion on Adhyāsa Definition (The Advaita View) (Page 37-38)

एतेषु मतेषु परत्र परावभासत्वलक्षणसंवादमाह - सर्वथापि त्विति । अन्यथाख्यातित्वादिप्रकारविवादेऽप्यध्यासः परत्र परावभासत्वलक्षणं न जहातीत्यर्थः । शुक्तावपरोक्षस्य रजतस्य देशान्तरे बुद्धौ वा सत्त्वायोगात्शून्यत्वे प्रत्यक्षत्वायोगात् , शुक्तौ सत्त्वे बाधायोगात्मिथ्यात्वमेवेति भावः । आरोप्यमिथ्यात्वे न युक्त्यपेक्षा, तस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वादित्याह - तथा चेति ।

The common thread running through all these conflicting theories (**anyathākhyātitva ādi prakāra vivāda**) is the core definition of Adhyāsa: **paratra parāvabhāsatvaṃ** (the apprehension of the other in the other). No school rejects this fundamental characteristic (**na jahāti**).

The Mithyātva (Falsity) of the Superimposed Object

The **Advaita** conclusion is that the superimposed object (**rajata**) is **Mithyā** (false) because:

1. It is perceived immediately (**aparokṣa**) on the shell.
2. It cannot be **sat** (real) in the shell, as if it were so, it would not be subject to sublation (**bādhāyogāt**).
3. It cannot be **śūnya** (non-existent) as it is directly perceived (**pratyakṣatvāt**).
4. Since it is neither Sat nor Asat, it is **Mithyā** (indescribable - **anirvacanīya**).
5. The falsity of the superimposed object (**āropya-mithyātva**) does not require elaborate reasoning (**na yukti apekṣā**) because it is anubhava-siddha (established by experience) – it is sublated when the substratum (shell) is correctly perceived.

Two Kinds of Adhyāsa - Nirupādhika and Sopādhika

तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः — शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते, एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति ॥

बाधानन्तरकालीनोऽयमनुभवः, तत्पूर्वं शुक्तिकात्वज्ञानायोगात् , रजतस्य बाधप्रत्यक्षसिद्धं मिथ्यात्वं वच्छब्देनोच्यते । आत्मनि निरुपाधिकेऽहङ्काराध्यासे दृष्टान्तमुक्त्वा ब्रह्मजीवावान्तरभेदस्याविद्याद्युपाधिकस्याध्यासे दृष्टान्तमाह - एक इति । द्वितीयचन्द्रसहितवदेक एवाङ्गुल्या द्विधा भातीत्यर्थः । लक्षणप्रकरणोपसंहारार्थ इति शब्दः ।

The Bhāṣyakāra gives two examples to illustrate the two main types of Adhyāsa in the world:

1. **Nirupādhika Adhyāsa** (Unconditioned/Uncaused Superimposition)
    - **Nature:** Immediate error without limiting adjunct.
    - **Example: Śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate** (The shell indeed appears as silver).

    - **Application: Ātmani nirupādhike ahaṅkāra adhyāse dṛṣṭāntam āha** (This example is given for the unconditioned superimposition of the **ahaṅkāra** (ego) on the **Ātman**).
    - Avidyā is present but acts only as the **Nimitta** (efficient cause), not the **Upādhi** (limiting condition).

2. **Sopādhika Adhyāsa** (Conditioned Superimposition)
    - **Nature:** Error conditioned by a limiting adjunct.
    - **Example: Ekaś candraḥ sa-dvitīyavat** (One moon appearing as two while pressing the eyeball with a finger).
    - **Application: Brahma jīva avāntara bhedasya avidyā upādhikasya adhyāse dṛṣṭāntam āha** (This example is given for the conditioned superimposition of the difference between **Brahman** and **Jīva**, where **Avidyā** is the **Upādhi**).
    - The **Upādhi** (e.g., the finger/limiting adjuncts of the **Jīva**) makes the single reality appear dual (**dvidhā bhāti**).

The concluding phrase **lakṣaṇaprakaraṇa upasaṃhārārtha iti śabdaḥ** marks the conclusion of the section on the definition of Adhyāsa.

Summary of Types of Adhyāsa

Following table summarizes types of Adhyāsa discussed so far:

Classification (Based On)	Name of Adhyāsa	Description	Example
Object of Superimposition	**Dharmādhyāsa** (Quality/Attribute)	The superimposition of the attributes of one onto the other.	The redness of the flower is transferred to the crystal or sat superimposed on jagat. Sentiency from the Self is superimposed onto the body; doership from the buddhi is superimposed onto the Self.
	Dharmi adhyāsa (Substratum/Substance)	The superimposition of the nature of one onto the other.	Self's nature is superimposed onto the Ego, making it seem sentient; the Ego's nature is superimposed onto the Self, making it seem mortal/doer.
Locus of Error	**Arthādhyāsa** (Object/Content)	The superimposition of the object (Artha) itself.	The snake (the object) is superimposed on the rope. The external world (Deha, Ahaṅkāra, Viṣaya), which is essentially the Non-Self, is superimposed onto the Self (Consciousness).
	Jñānādhyāsa (Knowledge/Cognition)	The superimposition of knowledge (Jñāna) or cognition.	The cognition of the snake (Sarpa-Jñāna) is superimposed on the Consciousness

			conditioned by the rope. The illusory self-notion, the Abhimāna (sense of self-identity) or knowledge, such as "Manuṣyo'ham" (I am a man) or "Ahaṁ Kartā" (I am the doer), is superimposed onto the Self.
Nature of Fusion	**Samsargādhyāsa** (Conjunction/Relation)	Superimposition of the connection.	Mistaking the attributes of the Not-Self (like kartṛtva - doership, bhoktṛtva - enjoyership, sukha - happiness) as belonging to the Self, leading to the feeling, "I am the doer" or "I am happy/sad."
	Svarūpādhyāsa (Nature/Essence)	Superimposition of the form/nature itself.	Mistaking the essence of the Self to be the Not-Self, leading to the belief, "I am the body."
Causality	**Kāraṇādhyāsa** (Causal/Avidyā)	Kāraṇa Adhyāsa is the superimposition of the beginningless, primal ignorance (avidyā or ajñāna), which serves as the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) of the entire universe, onto Brahman	avidyā or ajñāna on Brahman.
	Kāryādhyāsa (Effect/All subsequent superimpositions)	Kārya Adhyāsa is the superimposition of the effects or products of that primal ignorance onto the Self or the	Entire phenomenal world (jagat) and the individual psycho-physical apparatus (body,

		substratum (Brahman/Ātman)	mind, senses, etc.) on Brahman.
Conditioning (Upādhi)	**Nirupādhika Adhyāsa** (Unconditioned/Unca used Superimposition)	Immediate error without limiting adjunct.	Silver on a shell, ahaṅkāra (ego) on the Ātman
	Sopādhika Adhyāsa (Conditioned Superimposition)	Error conditioned by a limiting adjunct.	One moon appearing as two, difference between Brahman and Jīva,

Differentiating Upādhi, Viśeṣaṇa, and Upalakṣaṇa

The discussion clarifies the subtle but important distinctions among three terms used for conditioning or differentiating factors: **upādhi**, **viśeṣaṇa**, and **upalakṣaṇa**.

Concept	Defining Characteristic (Lakṣaṇa)	Explanation and Example
Viśeṣaṇa (Attribute/Qualifier)	**kāryānvayitve sati vartamānatve sati vyāvartakatvam |**(That which is always present in the substance and differentiates it).	"Nīlo ghaṭa" (Blue pot). The color nīlatva (blueness) is a viśeṣaṇa of the pot (ghaṭa). It is kārya-anvita (always connected to the substance/pot) and vyāvartaka (it differentiates this pot from the other colors).
Upādhi (Adjunct/Condition)	**kāryānanvayitve sati vartamānatve sati vyāvartakatvam** |(That which is present and differentiates, but is not inherently connected to the substance).	Crystal (sphaṭika) and a red hibiscus flower (japā kusuma). The japā kusuma and its color act as the upādhi for the crystal. The red color is not inherent in the crystal (kārya-ananvita), but it appears in the crystal and differentiates it as long as the flower is near it.
Upalakṣaṇa (Marker/Indication)	**kāryānanvayitve sati avidyamānatve'pi vyāvartakatvam |**(That which differentiates, even if it is no longer present with the substance).	"Kākavat devadattasya gṛham" (Devadatta's house which has a crow on it). The crow (kāka) is not an inherent part of the house (kārya-ananvita). Even when the crow is absent(avidyamānatve'pi), the description still serves to identify/differentiate that specific house.

The Pūrvapakṣa's (Opponent's) Objection to the Possibility of Adhyāsa on the Ātman (Page 39)

भवत्वध्यासः शुक्त्यादौ, आत्मनि तु न सम्भवतीत्याक्षिपति - कथं पुनरिति । यत्रापरोक्षाध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वं तत्रेन्द्रियसंयुक्तत्वं विषयत्वं चेति व्याप्तिः शुक्त्यादौ दृष्टा । तत्र व्यापकाभावादात्मनोऽधिष्ठानत्वं न सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रेत्याह - प्रत्यगात्मनीति । प्रतीचि पूर्ण इन्द्रियाग्राह्ये विषयस्याहङ्कारादेस्तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः कथमित्यर्थः । उक्तव्याप्तिमाह - सर्वो हीति । पुरोऽवस्थितत्वमिन्द्रियसंयुक्तत्वम् ।

कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषये अध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम् ? सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति; युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनः अविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि । उच्यते — न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात् अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः । न चायमस्ति नियमः — पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसितव्यमिति । अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालाः तलमलिनतादि अध्यस्यन्ति । एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि अनात्माध्यासः ॥

The discussion transitions to the central philosophical debate in the Brahma Sūtra: Is adhyāsa possible on the **Ātman**?

1. The Pūrvapakṣa's Challenge (Objection)

The opponent objects that while adhyāsa (like silver on a mother-of-pearl, **śukti**) is possible on an object, it is **not possible on the Ātman**.

- **The Objection (in Bhāṣya):**
  Kathaṃ punaḥ pratyagātmani aviṣaye'dhyāso viṣaya-tad-dharmāṇām? (How can there be a superimposition of the subject and its properties on the **Pratyagātman** (Inner Self) which is a **non-object** (**aviṣaya**)?).

2. The Pūrvapakṣa's Vyāpti (Universal Concomitance)

The opponent establishes a universal rule (vyāpti) for superimposition, based on observable facts:

- **Vyāpti 1 (Indriya-Saṃyuktatvam):**
  Yatra aparokṣa-adhyāsa-adhiṣṭhānatvam tatra indriya-saṃyuktatvam (saṃprayuktatvam) (Wherever there is the substratum-nature of immediate superimposition, there is also contact with the sense organ).
- **Vyāpti 2 (Viṣayatvam):**
  Yatra aparokṣa-adhyāsa-adhiṣṭhānatvam tatra viṣayatvam ca (Wherever there is the substratum-nature of immediate superimposition, there is also object-ness).
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example): Śuktyādi** (Mother-of-pearl etc.). The mother-of-pearl is in sense-contact and is an object, thus it is an **adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum).

3. The Pūrvapakṣa's Argument

- **Argument:** The **Ātman** is a **non-object** (**aviṣaya**) and **not** in contact with the sense organs (**anindriya-saṃyukta**).
- **Therefore: Tatra vyāpakābhāvāt ātmano adhiṣṭhānatvaṃ na saṃbhavati** (Due to the absence of the **vyāpaka** [pervader, i.e., object-ness and sense-contact] in the **Ātman**, its nature as a substratum is not possible).

- **The Pūrvapakṣa's Anumāna (Inference):** The **Ātman** is not a substratum of adhyāsa, **indriya-saṃyuktatva and viṣayatva-abhāvāt** (because of the absence of contact with the sense organ and object-ness).

4. The Pūrvapakṣa's Conclusion

नन्वात्मनोऽप्यधिष्ठानत्वार्थं विषयत्वादिकमस्त्वित्यत आह - युष्मदिति । इदंप्रत्ययानर्हस्य प्रत्यगात्मनो 'न चक्षुषा गृह्यते' इत्यादि श्रुतिमनुसृत्य त्वमविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि । संप्रत्यध्यासलोभेन विषयत्वाङ्गीकारे श्रुतिसिद्धान्तयोर्बाधः स्यादित्यर्थः ।

1. Rejecting the Siddhānta's Claim

- The **Pūrvapakṣa** notes that the Siddhānta cannot suddenly claim that the **Ātman** is an object (viṣayatva) just to make it a substratum.
- The **Ātman** is defined as that which is "devoid of the **yuṣmat**-idea" (**yuṣmat-pratyaya-apeta**), meaning it is **not** an object of the **idam-pratyaya** (the 'this' idea).
- If the **Ātman** is accepted as an object (**viṣaya**), it would lead to the **bādha** (contradiction) of both the **Śruti** (Vedic testimony, e.g., **"Na cakṣuṣā gṛhyate..."** - Not grasped by the eye or speech) and the **Siddhānta** itself.

The Siddhānta's (Vedāntin's) Rebuttal (Page 40)

आत्मन्यध्याससम्भावनां प्रतिजानीते - उच्यत इति । अधिष्ठानारोप्ययोरेकस्मिन् ज्ञाने भासमानत्वमात्रमध्यासव्यापकम् , तच्च भानप्रयुक्तसंशयनिवृत्त्यादिफलभाक्त्वम् , तदेव भानभिन्नत्वघटितं विषयत्त्वम् , तन्न व्यापकम् , गौरवादिति मत्वाह - न तावदिति ।

The Siddhānta refutes the opponent by rejecting their vyāpti and proposing a new, more fundamental one.

The Siddhānta's New Vyāpti

The Vedāntin declares a new, more appropriate **vyāpaka** (pervader) for adhyāsa:

- **New Vyāpaka: Adhiṣṭhāna-āropyayoḥ ekasmin jñāne bhāsamānatva-mātram** (The mere fact of the substratum and the superimposed object appearing in one single cognition).
- **The Ātman is not ekāntena aviṣaya**: The **Ātman** is not absolutely a **non-object** at all times.
- **Proof:** The **Ātman** is the object of the **asmat-pratyaya** (the 'I'-cognition, the Aham).
- **The Aham-Cognition:**
    - **Ātman** (Substratum) and **Ahaṅkāra** (Superimposed) appear together in the single cognition: **"Aham asmi"** (I am).
    - This is the required **ekasmin jñāne bhāsamānatva**.
    - This cognition is also characterized by **bhāna-prayukta-saṃśaya-nivṛttyādi-phala-bhāktvam** (it is a source of knowledge and possesses the fruit of removing doubt, as no one doubts "I am").

- **Therefore:** Since the **Ātman** and **Ahaṅkāra** appear in a single cognition (Aham), the **Ātman** fulfills the necessary condition for adhyāsa as its substratum.

Establishing the Manifestation (Bhāsamānatva) of the Self (Page 40)

अयमात्मा नियमेनाविषयो न भवति । तत्र हेतुमाह - अस्मदिति । अस्मप्रत्ययोऽहमित्यध्यासस्तत्र भासमानत्वादित्यर्थः । अस्मदर्थचिदात्मा प्रतिबिम्बितत्वेन यत्र प्रतीयते सोऽस्मत्प्रत्ययोऽहङ्कारस्तत्र भासमानत्वादिति वार्थः ।

Establishing Adhyāsa: The notion of 'I' (**aham**) is the subject of the **asmat-pratyaya** (the notion of 'I').

- **Option 1 (Jñānādhyāsa): asmat-pratyayo aham iti adhyāsaḥ tatra bhāsamānatvāt**. The **Ātman** is manifested (perceived/**bhāsamāna**) in the **adhyāsa** (superimposition) of 'I' (i.e., the ego). This is **Jñānādhyāsa** (superimposition of knowledge).
- **Option 2 (Arthādhyāsa): asmat-artha-cidātmā-pratibimbitatvena yatra pratīyate** (where the reflected essence of the **cidātmā** (conscious Self) is perceived in the **ahaṁkāra**), **tatra bhāsamānatvāt** (the Self is manifested there). This is **Arthādhyāsa** (superimposition of the substance/thing).
- In both ways, the **Ātman** is demonstrated to be **bhāsamāna** (manifested/apparent).

Refutation of the Fallacy of Mutual Dependence (Paraspārāśraya) (Page 40-41)

न चाध्यासे सति भासमानत्वं तस्मिन्सति स इति परस्पराश्रय इति वाच्यम् , अनादित्वात् , पूर्वाभ्यासे भासमानात्मन उत्तराध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वसम्भवात् ॥

- **Objection:** The opponent argues that there is a fallacy of mutual dependence (**parasparāśraya**) because:
    - **adhyāse sati bhāsamānatvam** (If **adhyāsa** exists, then manifestation (**bhāsamānatva**) occurs).
    - **tasmin sati saḥ** (If manifestation exists, then **adhyāsa** occurs).
- **Siddhānta's Refutation: na ca vācyam** (This should not be said).
    - This situation is like the **bījāṅkura-nyāya-vat** (the maxim of the seed and the sprout). The tradition of cause and effect is **anādi** (beginningless).
    - The **pūrva-adhyāsa** (previous superimposition) makes the **Ātman** suitable to be the **adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum) for the **uttarādhyāsa** (subsequent superimposition).
    - The **śuddha Ātman** (pure Self) is always the substratum, but to become the substratum for **adhyāsa**, it first requires a **saṁsargādhyāsa** (superimposition of relationship) to make it **yogya** (suitable).

Self-Luminous (Svayaṁ-prakāśatva) and Un-Objecthood (Page 41)

नन्वहमित्यहङ्कारविषयकभानरूपस्यात्मनो भासमानत्वं कथम् , तद्विषयत्वं विना तत्फलभाक्त्वायोगादित्यत आह - अपरोक्षत्वाच्चेति । चशब्दः शङ्कानिरासार्थः । स्वप्रकाशत्वादित्यर्थः । स्वप्रकाशत्वं साधयति - प्रत्यगिति । आबालपण्डितमात्मनः संशयादिशून्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धेः स्वप्रकाशत्वमित्यर्थः । अतः स्वप्रकाशत्वेन भासमानत्वादात्मनोऽध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वं सम्भवतीति भावः ।

- **Objection: ahaṁ iti ahaṁkāra-viṣayaka-bhāna-rūpasya ātmano bhāsamānatvam katham** (How is the Self, which is the form of the illumination of the ego, illumined?)
    - The Self is not the **viṣaya** (object) of the 'I' knowledge, so how can it be **bhāsamāna** (illumined)?
    - **tad-viṣayatvam vinā tat-phala-bhāktvānupapattitaḥ** (Without being its object, it cannot partake in the fruit/result of knowledge).
- **Siddhānta's Answer: iti ataḥ aparokṣat** (Therefore, because it is **aparokṣa** (immediate/directly experienced)).
    - The particle **ca** (**ca-śabda**) is for removing the doubt (**śaṅkā-nirāsārtha**).
    - The **Ātman** is **aparokṣa** (immediate) and **svayaṁ-prakāśa** (self-luminous).
    - **Svayaṁ-prakāśatva** definition: **avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam** (the state of being fit for immediate experience/usage, despite not being an object of knowledge (**vedya**)).
    - The **Ātman** is always self-luminous; therefore, the necessary condition for **adhyāsa**, which is the illumination of the **adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum), is always fulfilled. **Adhyāsa** is not possible in an **ajñāta vastu** (unillumined entity).

The Rule of Sense-Connection is Invalid

यदुक्तमपरोक्षाध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वस्येन्द्रियसंयुक्ततया ग्राह्यत्वं व्यापकमिति तत्राह - न चायमिति । तत्र हेतुमाह - अप्रत्यक्षेऽपीति । इन्द्रियाग्राह्येऽपीत्यर्थः । बाला अविवेकिनः तलमिन्द्रनीलकटाहकल्पं नभो मलिनं पीतमित्येवमपरोक्षमध्यस्यन्ति, तत्रेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वं नास्तीति व्यभिचारान्न व्याप्तिः ।

- **Opponent's Rule:** The **vyāpaka** (universal rule) for **aparokṣa-adhyāsa-adhiṣṭhānatva** (the substratum of immediate superimposition) is **indriya-saṁyukta-tayā grāhyatvam** (must be grasped through sense-connection).
- **Siddhānta's Refutation: na cāyam asti niyamaḥ** (And this is not the rule).
    - The rule **puro'vasthite viṣaye viṣayāntaram adhyasitavyam iti** (that superimposition of one thing onto another must occur only on a previously existing and present object) is not universally true.
- **The Example of Ākāśa (Sky): apratyakṣe api hi ākāśe bālāḥ talamalinatādi adhyasyanti** (Even on the **apratyakṣa** (non-sensorial) sky, children/ignorant people superimpose 'level ground' and 'dirtiness/blueness').
    - **apratyakṣe api** means **indriya-agrāhye api** (even though it is not grasped by the senses).
    - They superimpose **talam indranīla-kaṭāha-kalpam** (a surface resembling a sapphire bowl), **malinam** (dirty), **pītam** (yellow, at sunset) on the sky.
- **Vyabhicāra (The Fallacy of Deviation):**
    - **Ākāśa** (sky) is an example where **indriya-saṁyukta-grāhyatvaṁ nāsti** (sense-connection-grapple is absent), yet it is the **adhiṣṭhāna** for **aparokṣa-adhyāsa** (immediate superimposition).
    - Thus, the opponent's **vyāpti** is flawed due to **vyabhicāra** (deviation).

Refutation of the Necessity of Similarity (Sādṛśya) and Ākāśa as Sākṣi-Vedya (Page 41-42)

एतेनात्मानात्मनोः सादृश्याभावान्नाध्यास इत्यपास्तम् , नीलनभसोस्तदभावेऽप्यध्यासदर्शनात् । सिद्धान्ते आलोकाकारचाक्षुषवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तसाक्षिवेद्यत्वं नभसि इति ज्ञेयम् । सम्भावनां निगमयति - एवमिति ।

- **Refuting Similarity: etena ātma-anātmanoḥ sādṛśya-abhāvāt na adhyāsa iti apāstam** (By this, the argument that **adhyāsa** is impossible between the Self and the non-Self due to the lack of **sādṛśya** (similarity) is refuted).
    - **nīla-nabhasoḥ tad-abhāve api adhyāsa-darśanāt** (Because **adhyāsa** is observed between blueness and the sky despite the absence of similarity (**tad-abhāve**)).
    - Similarity is not an essential condition for **adhyāsa** (e.g., **pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ** - the yellow conch).

- **How the Sky is Known:** The sky is not grasped by the senses, yet it is manifested. How?
    - **Siddhānta:** In Vedānta, the sky (**nabhas**) is accepted to be **sākṣi-vedya** (known by the Witness/Sākṣin).
    - **ālokākāra-cākṣuṣa-vṛtti-abhivyakta-sākṣi-vedyatvam nabhasi ityabhyupagamāt** (Because the sky's knowability by the Witness is accepted, being manifested by the ocular mental **vṛtti** (modification) which takes the form of light).
    - Because it is **vedya** (knowable), it can be the **adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum).

Conclusion on Adhyāsa Possibility

Nigamanam (Conclusion): evaṁ aviruddhaḥ pratyagātmani api anātma-adhyāsaḥ (Thus, the superimposition of the non-Self onto the innermost Self (**pratyagātman**) is unopposed (**aviruddhaḥ**)).

- This confirms the possibility of the experience (like 'I am the doer/sufferer').

Adhyāsa's Equivalence to Avidyā (Page 42)

ननु ब्रह्मज्ञाननाश्यत्वेन सूत्रितामविद्यां हित्वा अध्यासः किमिति वर्ण्यत इत्यत आह - तमेतमिति । आक्षिप्तं समाहितमुक्तलक्षणलक्षितमध्यासमविद्याकार्यत्वादविद्येति मन्यन्त इत्यर्थः ।

Adhyāsa is Avidyā:

- **Objection:** Why describe **adhyāsa** when the ultimate goal is the removal of **avidyā** (**ignorance**), which is hinted at by the desire for **brahma-jñāna** (knowledge of Brahman)?
- **Answer: tametam evaṁ-lakṣaṇaṁ adhyāsaṁ paṇḍitāḥ avidyeti manyante** (The learned ones (**paṇḍitāḥ**), who are skilled in the means of knowledge (**pramāṇa-kuśalāḥ**), consider this very **adhyāsa**—which has been so defined—to be **avidyā**).
- **Adhyāsa** is considered **avidyā** because it is the **kārya** (effect) of **avidyā** (**avidyā-kāryatvāt avidyā**). Its nature as **Avidya** is also due to its **negatability**

(cessation) by **Vidyā** (Knowledge). Since **Vidyā** and **Avidya** are mutually **opposed** (**virodha**), it is called **Avidya** because **Vidyā nivartitatvāt asya** (it is removed by **Vidyā**).

- The phrase **tametam evaṁ-lakṣaṇaṁ adhyāsam** consists of terms that are in **samānādhikaraṇyam** (co-referentiality), all pointing to the same subject: the superimposition just discussed.
    - **tam** (that): Refers to the **adhyāsa** that was **ākṣiptam** (objected to) by the opponent (i.e., known through a mediated reference).
    - **etam** (this): Refers to the **adhyāsa** that is **samāhitam** (properly established/settled) in the mind of the listener (**buddhi**), making it **sannikṛṣṭa** (immediate/proximate).
    - **evaṁ-lakṣaṇaṁ** (having such a definition): Refers to the **adhyāsa** that has been **ukta-lakṣaṇa-lakṣitam** (defined by the characteristics that have been stated/described).

The Nature of Vidyā and Ascertaining the Nature of Reality (Vastu-Svarūpa-Avadhāraṇam) (Page 42)

अध्यस्तनिषेधेनाधिष्ठानस्वरूपनिर्धारणं विद्यामध्यासनिवर्तिकामाहुरित्यर्थः ।

- **Definition of Vidyā (Bhāṣya): tad vivekena ca vastu svarūpāva-dhāraṇam vidyām āhuḥ**
    - The ascertainment of the **true nature of the object** (**vastu-svarūpa**) through **Viveka** (discrimination) is called **Vidyā**.
- **What is the Ascertainment of Reality? (Ṭīkā): adhyasta niṣedhena adhiṣṭhāna svarūpa nirdhāraṇam vidyām adhyāsa nivartikām āhuḥ iti arthaḥ**
    - The **negation** (**niṣedha**) of what is **superimposed** (**adhyasta**) and the **determination** (**nirdhāraṇa**) of the nature of the **substratum** (**adhiṣṭhāna**) is the **Vidyā** that **removes Adhyāsa**.
    - Determination (**nirdhāraṇa**) means **certain knowledge** (free from doubt or error - **saṃśaya** or **viparyaya**).

Application of Ascertaining the Nature of Reality to Sādhanā (Spiritual Practice):

- **Substratum (Adhiṣṭhāna):** The **Pratyag-Ātman** (Inner Self).
- **Superimposed Element (Adhyasta):** The **Ahaṃkāra** (Ego).
- **The Process of Vidyā:**
    - **Ascertainment of the Substratum:** Correctly studying and hearing the nature of the **Ātman** through **śravaṇa**.
    - **Negation of the Superimposed:** The **negation** (or ascertainment of the **mithyātva** - falsity) of the **Ahaṃkāra**.
        1. It is not enough to say **Brahma Satyam**; one must also establish the **mithyātva** of the world (**jagat**).
        2. The falsity of the world is equivalent to the falsity of the **Ahaṃkāra** (ego), because the world appears only when the ego exists (**Ahaṃkāra satve jagat satvam**). In deep sleep (**suṣupti**), the ego dissolves, and the world is not perceived.
        3. Knowing that the ego, with its **kartṛtva** (doership), **bhoktṛtva** (enjoyership), and **pramātṛtva** (knower-ship), is false (like the snake superimposed on a rope) is the **negation**.
- **Vidyā** is therefore: **determining the nature of the Pratyag-Ātman** (the substratum) after **negating the Ahaṃkāra** (the superimposed element).
- **The Ultimate Goal:** The purpose of this journey is **ātyantika duḥkha nivṛtti** (complete cessation of suffering).
    - **Suffering, doership, and individuality** are all **superimposed** (**adhyasta**).
    - **Doership** (**kartṛtva**) is false because its connection to the **Ātman** is due to the limiting adjunct (**upādhi**) of the ego; hence it is called **sopādhika** (conditioned).
    - **"I am Brahman"** (**vastu-svarūpa nirdhāraṇam**) is **Vidyā**.
- **The Nature of Aparā-Vidyā (Lower Knowledge):**
    - In the **Muṇḍaka Bhāṣya**, the commentator states that **Aparā-Vidyā** is **Avidya** only.
    - All knowledge, even **śabda-jñāna** (word-knowledge) is **mithyā** (false) and **adhyasta** (**Avidya**).
    - **Parā-Vidyā** (Higher Knowledge) is only that by which **Brahman** is realized (**atha yayā tad akṣaram adhigamyate**).

Distinguishing Cause-Ignorance from Effect-Ignorance (Avidya vs. Adhyasa) (Page 42-43)

तथापि कारणाविद्यां त्यक्त्वा कार्याविद्या किमिति वर्ण्यते तत्राह - तत्रेति । तस्मिन्नध्यासे उक्तन्यायेनाविद्यात्मके सतीत्यर्थः । मूलाविद्यायाः सषुप्तावनर्थत्वादर्शनात्कार्यात्मना तस्या अनर्थत्वज्ञापनार्थं तद्वर्णनमिति भावः । अध्यस्तकृतगुणदोषाभ्यामधिष्ठानं न लिप्यत इत्यक्षरार्थः ।

- **Pūrva Pakṣa Objection:** Why focus on **kārya-avidyā** (**Adhyāsa**) and neglect **kāraṇa-avidyā** (**Mūlāvidyā** - Root Ignorance)?
- **The Answer (Bhāṣya & Ṭīkā):**
    - **Mūlāvidyā** does not cause any **anartha** (misery/evil) in deep sleep (**suṣupti**), i.e., **Mūlāvidyāyāḥ suṣuptau anarthatvādarśanāt** (since the non-injuriousness of **Mūlāvidya** is seen in deep sleep).
    - The misery (**anartha**) only manifests in the form of the **effect** (**kārya**) – the **Adhyāsa**.
    - Therefore, the description of **Adhyāsa** is for the purpose of demonstrating the **anarthatva** (misery-causing nature) of **Mūlāvidyā** through its effect (**kāryātmanā tasyāḥ anarthatvaṃ jñāpanārtham tad varṇanam iti bhāvaḥ**).
    - **The root of all misery is Adhyāsa.** This is why the **Adhyāsa Bhāṣya** was written.
- **The Substratum is Untainted:**
    - **adhyasta kṛta guṇa doṣabhyām adhiṣṭhānam na lipyate** (The substratum is not tainted by the good or bad qualities arising from the superimposed element).
        - This is a crucial point for **Sādhanā**: The **Ātman** (**Adhiṣṭhāna**) is **untouched** (**nirlepa**) by the fleeting thoughts (misery, praise, etc.) that arise from the mind (the superimposed element).

Adhyāsa as the Basis for All Transactions (Vyavahāra) (Page 43)

एवमध्यासस्य लक्षणसम्भावने उक्त्वा प्रमाणमाह - तमेतमिति । तं वर्णितमेतं साक्षिप्रत्यक्षसिद्धं पुरस्कृत्य हेतुं कृत्वा लौकिकः कर्मशास्त्रीयो मोक्षशास्त्रीयश्चेति त्रिविधो व्यवहारः प्रवर्तत इत्यर्थः | तत्र विधिनिषेधपराणि कर्मशास्त्राण्यृग्वेदादीनि, विधिनिषेधशून्यप्रत्यग्ब्रह्मपराणि मोक्षशास्त्राणि वेदान्तवाक्यानीति विभागः ।

तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि ।

- **Establishing the Proof (Pramāṇam):** After explaining the characteristics (**lakṣaṇa**) of **Adhyāsa**, the **Bhāṣya** now discusses its **proof** (**pramāṇam**).
- **Bhāṣya: tametam avidyā-ākhyam ātma-anātmanoḥ itaretara-adhyāsam puras-kṛtya sarve pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārāḥ laukikā vaidikāḥ ca pravṛttaḥ sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhi-pratiṣedha mokṣa-parāṇi**
    1. **All pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārāḥ** (transactions involving the means and objects of knowledge), whether **laukika** (mundane) or **vaidika** (Vedic), and **all śāstras** (scriptures) concerned with **vidhi** (injunctions), **pratiṣedha** (prohibitions), or **mokṣa** (liberation), proceed **puras-kṛtya** (taking as their basis)

this **mutual superimposition** (**itaretara-adhyāsa**) between the Self and the Non-Self, which is called **Avidyā**.

- **Proof of Adhyāsa:** It is **sākṣi pratyakṣa siddham** (established by the direct perception of the inner Witness).
- **Three Types of Vyavahāra (Transactions) based on Adhyāsa (Ṭīkā):**
    1. **Laukika Vyavahāra** (Mundane - non-Vedic).
    2. **Karma-Śāstrīya Vyavahāra** (Scriptural – those giving **vidhi-niṣedha** like fire ritual or dietary rules).
    3. **Mokṣa-Śāstrīya Vyavahāra** (Scriptural – those which are **vidhi-niṣedha-śūnya** (devoid of injunctions and prohibitions) and are focused on the **Pratyag-Brahman** (Vedānta Vākyas)).

Pratyakṣa (Perception) and Śāstras are Avidyāvat Viṣaya (Page 44)

एवं व्यवहारहेतुत्वेनाध्यासे प्रत्यक्षसिद्धेऽपि प्रमाणान्तरं पृच्छति - कथं पुनरिति । अविद्यावानहमित्यध्यासवानात्मा प्रमाता स विषय आश्रयो येषां तानि अविद्यावद्विषयाणीति विग्रहः । तत्तत्प्रमेयव्यवहारहेतुभूतायाः प्रमाया अध्यासात्मकप्रमात्राश्रितत्वात्प्रमाणानामविद्यावद्विषयत्वं यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षं तथापि पुनरपि कथं केन प्रमाणेनाविद्यावद्विषयत्वमिति योजना । यद्वाऽविद्यावद्विषयाणि कथं प्रमाणानि स्युः, आश्रयदोषादप्रामाण्यापत्तेरित्याक्षेपः ।

कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति ?

- **Bhāṣya Query: katham punar avidyāvad viṣayāṇi pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca iti**
    1. How, again, can perception and other means of knowledge (**pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni**), and the **śāstras** (scriptures) have the **avidyāvat** (ignorant person) as their **object** (**viṣaya**)?
- **Vigraha (Analysis of Avidyāvat Viṣaya - Ṭīkā):**
    1. **Avidyā-vān** (**adhyāsa-vān** - the possessor of **Avidya**), who is the **Ātman**/**Pramātā** (Knower), is the **viṣaya** (here: **āśraya** or resort) of the **Pramāṇas** (means of knowledge).
- **The Key Point: The Pramātā (Knower) is Superimposed:**
    1. The **Pramātā** (the individual who transacts knowledge) is itself **adhyāsa-ātmaka** (of the nature of superimposition).
        - The pure, unconditioned **Brahman** becomes the **Pramātā** only by association with the **antaḥkaraṇa** (internal organ). **The Pramātā is Adhyāsa (artha-adhyāsa)**.
    2. Since the **Pramātā** (the shelter/subject of the **Pramā**) is itself the result of **Adhyāsa**, **all Pramāṇas** are **Avidyāvat Viṣaya**.
- **The Double Question/Objection Implied by "Katham":**
    1. **Question (Pramāṇam):** By what **Pramāṇa** do you establish that **Śāstras** and **Pramāṇas** are for the **avidyāvat**?
    2. **Objection (Ākṣepa):** How can they be considered **Pramāṇa** at all?

- Since the **āśraya** (resort/subject - the **Pramātā**) is flawed (**avidyāvat**), there is the contingency of **aprāmāṇya-āpattiḥ** (the means of knowledge becoming invalid).

The Proofs for Adhyāsa: Arthāpatti and Anumāna (Page 44)

तत्तत्प्रमेयव्यवहारहेतुभूतायाः प्रमाया अध्यासात्मकप्रमात्राश्रितत्वात्प्रमाणानामविद्यावद्विषयत्वं यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षं तथापि पुनरपि कथं केन प्रमाणेनाविद्यावद्विषयत्वमिति योजना । यद्वाऽविद्यावद्विषयाणि कथं प्रमाणानि स्युः, आश्रयदोषादप्रामाण्यापत्तेरित्याक्षेपः । तत्र प्रमाणप्रश्ने व्यवहारार्थापत्तिम् , तल्लिङ्गानुमानं चाह - उच्यते इत्यादिना तस्मादित्यन्तेन ।

उच्यते — देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहंममाभिमानरहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः सम्भवति । न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यवहारः सम्भवति । न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते । न चैतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन्नसति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते । न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति । तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति ।

To answer the question "By what proof do we know this?" The Tīkā offers two logical proofs, both based on **vyavahāra** (worldly activity).

- **The Two Proofs:**
  - **Arthāpatti (Presumption/Postulation):** Using **vyavahāra** (activity) as the basis for postulation.
  - **Anumāna (Inference):** Using **vyavahāra** as the **linga** (inferential sign or mark).
- **Explanation of Arthāpatti:**
  - The argument is: **vyavahāra anyathā anupapattyā adhyāsaḥ kalpanā**
  - Worldly activity (**vyavahāra**) cannot be otherwise explained (**anyathā anupapattyā**). Therefore, we must presume/postulate (**kalpanā**) the existence of **Adhyāsa** to make sense of it.
  - Activity is the known fact (**upapādya**), and **Adhyāsa** is the postulated cause (**upapādaka**).

The Bhāṣya's Answer: Unpacking the Proof by Inference (Anumāna)

देवदत्तकर्तृको व्यवहारः, तदीयदेहादिष्वहंममाध्यासमूलः, तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुसारित्वात् , यदित्थं तत्तथा, यथा मृन्मूलो घट इति प्रयोगः । तत्र व्यतिरेकं दर्शयति - देहेति । देवदत्तस्य सुषुप्तावध्यासाभावे व्यवहाराभावो दृष्टः, जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरध्यासे सति व्यवहार इत्यन्वयः स्फुटत्वान्नोक्तः । अनेन लिङ्गेन कारणतयाध्यासः सिध्यति, व्यवहाररूपकार्यानुपपत्त्या वेति भावः ।

To prove that **Adhyāsa** (specifically, the "I" and "mine" feeling in the body, senses, etc.) is the cause (**mūlaḥ** or **kāraṇa**) of all worldly activity (**vyavahāra**), the following **Inference (Anumāna)** which establishes a cause-and-effect relationship is provided**:**

- **Subject (Pakṣa): devadatta-kartṛkaḥ vyavahāraḥ** (Any activity performed by a person, like Devadatta).
- **To-Be-Proven (Sādhya): tadīya-dehādishu aham-mama-adhyāsa-mūlaḥ** (It is rooted in the superimposition of 'I' and 'mine' on his body, senses, etc.).

- **Reason (Hetu): tad-anvaya-vyatireka-anusāritvāt** (Because it [activity] follows the presence and absence of that [Adhyāsa]).
- **Example (Dṛṣṭānta): yathā mṛṇ-mūlaḥ ghaṭaḥ** (Just like a pot is rooted in clay).

Further Elaboration on the Reason (Hetu): The Core of the Proof

The strength of this inference lies entirely in the **Hetu** (Reason). It uses two logical principles:

1. **Anvaya (Positive Co-existence):** "If the cause is present, the effect is present."
    - **The Rule: Adhyāsa-sattve, vyavahāra-sattvam** (Where **Adhyāsa** is present, activity is present).
    - **Proof:** This is seen in our two "active" states:
        - **Jāgrat (Waking State):** We are fully engaged in **Adhyāsa**. We think "I am this body, I am hungry, I must work, I see the world." All our actions follow from this identification.
        - **Svapna (Dream State):** We create a new "dream body" and have a complete **Adhyāsa** with it. We feel "I am running," "I am scared," "I am flying." All dream activities are driven by this dream-**Adhyāsa**.
    - The Bhāṣya considers this so obvious (**sphutam**) that it doesn't even bother to state it.
2. **Vyatireka (Negative Co-existence):** "If the cause is absent, the effect is absent."
    - **The Rule: Adhyāsa-abhāve, vyavahāra-abhāvaḥ** (Where **Adhyāsa** is absent, activity is absent).
    - **Proof:** This is the key proof and is demonstrated by:
        - **Suṣupti (Deep Sleep State):** In deep sleep, the mind (**antaḥkaraṇa**) itself is temporarily resolved. There is no ego, no "I" or "mine." Because there is no **Adhyāsa**, there is no activity (**vyavahāra**).
        - The person in deep sleep is not a **pramātā** (knower), **kartā** (doer), or **bhoktā** (experiencer). They don't see, hear, or think.
    - The Bhāṣya text explicitly points to this **Vyatireka** logic:
      deha-indriya-ādiṣu aham-mama-abhimāna-rahitasya pramātṛtva-anupapattau pramāṇa-pravṛttiḥ-anupapatteḥ
    - **Meaning:** "For one who is devoid (**rahitasya**) of the 'I' and 'mine' identification with the body, senses, etc., the very status of being a 'knower' (**pramātṛtva**) is impossible (**anupapattiḥ**). And if there is no 'knower', the operation of the means of knowledge (**pramāṇa-pravṛtti**) is impossible."

Conclusion of the Inference: Since activity only happens when **Adhyāsa** is present (Waking/Dream) and stops when **Adhyāsa** is absent (Deep Sleep), it is proven that **Adhyāsa** is the necessary root cause of all activity.

Adhyāsa as the Root of ALL Activity (Laukika and Vaidika)

This point elaborates on the scope of **Adhyāsa**. It's not just a term for "making a mistake" (like seeing a snake in a rope). It is the fundamental operating system for all human experience, which can be grouped into three categories.

Laukika Vyavahāra (Worldly Activity)

- **Example:** A simple act like "**aham ghaṭam paśyāmi**" (I see a pot).
- **The Chain of Adhyāsa Required:**
    1. The pure Self (**Kūṭastha**) is changeless and does not "act." To "see," it must first identify with the **antaḥkaraṇa** (mind) to become a conscious "knower."
    2. This "knower" must then identify with the **indriya** (the sense of sight) and claim it: "This is my eye."
    3. The **indriya** must be based in a **deha** (body), so the "knower" must identify with the body: "I am this body to which the eye belongs."
    4. Only after this entire stack of superimpositions (**body + sense + mind**) is in place can the **pramātā** (knower) engage in the act of seeing a pot.
- Without **Adhyāsa**, the Self remains **asaṅgaḥ** (unattached, unrelated) and can never become a "seer."

Vaidika Karma Shastreeya Vyavahārah (Scripture basedRitualistic Activity)

This is a crucial point: even sacred, religious duties are based on **Adhyāsa**.

- **Example 1: Vidhi (Injunctions):** The scriptural command "**agnihotram juhuyāt**" (One should perform the Agnihotra fire sacrifice).
    - Who is this "one"? The pure **Ātman** has no **varṇa** (caste, e.g., Brahmin), no **āśrama** (stage of life, e.g., householder), and no **adhikāra** (qualification).
    - To follow this rule, a person must first superimpose a specific identity: "I am a Brahmin," "I am a married householder," "I am the **kartā** (doer) of this rite," and "I am the **bhoktā** (experiencer) who desires the fruit of this action (e.g., heaven)."
    - Thus, the entire **Karma-Kāṇḍa** (ritual portion) of the Vedas is directed only to the person operating from **Adhyāsa**.
- **Example 2: Pratiṣedha (Prohibitions):** "**brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ**" (A Brahmin should not be killed).
    - This rule also requires **Adhyāsa**. One must first identify with the notion that "I am a potential killer" and "That other person is a Brahmin" for the prohibition to make sense.

Vaidika Mokṣa Shastreeya Vyavahārah (Scripture based Activity related to Liberation)

This is the most subtle and profound point. Even the path to end ignorance uses ignorance.

- **Example:** The teacher-student relationship.
- **The Śiṣya (Student):** To even begin the quest, the student must have the **Adhyāsa** of: "I am **duḥkhī** (suffering)," "I am **ajñaḥ** (ignorant)," "I am **baddhaḥ** (bound)," and "I am a **mumukṣu** (one who desires liberation)." These are all superimpositions on the pure Self, which is never bound or ignorant.
- **The Ācārya (Teacher):** The teacher, to teach, must adopt the **Adhyāsa** of: "I am the **upadeṣṭā** (instructor)" and "This student needs my help."
- **The Śāstra (Scripture):** The scriptures themselves, like "**tat tvam asi**" (That Thou Art), operate within this framework. They address the individual who has the **Adhyāsa** of "I am **tvam** (this limited person)" and then use that very identification to negate it by stating you are, in reality, **tat** (Brahman).
- **The "Thorn to Remove a Thorn":** The **Adhyāsa** of "I am a seeker" is used to destroy the **Adhyāsa** of "I am a worldly person."

Practical Takeaway (The "Why We Care"): As seekers of **ātyantika duḥkha nivritti** (permanent eradication of sorrow) we are interested in the cause of sorrow. The reason the Bhāṣya begins with **Adhyāsa** is to show that every state of suffering—"I am sad" (**aham duḥkhī**), "I am in pain," "I am angry"—is a product of **Adhyāsa**.

- Sorrow (**duḥkha**) exists in the **antaḥkaraṇa** (mind).
- The **Ātman** is **ānanda-svarūpa** (the nature of bliss).
- The statement "I am sad" is a false superimposition, claiming the properties of the mind as properties of the Self.
- Therefore, the problem is not the world; the problem is **Adhyāsa**. And the solution is **jñāna** (knowledge), which severs this false identification.

Necessity of Body Adhyāsa and Senses Adhyāsa (Page 46)

ननु मनुष्यत्वादिजातिमति देहेऽहमित्यभिमानमात्राद्व्यवहारः सिध्यतु किमिन्द्रियादिषु ममाभिमानेनेत्याशङ्क्याह - नहीति । इन्द्रियपदं लिङ्गादेरप्युपलक्षणम् , प्रत्यक्षादीत्यादिपदप्रयोगात् । तथा च प्रत्यक्षलिङ्गादिप्रयुक्तो यो व्यवहारो द्रष्टा अनुमाता श्रोताहमित्यादिरूपः स इन्द्रियादीनि ममतास्पदान्यगृहीत्वा न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः । यद्वा तानि ममत्वेनानुपादाय यो व्यवहारः स नेति योजना । पूर्वत्रानुपादानासम्भवक्रिययोरेको व्यवहारः कर्ता इति क्त्वाप्रत्ययः साधुः । उत्तरत्रानुपादानव्यवहारयोरेकात्मकर्तृकत्वात् , तत्साधुत्वमिति भेदः । इन्द्रियादिषु ममेत्यध्यासाभावेऽन्धादेरिव द्रष्टृत्वादिव्यवहारो न स्यादिति भावः । इन्द्रियाध्यासेनैव व्यवहारादलं देहाध्यासेनेत्यत आह - न चेति । इन्द्रियाणामधिष्ठानमाश्रयः । शरीरमित्यर्थः ।

Objection 1: Body Adhyāsa is enough, why Senses?

- **Objection:** Isn't the superimposition of "I" (**aham**) on the body (**deha**) enough for activity? Why do we also need the superimposition of "mine" (**mama**) on the senses (**indriyas**)?
- **Bhāṣya's Answer:**
  na hi indriyāṇi anupādāya pratyakṣādi-vyavahāraḥ sambhavati.
- **Elaboration:**
  - "Without grasping/using (**anupādāya**) the senses, perceptual (etc.) activity (**pratyakṣādi-vyavahāraḥ**) is not possible."
  - To be a **draṣṭā** (seer), **anumātā** (inferer), or **śrotā** (hearer), one must first claim the senses as "mine" (**mamatā**).
  - The **"ādi"** (etc.) in **pratyakṣādi** implies that other **pramāṇas** (like inference) also require their respective "tools" (e.g., the mind as a "sense" for inference) to be claimed through **Adhyāsa**.

Elaboration: The Three-Fold Knower (Draṣṭā, Anumātā, Śrotā)

The general concept of **vyavahāra** (activity) specifically refers to the activities rooted in our "means of knowledge" (**pramāṇas**). The Tīkā (commentary) uses three examples to show how **Adhyāsa** is the prerequisite for all forms of knowing.

- **Quote: tathā ca pratyakṣa-liṅgādi-prayukto yo vyavahāro draṣṭā anumātā śrotā aham ityādi-rūpaḥ...** (Thus, the behavior—which takes the form of 'I am the Seer,' 'I am the Inferer,' 'I am the Hearer'—is that which is prompted by "means of knowledge" (**pramāṇas**))
- **Elaboration:** The ṭīkā breaks down how we must adopt specific identities, or **upādhis** (limiting adjuncts), to perform any action of knowing:
  1. **Draṣṭā (The Seer):**
     - **Pramāṇa Used: Pratyakṣa** (Perception).
     - **How it Works:** To become a "Seer," the pure Self must associate with the sense of sight (**indriya**). This is the **Adhyāsa** (superimposition) of "I am the one who sees."
     - This requires **indriya-sannikarṣa** (contact of the sense organ with an object). Without first claiming the eye as "my" tool, the Self cannot become a **Draṣṭā**.

2. **Anumātā (The Inferer):**
    - **Pramāṇa Used: Anumāna** (Inference).
    - **How it Works:** To become an "Inferer" (e.g., "I see smoke, therefore I infer fire"), the Self must use the **linga** (the inferential mark, i.e., smoke) and the **antaḥkaraṇa** (mind) to process the logic.
    - This is the **Adhyāsa** of "I am the one who thinks/infers." One claims the mind's logical function as "my" action.
3. **Śrotā (The Hearer):**
    - **Pramāṇa Used: Śabda** (Testimony, or sacred scripture).
    - **How it Works:** To become a "Hearer" (especially in the context of Vedanta, "I am the one hearing the teaching"), the Self must associate with the sense of hearing and the mind's capacity to understand.
    - This is the **Adhyāsa** of "I am the student/listener."

The "Why This Matters":
sa indriyādīni mamatāspadāni agṛhītvā na sambhavati. (That very behavior [of being a Seer, Inferer, or Hearer] is not possible (**na sambhavati**) without first grasping (**agṛhītvā**) the senses, etc., as the seat of 'mine'-ness (**mamatāspadāni**).)

The Grammatical Justification

This part is a "commentary within a commentary." The **Tīkākāra** (commentator) has used a specific grammatical construction (**agṛhītvā**, a **ktvā/lyap** form) and now pauses to prove that his own sentence is grammatically correct.

- **The Grammatical Rule:** The suffixes **ktvā** (e.g., **snātvā**, "having bathed") or its substitute **lyap** (e.g., **anupādāya**, "having not grasped") are used to denote a prior action. The rule is **samāna-kartṛkayoḥ pūrvakāle**: "They are used when there are two actions performed by the same agent (**samāna-kartṛka**), with one action happening before (**pūrvakāle**)."
    - Example: **snātvā gaccati** ("Having bathed, he goes"). The agent "he" performs both the bathing (Action 1) and the going (Action 2).
- **The Problem in the Tīkā's Sentence:**
  ...indriyādīni ... agṛhītvā na sambhavati.
    - **Action 1 (Prior): agṛhītvā** (not grasping).
    - **Action 2 (Main): na sambhavati** (is not possible).
    - **Question:** Who or what is the single agent (**kartā**) performing both "not grasping" and "not being possible"? This is grammatically tricky.
- **The Tīkā's First Solution (Agent = Vyavahāra):**
  pūrvatra anupādāna-asambhava-kriyayoḥ eko vyavahāraḥ kartā iti...
    - **Translation:** "In the first case, for the two actions of 'non-grasping' (**anupādāna**) and 'non-possibility' (**asambhava**), the **single agent is 'activity' itself** (**vyavahāraḥ kartā**)."
    - **Explanation:** The sentence is understood as: "Activity, having not grasped the senses, is not possible."

    - Here, "Activity" (**Vyavahāra**) is the subject.
        - Action 1: Activity does not grasp the senses.
        - Action 2: Activity is not possible.
    - Since "Activity" is the common agent, the use of **ktvā (agṛhītvā)** is grammatically **sādhu** (correct, valid).
- **The Tīkā's Second (Alternative) Solution (Agent = Ātman/Jīvātmā): uttaratra anupādāna-vyavahārayoḥ ekātma-kartṛkatvāt...**
    - This refers to the alternative phrasing: **tāni mamatvena anupādāya yo vyavahāraḥ sa na...** ("Without grasping them with 'mine'-ness, that activity is not.")
    - **Translation:** "In the second case, for the actions of 'non-grasping' (**anupādāna**) and '[absence of] activity' (**vyavahāra**), there is **a single Self as the agent** (**ekātma-kartṛkatvāt**)."
    - **Explanation:** This is a more intuitive reading. The agent is the **Jīvātmā** (the individual person/soul) and the sentence is understood as “For **Jīvātmā,** without grasping the **indriya** with 'mine'-ness, there is no activity.”
        - Agent = The **Jīvātmā**.
        - Action 1: The **Jīvātmā** does not grasp the senses as "mine" (**anupādāya**).
        - Action 2: The **Jīvātmā**'s activity is absent (or, the **Jīvātmā** does not engage in activity).
    - "The **Jīvātmā** is the agent. The one whose non-grasping (**anupādāna**) of the senses (as 'mine') occurs, for that same **Jīva**, the absence of activity (**vyavahāra-abhāva**) occurs."

Objection 2: Sense Adhyāsa is enough, why Body?

- **Objection:** Okay, we need **Adhyāsa** on the senses. But that should be enough (**alam**). Why do we also need **Adhyāsa** on the body (**deha**)?
- **Bhāṣya's Answer:**
  na ca adhiṣṭhānam antareṇa indriyāṇāṁ vyavahāraḥ sambhavati.
- **Elaboration:**
    - "And without a base/substratum (**adhiṣṭhānam**), activity of the senses is not possible."
    - The Tīkā clarifies that **adhiṣṭhānam** here means **āśrayaḥ, śarīram** (the base, the body).
    - The senses (like sight, hearing) cannot function in a void; they must be based in the physical body.
    - This usage of **adhiṣṭhānam** to mean "body" is validated by the Bhagavad Gita (Chapter 18):
      अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्ता करणं च पृथग्विधम् |
      विविधाश्च पृथक्चेष्टा दैवं चैवात्र पञ्चमम् || 18.14||

      adhiṣṭhānaṃ tathā kartā karaṇaṃ ca pṛthagvidham |
      vividhāśca pṛthakceṣṭā daivaṃ caivātra pañcamam || 18.14||

This verse lists the five components of action, starting with **adhiṣṭhānam** (the body).

Differentiating 'Aham' (I) and 'Mama' (My)

The Bhāśya uses both **aham** and **mama**. A question arises: why **aham** for the body and **mama** for the senses?

- **The Distinction:**
  - **Aham** (I): This is used for things with which we have the strongest identification (**tādātmya**). This identity is most powerful with the physical body (**deha**).
  - **Mama** (My): This is used for things that are seen as instruments (**karaṇatva**)—tools we use and can set aside. The senses (**indriya**) fall into this category.
- **Analogy:** We pick up a pen (**lekhanī**), write, and put it down. We call it "my pen" (**mama**), not "I am the pen" (**aham**). The senses are treated similarly.
- **Strength of Identification:** The identification with the body is profound. An insult to the body feels like a direct assault on the "self." This is why, in the Panchakosha Viveka (analysis of the five sheaths), the **Annamaya Kosha** (food/body sheath) is discussed in great detail.
- When we say, "I am seeing," we are identifying with the action of seeing, which is performed through the body (the locus of **aham**).
  - This is similar to saying **aham gacchāmi** (I am going). The action of "going" is done by the legs, but the identification is with the self doing it. Nobody says **mama pādau gacchataḥ** ("My feet are going").
  - Therefore, the primary identification is **aham** with the body and **mama** with the senses/instruments, even if some linguistic overlap occurs.

Objection 3: Let Ātman be conjoined with the Body. What is the need of Adhyāsa? (Page 47)

नन्वस्त्वात्मना संयुक्तं शरीरं तेषामाश्रयः किमध्यासेनेत्यत्राह - न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेनेति । अनध्यस्त आत्मभावः आत्मतादात्म्यं यस्मिन् तेनेत्यर्थः । 'असङ्गो हि' इति श्रुतेः, आध्यासिक एव देहात्मनोः सम्बन्धो न संयोगादिरिति भावः ।

न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते ।

- **Objection:** Why do we need **adhyāsa**? Why can't the Self (**ātmā**) just be conjoined (**saṃyukta**) with the body, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school says?

- **Bhāṣya's Answer:**
  na cānadhyastātmabhāvena dehena kaścidvyāpriyate |
- **Translation:** "And no one can engage in any transaction/action (**vyāpriyate**) using a body (**dehena**) upon which the nature of the Self (**ātma-bhāva**) has not been superimposed (**anadhyasta**)."

- This superimposition is so strong that the identity "**aham manuṣyaḥ**" (I am a human) is extremely firm (**dṛḍha**). This firm, prior conviction is precisely why the scriptural teaching "**aham brahma**" (I am Brahman) fails to take root, even if heard a thousand times. The "I am the body" idea actively blocks it.

- **Elaboration:**
    - This is impossible because the Shruti (scripture) itself declares the Self is unattached. **asaṅgo hi ayaṃ puruṣaḥ** (This Self is indeed unattached).
    - Since the Self is **asaṅga** (unattached), its relationship with the body cannot be one of actual conjunction (**saṃyoga**). It can only be an apparent, superimposed relationship (**ādhyāsika sambandha**).

Objection 4: Let Ātman be the knower directly. What is the need of Adhyāsa? (Page 47-48)

नन्वात्मनो देहादिभिराध्यासिकसम्बन्धोऽपि मास्तु, स्वतश्चेतनतया प्रमातृत्वोपपत्तेः । न च सुषुप्तौ प्रमातृत्वापत्तिः करणोपरमादिति तत्राह - न चैतस्मिन्निति । प्रमाश्रयत्वं हि प्रमातृत्वम् । प्रमा यदि नित्यचिन्मात्रं तर्ह्याश्रयत्वायोगः करणवैयर्थ्यं च । यदि वृत्तिमात्रम् , जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गः, वृत्तेर्जडत्वात् । अतो वृत्तीद्धो बोधः प्रमा, तदाश्रयत्वमसङ्गस्यात्मनो वृत्तिमन्मनस्तादात्म्याध्यासं विना न सम्भवतीति भावः । देहाध्यासे, तद्धर्माध्यासे चासतीत्यक्षरार्थः । तर्ह्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वं मास्तु इति वदन्तं प्रत्याह - न चेति । प्रमाणसत्त्वादित्यर्थः । यद्वा प्रमाणप्रश्नं समाधायाक्षेपं परिहरति - तस्मादिति । अहमित्यध्यासस्य प्रमात्रन्तर्गतत्वेनादोषत्वात् , अविद्यावदाश्रयाण्यपि प्रमाणान्येवेति योजना ।

A more subtle objection is raised: Why can't the Self, which is inherently conscious, be the knower directly?

- **Objection:** "Let there be no relationship at all. The Self (**ātmā**) is inherently conscious (**svataḥ caitanyatayā**) and can be the knower (**pramātā**) on its own."
- **Bhāśya: na ca etasmin sarvasmin asati asaṅgasya ātmanaḥ pramātṛtvaṃ upapadyate**
- **Translation:** "And without all this (i.e., **adhyāsa**), knower-ship (**pramātṛtva**) is not possible (**na upapadyate**) for the unattached (**asaṅgasya**) Self (**ātmanaḥ**)." The Bhāśya's argument is that the unattached Self cannot become a "knower" without **adhyāsa**.
- **What is "knowership"?** The locus of cognition (**pramā-āśrayatvam hi pramātṛtvam**).
- **A Logical Dilemma:** What is this "cognition" (**pramā**)?
    - **Option 1:** Is **pramā** pure, eternal Consciousness (**nitya cin-mātram**)?
        - **Problem:** If so, it would not have/need any support. It cannot "rest on" the Self (Consciousness cannot be the location for Consciousness). Also, all senses would be useless (**karaṇa vaiyarthyam**).
    - **Option 2:** Is **pramā** just a mental modification (**vṛtti-mātram**)?
        - **Problem:** If so, the **vṛtti** is inert (**jaḍa**) and cannot illumine any object. This would lead to a world of blindness (**jagad-āndhya prasaṅga**).
- **The Advaita Answer: ato vṛtti-iddho bodhaḥ pramā**
- **Explanation:** Cognition (**pramā**) is **bodha** (consciousness, i.e., the **cidābhāsa**) that is illuminated or "lit up" (**iddha**) within a mental modification (**vṛtti**).

- It is this composite entity (inert **vṛtti** + conscious reflection) that allows for both change and illumination.

The Vedantic Problem with this:

- If the **ātmā** itself becomes the knower, it must change (**vikārī**) to perceive different things.
- Anything that changes is non-eternal (**vināśī**).
- This would make the Self non-eternal, which is unacceptable.

The Advaita Solution: Cidābhāsa (Reflection of Consciousness)

- Advaita Vedanta is unique in proposing the concept of **cidābhāsa**. Other schools (like Nyāya, Sāṅkhya) do not have this.
- **Cidābhāsa** is neither the pure, unchanging Self nor the inert, unconscious mind/body. It is the reflection of consciousness in the mind.
- This "reflected consciousness" is what does all the work: it experiences, suffers, and engages in **sādhanā** (practice).
- This concept brilliantly protects the Self: The Self remains pure and unchanging (**vikriyā nāsti**), while the reflection in the mind (**buddhi**) appears to be conscious and active.

Conclusion of the answer to the praśna and ākṣepa starting with "Katham"

The discussion concludes by solidifying the entire argument.

- **Final Conclusion:** To be the locus of this "cognition," the unattached Self must identify with the mind (**vṛttimat manaḥ**) through **tādātmya adhyāsa** (superimposition of identity). **tad āśrayatvam asaṅgasya ātmano vṛttimat manaḥ tādātmya-adhyāsaṃ vinā na saṃbhavati iti bhāvaḥ**
- **Therefore (tasmāt):** All means of knowledge (scripture, perception) are only for the one subject to **adhyāsa** (ignorance). **tasmāt avidyāvad viṣayāṇi pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca**

Resolving the Final Objection (ākṣepa): "If the knower is ignorant (**avidyāvat**), isn't his knowledge flawed and invalid (**aprāmāṇya**)?"

- **Answer:** No. The fundamental **adhyāsa** (e.g., "I am this body") is intrinsic to the very creation of the knower (**pramātṛ-antargatatvāt**). Since it is the universal prerequisite for all knowers, it is not considered a "fault" (**adoṣatvāt**) in the context of worldly knowledge.
- A "fault" (**doṣa**) is defined as something that comes after one has already become a knower. **sati pramātari paścāt bhavan doṣaḥ iti ucyate**
- **Example:** Jaundice or colored glass (**kāca-kāmalādi**). These are additional defects that distort perception. (**The Mūla Avidyā** is like air pollution—everyone breathes it (it's the

baseline). That is not counted as a personal fault. An additional fault is like a person also choosing to smoke.

- **Conclusion:** The Mūla Avidyā (root ignorance) is not a "fault" for worldly perception; it is, in fact, necessary for it. It is, however, the primary "fault" or obstacle for **Mokṣa** (liberation).

Additional Arguments in Support of **Adhyāsa (Page 48-49)**

सति प्रमातरि पश्चाद्भवन् दोष इत्युच्यते, यथा काचादिः । अविद्या तु प्रमात्रन्तर्गतत्वान्न दोषः, येन प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं भवेदिति भावः । ननु यदुक्तमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्यवहारोऽध्यासकार्य इति, तदयुक्तं विदुषामध्यासाभावेऽपि व्यवहारदृष्टेरित्यत आह - पश्वादिभिश्चेति । चशब्दः शङ्कानिरासार्थः, किं विद्वत्त्वं ब्रह्मास्मीति साक्षात्कारः उत यौक्तिकमात्मानात्मभेदज्ञानम् । आद्ये बाधिताध्यासानुवृत्त्या व्यवहार इति समन्वयसूत्रे वक्ष्यते ।

पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात् । यथा हि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते; यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य 'मां हन्तुमयमिच्छति' इति पलायितुमारभन्ते, हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति; एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान्बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान्प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते ।

A new objection is raised, transitioning to the next section of the Bhāśya.

Objection: "You claimed that **adhyāsa** and **vyavahāra** (worldly transaction) are invariably connected (if one is present, the other is too; **anvaya-vyatireka**). This is false."

The Proof: "Look at the **vidvān** (the enlightened sage). He has no **adhyāsa**, yet he is seen to engage in transactions (**viduṣaḥ adhyāsa-abhāve vyavahāraḥ dṛṣṭaḥ**)."

The Bhāśya's Response: To answer this, the Bhāśya introduces the famous "summary phrase" (**saṅgraha vākya**): **paśvādibhiḥ ca aviśeṣāt**

संग्रहवाक्य:

"बह्वर्थकवाक्यानामेकत्र संकलनं संग्रहः"
bahvarthakavākyānāmekatra saṃkalanaṃ saṃgrahaḥ

विस्तरेणोपदिष्टानामर्थानां सूत्र-भाष्ययोः | निबन्धो यः समासेन संग्रहं तं विदुर्बुधाः ||
vistareṇopadiṣṭānāmarthānāṃ sūtra-bhāṣyayoḥ |
ninbadho yaḥ samāsena saṃgrahaṃ taṃ vidurbudhāḥ ||

Clarifying the Objection: The Siddhāntin asks: What kind of **vidvān** are you talking about?

1. One with direct realization (**sākṣātkāra**) of "**aham brahmāsmi**"?
2. One with mere intellectual discrimination (**ātmā-anātma bheda jñānam**)?

1. The Case of a True Jñānī:

For the **first type** (the true **jñānī**), his worldly transactions continue due to **bādhita-adhyāsa-anuvṛtti**—the "lingering momentum of the sublated superimposition." This, the **Ṭīkā** notes, will be explained in the commentary on the **Samanvaya Sutra** (Brahma Sutra 1.1.4).

- For the person who has had the direct realization (**Aham Brahmāsmi sākṣātkāra**), their worldly behavior continues as usual, but it operates through **Bādhita Adhyāsa** (sublated or negated superimposition).
- They will still feel cold and put on warm clothes.
    - **The crucial difference:** Their behavior is accompanied by **viveka** (discrimination). They maintain the firm understanding: "I am not this body (**pañcakoṣātmaka**) that is feeling cold or wearing clothes."
    - Their **adhyāsa** is **bādhita** (negated); they know it's an appearance but interact with it as necessary.
- **Example (The Charging Bull):**
    - If a realized person (**Jñānī**) sees a bull charging at them, they will move out of the way.
    - They will not stand still thinking, "I am Brahman, the bull cannot harm me." This is not the meaning of realization.
    - **Paramārtha Jñāna** (knowledge of the ultimate reality) does not mean behaving foolishly or recklessly in **vyavahāra** (worldly transactions).
- **Absence of Kartṛtva (Doership):**
    - The **Jñānī** follows worldly rules and navigates reality, but their actions are not driven by **kartṛtva** (a sense of being the doer).
    - Because there is no identification with the doer, they do not accrue **pāpa** (sin) or **puṇya** (merit) from their actions, even if society might perceive their actions in that way.
    - They will still exercise practical discernment (e.g., avoiding spicy food if it doesn't suit their body), just like anyone else.

The True Mark of a Jñānī

- **One may ask:** If the **Jñānī**'s behavior is externally the same as an **Ajñānī**'s (ignorant person's), what is the difference?
- **Answer:** The defining characteristic (**lakṣaṇa**) of a **Jñānī** is **Jñāna** (Knowledge), **not vyavahāra** (behavior).
- **Critique of External Signs:**
    - People who judge "enlightenment" based on external signs—like wearing wooden sandals (**khaḍāū**), large beads (**mālā**), or matted hair (**jaṭā**)—have not understood the scriptures (**śāstra**).
    - These are not the characteristics mentioned in the texts.
- **The Real Characteristic (Scriptural Quote):** The true signs are internal and paradoxical to the worldly view. It is stated in the verse:

- **Conclusion:** Only the **Jñānī** truly knows their own state of knowledge. It cannot be definitively judged by external behavior.

2. The Case of one who has indirect/intellectual knowledge:

The Issue: This section returns to Category 2: the person with only intellectual/logical knowledge (**yuktikam ātmānātma bheda jñānam**).

द्वितीये परोक्षज्ञानस्यापरोक्षभ्रान्त्यनिवर्तकत्वात्

This intellectual knowledge is **parokṣa jñāna** (indirect, mediated knowledge).

The Delusion: The core delusion is "I am this body, I am this ego, I am happy/sad" (**Aham dehosmi, jīvosmi, sukhī, dukhī asmi**). This is an **aparokṣa bhrānti** (a direct, unmediated, self-evident delusion).

The Incompatibility:
Parokṣa jñānasya aparokṣa bhrānti anivartakatvāt (Indirect knowledge cannot remove a direct delusion.)

Example (Rope and Snake):

- **Caitra** sees a rope and thinks it's a snake. This is **Aparokṣa Bhrama** (direct illusion).
- **Caitra** tells **Maitra**, "There's a snake outside." **Maitra** (who hasn't seen it) now has a **Parokṣa Bhrama** (indirect illusion).
- **Maitra's** indirect illusion can be removed by indirect knowledge (**Parokṣa Jñānam** e.g., being told, "Caitra was wrong") and by direct knowledge (**Aparokṣa Jñānam)**.
- **Caitra's** direct illusion cannot be removed by being told. It can only be removed by **aparokṣa jñānam** (direct knowledge)—i.e., seeing the rope as a rope himself.

Application: Studying scriptures (**śāstra**) and using logic (**yukti**) gives **parokṣa jñānam**. But the "I am the body" understanding is an **aparokṣa bhrānti**. Therefore, indirect knowledge is insufficient to destroy it.

Conclusion:

विवेकिनामपि व्यवहारकाले पश्वादिभिरविशेषात् अध्यासवत्त्वेन तुल्यत्वाद्व्यवहारोऽध्यासकार्य इति युक्तमित्यर्थः ।

- **The Bhāṣya's Verdict:** Because the **Vivekī**'s (intellectual's) indirect knowledge cannot remove their direct delusion, their **adhyāsa** is still fully active.
  Vivekinām vyavahāra kāle paśvādibhi aviśeṣāt (For the Vivekīs, during the time of

worldly transactions, there is no difference from animals, etc.). This is because their behavior is **adhyāsavatvena tulyatvāt** (equivalent to [behavior] with adhyāsa).
- **Practical Advice:** We must remain vigilant (**satarka**) and constantly examine whether our **adhyāsa** is **bādhita** (negated) or not during our daily actions. This is the path to making knowledge firm (**dṛḍha**) and maturing one's **vairāgya** (dispassion).

The True Meaning of Vairāgya (Dispassion)

- **Gross vs. Subtle: Vairāgya** is not just its gross, external signs (e.g., eating less, wearing fewer clothes).
- **Subtle Vairāgya (Sūkṣma Vairāgya):** The true, subtle meaning is when **unnecessary vṛttis** (thought-waves or mental modifications) **simply do not arise** in the mind (**buddhi**).
- **Analogy:** When you walk through a busy market, you are not bothered by the countless shops because you are naturally **virakta** (detached) from them. You don't have to fight the desire to look at them.
- **True Dispassion:** Likewise, when unnecessary thoughts come and go without capturing your attention or causing a struggle, that is **vairāgya**.

The Formal Logical Argument (Anumāna) (Page 49-50)

अत्रायं प्रयोगः विवेकिनोऽध्यासवन्तः, व्यवहारवत्त्वात् , पश्वादिवदिति । तत्र सङ्ग्रहवाक्यं व्याकुर्वन् दृष्टान्ते हेतुं स्फुटयति - यथाहीति । विज्ञानस्यानुकूलत्वं प्रतिकूलत्वं चेष्टानिष्ठसाधनगोचरत्वम् , तदेवोदाहरति - यथेति । अयं दण्डो मदनिष्टसाधनम् , दण्डत्वात् , अनुभूतदण्डवत् , इदं तृणमिष्टसाधनम् अनुभूतजातीयत्वात् , अनुभूततृणवदित्यनुमाय व्यवहारन्तीत्यर्थः । अधुना हेतोः पक्षधर्मतामाह - एवमिति । व्युत्पन्नचित्ता अपीत्यन्वयः । विवेकिनोऽपीत्यर्थः । फलितमाह - अत इति । अनुभवबलादित्यर्थः । समान इति । अध्यासकार्यत्वेन तुल्येत्यर्थः ।

यथा हि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते; यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य 'मां हन्तुमयमिच्छति' इति पलायितुमारभन्ते, हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति; एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान्बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान्प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते । अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः । पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्धः अविवेकपुरस्सरः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः ।

The **Tīkā** introduces a formal logical argument (**prayoga**) to prove that the **Vivekī** (intellectual) still operates from **adhyāsa**.

- **The Argument (Prayoga):**
  Vivekinaḥ adhyāsavantaḥ, vyavahāravatvāt, paśvādivat.
- **Breakdown of the Argument:**
  - **Pakṣa** (Subject): **Vivekinaḥ** (The Vivekīs).
  - **Sādhya** (What is to be proven): **Adhyāsavantaḥ** (They possess adhyāsa).
  - **Hetu** (Reason): **Vyavahāravatvāt** (Because they engage in worldly behavior/transactions).
  - **Dṛṣṭānta** (Example): **Paśvādivat** (Like animals, etc.).

- **The Vyāpti (Invariable Concomitance):**
  Yatra yatra vyavāharavattvam tatra tatra adhyāsavattvam (Wherever there is behavior, there is adhyāsa.)
- **The Siddhānta's (Proponent's) Position:** This argument is valid. The hetu (behavior) is present in the dṛṣṭānta (animals), and the sādhya (adhyāsa) is also present in them.

Proving the Example: Animal Behavior as Proof of Adhyāsa

- **How do we know animals have adhyāsa?** The Bhāṣya explains how they behave.
- **Bhāṣya:**
  Yathā hi paśvādayaḥ śabdādibhiḥ śrotrādīnām sambandhe sati śabdādi vijñāne pratikūle jāte tato nivartante, anukūle ca pravartante.
- **Meaning:** When animals (**paśvādayaḥ**) come into contact (**sambandha**) with sense objects (like sound, **śabdādi**) via their sense organs (like the ear, **śrotrādi**), they gain knowledge (**vijñāna**).
  - If that knowledge is **pratikūla** (unfavorable), **tato nivartante** (they turn away from it).
  - If it is **anukūla** (favorable), **pravartante** (they move towards it).
- **Tīkā's Explanation of "Favorable/Unfavorable":**
  - **Anukūlatvam = Iṣṭa sādhana gocaratvam** (Being the object of [knowing it as] a means to a desired end).
  - **Pratikūlatvam = Aniṣṭa sādhana gocaratvam** (Being the object of [knowing it as] a means to an undesired end).
- **Bhāṣya's Specific Examples:**
  - **Daṇḍodyatakaram puruṣam... palāyante:** Seeing a man with a raised stick (**daṇḍa**), the animal [infers] "He wants to hit me," and runs away.
  - **Harita tṛṇa pūrṇa pāṇim... abhimukhī bhavanti:** Seeing a person with a hand full of green grass (**harita tṛṇa**), they move towards him.
- **The Animal's Inferences (Anumāna):** The ṭīkā clarifies that the animal is making logical inferences based on past experience.
  1. **Ayam daṇḍo madaniṣṭa sādhanam, daṇḍatvāt, anubhūta daṇḍavat.** (This stick is a means to my suffering, because it's a stick, like the stick I experienced before.)
  2. **Idam tṛṇam iṣṭa sādhanam, anubhūta jātīyatvāt, anubhūta tṛṇavat.** (This grass is a means to my pleasure, because it belongs to the same class as what I've experienced, like the grass I experienced before.)
- **Conclusion: Iti anumāya vyavaharanti paśavaḥ** (Animals behave after making such inferences). This proves their behavior is based on a perceived self, its likes, and dislikes (i.e., **adhyāsa**).

Applying the Logic Back to Vivekīs

- **Hetoḥ pakṣa dharmatām āha:** Now, the hetu (reason) is applied to the pakṣa (subject). This is the **Parāmarśa** (applicative cognition). **Adhyāsa vyāpya vyavahāravantaḥ**

vivekinaḥ. (The Vivekīs possess behavior, which is [known to be] pervaded by adhyāsa.)

- **Bhāṣya:**
  Evam puruṣā api vyutpannacittāḥ... Similarly, men, even those with cultivated/discerning minds behave the same way. They run from a man with a cruel face and a raised sword (**krūra dṛṣṭin... khaḍgodyatakarān**) and move towards those who are the opposite (**tad viparītān prati pravartante**).
- **Final Conclusion of the Argument (Phalitam):**
  Ataḥ samānaḥ paśvādibhiḥ puruṣāṇām pramāṇa prameya vyavahāraḥ. (Therefore, the behavior of men related to 'knower' and 'known'—**pramāṇa prameya vyavahāraḥ**—is the same [**samānaḥ**] as that of animals.)
- The ṭīkā clarifies "same" means **adhyāsa kāryatva tulyārthaḥ** (equivalent in being an effect of adhyāsa).

Objection (Pūrvapakṣa) to the Logical Argument (Page 50)

नन्वस्माकं प्रवृत्तिरध्यासादिति न पश्वादयो ब्रुवन्ति, नापि परेषामेतत्प्रत्यक्षम् , अतः साध्यविकलो दृष्टान्त इति नेत्याह - पश्वादीनां चेति ।

- **Nanu!** (But wait!). **An objector says**: We can't directly perceive (**na pareṣām pratyakṣam**) if animals actually have **adhyāsa**. They don't tell us.
- **The Logical Flaw:** Therefore, your argument is flawed.
  Ataḥ sādhya vikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ (Therefore, the example [**dṛṣṭānta**] is **sādhya vikala**—it is devoid of the sādhya, the very thing you are trying to prove.)
- **In simple terms:** You used animals (who have adhyāsa) as an example to prove Vivekīs have adhyāsa. But you haven't even proven that animals have adhyāsa in the first place!
- **Siddhānta's Reply:**
  - **Iti na** (That is not so).
  - **Bhāṣya: Paśvādīnām ca prasiddho aviveka purassaraḥ pratyakṣādi vyavahāraḥ.**
  - **Meaning:** The behavior of animals is well-known (**prasiddhaḥ**) to be preceded by **aviveka** (non-discrimination).
    - **Ṭīkā: "teṣām ātmānātmanoḥ jñānamātramasti na vivekaḥ, upadeśābhāvāt "**. This quote explains why animals lack **viveka** (discrimination). Animals (**paśvādīnām**) possess **jñāna mātra** (mere/rudimentary knowledge) of **ātmā** (self) and **anātmā** (non-self). Their idea of **ātmā** is the specific body-complex ("I" as this body). Their idea of **anātmā** is anything separate from that body-complex (e.g., food, offspring, a predator).
    - They lack true **viveka** because of **upadeśa abhāvāt**—an absence of instruction from a **śāstra** (scripture) or an **ācārya** (teacher).
  - **What is Viveka?**
    - **Viveka** here means the specific, instructed knowledge that "I" (**aham**) am **vilakṣaṇa** (distinct) from the **deha** (body) and **indriya** (senses).

        - With the exception of the **Cārvāka** (materialist) school, almost all other philosophies (like **Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika**, **Mīmāṁsaka**) accept this basic distinction, even if they don't separate the self from the **antaḥkaraṇa** (internal organ).
        - Animals lack even this basic level of discrimination.
    - **Conclusion on the presence of adhyāsa inAnimals:**
        - Because the **sāmagrī** (conditions/materials) for **adhyāsa** are present, **adhyāsa** is proven (**prasiddhaḥ**) in animals.
        - This defeats the opponent's objection of **sādhya vaikalya** (the example lacking the property to be proven). The animal example is valid.
        - This establishes the **vyāpti** (pervasion): "**yatra yatra vyavahāratvam tatra tatra adhyāsatvam**" (Wherever there is behavior, there is **adhyāsa**).

Concluding the Logical Argument (Page 51)

निगमयति - तत्सामान्येति । तैः पश्वादिभिः सामान्यं व्यवहारवत्त्वं तस्य दर्शनाद्विवेकिनामप्ययं व्यवहारः समान इति निश्चीयत इति सम्बन्धः । समानत्वं व्यवहारस्याध्यासकार्यत्वेनेत्युक्तं पुरस्तात् । तत्रोक्तान्वयव्यतिरेकौ स्मारयति - तत्काल इति । तस्याध्यासस्य काल एव कालो यस्य स तत्कालः । यदा अध्यासस्तदा व्यवहारः, तदभावे सुषुप्तौ तदभाव इत्युक्तान्वयादिमानिति यावत् । अतो व्यवहारलिङ्गाद्विवेकिनामपि देहादिष्वहंममाभिमानोऽस्तीत्यनवद्यम् ।

तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद्व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्तत्कालः समान इति निश्चीयते ।

- **Bhāṣya: "tat sāmānya darśanāt vyutpattimatāmapi puruṣāṇām pratyakṣādi vyavahāraḥ tatkālaḥ samānaḥ iti niścīyate"**
- **Meaning:** From seeing this commonality (**sāmānya darśanāt**), it is determined that the empirical behavior (**pratyakṣādi vyavahāraḥ**) of even **vyutpattimatām** (learned, discerning people) is **samānaḥ** (similar) and **tatkālaḥ** (co-temporal with **adhyāsa**).
- **Important Clarification:**
    - This does not mean a wise person behaves like an animal. That would be an insult and hence it is important to interpret it in the right way.
    - The **sāmānyam** (similarity) is only with respect to the underlying mechanism: **adhyāsa**.
    - **Ṭīkā: "samānatvam vyavahārasya adhyāsa kāryatve iti uktam purastāt"** (The similarity of behavior is in its being an effect of adhyāsa, as stated before).
    - Both animals and humans operate with a sense of **kartṛtva** (agency) and **bhoktṛtva** (enjoyership), and react to **iṣṭa** (desirable) and **aniṣṭa** (undesirable) stimuli. This is the common ground.

The Logic of Anvaya-Vyatireka (Co-presence & Co-absence)

- The Bhāśya's use of the word **tatkālaḥ** is crucial.
- **Analysis of Tatkālaḥ:** This is a **Bahuvrīhi samāsa**.
    - **"tasya adhyāsasya kālaḥ eva kālaḥ yasya saḥ tatkālaḥ"**
    - **Meaning:** "[That behavior] which happens at the very same time as that superimposition."

    - **tasya** refers to **adhyāsasya** (of **adhyāsa**).
    - The compound word **tatkālaḥ** refers to **vyavahāraḥ** (behavior).
- **The logic:**
    - **Anvaya (Co-presence):** "**yadā adhyāsaḥ tadā vyavahāraḥ**" (When **adhyāsa** is present, behavior is present).
    - **Vyatireka (Co-absence):** "**tadabhāve suṣuptau tad abhāvaḥ**" (In its absence [**adhyāsa**'s absence], as in deep sleep, there is its absence [behavior's absence]).
- **Final Conclusion (Nigamana):**
    - "**ataḥ vyavahāra liṅgāt vivekinām dehādiṣu aham mama abhimānaḥ asti iti anavadyam**"
    - **Meaning:** Therefore, from the **liṅga** (logical mark) of behavior, it is flawlessly (**anavadyam** / **nirdoṣam**) established that even in discerning people, the **adhyāsa** of "I" (**aham**) and "mine" (**mama**) exists on the body, etc.

New Objection: What About Śāstrīya Vyavahāra (Scriptural Actions)? (Page 51-52)

ननु लौकिकव्यवहारस्याध्यासिकत्वेऽपि ज्योतिष्टोमादिव्यवहारस्य नाध्यासजन्यत्वम् , तस्य देहातिरिक्तात्मज्ञानपूर्वकत्वादित्याशङ्क्य हेतुमङ्गीकरोति - शास्त्रीये त्विति । तर्हि कथं वैदिककर्मणोऽध्यासजन्यत्वसिद्धिरित्याशङ्क्य किं तत्र देहान्यात्मधीमात्रमपेक्षितमुत, आत्मतत्त्वज्ञानम् , आद्ये तस्याध्यासाबाधकत्वात्तत्सिद्धिरित्याह - तथापीति । न द्वितीय इत्याह - न वेदान्तेति । क्षुत्पिपासादिग्रस्तो जातिविशेषवानहं संसारीति ज्ञानं कर्मण्यपेक्षितं न तद्विपरीतात्मतत्त्वज्ञानम् , अनुपयोगात्प्रवृत्तिबाधाच्चेत्यर्थः । शास्त्रीयकर्मणोऽध्यासजन्यत्वं निगमयति - प्राक्चेति ।

शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोकसम्बन्धमधिक्रियते, तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यमशनायाद्यतीतमपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदमसंसार्यात्मतत्त्वमधिकारेऽपेक्ष्यते, अनुपयोगात् अधिकारविरोधाच्च । प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते ।

This is the objection from the **Mīmāṁsaka** school.

- **Objection:** "**nanu laukika vyavahārasya ādhyāsikatve...**" (Okay, we accept that **laukika** / worldly behavior is based on **adhyāsa**.)
- "...**jyotiṣṭomādi vyavahārasya na adhyāsa janyatvam**" (BUT, **śāstrīya** / scriptural behavior, like the **Jyotiṣṭoma** ritual, cannot be born of **adhyāsa**.)
- **Reason:** "**tasya deha-atirikta-ātma-jñāna-pūrvakatvāt**"
    - **Meaning:** Because this ritual is preceded by the knowledge that the self is distinct from the body (**deha-atirikta**).
    - **Explanation:** To perform a **yāga** (e.g., "**jyotiṣṭomena svarga kāmo yajeta**") for a result like heaven, one must believe in a self that outlasts the body. This is directly opposed to the **Cārvāka** (materialist) view.
    - **The Question:** How can one who knows they are distinct from the body still be under **adhyāsa**?

The Vedāntic Rebuttal

- **Bhāśya's Partial Agreement:**
    - **Bhāṣya: "śāstrīye tu vyavahāre yadyapi buddhipūrvakārī na aviditvā ātmanaḥ paraloka sambandham adhikriyate..."**
    - **Meaning:** "In scriptural transactions, although the intelligent practitioner (**buddhipūrvakārī**) does not become eligible (**na adhikriyate**) without knowing (**aviditvā**) the self's connection to the next world ..."
    - The "**na aviditvā**" implies "**viditvā**" (after knowing).
    - The Bhashyakara accepts (**aṅgīkaroti**) this premise: yes, the ritualist knows they are distinct from the gross body.
- **The Vedāntin's Counter-Question:**
    - To perform Vedic rituals, what knowledge is required?
        1. "**deha anya ātma dhī mātram**" (The mere understanding that the self is distinct from the body)?
        2. OR "**ātma tattva jñānam**" (The true knowledge of the Self, i.e., "I am Brahman")?
    - The **Mīmāṁsaka** must accept option 1.
- **The Refutation:**
    - "**tasya adhyāsa abādhakatvāt**"
    - **Key Point:** That first knowledge ("I am distinct from the body") is **abādhaka** (NOT a sublater) of **adhyāsa**.
    - The belief "I am distinct from the body" can co-exist with the **adhyāsa** of "I am a **kartā** (doer)," "I am a **bhoktā** (enjoyer)," or "I am a **Brāhmaṇa**."

Knowledge of Brahman (Ātma Tattva Jñānam) vs. Ritual

- **Bhāṣya: "tathāpi na vedānta vedyam aśanāyādyatītam apeta brahma-kṣatrādi bhedam asaṁsāri ātma tattvam adhikāre apekṣyate. anupayogāt, adhikāra virodhāt ca."**
- **Meaning:** "Nevertheless... the knowledge of the Self revealed by Vedanta (**vedānta vedyam**) is not required (**na apekṣyate**) for eligibility (**adhikāre**) in rituals."
- **What is this "Vedanta Knowledge"?**
    - The self as **aśanāyādy-atītam** (beyond hunger, thirst, etc.).
    - The self as **apeta-brahma-kṣatrādi-bhedam** (devoid of all distinctions like **Brāhmaṇa**, **Kṣatriya**, etc.).
    - The self as **asaṁsāri** (a non-transmigrator).
- **Why is this knowledge NOT required for rituals?**
    - **Anupayogāt:** It is useless for the ritual. Knowing "I am Brahman" has no utility in performing a **Jyotiṣṭoma**.
    - **Adhikāra-Virodhāt:** It contradicts the very eligibility (**adhikāra**) for the ritual.
- **Explanation of Adhikāra-Virodha:**
    - Rituals require a **kartā** (doer) with a specific **jāti** (caste), **gotra** (lineage), etc.
    - The **jñānī** (one who knows "I am Brahman") identifies as **akartā** (a non-doer) and is free from all such attributes.

- Therefore, the **jñānī** is ineligible for **karma**. This is why **vidvat sannyāsa** (the renunciation of the enlightened) is **sahaja** (natural/automatic)—their eligibility for action has been burnt by knowledge.

The Knowledge Required for Rituals is Adhyāsa

- **Ṭīkā: "kṣut-pipāsādi grastaḥ, jāti viśeṣavān, aham saṁsārī, iti jñānam karmaṇi apekṣitam"**
- **Meaning:** The knowledge actually required for rituals is: "I am afflicted by hunger and thirst," "I possess a specific caste," and "I am a transmigrator (**saṁsārī**)."
- This is, by definition, **adhyāsa**.
- **Final Conclusion of the Bhāśya:**
  - **Bhāṣya: "prāk ca tathābhūta-ātma-vijñānāt pravartamānaṁ śāstram avidyāvad-viṣayatvaṁ na ativartate"**
  - **Meaning:** Prior to the rise of true Self-knowledge ("I am Brahman"), all functioning scripture (i.e., the **karma-kāṇḍa**) **na ativartate** (does not transcend) having for its subject (**viṣaya**) one who is possessed of **avidyā** (ignorance/**adhyāsa**).
  - In summary: The ritual section of the Vedas is only for the person still under **adhyāsa**.

Āgama (Scripture) as Proof of Adhyāsa (Page 52-53)

अध्यासे आगमं प्रमाणयति - तथा हीति । यथा प्रत्यक्षानुमानार्थापत्तयोऽध्यासे प्रमाणं तथागमोऽपीत्यर्थः । 'ब्राह्मणो यजेत', 'न ह वै स्नात्वा भिक्षेत', 'अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत', 'कृष्णकेशोऽग्नीनादधीत' इत्यागमो ब्राह्मणादिपदैरधिकारिणं वर्णाद्यभिमानिनमनुवदन्नध्यासं गमयतीति भावः ।

तथा हि — 'ब्राह्मणो यजेत' इत्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थादिविशेषाध्यासमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते ।

The Bhashyakara now uses **āgama** (scripture) itself as a **pramāṇa** (proof) for **adhyāsa**.

- **Bhāṣya: "tathā hi brāhmaṇo yajeta ityādīni śāstrāṇi ātmani varṇa-āśrama-vaya-avasthā-ādi viśeṣa-adhyāsam āśritya pravartante"**
- **Analysis:** Injunctions like "**brāhmaṇo yajeta**" (A Brahmana should perform the sacrifice) function only by **āśritya** (depending on/presupposing) a **viśeṣa-adhyāsa** (a specific superimposition) onto the **ātmā**.
- These **adhyāsa**-based injunctions include:
  - **Varṇa (Caste): "brāhmaṇo yajeta"** (presupposes "I am a Brahmana").
  - **Āśrama (Stage of Life): "na snātvā bhikṣeta"** (A **snātaka**, one who has completed the **samāvartana** ritual, should no longer beg for alms like a **brahmacārī**). This depends on the **adhyāsa** of having changed one's stage of life.
  - **Vaya (Age): aṣṭavarṣaṁ brāhmaṇam upanayed tam vedam adhyāpayet** (One should initiate an 8-year-old Brahmin and teach him the Veda). This is to prevent absurdities like performing the initiation (yajnopavita) in the morning and getting

married in the afternoon (moving from **Brahmacharya** to **Gṛhastha āśrama** in hours). This depends on the **adhyāsa** of age.
    - **Avasthā** (Condition/State): **jāta putraḥ kṛṣṇakeśo agninādadhīta:** "One whose son has been born, and whose hair is still black (naturally), should establish the sacred fires." This rule is conditional on one's state.
    - **Other examples of implicit Adhyasa:**
        - **yāvat jīvet agnihotram juhuyāt** (As long as one lives, perform the Agnihotra). This is based on the adhyasa "I am living".
        - **jyotiṣṭomena svarga kāmo yajeta** (One who desires heaven should perform the Jyotishtoma). This is based on the adhyasa of being a desirer (kāmitva), "I am one who desires."

Second Definition of Adhyasa: What is adhyastha and Where? (Page 53)

एवमध्यासे प्रमाणसिद्धेऽपि कस्य कुत्राध्यास इति जिज्ञासायां तमुदाहर्तुं लक्षणं स्मारयति - अध्यासो नामेति ।

अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम ।

The discussion moves to clarification of the definition and categorization of adhyasa to elaborate on what is superimposed and where.

First Definition (from earlier)

- **smṛti rūpaḥ paratra pūrva dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ** (The appearance, in the form of memory, of something previously seen, in another location).

Second Definition (The focus of discussion here)

- **Bhāśya: adhyāso nāma atasmin tadbuddhiḥ**
- **Meaning:** "Adhyasa is the cognition of 'that' in 'what-is-not-that'."
- **Right Knowledge** (Pramā) = **tasmin tadbuddhiḥ** (cognizing "that" in "that," e.g., "rope in a rope").
- **Adhyasa = asarpa bhūte rajjau sarpa buddhiḥ** (cognizing a snake in the rope, which is "not-a-snake"). **In Vivekachudamani, Bhagavān Ādi Śaṅkarācārya** has composed a verse that reverses the example: **sphurati bhujage rajjudhiṣaṇā** (the cognition of a rope in a snake), proving that adhyasa is simply cognizing anything as what it is not.

Type 1: Adhyasa of External Properties (Bāhya Dharma)

उदाहरति - तद्यथेति । तल्लक्षणं यथा स्पष्टं भवति तथोदाह्रियत इत्यर्थः । स्वदेहाद्भेदेन प्रत्यक्षाः पुत्रादयो बाह्याः तद्धर्मान्साकल्यादीन्देहविशिष्टात्मन्यध्यस्यति, तद्धर्मज्ञानात्स्वस्मिन्स्तत्तुल्यधर्मानध्यस्यतीत्यर्थः । भेदापरोक्षज्ञाने तद्धर्माध्यासायोगात् , अन्यथाख्यात्यनङ्गीकाराच्चेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

तद्यथा — पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा अहमेव विकलः सकलो वेति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति । तथा देहधर्मान् 'स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहं गौरोऽहं तिष्ठामि गच्छामि लङ्घयामि च' इति । तथेन्द्रियधर्मान् 'मूकः काणः क्लीबो बधिरोऽन्धोऽहम्' इति; तथान्तःकरणधर्मान् कामसङ्कल्पविचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन् ।

- **Bhāśya: tad yathā putra bhāryādiṣu vikaleṣu sakaleṣu vā aham vikalaḥ sakalo veti bāhya dharmān ātmani adhyasati**
- **Meaning:** "When a son, wife, etc., are distressed (vikala) or whole/prosperous (sakala), one thinks, 'I am distressed' or 'I am whole.' Thus, one superimposes **external properties** onto the Self."
- **Tika:**
    - These properties are external because the son/wife are perceived as separate from one's own body (**svadehāt bhedena pratyakṣāḥ**).
    - The superimposition is not on the pure Self, but on the **Self-as-qualified-by-the-body** (**deha viśiṣṭa ātmani**).
    - One superimposes a similar property (**tat-tulya dharmān**), not the exact same property.
    - **Reasoning: bheda aparokṣa jñāne tad dharmādhyāsa ayogāt** (Because there is direct knowledge of the difference between the subjects [me and my son], the exact property cannot be superimposed, only a similar feeling).

Type 2: Adhyasa of Body, Senses, and Mind

देहेन्द्रियधर्मान्मनोविशिष्टात्मन्यध्यस्यतीत्याह - तथेति । कृशत्वादिधर्मवतो देहादेरात्मनि तादात्म्येन कल्पितत्वात्तद्धर्माः साक्षादात्मन्यध्यस्ता इति मन्तव्यम् । अज्ञातप्रत्यग्रूपे साक्षिणि मनोधर्माध्यासमाह - तथान्तःकरणेति ।

1. **Body Properties (Deha Dharma):**
    - **Bhāśya: sthūlo'haṁ, kṛśo'haṁ, gauro'haṁ, tiṣṭhāmi, gacchāmi, laṅghayāmi ceti** (I am fat, I am thin, I am fair, I am standing, I am going, I am jumping).
    - **Meaning:** This includes any identification with the body's state or location, e.g., "I am in this room." Due to identification (tādātmya) with the body, its properties are **directly** (sākṣāt) superimposed on the Self (as qualified by the mind, **manoviśiṣṭa ātmani**).
2. **Sense Properties (Indriya Dharma):**
    - **Bhāśya: mūkaḥ, badhiraḥ, andho'ham iti** (I am dumb, I am deaf, I am blind).
3. **Mind Properties (Antaḥkaraṇa Dharma):**
    - **Bhāśya: kāma-saṅkalpa-vicikitsā-adhyavasāyādayaḥ** (Desire, resolve, doubt, determination, etc.).
    - **Meaning:** These properties of the inner-organ (mind/intellect) are superimposed on the **Sākṣī** (Witness-Self). The Sākṣī is described as **ajñāta pratyag rūpe** (the unknown inner Self), because the very term "Witness" implies a duality (witness and witnessed) that only exists in ignorance.

Mutual Superimposition (Dharmī Adhyasa) (Page 55)

धर्माध्यासमुक्त्वा तद्वदेव धर्म्यध्यासमाह - एवमिति । अन्तःकरणं साक्षिण्यभेदेनाध्यस्य तद्धर्मान् कामादीनध्यस्यतीति मन्तव्यम् । स्वप्रचारा मनोवृत्तयः । प्रति - प्रातिलोम्येनासज्जडदुःखात्मकाहङ्कारादिविलक्षणतया सच्चित्सुखात्मकत्वेनाञ्चति प्रकाशत इति प्रत्यक् । एवमात्मन्यनात्मतद्धर्माध्यासमुदाहृत्यानात्मन्यात्मनोऽपि संसृष्टत्वेनाध्यासमाह - तञ्चेति ।

एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति ।एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः ।

This is the superimposition of the substances (dharmī) themselves, not just their properties.

Bhāśya: evam aham pratyayinam aśeṣa svapracāra sākṣiṇi pratyagātmani adhyasya taṁ ca pratyagātmānam sarva sākṣiṇaṁ tad viparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiṣu adhyasati

This describes a two-way, reciprocal (tad viparyayeṇa) superimposition:

- **Anātman onto Ātman:** The **aham pratyayinam** (the "I-concept," the Ego/Intellect, **ahaṅkāra**) is superimposed onto the **pratyagātman** (the inner Self, which is the Sākṣī or witness).
- **Ātman onto Anātman:** The **pratyagātmānam** (the Self, the witness-of-all) is superimposed onto the **antaḥkaraṇādiṣu** (the inner organ, i.e., the Ego).

Tika:

- **svapracārāḥ** = (sva = antaḥkarana = mind), pracārāḥ (vritti = thought modifications) = manovṛttayaḥ (mental modifications).
- **pratyak** (Inner Self): This is derived from **prati** (against, in reverse) + **añcati** (to shine, to go). It shines (añcati) in reverse (prātilomyena) to the unreal, insentient, and painful (asat, jaḍa, duḥkhātmaka) ego, as real, conscious, and blissful (sat, cit, sukhātmaka).
- **In Reverse to What?** It shines in opposition to the phenomenal world (the **ahaṅkāra** or Ego).
    - The Ego is **asat** (unreal), **jaḍa** (insentient/inert), and **duḥkhātmaka** (of the nature of suffering).
    - The **Pratyagātman** shines as the opposite: **sat** (Real/Existent), **cit** (Conscious), and **sukhātmaka** (Blissful).

Therefore, the **Pratyagātman** is the pure, inner Witness-Self (the Sākṣī), which is fundamentally Real, Conscious, and Blissful, and is the substrate upon which the unreal, insentient Ego is superimposed.

Reflections on the Witness (Sākṣī)

The text analyzes the phrase **ajñāta-pratyag-rūpe sākṣiṇi** (on the inner Self, the Witness, which is unknown).

- **The Definition:** The Witness (**Sākṣī**) is Consciousness conditioned by Ignorance (**Ajñāna**): **Ajñāna-upahita-caitanya**.
- **Why use the term Witness?**
    - The term **Sākṣī** is relative to the witnessed object (**Sākṣya** or **Dṛśya**).
    - In reality, there is no duality. However, due to **Ajñāna** (Ignorance), we accept a distinction between the Seer (**Draṣṭā**) and the Seen (**Dṛśya**).
    - Contrast with Yoga: In Yoga philosophy, the Seer (**Puruṣa**) and the Seen (**Pradhāna**) are real and distinct. In Vedanta, this distinction exists only due to the limiting adjunct (**Upādhi**) of ignorance.

Sākṣī vs. Pramātā (Witness vs. Knower)

A crucial technical distinction is made between the Witness and the Knower based on how the Inner Organ (**Antaḥkaraṇa**) functions as an adjunct.

Term	Definition	Explanation
Pramātā (Knower)	**Antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa-caitanya**	Consciousness qualified by the mind. Here, the mind is an attribute (Viśeṣaṇa). Characteristics like "I am happy," "I am sad," or "I am angry" appear here.
Sākṣī (Witness)	**Antaḥkaraṇa-upahita-caitanya**	Consciousness limited by the mind (or ignorance). Here, the mind is merely a limiting adjunct (Upādhi) that distinguishes it, but its attributes do not affect the Witness.

The Logic of the Adjunct:

- Primary Definition: **Sākṣī** is **Ajñāna-upahita** (conditioned by ignorance).
- Secondary Definition: **Sākṣī** is **Antaḥkaraṇa-upahita** (conditioned by the mind).
- Reconciliation: Ignorance is the cause; the mind (**Antaḥkaraṇa**) is the effect. In deep sleep (**Suṣupti**), only ignorance exists (Pure Witness). In waking/dream, both ignorance and the mind exist. Therefore, calling it "mind-conditioned" during the waking state is acceptable for analysis.

The Nature of the Self's Superimposition on Non-Self

अहमित्यध्यासे चिदात्मनो भानं वाच्यम् , अन्यथा जगदान्ध्यापत्तेः । न चानध्यस्तस्याध्यासे भानमस्ति । तस्माद्रजतादाविदम् इवात्मनः संसर्गाध्यास एष्टव्यः । तद्विपर्ययेणेति ।

तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति ।

Question: How is the Self superimposed on the non-Self?
Answer: It is a **saṁsarga-adhyāsa** (superimposition of relation), not a **svarūpa-adhyāsa** (superimposition of its entire nature).

Argument 1: Tika: aham iti adhyāse cidātmano bhānam vācyam anyathā jagadāndhyāpatteḥ
In the superimposition 'I' (aham), the manifestation (bhānam) of the Consciousness-Self (Cidātmā) **must** be accepted. To interact with the world (speech, accepting/rejecting things), one requires knowledge. Knowledge resides in the "I". If the "I" were insentient matter without the reflection of Consciousness, no transaction (**Vyavahāra**) would be possible, the world would be plunged into darkness [i.e., nothing would be perceived].

Argument 2: Tika: Na ca anadhyastasya adhyāse bhānam asti

That which is not superimposed does not shine (is not perceived) during the superimposition.

Analysis of "This is Silver" (Idam Rajatam):

Idam (This): This is the "General Existence" (**Sattā** aspect) or the Base (**Ādhāra**). This is perceived.

Śukti (Shell): This is the specific name/form or Substratum (**Adhiṣṭhāna**). This is **not** perceived during the illusion.

Application to the Self:

Just as the "This" (**Idam**) mixes with the false silver, the Existence/Consciousness of the Self mixes with the Ego. This is called **Saṃsarga-adhyāsa** (Superimposition of relation/contact). We must accept that the Self has a relational superimposition with the "I-thought" (**Aham**); otherwise, the "I" would not be conscious.

The Rope-Snake Analogy: For the adhyasa of the snake to occur, the **idam-aṁśa** ("this-ness") of the rope (the substrate) must be perceived. If you perceive nothing, you can't superimpose anything. You see the "this," but fail to see the "rope."

Applying the Analogy:

- The Sat (Existence) and Cit (Consciousness) aspects of the Self are manifest in the adhyasa.
- This is why we have the cognitions "I **am**" (aham asmi) and "I **know**" (aham jānāmi).

- The Ānanda (Bliss) and Ananta (Infinite) aspects remain veiled.

Conclusion:
tasmāt rajatādau idamah iva ātmanaḥ saṁsarga-adhyāsaḥ eṣṭavyaḥ
Therefore, just as the 'this-ness' (idamah) [of the substrate] is [present] in the [superimposition of] silver, etc., so too, a **relational superimposition** (saṁsarga-adhyāsa) of the **Ātman** must be accepted. This relational superimposition of the Self's Sat-Cit aspect onto the ego and the world allows for all cognitions, such as "I **am**," "I **know**," "the pot **is**" (ghaṭo asti), etc.

Reciprocal Superimposition (Anyonyādhyāsa)

तस्याध्यस्तस्य जडस्य विपर्ययोऽधिष्ठानत्वम् , चैतन्यं च तदात्मना स्थितमिति यावत् । तत्राज्ञाने केवलात्मना संसर्गः, मनस्यज्ञानोपहितस्य देहादौ मन उपहितस्येति विशेषः । एवमात्मनि बुद्ध्याद्यध्यासात्कर्तृत्वादिलाभः, बुद्ध्यादौ चात्माध्यासाच्चैतन्यलाभ इति भावः ।

Superimposition works both ways between the Self (**Ātman**) and the Mind/Intellect (**Buddhi**).

1. **Buddhi on Ātman:**
    - **Quote: Ātmani buddhyādi adhyāsāt kartṛtva-lābhaḥ**
    - Result: The Self gains "Agency" (**Kartṛtva**). The Self appears to be the doer.
2. **Ātman on Buddhi:**
    - **Quote: Buddhyādau ca ātma-adhyāsāt caitanya-lābhaḥ**
    - Result: The inert intellect/body gains "Sentience" (**Caitanya**). The body/mind appears to be conscious.

In Summary: Characteristics of Adhyāsa (Page 56)

वर्णिताध्यासमुपसंहरति - एवमयमिति । अनाद्यविद्यात्मकतया कार्याध्यासस्यानादित्वमध्यासात्संस्कारस्ततोऽध्यास इति । प्रवाहतो नैसर्गिकत्वम् । एवमुपादानं निमित्तं चोक्तं भवति । ज्ञानं विना ध्वंसाभावादानन्त्यम् । तदुक्तं भगवद्गीतासु 'न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते नान्तो न चादिर्न च सम्प्रतिष्ठा' इति । हेतुमुक्त्वा स्वरूपमाह - मिथ्येति । मिथ्या माया तया प्रतीयत इति प्रत्ययः कार्यप्रपञ्चः तत्प्रतीतिश्चेत्येवंस्वरूप इत्यर्थः । तस्य कार्यमाह - कर्तृत्वेति ।

एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः ।

The **Ṭīkā** concludes with the defining characteristics of superimposition found in the **Bhāṣya**.

Bhāṣya: Anādi ananto naisargiko'dhyāso mithyā-pratyaya-rūpaḥ

1. Anādi (Beginningless): Because **Avidyā** (Ignorance) is beginningless, its effect (superimposition) is also beginningless. For example, the stream of Seed and Sprout (**Bījāṅkura-nyāya**). We cannot say which came first; it is a flow.

2. Naisargika (Natural): It follows a flow: **Adhyāsa** creates Impression (**Saṃskāra**) -> **Saṃskāra** creates **Adhyāsa**. This cycle is natural and beginningless. This cycle defines its **Upādāna** (Material cause - **Avidyā**) and **Nimitta** (Efficient cause - **Saṃskāra**).

3. Ananta (Endless - in a specific sense): It continues endlessly until Knowledge arises (**Jñānam vinā dhvaṃsa abhāvāt**).

न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते नान्तो न चादिर्न च सम्प्रतिष्ठा | (भ. गी १५.३)
na rūpam asyeha tathopalabhyate nānto na chādir na ca sampratiṣhṭhā | (B. G. 15.3) (Its form is not perceived here, nor its end, nor its beginning).

4. Mithyā-pratyaya-rūpaḥ (Form of false cognition): It covers both **Arthādhyāsa** (Object superimposition, **pratīyate iti pratyayaḥ** - the false perceived product/world) and **Jñānādhyāsa** (Knowledge superimposition, **tat pratītiḥ** - the false cognition).

5. Kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva pravartakaḥ (Promoter of Agency and Enjoyership): It is the fuel that keeps the individual engaging in action as a "doer" and "enjoyer." **Avidyā** acts as the nutrient/food that sustains the ego's sense of doership. True liberation from **Kartṛtva-Bhoktṛtva** requires **Jñāna** (Knowledge), as merely adopting a "Witness attitude" (**Sākṣī bhāva**) is unstable while **Adhyāsa** remains. One cannot simply "think" they are the witness while the superimposition of agency remains. True removal of **Kartṛtva** (doership) requires Self-knowledge. Mere intellectual suppression of doership usually fails when tested by life situations (e.g., the story of the Swami whose construction project was demolished).

6. **Sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ (Primary Proof - Pramāṇa):** The proof for **Adhyāsa** is **Sarvalokapratyakṣaḥ** (direct perception by all people). The actual validating instrument is **Sākṣī Pratyakṣa** (direct experience by the witness consciousness). **Sākṣī Pratyakṣa** is the **Mānam** (authority) that apprehends the nature (**svarūpa**) of **Adhyāsa**.

Role of Inference (Anumāna) and Implication (Arthāpatti):

While Witness perception is the primary proof, inference and implication are used to establish **sambhāvanā** (probability/possibility).

Definition of Sambhāvanā vs. Saṃśaya (Doubt):

- **Saṃśaya** (Doubt): When two possibilities are of equal strength (e.g., "Is it a snake or a rope?"—50/50).
- **Sambhāvanā** (Probability): When one possibility is significantly stronger than the other (e.g., "It is highly likely a rope"). Inference strengthens the probability that the world is an overlay on Brahman.

Viṣaya (Subject Matter) and Prayojana (Goal) of Brahmasūtra

एवमध्यासं वर्णयित्वा तत्साध्ये विषयप्रयोजने दर्शयति - अस्येति । कर्तृत्वाद्यनर्थहेतोरध्यासस्य समूलस्यात्यन्तिकनाशो मोक्षः स केनेत्यत आह - आत्मेति । ब्रह्मात्मैक्यसाक्षात्कारस्य प्रतिपत्तिः श्रवणादिभिरप्रतिबन्धेन लाभस्तस्या इत्यर्थः ।

अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते ।

The **Bhāṣyakāra** presents the **Sādhya** (that which is to be accomplished), **Viṣaya** (subject), and **Prayojana** (goal) of the **Vedānta Śāstra**.: **"asya anartha heto ho prāhānāya ātmaikatva. vidhyā pratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante**"

A. Adhyāsa as the Cause of Misery (Crucial Point)

- The text explicitly identifies **Adhyāsa** as the root of all suffering: This **Adhyāsa**, is the **cause of misery** (**anartha hetu**). The **Anartha** essentially consists of **Kartṛtva** (doership) and **Bhoktṛtva** (enjoyership).

B. Prayojana (Goal)

The entire **Vedānta** is undertaken for two main purposes:

1. **For the complete cessation of Adhyāsa** (**Prahāṇāya**):
    - The goal is **Atyantika Nāśa** (absolute destruction) of **Adhyāsa**, including its root (**samūla**), **Avidyā**. This destruction must be permanent.
2. **For the realization of the knowledge of the Self's Oneness** (**Ātmaikatva Vidyā Pratipattaye**):
    - **Pratipatti** means **Niṣṭhā** (firm establishment) or attainment of **Jñāna** (knowledge) free from **Saṁśaya** (doubt) and **Viparyaya** (error/contrary notion).

C. The Obstacles to Pratipatti

Pratipatti (firm knowledge) is blocked by three main **Pratibandha** (obstacles): **Pramāṇa Asaṁbhāvanā**, **Prameya Asaṁbhāvanā**, and **Viparīta Bhāvanā** (contrary notions).

Pramāṇa Asambhāvanā: Doubt regarding the validity of the means of knowledge (Scripture).
Prameya Asambhāvanā: Doubt regarding the object of knowledge (e.g., "How can I be the infinite Brahman?").
Viparīta Bhāvanā: Habitual contrary tendencies (e.g., feeling "I am the body" despite intellectual knowledge).

D. The Role of the Means (Sādhanas)

- **Śravaṇa**, **Manana**, and **Nididhyāsana** are required to achieve the **Apratibandhena Lābha** (unobstructed attainment) of the knowledge.
- The highest priority should be identifying and addressing one's specific weakness (**Kāmanā**, **Bhaya** (fear), **Lobha** (greed)) which acts as a personal **Pratibandha**. The practice should be tailored to overcome this specific block.

Important to note that while the medicine is the same, the application depends on the "disease." If one has fear, they must meditate on the fearless Brahman; if one has desire, they must practice renunciation.

Feature	Vivaraṇa Mata (Prakāśātman Muni)	Bhāmatī Mata (Vācaspati Miśra)
Nature of Brahma-Jñāna	Always **Aparokṣa** (Direct Perception).	**Śabda** (Word) gives **Parokṣa** (Indirect) knowledge.
Primary Cause of Aparokṣa	**Mahāvākya** (Vedic statement) itself. They say "You are the 10th" (**Daśamastvamasi**). This statement produces **Immediate (Aparokṣa)** knowledge directly from the words. One does not need a new instrument; one needs the removal of obstacles.	**Manas** (Mind), after purification through **Nididhyāsana**. The Mind (**Manas**) is the instrument for immediate realization.

Definition of Scripture and Study

विद्यायां कारणमाह - **सर्व इति ।** आरभ्यन्ते अधीत्य विचार्यन्ते इत्यर्थः । विचारितवेदान्तानां ब्रह्मात्मैक्यं विषयः, मोक्षः फलमित्युक्तं भवति । अर्थात्तद्विचारात्मकशास्त्रस्यापि ते एव विषयप्रयोजने इति ज्ञेयम् ।

Vedānta Ārabhyante: "Vedanta is begun." This implies **adhītya vicāryante**—study followed by inquiry. Mere chanting is not enough; inquiry into the meaning is essential.

Result of Inquiry:

- **Viṣaya**: **Brahmātma-aikyam** (Oneness of Brahman and Ātman).
- **Phalam**: **Mokṣa** (Liberation).

Relation to Brahma Sutra:

- Since the **Brahma Sutras** are the "inquiry into Vedanta" (**tadvicārātmaka śāstra**), they share the exact same Subject (**Viṣaya**) and Purpose (**Prayojana**) as the Upanishads.

The Conflict: Upāsanā (Duality) vs. Jñāna (Oneness)

ननु वेदान्तेषु प्राणाद्युपास्तीनां भानादात्मैक्यमेव तेषामर्थ इति कथमित्यत आह - यथा चेति । शरीरमेव शरीरकम् , कुत्सितत्वात् , तन्निवासी शारीरको जीवस्तस्य ब्रह्मत्वविचारो मीमांसा तस्यामित्यर्थः । उपास्तीनां चित्तैकाग्र्यद्वारात्मैक्यज्ञानार्थत्वात्तद्वाक्यानामपि महातात्पर्यमैक्ये इति वक्ष्यते । एवमध्यासोक्त्या ब्रह्मात्मैक्ये विरोधाभावेन विषयप्रयोजनवत्वाच्छास्त्रमारम्भणीयमिति दर्शितम् ॥

यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानाम् , तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ।

The **Ṭīkā** addresses a potential objection (**Pūrvapakṣa**) raised by the **Samuccayavādins** (those who believe in the combination of Ritual/Meditation and Knowledge).

The Objection: “Nanu...vedānteṣu prāṇādi upāsanā... iti katham?" (Since there are meditations on Prāṇa etc. in Vedanta, how is the subject Oneness?)

The Bhāṣyakāra has just stated that the purpose of all Vedanta is **Ātma-aikya Vidyā** (Knowledge of the Oneness of the Self). However, the Objector asks:

- **The Issue:** In the Vedantas (Upanishads), there are not only texts about Oneness. There are also injunctions for **Prāṇādi Upāsanā** (meditations on Prāṇa, Om, etc.). Meditation (**Upāsanā**) requires duality—a meditator (**Upāsaka**) and an object of meditation (**Upāsya**). If the Vedas teach these Upāsanās, they are validating duality. "How (**Katham**) then can you assert that the subject of all Vedanta texts is solely Oneness (**Ātma-aikyam eva**), when texts describing Prāṇa and other deities clearly exist?"

The Resolution: The Promise of the Sutras

The Bhāṣyakāra responds by setting the stage for the **Brahma Sūtra** itself. He acknowledges the presence of Upāsanā texts but asserts that their ultimate purport (**Mahā-tātparya**) is also subservient to, or eventually leads to, Oneness.

The Answer (Siddhānta):

The **Ṭīkā** explains that the **Brahma Sūtras** (referred to here as **Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā**) are written specifically to demonstrate how these apparent contradictions are resolved into Oneness.

Bhāṣya: "yathā ca ayam arthaḥ sarveṣāṃ vedāntānām tathā vayam asyāṃ śārīraka mīmāṃsāyām pradarśiṣyāmaḥ"

And just as this meaning referring to **Ātma-aikya** / Oneness) is the purport of all Vedanta texts" (including the Upāsanā sections, when properly understood) so shall we in this inquiry into the Embodied Self (**Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā** / Brahma Sūtra) demonstrate/show.

- **Mīmāṃsā:** A deep revered desire to know/investigate.
- **Śārīraka:** Refers to the **Jīva** (the embodied soul).
    - **Derivation 1: śarīre bhavaḥ śārīraḥ** (That which dwells in the body).
    - **Derivation 2: śarīram eva śārīrakam** (The body itself—using the suffix **kan** in a diminutive/contemptuous sense, implying the body is **kutsita** or wretched).

Upāstīnāṃ cittaikāgryadvārā jñānārtham tadvākyānāṃ mahātātparyam aikya iti vakṣyate.
Meaning: The purpose of **Upāsanā** (worship) is knowledge through the concentration of the

mind (**Cittaikāgrya**). Therefore, the **Mahā Tātparya** (Ultimate Great Purport) of those sentences is Unity (**Aikyam**).

Mahā Tātparya (The Great Purport)

- **Definition: Mahat ca tat tātparyam ca iti Mahātātparyam** — That which is Great and is the Purport.
- **The Chain of Logic:**
    - The purport of **Upāsanā** sentences is not directly in **Brahma-Ātma-Aikyam**.
    - The purport of **Upāsanā** is **Citta Ekāgratā** (Concentration).
    - The purport of Concentration is **Jñāna** (via effective **Śravaṇa**).
    - **Conclusion:** While the immediate purport is worship, the **Paryavasita Tātparya** (Final/Ultimate Purport) culminates in the Unity of Brahman and Ātman.

Mananam: The Purpose of Upāsanā (Worship/Meditation)

There are two main benefits of **Upāsanā**:

A. Citta Ekāgratā (One-pointedness of the Mind):

- **Ekam agram yasya** — That before which there is only one thing.
- A mind that has only one principal thought in its focus (lakṣya) is **Ekāgra Citta**. While other thoughts may appear peripherally, the main thought remains singular.
- **Agra** means "front" or "ahead."

B. Rāga-Dveṣa Nivṛtti (Removal of Attachment and Aversion):

- Referencing t**The Problem:** When we perceive difference (something other than **Īśvara** or **Paramātmā**), we categorize it as "mine/beneficial" (leading to **Rāga** - attachment) or "not mine/harmful" (leading to **Dveṣa** - aversion).
- **The Solution:** By seeing only the **Paramātma Rūpa** (the Divine Form) everywhere, the intellect of "otherness" vanishes. One realizes there is nothing but **Īśvara**, removing the grounds for attachment and aversion. This is demonstrated in the **Viśvarūpa Darśana** (Vision of the Cosmic Form) in the 10th/11th chapters of the Gītā.

The Necessity of Prior Practice

For the Practitioner:

- Those who have practiced **Upāsanā** prior to **Śravaṇa** (hearing the scriptures) have less need for **Jñānābhyāsa** (practice of knowledge) later.

- **Prāg anabhyāsinaḥ paścāt brahmābhyāsena tadbhavet:** Those who did not practice before must engage in **Brahmābhyāsa** (constant dwelling on Brahman) or **Nididhyāsana** after **Śravaṇa** and **Manana** to achieve knowledge.

Why Upāsanā is in the Śāstra?:

- **Brahma Śāstra** includes thoughts on **Upāsanā** (e.g., many in **Bṛhadāraṇyaka** and **Chāndogya Upaniṣads**).
- Without the concentration gained from **Upāsanā**, **Śravaṇa** (hearing) does not result in knowledge.
- **Impact on Hearing:**
    - Concentrated Mind: Hears once and grasps the meaning correctly.
    - Distracted (Vikṣipta) Mind: Hears fragments, fails to recall them later, and cannot grasp the importance (**Mahatva Buddhi**) of the teaching.

॥ इति प्रथमवर्णकम् ॥

The Structure of the First Sūtra: The Four Varṇakas

The term **Varṇaka** is defined as **Varṇayati iti Varṇakam** (That which describes/explains). The first Sūtra is divided into four distinct descriptive sections (Varṇakas):

1. **First Varṇaka (Adhyāsa):** Completed. Established the superimposition of the Self and Non-Self.
2. **Second Varṇaka (Agatārthatva):** (Current Topic). Discusses whether the subject matter (oneness of ātman and brahman) is not already made known elsewhere i.e. in karmakāṇḍa portion of Vedas.
3. **Third Varṇaka (Adhikārī):** Covers the words **Atha Ataḥ Brahma Jijñāsā**. Discusses the eligibility/qualifications (Sādhana Catuṣṭaya).
4. **Fourth Varṇaka (Āpāta Prasiddhi):** Addresses the doubt: "Is Brahman famous/known or unknown?" (Starts from the Bhāṣya line: Nanu kiṃ tad brahma prasiddham na vā).

Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 1. Sūtra 1.

The Second Varṇaka: Agatārthatva (Novelty of the Subject): Jijñāsādhikaraṇam (Page 59)

विचारस्य साक्षाद्विषया वेदान्ताः, तेषां गतार्थत्वागतार्थत्वाभ्यामारम्भसन्देहे कृत्स्नस्य वेदस्य विधिपरत्वात् , विधेश्च ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा’ इत्यादिना पूर्वतन्त्रेण विचारितत्वात् , अवगतार्था एव वेदान्ता इत्यव्यवहितविषयाभावान्नारम्भ इति प्राप्ते ब्रूते - वेदान्तेति । वेदान्तविषयकपूजितविचारात्मकशास्त्रस्य व्याख्यातुमिष्टस्य सूत्रसन्दर्भस्येदं प्रथमसूत्रमित्यर्थः । यदि विधिरेव वेदार्थः स्यात्तदा सर्वज्ञो बादरायणो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां न ब्रूयात् , ब्रह्मणि मानाभावात् । अतो ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञास्यत्वोक्त्या केनापि

तन्त्रेणानवगतब्रह्मपरवेदान्तविचार आरम्भणीय इति सूत्रकृद्दर्शयति । तच्च 'व्याचिख्यासितस्य' इति पदेन भाष्यकारो बभाषे ॥

वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम् —

This section analyzes whether the **Vedānta** texts are merely repeating what is already known (Gatārtha) or if they reveal something new/unknown (Agatārtha).

Importance of Vicāra (Inquiry):

- It is important to emphasize that inquiry is "worshipped" (Pūjita) because only inquiry removes ignorance.
- **Quote:**
  विचारज्जायते बोधोऽनिच्छा यं न निवर्तयेत्| स्वोत्पत्तिमात्रात्संसारे दहत्यखिलसत्यताम् || (पंचदशी ९.७५)
  vicārajjāyate bodho'nicchā yaṃ na nivartayet| svotpattimātrātsaṃsāre dahatyakhilasatyatām || (Paṃcadaśī 9.75)
- Knowledge is born of inquiry; it does not depart even if one does not desire it (once known, it is known). Upon its mere arising, it burns up the reality of the entire Saṃsāra.

1. The Structure of the Inquiry (Adhikaraṇa) for First Sutra

An inquiry in the **Mīmāṃsā** tradition has five parts (Pañcāṅgam) as narrated in the verse below:

विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षः तथोत्तरम्। सङ्गतिश्चेति पञ्चाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम्॥
viṣayo viśayaścaiva pūrvapakṣaḥ tathottaram| saṅgatiśceti pañcāṅgaṃ śāstre'dhikaraṇaṃ smṛtam||

1. **Viṣaya** (Subject): The **Vedānta** (Upaniṣad) mantras.
   - Note: One cannot inquire into Brahman directly without inquiring into the mantras that reveal Brahman. This involves checking for the six indicators of purport (Upakrama, Upasaṃhāra, etc.).
2. **Saṃśaya** (Doubt): **Teṣāṃ gatārtha agatārthatvābhyām ārambha sandehaḥ**.
   - The subject matter in the texts **Gatārtha** (meaning already known/decided) or **Agatārtha** (meaning unknown/new)? Consequently, is the study of **Brahma Sūtra** necessary?
3. **Pūrvapakṣa** (Opponent's View - Mīmāṃsaka):
   - **Argument:** The entire Veda is Action-oriented (**Kriyārtha**).
   - **Mīmāṃsā Sūtra: Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt ānarthakyam atadarthānām**.
     - Meaning: Since the Veda is for action, parts that do not pertain to action are useless.
   - **Interpretation of Non-Action Texts:** Texts that are not commands (Vidhi) must be interpreted as **Arthavāda** (praise/Stuti or condemnation/Nindā) to support a command.
   - **Claim:** The inquiry into Dharma (athāto dharmajijñāsā) covers the entire Veda. Therefore, **Vedānta** is **Gatārtha** (already interpreted as subservient to ritual) and has no **Avyavahita Viṣaya** (direct, independent subject).
   - **Conclusion of Opponent: Na ārambhaḥ** (The Brahma Sūtra need not be commenced).

4. **The Siddhānta (Conclusion of the Vedāntin)**

The Vedāntin argues that **Vedānta** is **Agatārtha** (reveals a new, independent subject not covered by rituals).

1. **Definition of Agatārtha/Anavagatārtha:** That which has not been comprehended/known yet.
2. **Argument 1: The Existence of the Brahma Sūtra**
    a. **Vedānta mīmāṃsā śāstrasya vyācikhyāsitasya idam ādimam sūtram**.
    b. If **Vidhi** (Action/Ritual) were the only meaning of the Veda, the investigation into it was already completed by Jaimini (in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā).
    c. **Sage Badarāyaṇa's Intent:** If the subject was already covered, the omniscient Sage **Bādarāyaṇa** (Vyāsa) would not have composed the **Brahma Sūtra** or explicitly stated **Brahma Jijñāsā** (Desire to know Brahman).
    d. If Brahman were merely a part of ritual, there would be no independent proof (Pramāṇa) for Brahman.
3. **Argument 2: The Limitation of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā**
    a. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas (like **Śabara Svāmī** and **Kumārila Bhaṭṭa**) admit their inquiry has a limited scope regarding the Self.
    b. **Quote (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa - Vārtika):**
    इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुः आत्मास्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्तया ।
    दृढ़त्वमेतद्विषयश्च बोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ।।
    (मीमांसा श्लोकवार्तिक - आत्मवादः १४८)

    ityāha nāstikyanirākariṣṇuḥ ātmāstitāṃ bhāṣyakṛdatra yuktayā |
    dṛḍhtvametadviṣayaśca bodhaḥ prayāti vedāntaniṣevaṇena ||
    (mīmāṃsā ślokavārtika - ātmavādaḥ 148)

    Meaning: The commentator (Bhāṣyakṛt - Śabara) used logic merely to refute atheists (Nāstikya Nirākaraṇa) and establish that a soul **exists** (so that rituals have an agent who reaps results in this birth or future). However, the **nature** of agent as the Self is established only through the study of **Vedānta**.

    c. Therefore, the **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā** did not touch upon the specific subject matter of **Vedānta** (the nature of Brahman/Atman).

5. **Conclusion of the Second Varṇaka**
    - **ato brahmaṇo jijñāsyatvoktyā kenāpi tantreṇa anavagatabrahmapara vedāntavicāra ārambhaṇīya iti sūtrakṛddarśayati |**
    - By stating that Brahman is to be inquired into (Jijñāsya), the Sūtra-maker shows that the inquiry into **Vedānta** texts—which have Brahman as their primary purport which is not already comprehended by any other system (Tantra)—must be commenced.
    - **Final Verdict:** The **Vedānta Śāstra** has:
        1. **Viṣaya** (Subject): Brahman.
        2. **Prayojana** (Purpose): Liberation.
        3. **Agatārthatva** (Novelty): It is not a repetition of the Karma Kāṇḍa.
        4. Therefore, **Śāstram Ārambhaṇīyam** (The scripture is to be begun).

॥ इति द्वितीयवर्णकम् ॥

Here ends the Second Varnakam.

The Third Varṇaka: The Qualified Aspirant (Adhikārī) (Page 60)

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥
athāto brahmajijñāsā || 1 ||

Padaccheda (Word Split): **Atha**, **Ataḥ**, **Brahmajijñāsā**. **Brahmajijñāsā** is a compound word (**Samasta Pada**) resolving to **Brahmaṇaḥ Jijñāsā** (Inquiry into Brahman).

Padārthokti: (Meanings of the Terms):

1. **Atha**:
    - Meaning: **Sādhana Catuṣṭaya Sampatti Anantaram** (Immediately after the acquisition of the fourfold qualifications).
    - It denotes succession (**Ānantarya**).
2. **Ataḥ**:
    - Meaning: **Tasmāt** or **Yasmāt Kāraṇāt** (For this reason/Therefore). It signifies the cause (**Hetu**).
    - **The Reasoning:** One who understands that the fruits of action (**Karma Phala**) are impermanent (**Anitya**) and the fruit of knowledge (Liberation/ **Mokṣa**) is eternal (**Nitya**), and desires the eternal fruit, is the one who must inquire.
3. **Brahmajijñāsā**:
    - Meaning: The duty to inquire into the sentences revealing **Brahman**.

The discussion begins by reviewing the first two descriptions (**Varṇaka**) of the first Sutra:

- **First Varṇaka:** Established that the **directive to conduct inquiry into Brahman** has a specific subject matter (**Viṣaya**) and purpose (**Prayojana**).
- **Second Varṇaka:** Established **Agatārthatva** (Uniqueness/Newness). It clarified that the inquiry into **Brahman** and the meaning of **Vedānta** mantras were not covered in the **Dharma Jijñāsā** (the inquiry into Dharma by Sage Jaimini). Therefore, the study of **Vedānta Śāstra** is **Ārambhaṇīyam** (to be commenced).

This Varṇaka focuses on establishing the qualified aspirant.

Mananam: About The Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā

Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā, is a composition by **Śrī Bhāratī Tīrtha Svāmī** (the Guru of **Vidyāraṇya Svāmī**). It literally means - A garland of logic/rules (**Nyāya**) pertaining to the Sutras of Vyasa (**Vaiyāsikam**). For every **Adhikaraṇa** (topic), there are two verses (**Śloka**) in **Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā**.

Here are some verses from **Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā:**

The Function of the Two Verses:

एकोविषय संदेहपूर्वपक्षावभासकः | श्लोकोऽपरस्तु सिद्धान्तवादी संगतयः स्फुटाः || २

ekoviṣaya saṃdehapūrvapakṣāvabhāsakaḥ | śloko'parastu siddhāntavādī saṃgatayaḥ sphuṭāḥ || 2

The two verses cover the five parts of **Adhikaraṇa** as follows:

1. **First Verse:** Presents the Subject (**Viṣaya**), the Doubt (**Sandeha**), and the Opponent's View (**Pūrvapakṣa**).
2. **Second Verse:** Presents the Established Conclusion (**Siddhānta**) and the Connection/Relevance (**Saṅgati**).

General Rule of Adhikaraṇa: A standard topic of inquiry has five limbs (**Avayava**): **Viṣaya** (Subject), **Sandeha** (Doubt), **Pūrvapakṣa** (Opponent's view), **Siddhānta** (Conclusion), and **Saṅgati** (Connection).

Definition and Four Chapters (Adhyāyas):

शास्त्रं ब्रह्मविचाराख्यम् अध्यायायाः स्युश्चतुर्विधाः । समन्वयाविरोधौ द्वौ साधनं च फलं तथा ॥ ४

śāstraṃ brahmavicārākhyam adhyāyāyāḥ syuścaturvidhāḥ | samanvayāvirodhau dvau sādhanaṃ ca phalaṃ tathā || 4

The **Brahma Sūtra** is defined as the scripture for the inquiry into **Brahman**.

- **Śāstraṃ Brahmavicārākhyam:** This scripture is named "The Inquiry into Brahman."
- **Adhyāyāś caturdhā:** It consists of four chapters.
- **The Four chapters are:**
    1. **Samanvaya** (Reconciliation).
    2. **Avirodha** (Non-contradiction).
    3. **Sādhana** (The Means).
    4. **Phala** (The Fruit/Result).

Detailed Breakdown of the First Chapter (Samanvaya Adhyāya):

समन्वये स्पष्टलिङ्गम् अस्पष्टमत्वेऽप्युपास्यगम् | ज्ञेयगं पदमात्रं च चिन्त्यं पादेष्वनुक्रमात् || ५

samanvaye spaṣṭaliṅgam aspaṣṭamatve'pyupāsyagam | jñeyagaṃ padamātraṃ ca cintyaṃ pādeṣvanukramāt ||5

This verse provides a specific breakdown of the first chapter, which contains four Quarters (**Pādas**).

The **Samanvaya Adhyāya** is divided as follows based on the clarity of the **Brahma Liṅga** (Indicators of Brahman in the Sruti passages):

A. First Pāda (Current Topic)

- **Topic: Spaṣṭa Brahma Liṅga**.
- **Definition:** It deals with Scriptural passages where the indicators of **Brahman** are clear and distinct.
- **Context:** This is the section beginning now with **Athāto Brahmajijñāsā**.

B. Second and Third Pādas

- **Topic: Aspaṣṭa Brahma Liṅga**.
- **Definition:** These deal with passages where the indicators of **Brahman** are unclear or ambiguous.
- **The Distinction between Pāda 2 and 3:**
    - **Second Pāda:** Focuses on **Upāsyagam** (Passages relating to **Brahman** as the object of **Upāsanā** / Meditation).
    - **Third Pāda:** Focuses on **Jñeyagam** (Passages relating to **Brahman** as the object of **Jñāna** / Knowledge).

C. Fourth Pāda

- **Topic: Pada Mātra Cintanam**.
- **Definition:** Inquiry into specific words or terms.
- **Function:** It analyzes specific ambiguous terms found in the **Upaniṣads** to determine their meaning in relation to **Brahman** (e.g., Avyakta, Aja, etc.).

Analysis of the Jijñāsā Adhikaraṇa (Via Nyāyamālā) (Page 60)

Verse 1: The Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's Argument)

अविचार्यं विचार्यं वा ब्रह्माध्यासानिरूपणात् । असन्देहाफलत्वाभ्यां न विचारं तदर्हति ॥

avicāryaṃ vicāryaṃ vā brahmādhyāsānirūpaṇāt | asandehāphalatvābhyāṃ na vicāraṃ tadarhati ||

- **Viṣaya (Subject): Brahman**.
- **Sandeha (Question): Avicāryam vicāryam vā?** (Is Brahman to be inquired into or not?)
- **Pūrvapakṣa (Argument): Na vicāryam** (It is not to be inquired into).

Reasons given by the Pūrvapakṣa:

1. **Adhyāsa Anirūpaṇāt:** Superimposition is impossible to establish because the Self (**Ātmā**) and Non-Self (**Anātmā**) are distinct like light and darkness.
2. **Asandehāt:** There is no doubt. Everyone knows "I am."
3. **Aphalatvāt:** It is fruitless. Knowing "I exist" does not lead to liberation.

Note on the Pre-requisites for Inquiry: For any inquiry (**Pratipitsā**) to be valid, the subject must have:

1. **Sandeha** (Doubt).
2. **Prayojana** (Purpose).

> **Quote (Bhāmatī): Yad asaṃdigdham aprayojanaṃ ca na tat prekṣāvat pratipitsā gocaraḥ...** "That which is free from doubt and without purpose is not a subject of desire for knowledge for a wise person."
>
> Example: A pot sitting in plain sight in broad daylight (**samanaska indriya sannikṛṣṭa -** in the proximity of one’s senses and mind) requires no inquiry (as there’s no doubt as to what it is). Counting the teeth of a crow requires no inquiry (as there’s no purpose to it).

Verse 2: The Siddhānta (Established View)

> **अध्यासोऽहं बुद्धिसिद्धोऽसङ्गं ब्रह्म श्रुतीरितम् । सन्देहान्मुक्तिभावाच्च विचार्यं ब्रह्मवेदतः ॥**
>
> **adhyāso'haṃ buddhisiddho'saṅgaṃ brahma śrutīritam | sandehānmuktibhāvācca vicāryaṃ brahmavedataḥ ||**

- **Rebuttal to "No Superimposition": Adhyāso aham buddhi siddhaḥ**. Adhyāsa is established by the very experience of "I" (**Aham**). Whether one identifies with the body or the ego, the superimposition of Self and Non-Self is present.
- **Rebuttal to "No Doubt":** Doubt exists regarding the specific nature of the Self.
    - Examples of Doubt: Am I the body? The senses? The mind? The void? The doer (**Kartā**)? The enjoyer (**Bhoktā**)? Atomic (**Aṇu**) or Infinite (**Mahat**)?
    - **Asaṅgam Brahma**: Scripture declares Brahman is unattached, yet we feel attached/affected. This contradiction creates doubt.
- **Rebuttal to "No Fruit": Mukti Bhāvāt**. Liberation is the fruit.
    - Scriptural Proof: Vamadeva realized "I was Manu, I was the Sun" (**Aham manurabhavam sūryaśca** - Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad).
- **Conclusion: Vicāryam Brahma Vedataḥ**. Brahman must be inquired into through the Vedas.

Discussion on the word "Atha" (Page 62)

एवं वर्णकद्वयेन वेदान्तविचारस्य कर्तव्यतायां विषयप्रयोजनवत्त्वमगतार्थत्वं चेति हेतुद्वयं सूत्रस्यार्थिकार्थं व्याख्यायाक्षरव्याख्यामारभमाणः पुनरप्यधिकारिभावाभावाभ्यां शास्त्रारम्भसन्देहे सति अथशब्दस्यानन्तर्यार्थकत्वोक्त्या अधिकारिणं साधयति - तत्राथशब्द इति ।

The word **Atha** is used to establish the existence of a qualified student (**adhikāri)**.

तत्र अथशब्दः आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते; नाधिकारार्थः, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात् ।

Bhāṣya:

- **Atha śabdaḥ ānantaryārthaḥ** (The word Atha denotes succession /sequence).
- By stating "Succession" (After X, do Y), it implies the prerequisite conditions (the **Adhikāra**).
- Inquiry into Brahman is not something that can be commenced.

Argument 1: Why "Atha" does not mean "Commencement" (Ārambha)

सूत्र इत्यर्थः । 'मङ्गलानन्तरारम्भप्रश्नकात्स्न्येष्वथो अथ' इत्यथशब्दस्य बहवोऽर्थाः सन्ति । तत्र 'अथ योगानुशासनम्' इत्यत्र सूत्रे यथा अथशब्द आरम्भार्थकः योगशास्त्रमारभ्यत इति तद्वदत्र किं न स्यादित्यत आह - नाधिकारार्थ इति ।

Meanings of the Word "Atha"

The **Ṭīkā** discusses the various grammatical meanings of the indeclinable (**Avyaya**) word **Atha**.

Contextual Note: In the text/commentary, the word **Tatra** is used. **Tatra = Sūtre** (In the Sutra). **Meaning in this Sutra: Ānantaryārtha** (Succession/Immediacy).

Dictionary Meanings (Amarakośa & Others): There are several meanings attributed to **Atha**:

1. **Maṅgala** (Auspicousness)
2. **Ānantarya** (Succession/Afterwards)
3. **Ārambha** (Commencement)
4. **Praśna** (Question)
5. **Kārtsnya** (Totality)
6. **Adhikāra** (Heading/Topic)
7. **Pratijñā** (Promise/Declaration)
8. **Samuccaya** (Conjunction/Collection)

Note: While the Amarakośa lists specific meanings, other lexicons (like the Laghu commentary mentioned) expand this list to include **Adhikāra**, **Pratijñā**, and **Samuccaya**.

In other contexts, such as the Yoga Sutras (**Atha yogānuśāsanam**), **Atha** implies **Ārambha** (Commencement). The question arises: Why not apply the same meaning here?

The Argument:

Pūrvapakṣa: Why not say **Vedānta Śāstra** is being commenced (Ārabhyate) just like Yoga Shastra? Why not interpret Athāto Brahmajijñāsā as "Now, the inquiry into Brahman is being commenced"? This would seem simpler than constructing a complex requirement of "Succession after qualifications."

The Siddhānta (Bhāṣya's Rejection)

The Bhāṣyakāra rejects this by stating: **Na Adhikārrārthaḥ** (It is not in the sense of Adhikāra).

Equating Ārambha and Adhikāra The ṭīkā clarifies a potential confusion:

1. The Opponent proposed **Ārambha** (Commencement).
2. The Siddhānti/Proponent rejected **Adhikāra** (Heading/Rights).
3. **Why?** In this specific context, they are treated as functionally identical.
    a. If **Atha** means **Ārambha**, the scripture becomes **Ārabhya** (That which is commenced).
    b. If **Atha** means **Adhikāra**, the scripture becomes **Adhikārya** (That which is made a topic/heading).
    c. Therefore, the rejection **Na Adhikārrārthaḥ** is a rejection of the meaning of "Commencement."

Why "Jijñāsā" Cannot be Commenced (Anārabhyatva)

अयमाशयः - किं जिज्ञासापदं ज्ञानेच्छापरमुत विचारलक्षकम् ? आद्येऽथशब्दस्यारम्भार्थत्वे ब्रह्मज्ञानेच्छारभ्यत इति सूत्रार्थः स्यात्स चासङ्गतः, तस्या अनारभ्यत्वात् । न हि प्रत्यधिकरणमिच्छा क्रियते किन्तु तया विचारः । न द्वितीयः, कर्तव्यपदाध्याहारं विना विचारलक्षकत्वायोगात् , अध्याहृते च तेनैवारम्भोक्तेरथशब्दवैयर्थ्यात् । किन्त्वधिकारिसिद्ध्यर्थमानन्तर्यार्थतैव युक्तेति ।

The core logical argument for rejecting **Ārambha** lies in the nature of the word **Jijñāsā**.

Siddhānti raising the question: Does **Jijñāsā** mean:

1. **Jñānecchā** (Desire to know)?
2. **Vicāra** (Inquiry/Discussion)?

Scenario A: If Jijñāsā = Desire to Know (Jñānecchā)

Can a desire be "started" or "commenced" at will?

- **Argument: Tasyāḥ anārambhāt**. (Because it cannot be commenced).
- **Nature of Desire:** Desire is not **Kṛti-sādhya** (accomplished by action/will). It is not **Puruṣa-tantra** (dependent on man). It is **Vastu-tantra** (dependent on the object/situation).
- **Analogy (Hunger):**
    - You cannot say, "I will now commence a desire to eat."
    - Even if food is present, you only eat when hunger arises naturally.
    - Similarly, **Brahma-jñānecchā** (Desire for Brahman knowledge) arises only when the requisite causes (purity of mind, etc.) are present. It cannot be "started" by a Sutra.

Scenario B: If Jijñāsā = Inquiry (Vicāra)

- **Argument:** If the meaning is "Inquiry," one would have to supply the word **Kartavya** (is to be done) to make sense of the sentence "Now, Inquiry."
- **Flaw: Kartavya pada adhyāhāraṃ vinā vicāra lakṣakatva ayogāt**. By adding the extra word "duty/to be done" (**Adhyāhāra**) commencement is implied, the interpretation of **Atha** as a simple "Commencement" of an inquiry becomes redundant and doesn't grammatically hold weight as well as "Succession" does.

Brahma-jijñāsā (the desire to know Brahman) or **Jñāna** (knowledge) cannot be "commenced" like a voluntary action. Knowledge and desire arise spontaneously when the necessary causal materials (**Sāmagrī**) are present; they are not willful actions initiated by a command.

Application of Lakṣaṇā (Implication): To understand the Sūtra correctly, logical implication is used:

1. **Jahal-lakṣaṇā on 'Jijñāsā':** The literal meaning "desire" is dropped, and "inquiry" (**Vicāra**) is adopted (since desire cannot be commanded, but inquiry can be a duty).
2. **Ajahal-lakṣaṇā on 'Brahma':** The term **Brahma** implies not just the entity Brahman (Satyam Jñānam Anantam), but also includes the necessary means, such as **Sādhana Catuṣṭaya** (the fourfold qualifications) and **Upāsanā**.

Argument 2: Refutation of 'Maṅgala' (Auspiciousness) as the Meaning of "Atha" (Page 63)

अधुना सम्भावितमर्थान्तरं दूषयति - मङ्गलस्येति । वाक्यार्थो विचारकर्तव्यता न हि तत्र मङ्गलस्य कर्तृत्वादिनान्वयोऽस्तीत्यर्थः । ननु सूत्रकृता शास्त्रादौ मङ्गलं कार्यमित्यथशब्दः प्रत्युक्त इति चेत्सत्यम् , न तस्यार्थो मङ्गलं

किन्तु तच्छ्रवणमुच्चारणं च मङ्गलकृत्यं करोति । तदर्थस्त्वानन्तर्यमेवेत्याह - अर्थान्तरेति । अर्थान्तरमानन्तर्यम् । श्रुत्या श्रवणेन शङ्खवीणादिनादश्रवणवदोङ्काराथशब्दयोः श्रवणं मङ्गलफलकम् ।

'ओङ्कारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा । कण्ठं भित्त्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकाविमौ ॥ '

इति स्मरणादिति भावः ।

A distinct objection arises suggesting **Atha** means **Maṅgala** (auspiciousness), as is common at the start of treatises.

मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् । अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति ।

The Bhāṣya (Commentary) Refutation:

> **"Maṅgalasya ca vākyārtha-samanvayābhāvāt."** "Because the meaning of 'Auspiciousness' does not cohere syntax-wise with the meaning of the sentence."

- **Explanation:** The meaning of the sentence is **Vicāra-kartavyatā** (The duty to inquire). If **Atha** meant **Maṅgala**, the sentence would mean "Auspiciousness is a duty to inquire," which is syntactically incoherent.
- Even when used in the context of some other meaning, the word **Atha** from being heard, serves the purpose of engendering auspiciousness.

The Objection (Pūrvapakṣa): The objector argues that the author (**Sūtrakṛt** i.e., **Bādarāyaṇa**) must perform a mangala at the start of the **Śāstra**. Therefore, **Atha** is used effectively (**Prayukta**) for this purpose.

The Siddhānta Response: It is true that **Maṅgala** is required, but the meaning of the word **Atha** need not be **Maṅgala**.

- **Sound vs. Meaning:** The mere hearing (**Śravaṇam**) or articulation (**Uccāraṇam**) of the word **Atha** generates auspiciousness, regardless of its semantic definition.
- **Analogy:** Just as the sound of a conch shell (**Śaṅkha**) or a **Vīṇā** produces auspiciousness merely by being heard, so does **Atha**.
- **Result:** The word serves the function of **Maṅgala** through its sound, while semantically retaining the meaning of **Ānantarya**. A word should have only one semantic meaning and therefore the meaning “Mangala” should be rejected. .

Quote from Smṛti:

> **"Oṃkāraśca atha-śabdaśca dvau etau brahmaṇaḥ purā | Kaṇṭham bhittvā viniryātau tasmāt māṅgalikau ubhau ||"**
>
> "The syllable **Om** and the word **Atha**—these two broke through the throat of **Brahmā** and came forth at the very beginning (of creation). Therefore, both are auspicious (**Māṅgalika**)."

- Note: Since they originated directly from **Brahmā** without touching the tongue/palate (implying absolute purity), their mere resonance is auspicious.

Argument 3: Refutation of 'Arthāntara' (Introduction of a Distinct Topic) (Page 64-65)

ननु प्रपञ्चो मिथ्येति प्रकृते सति, अथ मतं प्रपञ्चः सत्य इत्यत्र पूर्वप्रकृतार्थादुत्तरार्थस्यार्थान्तरत्वार्थोऽथशब्दो दृष्टः, तथात्र किं न स्यादित्यत आह - पूर्वेति । फलतः फलस्येत्यर्थः । ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः पूर्वम् अर्थविशेषः प्रकृतो नास्ति यस्मात्तस्या अर्थान्तरत्वमथशब्देनोच्येत । यतः कुतश्चिदर्थान्तरत्वं सूत्रकृता न वक्तव्यम् , फलाभावात् । यदि फलस्य जिज्ञासापदोक्तकर्तव्यविचारस्य हेतुत्वेन यत्पूर्वं प्रकृतं तदपेक्षास्तीत्यपेक्षाबलात्प्रकृतहेतुमाक्षिप्य ततोऽर्थान्तरत्वमुच्यते, तदार्थान्तरत्वमानन्तर्येऽन्तर्भवति हेतुफलभावज्ञानायानन्तर्यस्यावश्यं वाच्यत्वात् । तस्मादिदमर्थान्तरमित्युक्ते तस्य हेतुत्वाप्रतीतेः । तस्मादिदमनन्तरमित्युक्ते भवत्येव हेतुत्वप्रतीतिः । न चाश्वादनन्तरो गौरित्यत्र हेतुत्वभानापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् , तयोर्देशतः कालतो वा व्यवधानेनानन्तर्यस्यामुख्यत्वात् । अतः सामग्रीफलयोरेव मुख्यमानन्तर्यम् , अव्यवधानात् । तस्मिन्नुक्ते सत्यर्थान्तरत्वं न वाच्यं ज्ञानत्वाद्वैफल्याच्चेति भावः । फलस्य विचारस्य पूर्वप्रकृतहेत्वपेक्षाया बलाद्यदर्थान्तरत्वं तस्यानन्तर्याभेदात् न पृथगथशब्दार्थत्वमित्यध्याहृत्य भाष्यं योजनीयम् । यद्वा पूर्वप्रकृतेऽर्थेऽपेक्षा यस्या अर्थान्तरतायास्तस्याः फलं ज्ञानं तद्द्वारानन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात्तज्ज्ञाने तस्याः ज्ञानतोऽन्तर्भावान्नाथशब्दार्थतेत्यर्थः ।

पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात् ।

The Objection: Can **Atha** indicate **Arthāntara**? This refers to presenting a view different from a previous context (e.g., "The world is false" followed by "Now (atha), the view that the world is true").

The Siddhānta Refutation:

1. **No Prior Context:** Being the first Sūtra, there is no **Pūrva-prakṛta** (previously discussed topic) to contrast with.
2. **Lack of Causality:** Even if one assumes an implicit prior action, mere **Arthāntara** does not establish a causal relationship (**Hetu-phala-bhāva**).
    - Example: A person may eat and then walk. This is a sequence, but eating is not the cause of walking.
    - **Brahma-jijñāsā** (the result) requires specific antecedents (**Sādhana Catuṣṭaya**).

The Bhāṣya View:

"Phalataḥ ānantaryāvyatirekāt." "Because, in terms of fruit/result, [Arthāntara] is not different from [Ānantarya]."

Elaboration from the Ṭīkā:

- **Ānantarya** (Sequence with causality) inherently includes **Arthāntara** (distinctness).
- However, **Arthāntara** alone does not capture the **Hetu** (cause).
- To understand the **Hetu-phala-bhāva** (Cause-Effect relationship) between the qualifications and the inquiry, **Ānantarya** must be the meaning.
- **Key Distinction:**

- Saying "This is a distinct topic from the previous" (**Arthāntara**) does not reveal the cause.
- Saying "This follows immediately after that" (**Ānantarya**) reveals the cause.

Definition of Primary Ānantarya (Mukhyam Ānantaryam)

The Objection regarding Causality (The Horse and Cow Analogy):

- Argument: "A cow follows a horse" (**Aśvād anantaro gauḥ**). Here, there is a sequence, but the horse is not the cause of the cow. Thus, **Ānantarya** does not prove causality.

The Response:

- Response: The meaning of sequence (**Ānantarya)** between the horse and the cow is **Gauṇa** (secondary/figurative) because there is a separation in space and time (**Deśataḥ kālataśca vyavadhānāt**).

The Primary Meaning (Siddhānta):

> **"Sāmagrī-phalayoreva mukhyam ānantaryam avyavadhānāt."** "The primary immediate sequence is only between the causal material (**Sāmagrī**) and the effect/fruit (**Phala**), because there is no delay/separation (**Avyavadhāna**)."

- **Explanation:** When the all causal material is present, the effect occurs in the very next moment (e.g., the moment rice begins to cook, or a pot begins to be formed).
- Therefore, **Atha** denotes this strict causal sequence: The qualifications (**Sādhana**) are the **Sāmagrī**, and **Brahma-vicāra** is the inevitable result.

Interpreting the Bhāṣya (pūrvaprakṛtāpekṣāyāśca phalata ānantaryāvyatirekāt |)

Two methods are used to syntactically interpret the Bhāṣya line: Phalataḥ ānantaryāvyatirekāt.

Method 1 (With Adhyāhāra):
Ṭīkā: "Phalasya vicārasya pūrva prakṛta hetu apekṣāyā balāt yat arthāntaratvam tasya ānantarya abhedāt na pṛthak atha śabdārthatvam.": The status of being a new topic (**Arthāntaratvam**)—which arises from the strength of the expectation of a cause for the result (inquiry)—is not different from **Ānantarya**. Therefore, **Atha** does not need a separate meaning.

Method 2 (Yadvā - Without Adhyāhāra):
Ṭīkā: "Pūrva prakṛte arthe apekṣā yasyāḥ arthāntaratāyāḥ tasyāḥ phalam jñānam taddvārā ānantarya avyatirekāt.": The state of being a new topic (**Arthāntaratā**) has an expectation regarding the meaning previously discussed. The fruit of that is Knowledge. Through that Knowledge, it is not distinct from **Ānantarya**.

Ṭīkā: "Tajjñāne tasyāḥ jñānataḥ antarbhāvāt na atha śabdārthatā.": Since the knowledge

of that [Arthāntara] is included within the knowledge of that [Ānantarya], it is not a separate meaning of the word **Atha**.

Defining the Limit (Avadhi) (Page 65-66)

नन्वानन्तर्यार्थकत्वेऽप्यानन्तर्यस्यावधिः क इत्याशङ्क्याह - सति चेति । यन्नियमेन पूर्ववृत्तं पूर्वभावि असाधारणकारणं पुष्कलकारणमिति यावत् , तदेवावधिरिति वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः । नन्वस्तु धर्मविचार इव ब्रह्मविचारेऽपि वेदाध्ययनं पुष्कलकारणमित्यत आह - स्वाध्यायेति । समानं ब्रह्मविचारे साधारणकारणं न पुष्कलकारणमित्यर्थः । ननु संयोगपृथक्त्वन्यायेन 'यज्ञेन दानेन' इत्यादिश्रुत्या 'यज्ञादिकर्माणि ज्ञानाय विधीयन्ते' इति सर्वापेक्षाधिकरणे वक्ष्यते । तथा च पूर्वतन्त्रेण तदवबोधः पुष्कलकारणमिति शङ्कते - नन्विति । इह ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां विशेषोऽसाधारणं कारणम् । ['एकस्य तूभयार्थत्वे संयोगपृथक्त्व' इति जैमिनीसूत्रम् , तदर्थस्तु - एकस्य कर्मण उभयार्थत्वेऽनेकफलसम्बन्धे संयोगः उभयसम्बन्धबोधकं वाक्यं तस्य पृथक्त्वं भेदः स हेतुः । ततश्चात्रापि ज्योतिष्टोमादिकर्मणां स्वर्गादिफलकानामपि 'यज्ञेन दानेन' इत्यादि वचनात् ज्ञानार्थत्वं चेति ।] परिहरति - नेत्यादिना । अयमाशयः - न तावत्पूर्वतन्त्रस्थं न्यायसहस्रं ब्रह्मज्ञाने तद्विचारे वा पुष्कलं कारणम् , तस्य धर्मनिर्णयमात्रहेतुत्वात् । नापि कर्मनिर्णयः, तस्यानुष्ठानहेतुत्वात् । न हि धूमाग्न्योरिव धर्मब्रह्मणोर्व्याप्तिरस्ति, यया धर्मज्ञानात् ब्रह्मज्ञानं भवेत् । यद्यपि शुद्धिविवेकादिद्वारा कर्माणि हेतवः, तथापि तेषां नाधिकारिविशेषणत्वम् , अज्ञातानां तेषां जन्मान्तरकृतानामपि फलहेतुत्वात् ।

सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे, यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते तद्वक्तव्यम् । स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानम् । नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः; न; धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः ।

Determining the Limit (Avadhi)

Since **Atha** means "immediate sequence," the question is: **Sequence after what?**

- **Definition:** The antecedent must be a specific, sufficient cause.
- **Ṭīkā: Yat niyamena pūrvavṛttam pūrva bhāvi asādhāraṇa kāraṇam puṣkala kāraṇam iti yāvat tadeva avadhi iti vaktavyam.** (That which is invariably an antecedent, the extraordinary/specific cause, or the sufficient cause [**Puṣkala kāraṇa**] — that alone must be stated as the limit/condition.)

Refutation of Vedic Study (Vedādhyayana):

> **Bhāṣya: Svādhyāyānantaryaṃ tu samānam.** (Sequence after Vedic study is common [to both Dharma and Brahman inquiry].)
>
> **Objection:** Vedic study is the prerequisite for **Dharma** inquiry, so it should be for **Brahma** inquiry too.
>
> **Refutation:** Vedic study is a common/general cause (**Sādhāraṇa kāraṇa**), not the specific cause that makes one eligible for Brahman inquiry.

Refutation of Karma (Saṃyoga Pṛthakatva Nyāya):

Ṭīkā: Tad arthastu ekasya karmaṇaḥ ubhayārthatvam aneka phala sambandhaḥ saṃyogaḥ. (Its meaning is: One action having two purposes is due to connection with multiple results.)

Objection: Karma (Yajña, Dāna) is prescribed for knowledge via the **Saṃyoga-pṛthakatva Nyāya**. **Jaimini Sūtra: Ekasya tu ubhayārthatvam saṃyoga pṛthakatvam.** (One action having two purposes due to a separation of connection.) Thus, Rituals can give Heaven (Sakāma) and Purification (Niṣkāma).

Siddhānta Refutation: Bhāṣya: Na dharma jijñāsāyāḥ prāgapi adhīta vedāntasya brahma jijñāsā upapatteḥ. (No, because the desire to know Brahman is possible for one who has studied Vedanta, even before [or without] the inquiry into Dharma.). Knowledge of Karma is not a direct prerequisite.

Logic:

1. **No Invariable Concomitance:**
    - **Ṭīkā: Na hi dhūmāgniyoriva dharma brahmaṇoḥ vyāptiḥ asti yayā dharma jñānāt brahma jñānam bhavet.** (There is no invariable concomitance between Dharma and Brahman—like there is between smoke and fire—by which knowledge of Dharma would lead to knowledge of Brahman.)
2. **Insufficient Cause:**
    - **Ṭīkā: Na tāvat pūrva tantrastham nyāya sahasram brahmajñāne tad vicāre vā puṣkala kāraṇam.** (The thousand maxims [12,000 sūtras/1,000 adhikaraṇas] of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā are not the sufficient cause for Brahma-knowledge or it's inquiry.)
    - **Ṭīkā: Tasya dharma nirṇaya mātra hetutvāt.** (Because that is the cause only for the determination of Dharma.)
    - Nor is the determination of Karma the sufficient cause for Brahma-knowledge as it is only the cause for the performance of rites.
3. **Subtle Intellect:** Performance of rituals does not guarantee the **Sūkṣma-buddhi** (subtle intellect) required for Vedanta; reflection and logic do.
4. **Role of Karma:**
    - **Ṭīkā: Yadyapi śuddhi vivekādi dvārā karmāṇi hetavaḥ tathāpi teṣām na adhikāri viśeṣaṇatvam.** (Even though Karmas are cause for purification and discrimination, they do not constitute the specific qualification of the aspirant.)
    - Even those who are ignorant of the Karmas in this birth can reap the benefits of Karmas performed in previous births.

Elaboration on Ānantarya (Page 67)

अधिकारिविशेषणं ज्ञायमानं प्रवृत्तिपुष्कलकारणमानन्तर्यावधित्वेन वक्तव्यम् । अतः कर्माणि, तदवबोधः, तन्न्यायविचारो वा नावधिरिति, न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया धर्मजिज्ञासानन्तर्यमिति ।

The focus shifts to defining the precise condition that precedes **brahma-jijñāsā**.

Ṭīkā: **Adhikāri-viśeṣaṇam jñāyamānaṃ pravṛtti-puṣkala-kāraṇam ānantarya-avadhitvena vaktavyam**

- It must be stated that the limit (**avadhitvam**) of the **Ānantarya** is a **special qualification** (**viśeṣaṇam**) of the **Adhikārī** (qualified seeker).
- When this qualification is known, it becomes the **pravṛtti-puṣkala-kāraṇam** (the powerful cause) for undertaking **brahma-vicāra** (inquiry into Brahman).
- This **Puṣkala-kāraṇam** is an **asādhāraṇa-kāraṇam** (extraordinary cause).

The capacity to progress in inquiry is based on the availability of this extraordinary cause - **sādhana-catuṣṭaya** (the four means).

- As an analogy, an ordinary person may see **dhūma** (smoke) and stop, while a person with deep capacity immediately infers **vahni** (fire) or proceeds further, similarly a qualified seeker realises the falseness (**mithyātva)** of the world knowing it's **dṛśyatva** (objectness).
- The **Bhāṣyakāra** is cited for their ability to use common sights to demonstrate **Adhyāsa** (superimposition), leading the mind directly to the inquiry of the falseness of the world and to the substratum of superimposition, Brahman.

Refutation of Karma as the Preceding Condition

The notion that the study of **Dharma** (ritual/duty) is the necessary antecedent to the study of Brahman is rejected.

- **Statement on Non-Preconditions:**
  ataḥ karmāṇi tad-avabodhaḥ tan-nyāya-vicāro vā na avadhiḥ iti na brahma-jijñāsāyāḥ dharma-jijñāsā-ānantaryam
    - The following three are declared **na avadhiḥ** (not the necessary precondition) for **brahma-jijñāsā**:
        1. **Karmāṇi**: The mere performance of Vedic rites (e.g., **aśvamedha**).
        2. **Tad-avabodha**: The knowledge of how to perform the rites (e.g., the science of **yajña**).
        3. **Tan-nyāya-vicāra** : The inquiry into the **1000 Adhikaraṇas** of **Pūrva Mīmāṁsā** (referred to by **Nyāya/अधिकरण**).
- **Conclusion:** There is no necessary **ānantarya** (sequence) that dictates **brahma-jijñāsā** must follow **dharma-jijñāsā**. While an individual like **Sureśvarācārya** may transition from being a **Pūrva Mīmāṁsaka** to a seeker of Brahman, this is not a mandatory, regular rule.

Refutation of Atha Meaning Krama (Sequence) (Page 68)

ननु धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः कार्यकारणत्वाभावेऽप्यानन्तर्योक्तिद्वारा क्रमज्ञानार्थोऽथशब्दः । 'हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यत्यथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः' इत्यवदानानां क्रमज्ञानार्थाथशब्दवदित्याशङ्क्याह - यथेति । अवदानानामानन्तर्यनियमः क्रमो यथाथशब्दार्थस्तस्य विवक्षितत्वात् न तथेह धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः क्रमो विवक्षितः, एककर्तृकत्वाभावेन तयोः क्रमानपेक्षणात् । अतो न क्रमार्थोऽथशब्द इत्यर्थः ।

यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानामानन्तर्यनियमः, क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात् , न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः । शेषशेषित्वे अधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात् । धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च ।

Pūrvapakṣa Argument (Sequence as Krama)

The **Pūrvapakṣa** argues that **atha** in the Sūtra must mean **krama** (sequence) to establish an order, even without a cause-effect relationship.

Pūrvapakṣa: **Nanu dharma-brahma-jijñāsayōḥ kārya-kāraṇatva-abhāve'pi ānantarya-ukti-dvārā krama-jñānārtho'tha śabdaḥ**

Pūrvapakṣa Example (Paśu-Yāga): Hṛdayasya agre avadyati atha jihvāyā atha vakṣasaḥ iti avadānānām krama-jñānārtha atha śabda vat iti āśaṅkā

- In ritual offerings (such as **avadāna kriyā -** animal sacrifice), **atha** denotes the sequence (such as the heart, then the tongue, then the chest) which is necessary to prevent confusion where multiple alternatives exist.

Ṭīkā: **Siddhānta Refutation (Vyatirekī Dṛṣṭānta)**

- **Bhāṣya**: **Yathā ca hṛdayādi-avadānānām ānantarya-niyamaḥ kramasya vivakṣitatvāt. Na tathā iha kramo vivakṣitaḥ**
  - In ritual offerings, the sequence (**krama**) is **intended** (**vivakṣitatvāt**), making it mandatory (**ānantarya-niyamaḥ**).
  - However, such a sequence is **not intended** (**na tathā iha kramo vivakṣitaḥ**) here.
- **Reason (Lack of Eka-Kartṛkatva):**
  - **Ṭīkā**: **Avadānānām ānantarya-niyamaḥ kramo yathā atha śabdārthaḥ tasya vivakṣitatvāt na tathā iha dharma-brahma-jijñāsayōḥ kramo vivakṣitaḥ**
  - The primary reason is the **absence of a single agency of same person** (**Eka-kartṛkatva-abhāvena**). Sequence is only mandatory when actions are undertaken by one single agent (by the same person). Since it is not essential that both enquiries (into dharma and brahman) be performed by the same person, sequence is not expected (**krama-anapekṣaṇāt**).

Conclusion: **Ato na kramārtho'tha śabdaḥ**. Therefore, sequence cannot be the meaning of the word **atha**.

Conditions for Eka-Kartṛkatva (Page 68-69)

ननु तयोरेककर्तृकत्वं कुतो नास्तीत्यत आह - शेषेति । येषामेकप्रधानशेषता, यथावदानानां प्रयाजादीनां च । ययोश्च शेषशेषित्वम् , यथा प्रयाजदर्शयोः । यस्य चाधिकृताधिकारत्वम् , यथा अपां प्रणयनं दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गमाश्रित्य 'गोदोहनेन पशुकामस्य' इति विहितस्य गोदोहनस्य । यथा वा 'दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्ट्वा सोमेन यजेत' इति दर्शाद्युत्तरकाले विहितस्य सोमयागस्य दर्शाद्यधिकृताधिकारत्वं तेषामेककर्तृकत्वं भवति । ततश्चैकप्रयोगवचनगृहीतानां तेषां युगपदनुष्ठानसम्भवात्क्रमाकाङ्क्षायां श्रुत्यादिभिर्हि क्रमो बोध्यते, नैवं जिज्ञासयोः शेषशेषित्वे श्रुतिलिङ्गादिकं मानमस्ति ।

In response to the **Pūrvapakṣa** asking why **eka-kartṛkatva** is absent, the **Siddhānta** defines the rigid conditions for its existence in **Mīmāṁsā**.

- **Siddhānta** (Initial Response): The link is absent because there is no **pramāṇa** (proof) for **śeṣa-śeṣitva** or **adhikṛta-adhikāratva** between the two inquiries.
- **Ṭīkā** (Defining the Conditions): **Yeṣām eka-pradhāna-śeṣatā... yayoḥ śeṣa-śeṣitvam... yasya ca adhikṛta-adhikāratvam... teṣām eka-kartṛkatvam bhavati**

    - Single agency is established only in cases of:
        1. **Eka-Pradhāna-Śeṣatā:** One action is the principal (**pradhāna**) and the other is the subsidiary (**śeṣa**), such as **Prayājādīnām** (**Prayājādīnām**) being subsidiary to the main rite. The agent must have **abhimāna** (intention/sense of doership) for both to claim the merit.
        2. **Śeṣa-Śeṣitvam:** A - relationship between the whole and its parts (e.g., **Prayāja-Darśayoḥ**).
        3. **Adhikṛta-Adhikāratvam:** Subsequent qualification derived for one already qualified in the principal rite.
            - Example 1 (Specialization): The **Godohana** vessel is only prescribed for the **paśu-kāma** (cattle-desiring) person who is **already qualified** for the main **Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa** rite.
            - Example 2 (Sequential Action): The use of the **tvā** suffix in "**Darśa-Pūrṇamāsābhyām iṣṭvā somena yajeta**" proves **Eka-kartṛkatva**, mandating that the **Somayāga** must follow, and be performed by, the same person who performed **Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa**.
- **Necessity of Sequence in Rites:** In these cases, because simultaneous performance (**yugapat anuṣṭhāna-asaṁbhavāt**) is impossible, a desire for sequence (**krama-ākāṁkṣā**) arises. This sequence is defined by the indicators **Śruti**, **Artha**, **Pāṭha**, **Sthāna**, **Mukhya**, and **Pravṛtti**. (श्रुत्यर्थपाठस्थानमुख्यप्रवृत्त्याख्यानि क्रमबोधकानि षट् प्रमाणानि||
śrutyarthapāṭhasthānamukhyapravṛttyākhyāni kramabodhakāni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni||)
- **Final Proof of Absence:**
  Naivam jijñāsayōḥ śeṣa-śeṣitvam śruti-liṅgādikaṁ mānam asti
    - There is no evidence (**mānam**) from the six relationship indicators (**Śruti**, **Liṅga**, **Vākya**, **Prakaraṇa**, **Sthāna**, **Samākhyā**) to establish a **śeṣa-śeṣitva** relationship between the two inquiries. (श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यारूपाण्यङ्गत्व बोधकानि षट् प्रमाणानि|
śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyārūpāṇyaṅgatva bodhakāni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni|)

Resolution of the Āśrama (Life Stage) Sequence

ननु 'ब्रह्मचर्यं समाप्य गृही भवेत् गृहाद्वनी भूत्वा प्रव्रजेच्च' (जाबालो. ४) इति श्रुत्या,

'अधीत्य विधिवद्वेदान् पुत्रानुत्पाद्य धर्मतः । इष्ट्वा च शक्तितो यज्ञैर्मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत्' ।।

इति स्मृत्या चाधिकृताधिकारत्वं भातीति तन्न । 'ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्' (जाबालो. ४) । 'आसादयति शुद्धात्मा मोक्षं वै प्रथमाश्रमे । ' इति श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां त्वयोदाहृतश्रुतिस्मृत्योरशुद्धचित्तविषयत्वावगमात् ।

Pūrvapakṣa Argument (Sequence of Āśramas)

The **Pūrvapakṣa** uses **Śruti** and **Smṛti** texts to argue for a mandatory sequence of life stages (**Āśrama**) to show the **Adhikṛta-Adhikāra** relationship between the two inquiries. This is done by pointing out that the one who has the desire to know dharma (**Adhikāra** through **Āśrama**)**,** the same person will have **Adhikāra** in the desire to know Brahman**.**

- **Śruti**: **Brahmacaryaṁ samāpya gṛhī bhavet gṛhād vanī bhūtvā pravrajet** (Student → Householder → Forest Dweller → Renunciate).
- **Smṛti**: **Adhītya vidhivat vedān putrāṁścotpādya dharmataḥ iṣṭvā ca śaktyā yajñair mano mokṣe niveśayet** (Study **Vedas** → Beget sons → Perform sacrifices → Seek liberation).

Siddhānta Resolution (Distinction of Seeker)

The **Siddhānta** resolves the conflict by pointing to a distinction in the **Adhikārī**.

- **Śruti** (Counter-Injunction): **Brahmacaryād eva pravrajet** (One may renounce directly from the **Brahmacarya** stage).
- **Ṭīkā** (Clarification of the **Adhikārī**): **Āsādayatiśuddhātmā mōkṣam vai prathamāśrame**
    - One whose **antaḥkaraṇa** (inner instrument) is **śuddhātmā** (pure) may seek liberation (**mokṣam**) immediately in the **prathamāśrame** (first stage).
- **Final Conclusion: iti śruti-smṛtibhyām, tvayā udāhṛta śruti-smṛtyoḥ aśuddha-citta-viṣayatva-avagamāt**
    - The **Śruti** and **Smṛti** texts cited by the **Pūrvapakṣa** earlier are meant **only for the aśuddha-citta** (one whose mind is impure and full of desires). For the seeker with **vairāgya** (detachment), the mandatory sequence is not applicable.

The Course for the Pure in Mind

एतदुक्तं भवति यदि जन्मान्तरकृतकर्मभिः शुद्धं चित्तं तदा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव संन्यस्य ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् , यदा न शुद्धमिति रागेण ज्ञायते तदा गृही भवेत् , तत्राप्यशुद्धौ वनीभवेत् , तत्राप्यशुद्धौ तथैव कालमाकलयेत् , वने शुद्धौ प्रव्रजेदिति । तथा च श्रुतिः - ‘यदहरेव विरजेत्तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत्’ (जाबालो. ४) इति । तस्मान्नानयोरधिकृताधिकारत्वे किञ्चिन्माननिति भावः ।

For those who have already attained purity, the sequence is unnecessary.

Ṭīkā: yadi janmāntara kṛta karmabhiḥ śuddhaṁ cittam tadā brahmacaryād eva saṁnyasya brahma jijñāsitavyam
If the mind is purified by actions performed in previous births (**Janmāntara**), such a seeker upon completion of **Brahmacarya, with the permission from the teacher,** directly renounce samsara and inquire into **Brahman**.

Definition of True Saṁnyāsa: Saṁnyāsa is not merely changing clothes or names. It requires the total abandonment of the three desires (**Eṣaṇātraya**) and a mind solely fixed on **Brahman**.

- **Important Warning (Quote):**

  शिखा सूत्र परित्यागी वेदान्त श्रबणं विना। विद्यमानेऽपि संन्यासे पतत्येव न संशयः ॥
  (śikhā sūtra parityāgī vedānta śrabaṇaṃ vinā| vidyamāne'pi saṃnyāse patatyeva na saṃśayaḥ ||)
  A **Saṁnyāsī** who abandons the tuft (**Śikhā**) and sacred thread (**Sūtra**)—thus becoming unfit for Vedic rituals—but does not engage in **Vedānta Śravaṇa** (listening to/studying Vedanta), will undoubtedly fall (**Patati**).

The Logic of the Āśramas for the Impure If one does not have purity (**Na Śuddham**), that is if filled with **Rāga** (attachment) and **Dveṣa** (aversion), one must enter the **Gṛhastha Āśrama**.

- **Purpose:** The householder's life subjects the individual to conflicting circumstances that crush the ego and willfulness, eventually fostering **Vairāgya**.
- **Progression:**

- If purity is not attained in **Gṛhastha**, one goes to **Vanaprastha** (**Vanī bhavet**).
- If still impure (**Tatrāpi aśuddhaḥ**), one remains there practicing austerity until death (**Tathaiva kālamākalayet**).
- However, if purity is attained in the forest: **Vane śuddhou pravrajet** (One should renounce).

The Supreme Rule of Renunciation The **Siddhānta** provides the definitive **Śruti** that overrides the sequential rule.

- **Śruti: Yad ahareva virajet tad ahareva pravrajet (Jabal. 4)**
  "The very day one attains detachment (**Vairāgya**), that very day one should renounce."

Conclusion: There is no scriptural proof for **Adhikṛtādhikāratva** (qualification dependent on sequence) between **Dharma** and **Brahma** inquiries. One must apply the specific **Śruti/Smṛti** appropriate to the specific qualification of the seeker (**Adhikārī**)

Pūrvapakṣa: The Argument for Single Agency (Ekakartṛtva) by Samuccayavādin
ननु मीमांसयोः शेषशेषित्वमधिकृताधिकारत्वं च मास्तु । एकमोक्षफलकत्वेनैककर्तृकत्वं स्यादेव । वदन्ति हि - 'ज्ञानकर्माभ्यां मुक्तिः' इति समुच्चयवादिनः । एवमेकवेदार्थजिज्ञास्यकत्वाच्चैककर्तृकत्वम् । तथा चाग्नेयादिषड्यागानामेकस्वर्गफलकानाम् , द्वादशाध्यायानां चैकधर्मजिज्ञास्यकानां क्रमवत्तयोः क्रमो विवक्षित इति क्रमार्थोऽथशब्द इत्यशङ्क्याह - **फलेति ।**

The opponent shifts ground. Even if **Śeṣa-Śeṣitva** (subsidiary relationship) is absent, they argue for **Ekakartṛtva**—that both inquiries are performed by a single agent, implying a combined path (**Samuccaya**).

1. The Argument of the Samuccayavādin The opponent argues that **Dharma** (Action) and **Brahman** (Knowledge) must be combined because:

- **Eka Mokṣa Phalakatvāt:** Both have the same result/fruit, **Mokṣa**. They quote '**Jñāna karmabhyāṁ muktiḥ'** (Liberation is through both Knowledge and Action).
- **Eka Vedārtha Jijñāsakatvāt:** Both constitute an inquiry into the single meaning of the Vedas.

2. Analogies for Sequence from Pūrva Mīmāṁsā: The opponent uses examples of actions with a single result and inquiry into a single meaning of the Vedas to show sequence as the meaning of **atha**.

- **Ṭīkā (Example 1): Āgneyādi ṣaḍ yāgānām eka svarga phalakānām...**

  आग्नेय, अग्नीषोमीय, उपांशुयाग पौर्णमासत्रिकं (āgneya, agnīṣomīya, upāṃśuyāga paurṇamāsatrikaṃ). आग्नेय, ऐन्द्र, उपांशुयाग दर्शत्रिकं (āgneya, aindra, upāṃśuyāga darśatrikaṃ). The six sacrifices combined together constitute the **Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa**, yet they have a single result/fruit (**Svarga**) and are performed in sequence.

- **Ṭīkā (Example 2): Dvādaśādhyāyānāṁ ca eka dharma jijñāsakānām...**
  The 12 chapters of Jaimini's Sutras have one subject (**Dharma Jijñāsā**), yet a strict sequence is observed.

Inference: Similarly, **Dharma** and **Brahman** inquiries should be sequential parts of a single path.

Siddhānta: Final Refutation via Difference in Result/Fruit, Object and the Cause of inquiry (Page 71)

फलभेदाज्जिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च न क्रमो विवक्षित इत्यनुषङ्गः । यथा सौर्यार्यम्णप्राजापत्यचरूणां ब्रह्मवर्चसस्वर्गायुःफलभेदात् , यथा वा कामचिकित्सातन्त्रयोर्जिज्ञास्यभेदान्न क्रमापेक्षा तद्वन्मीमांसयोर्न क्रमापेक्षेति भावः । तत्रफलभेदं विवृणोति - अभ्युदयेति । विषयाभिमुख्येनोदेतीत्यभ्युदयो विषयाधीनं सुखं स्वर्गादिकं तच्च धर्मज्ञानहेतोर्मीमांसायाः फलमित्यर्थः । न केवलं फलस्य स्वरूपतो भेदः किन्तु हेतुतोऽपीत्याह - तच्चेति । ब्रह्मज्ञानहेतोर्मीमांसायाः फलं तु तद्विरुद्धमित्याह - निश्रेयसेति । नित्यं निरपेक्षं श्रेयो निश्रेयसं मोक्षस्तत्फलमित्यर्थः । ब्रह्मज्ञानं च स्वोत्पत्तिव्यतिरिक्तमनुष्ठानं नापेक्षत इत्याह - न चेति । स्वरूपतो हेतुतश्च फलभेदान्न समुच्चय इति भावः ।

जिज्ञास्यभेदं विवृणोति - भव्यश्चेति । भवतीति भव्यः । साध्य इत्यर्थः । साध्यत्वे हेतुमाह - नेति । तर्हि तुच्छत्वम् , नेत्याह - पुरुषेति । पुरुषव्यापारः प्रयत्नस्तन्त्रं हेतुर्यस्य तत्त्वादित्यर्थः । कृतिसाध्यत्वात्कृतिजनकज्ञानकाले धर्मस्यासत्वं न तुच्छत्वादित्यर्थः । ब्रह्मणो धर्माद्वैलक्षण्यमाह - इह त्विति । उत्तरमीमांसायामित्यर्थः । भूतमसाध्यम् । तत्र हेतुः - नित्येति । सदा सत्वादित्यर्थः । साध्यासाध्यत्वेन धर्मब्रह्मणोः स्वरूपभेदमुक्त्वा हेतुतोऽप्याह - नेति । धर्मवत्कृत्यधीनं नेत्यर्थः ।

धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च । अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम् , तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम्; निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मविज्ञानम् , न चानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम् । भव्यश्च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकालेऽस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात् । इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं नित्यत्वान्न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम् ।

मानतोऽपि भेदमाह - चोदनेति । अज्ञातज्ञापकं वाक्यमत्र चोदना । तस्याः प्रवृत्तिर्बोधकत्वं तद्वैलक्षण्याच्च जिज्ञास्यभेद इत्यर्थः । सङ्ग्रहवाक्यं विवृणोति - या हीति । लक्षणं प्रमाणं 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादिवाक्यं हि स्वविषये धर्मे यागादिकरणस्वर्गादिफलकभावनारूपे फलहेतुयागादिगोचरनियोगे वा हितसाधने यागादौ वा पुरुषं प्रवर्तयदेवावबोधयति । 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (बृ २.५.१९) इत्यादि त्वमर्थं केवलमप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्म बोधयत्वेव न प्रवर्तयति विषयाभावादित्यर्थः ।

चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च । या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणं सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जानैव पुरुषमवबोधयति । ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलम् । अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वात् , न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते । यथा अक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेणार्थावबोधे, तद्वत् । तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम् , यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति ।

The **Siddhānta** dismantles the "Single Agent/Single Result/Fruit" premise by proving **Phala Bheda** (Difference in Result/Fruit) and **Jijñāsya Bheda** (Difference in Object of Inquiry).

Bhāṣya Quote: Phala jijñāsya bhedāt ca
Because there is a difference in the result/fruit and the object of inquiry, no sequence is intended.

Analogy for No Sequence: Yathā Śaurya-Aryamṇa-Prājāpatya-caruṇāṁ brahmavarcasa-svarga-āyuḥ phala bhedāt na krama apekṣā
The **Śaurya** sacrifice gives **Brahmavarcasa** (spiritual luster), **Aryamṇa** gives **Svarga** (heaven), and **Prājāpatya** gives **Āyuḥ**(long life). Since results/fruits differ, there is no mandatory sequence between them.

The **Siddhānta** highlights following differences in the nature (**Svarūpa**) and the cause (**Hetu**) in the results (**Phalam**) of **Dharma** and **Brahman** inquiries, to prove that they cannot be combined (**Na Samuccaya Bhāvaḥ**):

	Dharma	Brahman
Jñāna (Knowledge)	**Dharma Jñāna**	**Brahma Vijñānam**
Phala (Result)	**Abhyudaya** (Prosperity, Heaven)	**Niḥśreyasa** (Mokṣa/Ultimate Good)
Nature of Phala	**Viṣayādhīnam Sukham** (Happiness dependent on objects/realm)	**Nityam nirapekṣam śreyaḥ** (Eternal, non-relative, independent good)
Anuṣṭhāna (Dependence on Action)	**anuṣṭhāna apekṣam** (Requires performance of action/ritual)	**Na anuṣṭhānāntara apekṣam** (Does not require subsequent ritual /action to Knowledge)
Svarūpa (Nature)	**Bhavyaḥ/Sādhya** (To be attained/Effect)	**Bhūtam/Asādhya** (Already attained/Existent)
Time	**Na jñāna kāle asti** (Does not exist at the time of knowing. **Dharma** (like merit/Puṇya) does not exist at the moment of knowing it. Mere knowledge of a ritual does not bring the result (heaven); the act must be performed.)	**Brahman** is **Bhūta**, meaning **Siddha** (already accomplished/existing). It is **Nitya** (eternal). Therefore, it is not dependent on human effort (**Puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantra**); it is **Vastu-tantra** (dependent on the object/reality). Even during the state of ignorance (**Avidyā**), the Jīva is **Brahman**. It is not a case of becoming something one is not (which would be **Bhavya**), but realizing what one already is (**Prāptasya prāptiḥ**).
Dependence	**Puruṣa vyāpāra tantram** **Puruṣa-vyāpāra** = Human effort (**Prayatna**). **Tantram** = Cause (**Hetu**). **Dharma** is that whose cause depends entirely on human efforts.	**Na puruṣa vyāpāra tantram** (Not dependent on the agent's action/will, it is **vastu tantra** - dependent on vastu)

Definition of Codanā (Command)	**Yāgādikaraṇaka-svargādiphalaka-bhāvanā-rūpā**. Vedic sentences are **Pravartaka** (impelling action).	**Ajñātajñāpakaṃ vākyam atra Codanā** **Codanā** is a statement that reveals what is unknown. It is a valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**).
Interpretation of Codanā (Command)	**Yā hi Codanā dharmasya lakṣaṇaṃ sā svaviṣaye niyuñjānā eva puruṣam avabodhayati** The command (**Codanā**) is the **Lakṣaṇa** (proof/**Pramāṇa**) of Dharma. It enlightens the person only by engaging/appointing (**Niyuñjānā**) them into action. (e.g., "One desiring heaven should sacrifice").	**Brahmacodanā tu puruṣam avabodhayatyeva kevalam.** The scriptural text regarding Brahman (e.g., Tat Tvam Asi) only enlightens the person; it does not command action.

Mananam: Clarification on Śravaṇa, Manana, and Nididhyāsana and Action

A doubt arises: Are practices like **Śravaṇa** (hearing), **Manana** (reflection), and **Nididhyāsana** (contemplation) not considered actions (**Anuṣṭhāna**)?

Refutation: These are not **Anuṣṭhāna** in the ritualistic sense because they are purely cognitive processes aiming at knowledge.

- **Śravaṇa** produces knowledge.
- **Manana** removes doubts (intellectual obstacles).
- **Nididhyāsana** removes deep-seated habitual obstacles (**Viparīta-bhāvanā**).

The Nature of Meditation: Texts like Vākya Sudhā or Dṛg-Dṛśya-Viveka prescribe rejecting names and forms (**Nāma-Rūpa**) and focusing on **Sat-Cit-Ānanda**. This is a method to remove obstacles (**Pratibandha**), not a creative action that produces **Brahman**.

Analogy of the Cloth (Paṭa): If a cloth is present but one's attention is elsewhere, one does not see the cloth.

- The instruction "Look at the cloth" is not asking you to create the cloth.
- Similarly, the **Ātmā** is already **Brahman**. If the mind is distracted by limited objects, one fails to recognize this.

- Practices are merely "ladders" or methods to turn the intellect away from distractions. If one only repeats "I am Brahman" without shifting the focus (**Buddhi**) from the limited to the infinite, it results in **Ukti** (mere speech), not **Mukti** (liberation).

Additional Points from Ṭīkā and Bhāṣya

1. **Is Dharma Non-existent (Tuccha)?** No. It is not **Tuccha** (void/non-existent like a rabbit's horn), but it is **Asat** (non-real) specifically at the time of knowledge. because it is **Kṛti-sādhya** (to be accomplished by action). **Jñāna** (Knowledge) → **Icchā** (Desire) → **Kṛti** (Effort/Action) → **Dharma** (Merit).
2. **Warning to Seekers:** One must abandon the notion "I am currently not Brahman, but I will become Brahman through effort." This mindset reduces **Mokṣa** to a result of action (making it impermanent). One must hold on to the conviction of being **Brahman** even amidst ignorance.
3. More about **Codanā:**
   Bhāṣya: Codanā pravṛttibhedācca
   Meaning: There is a difference in the functioning (**Pravṛtti**) of the scriptural command (**Codanā**).

   Definitions and Views on Codanā

   A. **General/Vedāntic Definition: Ajñātajñāpakaṃ vākyam atra Codanā**
      a. **Codanā** is a statement that reveals what is unknown. It is a valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**).
   B. **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā View (Bhāṭṭa School):**
      a. Vedic sentences are **Pravartaka** (impelling action).
      b. Structure: **Yāgādikaraṇaka-svargādiphalaka-bhāvanā-rūpā.**
      c. **Bhāvanā** (Creative energy) answers three questions:
         i. **Kiṃ bhāvayet?** (What to achieve?) → **Svarga** (Result).
         ii. **Kena?** (By what means?) → **Yāga** (Ritual).
         iii. **Katham?** (How?) → Through the procedural steps (**Itikartavyatā**).
      d. A sentence is not complete until the action is performed.
   C. **Prābhākara View:**
      a. Focus is on **Niyoga** (Command/Apurva).
      b. The scripture connects the **Niyojya** (**adhikāri** - the agent/officiant) to the **Phala** (fruit) via the act.
      c. **Ṭīkā: Phalahetuyāgādigocaraniyogaviṣayam…**

   Two Interpretations of this sentence:

   1. In the reading**: Avabodhasya Codanā-janyatvāt:**
      - **Codanā** is interpreted as **Ajñātajñāpakaṃ:** The realization of **Brahman** is not generated by a command to act. It is generated by the sentence functioning as a valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**). While knowledge

is indeed generated by the statement (**codanā-janyatvāt**), the person is not impelled into action because knowledge itself requires no further performance.

2. In the reading**: Avabodhasya Codanā-ajanyatvāt:**
    - **Codanā** is interpreted as **Pravartaka:** The accomplishment of **Dharma** is not done by mere knowledge but also by the act enjoined as per the scriptures. It is generated by the sentence functioning as a **Pravartaka**. In this reading **ajanyatvāt** (not generated by action/injunction) indicates that while the knowledge of Brahma is generated through the scriptural statement, it does not generate a duty to act.
3. **Meaning of "Puruṣam" and "Kevalam":**
    - **Puruṣam:** Refers to the **Adhikārin** (qualified seeker) or, specifically, the **Tvam-padā vachyārtha** (the direct meaning of the word "You"). Another meaning (by Ānanda Giri ji) is **Brahma** - **Tvam-padā lakshyārtha** (the implied meaning of the word "You")
    - **Kevalam (Interpretations):**
        - Option A: It **only** enlightens (and does nothing else like commanding).
        - Option B (Ānanda Giri): It enlightens the individual about the **Kevalam (Puruṣam) Brahma** (the Non-dual, pure Brahman).
        - Syntactical connection: **Vākyam** (The sentence) **bodhayati** (reveals) **lakṣyārtha** (the implied meaning—Brahman) to the **vācyārtha** (the literal meaning—the individual).

नन्ववबोध एव विषयस्तत्राह - न पुरुष इति । ब्रह्मचोदनया पुरुषोऽवबोधे न प्रवर्त्यत इत्यत्र हेतुं पूर्ववाक्येनाह - अवबोधस्येति । स्वजन्यज्ञाने स्वयं प्रमाणं न प्रवर्तकमित्यत्र दृष्टान्तमाह - यथेति । मानादेव बोधस्य जातत्वात् , जाते च विध्ययोगात् , न वाक्यार्थज्ञाने पुरुषप्रवृत्तिः । तथा च प्रवर्तकमानमेयो धर्मः, उदासीनमानमेयं ब्रह्म, इति जिज्ञास्यभेदात् , न तन्मीमांसयोः क्रमार्थोऽथशब्द इति भावः । एवमथशब्दस्यार्थान्तरासम्भवात् आनन्तर्यवाचित्वे सति तदवधित्वेन पुष्कलकारणं वक्तव्यमित्याह - तस्मादिति ।

यथा अक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेणार्थावबोधे, तद्वत् । तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम् , यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति ।

Ṭīkā: nanvavabodha eva viṣayastatrāha - na puruṣa iti | brahmacodanayā puruṣo'vabodhe na pravartata ityatra hetuṃ pūrvavākyenāha - avabodhasyeti. "codanā-janyatvāt"
A doubt is raised: Is knowledge (**avabodha**) the only subject? The explanation clarifies that the **codanā** (scriptural statement) generates knowledge, but it does not incite the person into further activity after that knowledge.

Brahma-related statements do not mandate a person to engage in action. In contrast, statements regarding **Dharma** do mandate action.

Knowledge as Self-Validating vs. Incitement to Action

The discussion moves to how knowledge functions as a valid means of proof (**pramāṇa**) without inducing further action.

Ṭīkā: Svajanya-jñāne svayaṃ pramāṇaṃ na pravartakam... yathā akṣārtha-sannikarṣeṇa arthāvabodhe tadvat

Explanation: The valid means of knowledge (**pramāṇa**) is self-sufficient in propagating its meaning without requiring any further action, but it is not a **pravartakam** (inciter to action). The text provides the example of sensory perception (**pratyakṣa**). When there is contact between the sense organ and the object (**akṣārtha-sannikarṣa**), knowledge of the object (e.g., a pot) arises naturally. This knowledge does not command the perceiver to do anything; it simply reveals what exists. Similarly, the knowledge of **Brahma** arises from the sentence (**tattvamasi**) and does not require further action.

Ṭīkā: Mānād eva bodhasya jātatvāt, jāte ca vidhi-ayogāt, na vākyārtha-jñāne puruṣa-pravṛttiḥ

Explanation: Knowledge arises solely from the valid means (**mānād eva**). Once knowledge has arisen (**jāte**), there is no scope for a commandment or rule (**vidhi-ayogāt**).
The State of Fulfillment: If one feels, "I have realized Brahman but I am not satisfied," or "I feel empty," it indicates that realisation has not yet occurred or the understanding is flawed.

- True knowledge (**ahaṃ brahmāsmi**) leads to total satisfaction (**tṛpti**) and the cessation of all desires (**sarva-kāmanā-nivṛtti**).
- There is no expectation of mystical changes (like growing two horns); the transformation is Self-realisation alone.

The Distinction Between Dharma and Brahman

A crucial technical distinction is made between the objects of inquiry in the Karma Kāṇḍa (Dharma) and Jñāna Kāṇḍa (Brahman).

Ṭīkā: Pravartaka-mānameyo dharmaḥ udāsīna-mānameyaṃ brahma... iti jijñāsya-bhedāt

- **Definitions:**
    - **Dharma:** This is the object known (**meya**) by a source of knowledge (**māna**) that is **pravartaka** (inciting to action). The Veda in the context of Dharma functions as a command.
    - **Brahma:** This is revealed by a source of knowledge that is **udāsīna** (indifferent, neutral, or non-injunctive). The Veda here is a revealer, not a commander.
- **Conclusion:** Since the objects of inquiry (**jijñāsya**) are fundamentally different—one requiring action and the other being revealed by a neutral source—the sequence proposed by Mimamsakas (that one must study Dharma before Brahman) is rejected.

The Meaning of 'Atha' (Prerequisites for Inquiry)

Since sequential continuity from Dharma inquiry is rejected, the text defines the true meaning of the word **Atha** in the sutra **Athāto Brahmajijñāsā**.

Ṭīkā: Evaṃ atha-śabdasya arthāntara-asambhavāt ānantarya-vācitve sati tad-avadhitvena puṣkala-kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam

Explanation: Since other meanings of **Atha** are not possible in this context, it must denote **ānantarya** (immediate succession). Therefore, one must state the **puṣkala-kāraṇam** (the specific, sufficient cause) which acts as the limit/boundary (**avadhi**) after which the inquiry begins.

Bhāṣya: Tasmāt kimapi vaktavyaṃ yad-anantaraṃ brahma-jijñāsā upadiśyate

Explanation: Therefore, something must be specified, immediately after which the instruction of **Brahma-jijñāsā** takes place. This implies the qualifications of the student.

Ṭīkā: Tat kim ityata āha... Nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ, ihāmutrārtha-bhoga-virāgaḥ, śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat, mumukṣutvam

Explanation: The specific prerequisite is the Fourfold Qualification (**Sādhana Catuṣṭaya**). These are well-known from texts like Tattvabodha, but their origin is traceable here to the commentary on the Brahma Sūtra.

Detailed Exposition of the Fourfold Qualifications (Page 74)

उपदिश्यते । सूत्रकृतेति शेषः । तत्किमित्यत आह - **उच्यत इति ।** विवेकादीनामागमिकत्वेन प्रामाणिकत्वं पुरस्तादेवोक्तम् । लौकिकव्यापारात् मनस उपरमः शमः बाह्यकरणानामुपरमो दमः । ज्ञानार्थं विहितनित्यादिकर्मसन्यास उपरतिः । शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वसहनं तितिक्षा । निद्रालस्यप्रमादत्यागेन मनःस्थितिः समाधानम् । सर्वत्रास्तिकता श्रद्धा । एतत्षट्कप्राप्तिः शमादिसम्पत् ।

तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम् , यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति । उच्यते — नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत् , मुमुक्षुत्वं च ।

The text details the specific components of the qualifications.

1. Viveka (Discrimination)

Ṭīkā: Vivekādīnām āgamikatva-prāmāṇikatvaṃ purastād eva uktam

Note: The validity of Viveka and others based on scriptures was established during the Pūrvapakṣa (opponent's argument) (See topic “Pūrvapakṣa: Why is the Sūtra necessary?” on Page 7 of Adhyasa Bhashya notes). The opponent argued that since these are established in scriptures like Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the Sutra is unnecessary. The Siddhantin accepts

their scriptural validity but establishes thatthe Sutra is necessary and useful to determine the true purport of those scriptures.

2. Vairāgya (Dispassion)

Defined as dispassion towards the enjoyment of fruits in this world (**iha**) and the next (**amutra**), including both worldly objects and celestial pleasures derived from karma.

3. Śamādi-Ṣaṭka-Sampatti (The Sixfold Wealth)

- **Śama (Control of Mind): Ṭīkā: Laukika-vyāpārāt manasa uparamaḥ śamaḥ**
    - **Definition:** The withdrawal of the mind from worldly activities.
    - **Elaboration:** The mind should retreat from all external engagements and desires to study other things, focusing solely on spiritual study and the internal realm.
- **Dama (Control of Senses): Ṭīkā: Bāhya-karaṇānām uparamo damaḥ**
    - **Definition:** The withdrawal of external sense organs (sight, hearing, etc.) from objects other than those related to **śravaṇa** (hearing the scriptures).
    - **Elaboration:** Vivekacūḍāmaṇi defines it as placing the sense organs in their respective receptacles(**golaka**) and detaching them from objects.
- **Uparati (Withdrawal/Renunciation): Ṭīkā: Jñānārthaṃ vihita-nityādi-karma-sannyāsaḥ uparatiḥ**
    - **Definition:** The renunciation of prescribed obligatory duties (**nitya karma**) for the purpose of Knowledge (**jñānārtham**).
    - **Elaboration:** This is not for laziness but to free up mental space for deep study (**pārāyaṇa**) of texts like the Adhyāsa Bhāṣya.
- **Titikṣā (Forbearance): Ṭīkā: Śītoṣṇādi-dvandva-sahanam**
    - **Definition:** Enduring pairs of opposites like heat and cold without anxiety or lamentation (**cintā-vilāpa-rahitam**).
    - **Elaboration:** In a Gurukul or spiritual life, this primarily refers to enduring the ego-checks, scoldings, or perceived insults from elders and teachers. It is the ability to withstand the "heat" of correction without abandoning the path or the teacher.
- **Samādhāna (Concentration): Ṭīkā: Nidrālasya-pramāda-tyāgena manaḥ-sthitiḥ... samādhānam**
    - **Definition:** The steadiness of the mind in pure **Brahma**, achieved by abandoning sleep, laziness, and inadvertence (**pramāda**).
    - **Elaboration:** It is not "pampering" (**lālanam -** developing extreme affection **atyanta sneha** for) the mind but fixing it firmly on the goal.
- **Śraddhā (Faith): Ṭīkā Sarvatra āstikatā**
    - **Definition:** Usually defined as faith in the Guru and Scriptures, here it is expanded to "faith everywhere" (**sarvatra āstikatā**).
    - **Elaboration:** Recognizing the Divine Will or Isvara in all situations.

4. Mumukṣutvam (Desire for Liberation)

The intense desire for liberation (mentioned in the list).

Causality and the Necessity of Qualifications

अत्र विवेकादीनामुत्तरोत्तरहेतुत्वेनाधिकारिविशेषणत्वं मन्तव्यम् । तेषामन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाहेतुत्वमाह - **तेष्विति ।**

तेषु हि सत्सु, प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च, शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च; न विपर्यये । तस्मात् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमुपदिश्यते ॥

The text concludes by establishing the relationship between these qualifications and the inquiry into Brahman.

Ṭīkā: Atra vivekādīnām uttarottara-hetu-adhikāri-viśeṣaṇatvam mantavyam

Elaboration: There is a cause-and-effect relationship between these qualifications. Viveka leads to Vairāgya, Vairāgya leads to Śama, etc.

Bhāṣya: Teṣu hi satsu prāg api dharma-jijñāsāyā ūrdhvaṃ ca śakyate brahma-jijñāsitum...

The Logic of Anvaya-Vyatireka (Presence and Absence):

- **Anvaya (Presence):** If these qualifications (**Sādhana Catuṣṭaya**) are present (**teṣu hi satsu**), one is capable of inquiring into Brahman, regardless of whether one has inquired into Dharma beforehand or not.
- **Vyatireka (Absence):** Without these qualifications, true inquiry cannot happen (implied by the phrase **na viparyaye** " not in reverse").

Conclusion: Dharma-jijñāsā is not the cause of **Brahma-jijñāsā**. The **Sādhana Catuṣṭaya** is the exclusive and necessary cause. Even if someone listens to the teachings out of curiosity without these qualifications, it does not count as true inquiry.

The Objection Regarding 'Curiosity' (Kutūhala)

यथाकथञ्चित्कुतूहलितया ब्रह्मविचारप्रवृत्तस्यापि फलपर्यन्तं तज्ज्ञानानुदयाद्व्यतिरेकसिद्धिः । अथशब्दव्याख्यानमुपसंहरति - **तस्मादिति ।**

The Ṭīkā raises a practical objection based on observation regarding the strictness of this rule.

Ṭīkā: **atha kathañcit kutūhalitayā brahma vicāra pravṛttasyāpi phalaparyantaṃ tajjñānānudayāt vyatireka siddhiḥ**

- **The Objection:** We observe that people who lack the full **Sādhana Catuṣṭaya** (e.g., lacking intense dispassion or desire for liberation) yet still engage in **Brahma Vicāra** (study of Vedanta) out of **Kutūhala** (curiosity). They might listen to recordings or sit in lectures just to "purify their ears" or see what the Upanishads are about.

- **The Problem:** This seems to be a **Vyatireka Vyabhicāra** (a deviation from the rule of absence - the effect, **Brahma Vicāra,** is seen in the absence of the cause, full **Sādhana Catuṣṭaya**). It suggests that inquiry can happen without the qualifications, challenging Bhāṣya's assertion.

The Refutation: The Necessity of 'Phalaparyantam'

The text provides a two-fold refutation to prove that the original logic holds true. The inquiry must be judged by its ability to reach the fruit (Phala), which is **Mokṣa** (Liberation).

- **Point A: Lack of Steadfastness (Inconstancy in Shravana)**
  - Those driven merely by curiosity do not sustain their study until the end (**phalaparyantam**).
  - They are inconsistent; they listen to one guru, then another, never studying a text from "Atha" to "Iti" (beginning to end).
  - As they lack the burning desire for **Mokṣa**, they eventually drop out. Therefore, true, fruitful inquiry does not happen.
- **Point B: The Obstacle of Attachments (Pratibandha)**
  - Even scholars (e.g., university professors or Pandits in Kashi) who study and teach Vedanta extensively may not attain **Aparokṣa Jñānaṃ** (Direct Realization).
  - **Example:** A story is cited of a Pandit who preached "The world is false (**Mithyā**)" daily, but when asked by his wife, admitted he only said it for the monks; for himself, the world was real.
  - They may possess **Śāstrārtha Niścaya** (intellectual certainty of the scripture's meaning), but not **Mokṣa**.
  - **Reason: Pratibandha** (Obstacles). They engage in inquiry with obstacles intact (e.g., attachment to wealth, reliance on worldly security, or emotional attachments like Dronacharya had for Ashwatthama).
  - **Conclusion:** As long as the "fire of knowledge" is being lit while the "water of obstacles" is present, burning (of ignorance) will not occur. Therefore, without the qualifications (removal of obstacles), the result (Knowledge/Liberation) does not rise.

Quote from another Commentary:
फलपर्यन्त ज्ञान प्रतिबन्धक सहित विचार सत्त्वेऽपि तद्रहित विचाराभावो विद्यत इति व्यतिरेक सिद्धिः
phalaparyanta jñāna pratibandhaka sahita vicāra sattve'pi tadrahita vicārābhāvo vidyata iti vyatireka siddhiḥ

- **Meaning:** Even if inquiry exists, if it is accompanied by obstacles to the final fruit/result, it is equivalent to the absence of valid inquiry. Thus, the rule (that qualifications are required) is proved.

The Definition and Necessity of 'Ataḥ' (Therefore) (Page 76)

Having established "Atha" as immediate succession to qualifications, the text moves to "Ataḥ" (Therefore), which provides the reason (**Hetu**) for the inquiry.

The Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's Argument against Inquiry)

ननूक्तविवेकादिकं न सम्भवति, 'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतम्' इत्यादिश्रुत्या कर्मफलस्य नित्यत्वेन ततो वैराग्यसिद्धेः । जीवस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपमोक्षश्चायुक्तः, भेदात्तस्य लोष्टादिवत्पुरुषार्थत्वायोगाच्च । ततो न मुमुक्षासम्भव इत्याक्षेपपरिहारार्थोऽतःशब्दः तं व्याचष्टे - **अतःशब्द इति ।**

The Ṭīkā presents an opponent who claims inquiry is unnecessary for three reasons:

1. **Impossibility of Qualifications:** Perfect discrimination (Viveka) is impossible to attain.
2. **Eternity of Karma:** Vedic texts suggest rituals provide eternal results.
    - Quote: **akṣayyaṃ ha vai cāturmāsya yājinaḥ sukṛtam** (The merit of one who performs the Cāturmāsya sacrifice is undecaying). The merits being undecaying, dispassion from them is not possible.
3. **Difference between Jīva and Brahma:** The Jīva is distinct from Brahman; asking a Jīva to be Brahman is like asking a clod of earth to be divine. It is not a valid goal (**Puruṣārtha**).

The Siddhānta (Resolution via 'Atah')

अथशब्देनानन्तर्यवाचिना तदवधित्वेनार्थाद्विवेकादिचतुष्टयस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाहेतुत्वं यदुक्तं तस्यार्थिकहेतुत्वस्याक्षेपनिरासायानुवादकोऽतःशब्द इत्यर्थः । उक्तं विवृणोति - **यस्मादिति ।** तस्मादित्युत्तरेण सम्बन्धः । 'यदल्पं तन्मर्त्यं' 'यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम्' इति न्यायवती 'तद्यथेह' इत्यादिश्रुतिः कर्मफलाक्षयत्वश्रुतेर्बाधका । तस्मात् 'अतोऽन्यदार्तम्' इति श्रुत्या अनात्ममात्रस्यानित्यत्वविवेकात् वैराग्यलाभ इति भावः ।

अतःशब्दः हेत्वर्थः । यस्माद्वेद एव अग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति — 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते' (छा. उ. ८ । १ । ६) इत्यादिः; तथा ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति — 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' (तै. उ. २ । १ । १) इत्यादिः । तस्मात् यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या ॥

The word **Ataḥ** refutes these objections by establishing that Karma is perishable and Brahman is the only eternal goal.

- **Bhāṣya**: **ataḥ śabdo hetvarthaḥ**
    - **Explanation:** "Ataḥ" signifies the reason. It answers "Why inquire?"
- **Refutation regarding Eternality of Results of Karma (The Argument of Perishability):**
    - **Bhāṣya**: **yasmādveda eva agnihotrādīnāṃ śreyaḥsādhanānām anityaphalatāṃ darśayati**
    - **Explanation:** The Veda itself reveals that the results of rituals like Agnihotra are perishable (**anitya**).
    - **Supporting Sruti (Chandogya 8.1.6): tad yatheha karmacito lokaḥ kṣīyate evam evāmutra puṇyacito lokaḥ kṣīyate**
    - **Meaning:** Just as worldly gains acquired through effort perish, so too do the heavenly worlds acquired through merit (**Puṇya**) perish.

    - **Logic (Nyāya): yat kṛtakam tadanityam** (Whatever is created/produced is impermanent). This logic overrules the specific text about Cāturmāsya being eternal.
    - **Śruti: ato'nyadārtam:** (Everything other than ātman is destructible and therefore anityam or mithyā). With this śruti, discrimination will arise resulting in dispassion.

Establishing Brahman as the Supreme Goal

मुमुक्षां सम्भावयति - **तथेति ।** यथा वेदः कर्मफलानित्यत्वं दर्शयति, तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानात् प्रशान्तशोकानलमपारं स्वयञ्ज्योतिरानन्दं दर्शयतीत्यर्थः । जीवत्वादेरध्यासोक्त्या ब्रह्मत्वसम्भव उक्त एवेति भावः । एवमथातःशब्दाभ्यां पुष्कलकारणवतोऽधिकारिणः समर्थनात् शास्त्रमारब्धव्यमित्याह - **तस्मादिति ।**

To ensure the seeker doesn't fall into nihilism (giving up Karma but not seeking Brahman), the text proves Brahman is a worthy goal.

- **Bhāṣya**: **tathā brahma vijñānādapi parama puruṣārthaṃ darśayati**
    - **Explanation:** The Veda shows that the Knowledge of Brahman leads to the Supreme Goal (Parama Puruṣārtha).
    - **Supporting Śruti (Taittiriya Upanishad): brahmavid āpnoti param** (The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme).
    - **The Result of Knowledge:**
        - **Bhāṣya**: **brahma jñānāt praśānta śoka analam...** (Knowledge of Brahma leads to the fire of sorrow being extinguished).
        - It leads to **apāram svayaṃ jyotir ānandam** (Limitless, self-illumined bliss).

Resolution of Jīva-Brahma Difference

Ṭīkā: **jīvatvādeḥ adhyāsa uktyā brahmatva saṃbhavaḥ**

Explanation: The "Jīva-hood" (limitations of the individual) is an error due to **Adhyāsa** (superimposition). Therefore, it is possible for the Jīva to realize its true nature as Brahman. Since they are essentially one, the goal is valid.

Summary of Atha and Atah

The text summarizes the combined meaning of **Atha** and **Atah**.

- **Bhāṣya**: **tasmāt yathokta sādhana saṃpattyanantaram brahma jijñāsā kartavyā**
    - **Translation:** Therefore (Tasmāt - because Karma is perishable and Mokṣa is eternal), immediately following the acquisition of the stated qualifications (yathokta sādhana saṃpatti), the Inquiry into Brahman **should be done** (kartavyā).
- **Clarification on 'Jijñāsā':**
    - Although **Jijñāsā** grammatically means "desire to know," in this context, it implies the **action** driven by that desire: **Vicāra** (Inquiry/Deliberation).

    - One must engage in reflection (Vicāra) until the realization removes the obstacles and the limitations of the Jīva.

- **Atha**: Signifies immediate sequence or auspiciousness (implies the prerequisite qualifications).
- **Ataḥ**: Signifies the reason (**Hetu**).
    - **The Reason:** The fruits of action (**Karma Phala**) are impermanent (**Anitya**), whereas **Mokṣa** (liberation) attained through **Brahma Jñāna** (knowledge of Brahman) is eternal (**Nitya**).
    - Therefore, one must inquire into **Brahma**.

Syntactical Analysis (Anvaya): The Addition of "Kartavya"

सूत्रवाक्यपूरणार्थमध्याहृतकर्तव्यपदान्वयार्थं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापदेन विचारं लक्षयितुं तस्य स्वाभिमतसमासकथनेनावयवार्थं दर्शयति - **ब्रह्मण इति ।**

To make the sūtra a complete sentence, a verb must be supplied.

sutravākyapūraṇārthaṃ yadadhyāhṛataṃ kartavyapadaṃ tasyānvayārthaṃ

Explanation: To complete the sentence of the sūtra, one must supply the word (**Adhyāhāra**) "**Kartavya**" (to be done/is a duty).

Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā Kartavyā (Therefore, the inquiry into Brahman is to be done).

The Implied Meaning of Jijñāsā

There is a semantic issue between **Jijñāsā** (desire to know) and **Kartavya** (duty/to be done). One cannot enjoin "desire." Desire happens spontaneously; it cannot be "done."

brahma Jijñāsā padena vicāram lakṣayati

- **Lakṣaṇā (Implication):** Since one cannot perform "desire," the word **Jijñāsā** figuratively implies **Vicāra** (Inquiry/Reflection).
- **Final Meaning: Brahma Vicāra Kartavya** (The inquiry into Brahman is to be performed).

Grammatical Analysis of "Brahma Jijñāsā" (Page 77-78)

ननु धर्माय जिज्ञासा इतिवत् ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासेति चतुर्थीसमासः किं न स्यादिति चेत् । उच्यते जिज्ञासा पदस्य हि मुख्यार्थमिच्छा, तस्याः प्रथमं कर्मकारकमपेक्षितं पश्चात्फलम् , ततश्चादौ कर्मज्ञानार्थं षष्ठीसमासो युक्तः । कर्मण्युक्ते सत्यर्थात्फलमुक्तं भवति, इच्छायाः कर्मण एव फलत्वात् । यथा स्वर्गस्येच्छा इत्युक्ते स्वर्गस्य फलत्वं लभ्यते तद्वत् । अत एव 'धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यत्रापि 'सा हि तस्य ज्ञातुमिच्छा' इति इच्छां गृहीत्वा षष्ठीसमासो दर्शितः ।

ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ।

The text analyzes the compound word (**Samāsa**) **Brahma Jijñāsā**. The discussion centers on whether it is a Dative compound (**Caturthī**) or a Genitive compound (**Ṣaṣṭhī**).

A. The Objection: Why not Caturthī (Dative)?

In the **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā** text (Dharma Jijñāsā), the interpretation is Dative.

Ṭīkā: nanu dharmāya jijñāsā itivat brahmaṇe jijñāseti caturthīsamāsaḥ kiṃ na syāt

- **Argument:** Just as the **Śabara Bhāṣya** interprets **Athāto Dharma Jijñāsā** as **Dharmāya Jijñāsā** (Desire for Dharma), why not interpret this as **Brahmaṇe Jijñāsā** (Desire for Brahman)?
- **Response:**
  Ṭīkā: jijñāsā padasya hi mukhyārthamicchā
  The primary meaning of **Jijñāsā** is **Icchā** (Desire). When the word "desire" is heard, the first question that arises in the intellect is "Desire for what object?" (**Kiṃ Viṣaya**).

  Ṭīkā: **tasyāḥ prathamaṃ karmakārakamapekṣitaṃ paścātphalam**
  Desire primarily expects an object (**Karma Kāraka**) first. The fruit/result (**Phala**) is considered later. **Example:** If one desires a pot (**Ghaṭa**), the object is the pot. The fruit is the possession or knowledge of the pot.

B. The Justification for Ṣaṣṭhī (Genitive)

Because the intellect first demands the object of the desire, the compound must be an Objective Genitive (**Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī**).

Ṭīkā: tataścādau karmajñānārthaṃ ṣaṣṭhīsamāso yuktaḥ

- **Explanation:** The grammatical rule **Kartṛ Karmaṇoḥ Kṛti** dictates that when associated with a gerund - a noun formed from a verbal root with an affix(like a desire or an agent), the object takes the Genitive case (**Ṣaṣṭhī**).
- **Examples:**
  - **Jagataḥ Kartā** (Creator of the world) – Here, world is the object, taking Ṣaṣṭhī.
  - **Ghaṭasya Jñānam** (Knowledge of the pot) – Pot is the object.
- **Conclusion:** It is **Brahmaṇaḥ Jijñāsā** (Desire for the knowledge of Brahman).

C. Rejection of Caturthī (Dative) Exceptions

The notes clarify that Dative is generally used for materials intended for a specific purpose (e.g., wood for a sacrificial post - **Yūpāya Dāru**). However, for inquiry, the relationship is Object-Agent, necessitating **Ṣaṣṭhī**.

Ṭīkā: icchāyāḥ karmaṇa eva phalatvāt

- **Logic:** In this specific context, the object of desire (**Karma**) and the fruit/result (**Phala**) are identical.
  - If the desire is for **Svarga** (Heaven), the fruit is **Svarga**.

    - If the desire is for **Brahma**, the fruit is **Brahma**.
- Therefore, stating the object (via Genitive) automatically implies the fruit. There is no need for Dative to indicate the fruit separately.

D. Clarification on Dharma Jijñāsā

The text clarifies that even in **Dharma Jijñāsā**, although formally explained as Dative (**Dharmāya**), the ultimate meaning relies on the object.

Ṭīkā: 'sā hi tasya jñātumicchā' iti icchāṃ gṛhītvā ṣaṣṭhīsamāso darśitaḥ

- Even in the context of Dharma, it is eventually understood as **Dharmasya Jñātum Icchā** (Desire to know Dharma), utilizing the Genitive sense.
- **Why was Dative used there initially?**
    - **Bhāṣya/Explanation:** Inquiry (**Vicāra**) is **Kleśātmaka** (painful/difficult/requires effort).
    - To motivate the seeker, the result (Dharma) was emphasized using Dative (for the sake of Dharma).
    - **Brahma Vicāra** is subtle and difficult (Kleśātmaka), requiring **Śāstra** study to remove the wrong notion of identifying with the body.

The View of the Vṛttikāra

विचारलक्षणायां तु विचारस्य क्लेशात्मकतया प्रथमं फलाकाङ्क्षत्वात् धर्माय जिज्ञासेति चतुर्थीसमास उक्तः, तथा वृत्तिकारैर्ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा इत्युक्तं चेदस्तु ज्ञातत्वेन ब्रह्मणः फलत्वादिति । There is a mention of an ancient commentator known as the **Vṛttikāra**.

Ṭīkā: tathā vṛttikārairbrahmaṇe jijñāsā ityuktaṃ cedastu jñātatvena brahmaṇaḥ phalatvāditi |

The **Vṛttikāra** accepted the Dative case (**Brahmaṇe Jijñāsā**).

- **Reconciliation:** This is acceptable only if one understands that "knowledge of Brahman -" (**Jñātatva**) is the fruit. However, the primary view of **Śaṅkarācārya** remains **Ṣaṣṭhī**.

Definition of the Word "Brahma" (Page 79)

अधुना ब्रह्मपदार्थमाह - **ब्रह्म चेति ।** ननु 'ब्रह्मक्षत्रमिदं ब्रह्म आयाति ब्रह्म स्वयम्भूर्ब्रह्म प्रजापतिः' इति श्रुतिषु लोके च ब्राह्मणत्वजातौ जीवे वेदे कमलासने च ब्रह्मशब्दः प्रयुज्यत इत्याशङ्क्याह - **अत एवेति ।**

ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इति । अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यम् ।

Now that the grammatical relation is established, what does the word **Brahma** actually mean in this Sūtra?

Bhāṣya: brahma ca vakṣyamāṇa lakṣaṇam ‘janmādyasya yataḥ’ iti |

Explanation: Brahma here refers only to that which will be defined in the next sūtra (**Janmādyasya Yataḥ** - That from which the universe has its birth/origin, etc.).

Exclusion of Other Meanings

Bhāṣya: ata eva na brahmaśabdasya jātyādyarthāntaramāśaṅkitavyam |

One should not imagine other common meanings of the word **Brahma** found in **Śruti** or common usage (**Loka**):

1. **Jāti (Caste):** As in "Brahmana" (referencing the phrase Brahma kṣatram).
2. **Jīva:** Individual soul (Idam brahma āyāti).
3. **Veda:** The scriptures (Brahma svayambhu - Veda is self-born; or Karma brahmodbhavam viddhi - Action arises from Veda).
4. **Kamalāsana:** The creator god, Chaturmukha Brahmā (Brahma prajāpatiḥ).
5. **Prakṛti:** Matter (referred to in Gita Mama yonir mahad brahma).

Reason for Exclusion

जगत्कारणत्वलक्षणप्रतिपादकसूत्रासाङ्गत्यप्रसङ्गादेवेत्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: jagatkāraṇatva lakṣaṇa pratipādaka sūtra asāṅgatyaprasaṅgāt eva iti arthaḥ |

- If **Brahma** meant caste, Veda, or Jīva, the subsequent sūtra describing the "Cause of the World" (**Jagat Kāraṇatva**) would become inconsistent/illogical (**Asaṅgata**).
- To maintain consistency with the second sūtra, **Brahma** must imply the Supreme Reality.

Debate: Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī vs. Śeṣe Ṣaṣṭhī (Page 79)

वृत्यन्तरे शेषे षष्ठीत्युक्तं दूषयति - **ब्रह्मण इतीति ।** सम्बन्धसामान्यं शेषः । जिज्ञासेत्यत्र सन्प्रत्ययवाच्याया इच्छाया ज्ञानं कर्म, तस्य ज्ञानस्य ब्रह्म कर्म । तत्र सकर्मकक्रियायाः कर्मज्ञानं विना ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् , इच्छाया विषयज्ञानजन्यत्वाच्च प्रथमापेक्षितं कर्मैव षष्ठ्या वाच्यं न शेष इत्यर्थः । ननु प्रमाणादिकमन्यदेव तत्कर्मास्तु ब्रह्म तु शेषितया सम्बध्यतां तत्राह - **जिज्ञास्यान्तरेति ।**

ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी, न शेषे; जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाज्जिज्ञासायाः। जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्च ।

A specific grammatical debate arises regarding the type of Genitive case used.

- **Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī:** Objective Genitive (The object of the action/desire).
- **Śeṣe Ṣaṣṭhī:** Residual Genitive (General relationship/connection, "Related to...").

Bhāṣya: brahmaṇa iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī, na śeṣe

- **Assertion:** It is strictly **Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī**. It is NOT **Śeṣe**.

Reasons for Rejecting Śeṣe (Residual) Ṣaṣṭhī:

1. **Expectation of Object: Bhāṣya: jijñāsya apekṣatvāt jijñāsāyāḥ|**
    - Desire/Inquiry inherently demands an object (What do you want to know?). It cannot be satisfied with a general relationship.
2. **No Other Object Mentioned: Bhāṣya: jijñāsya antara anirdeśācca**
    - The sūtra does not mention any other object to be known. **Brahma** is the only noun available to serve as the object.
3. **The Nature of the Desire (San Pratyaya): Ṭīkā: icchāyā jñānaṃ karma, tasya jñānasya brahma karma**
    - **Grammatical Chain:**
        - The suffix **San** implies **Icchā** (Desire).
        - The object of **Icchā** is **Jñāna** (Knowledge). (Desire for knowledge).
        - The object of **Jñāna** is **Brahma**. (Knowledge of Brahman).
    - Therefore, **Brahma** is the direct object of the cognitive process implied by the desire.
    - **Conclusion: Sakarmaka kriyā** (Transitive verb) requires an object immediately. One cannot proceed without knowing what the object is.

Refuting the Counter-Argument regarding "Related Matters"

Ṭīkā: nanu pramāṇādikamanyadeva tatkarmāstu brahma tu śeṣitayā sambadhyatāṃ

Objection: Should we not use **Śeṣe Ṣaṣṭhī** (General relation) so that we can include all things related to Brahman, such as:

- **Pramāṇa** (Proofs)
- **Lakṣaṇa** (Definitions)
- **Yukti** (Logic)
- **Jñāna** (Knowledge)
- **Sādhana** (Means)
- **Phala** (Fruit)?

The opponent suggests that **Pramāṇādikam** (things like proof, definition, and reasoning) should be the **Karma** (object) of the desire/inquiry, and **Brahma** should be indirectly related as the **Śeṣī** (the principal for which the others are subordinates), thereby justifying the **ŚeṣeṢaṣṭhī** (genitive case in the sense of a subordinate relation).

The Siddhānta's Reply and Analogy:

- **Bhāṣya: jijñāsyāntara anirdeśāt**
- While proofs, logic, and definitions are necessary, they are implied via **Ajahat Lakṣaṇā** (implication without abandoning the primary meaning).
- However, the **primary focus** must be the direct object (**Karma**). If one wants to meet a king, the entourage is implied, but the stated desire is to meet the king.

- Therefore, **Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī** is the correct interpretation. The inquiry is directly into the nature of Brahman.

श्रुतं कर्म त्यक्त्वान्यदश्रुतं कल्पयन् 'पिण्डमुत्सृज्य करं लेढि' इति न्यायमनुसरतीति भावः । गूढाभिसन्धिः शङ्कते - नन्विति । 'षष्ठी शेषे' इति विधानात् , षष्ठ्या सम्बन्धमात्रं प्रतीतमपि विशेषाकाङ्क्षायां सकर्मकक्रियासंनिधानात् कर्मत्वे पर्यवस्यतीत्यर्थः ।

ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते, सम्बन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात् ।

Ṭīkā: śrutaṃ karma tyaktvānyadaśrutaṃ kalpayan 'piṇḍamutsṛjya karaṃ leḍhi' iti nyāyamanusaratīti bhāvaḥ |

- The Siddhāntin states that the opponent is rejecting the **śrutaṃ Karma** (the object explicitly mentioned, i.e., **Brahma**) and imagining an **aśrutaṃ** (unmentioned object, like **pramāṇa**).
- This is likened to the maxim: **Piṇḍam utsṛjya karam leḍhi** (One discards the main morsel of food and licks the hand for residual flavor), meaning one is focusing on secondary aspects after giving up the primary, explicitly stated object.

The Hidden Intention (Gudhābhisandhi)

- **Opponent with Hidden Motive: gūḍhābhisandhiḥ śaṅkate**
  - The opponent here is addressed by the word **gūḍhābhisandhiḥ.** . This compound word is analyzed as: **Gūḍhaḥ Abhisandhiḥ yasya saḥ** (The one whose intention is hidden). This opponent with a hidden motive raises a doubt (**śaṅkate).**

- **Opponent's Argument for Śeṣa Ṣaṣṭhī (Re-objection):**

  Bhāṣya: nanu śeṣaṣaṣṭhīparigrahe'pi brahmaṇo jijñāsākarmatvaṃ na virudhyate, sambandhasāmānyasya viśeṣaniṣṭhatvāt |

  - Even if **Śeṣa Ṣaṣṭhī** is accepted, the object-hood (**karmatvam**) of Brahma in the inquiry is not contradicted (**na virudhyate**), because a general relation (**sambandha-sāmānya**) is inherent in a specific relation with an object (**viśeṣa-niṣṭhatvāt**).

- **Elaboration on the Ṣaṣṭhī Śeṣaḥ Sūtra:**

  Ṭīkā: 'ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe' iti vidhānāt, ṣaṣṭhyā sambandhamātraṃ pratītamapi viśeṣākāṅkṣāyāṃ sakarmakakriyāsaṃnidhānāt karmatve paryavasyatītyarthaḥ |

  Though the **ṣaṣṭhī** (genitive case) primarily denotes only a general relation, when there is a need for a specific relation (**viśeṣa ākāṅkṣāyām**) and a transitive verb (**sakarmaka kriyā**, i.e., **jijñāsā**) is present, the meaning culminates in **karmatvam** (object-hood).

The Siddhānta's Strategy: Replying as if Unaware

अभिसन्धिमजानन्निवोत्तरमाह - एवमपीति । कर्मलाभेऽपि प्रत्यक्षं 'कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति' इति सूत्रेण जिज्ञासापदस्याकारप्रत्ययान्तत्वेन कृदन्तस्य योगे विहितं प्रथमापेक्षितं च कर्मत्वं त्यक्त्वा परोक्षमशाब्दं कल्पयत इत्यर्थः ।

एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमुत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात् ।

Ṭīkā: abhisandhim ajānan iva uttaramāha (As if unaware of the intention)**:**

- The Siddhāntin (Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra) gives a reply as if unaware of the opponent's hidden motive.

The Bhāṣya's Counter-Argument: evamapi pratyakṣaṃ brahmaṇaḥ karmatvamutsṛjya sāmānyadvāreṇa parokṣaṃ karmatvaṃ kalpayato vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ syāt |

- When **Brahman's** object-hood (**karmatvam**) is **Pratyakṣam** (directly evident/stated), abandoning it and imagining **Parokṣam Karmatvam** (indirect object-hood) through a general relation is a **Vyartha Prayāsa** (futile effort).

Technical Elaboration of Vyartha Prayāsa:

Ṭīkā: karmalābhe'pi pratyakṣaṃ 'kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti' iti sūtreṇa jijñāsāpadasyākārapratyayāntatvena kṛdantasya yoge vihitaṃ prathamāpekṣitaṃ ca karmatvaṃ tyaktvā parokṣamaśābdaṃ kalpayata ityarthaḥ |

Since the object (**karma**) is directly obtained (**pratyakṣam**) based on the sūtra **Kartṛkarmaṇoḥ Kṛti** (Pāṇini 2.3.65), and the word **Jijñāsā** is a **Kṛdanta** (verbal derivative) ending in the **A(A-kāra) Pratyaya** (suffix), which directly requires an object (**prathamāpekṣitam karmatvam**), imagining an **Aśābdam** (not stated in the text, i.e., indirect) object is futile.

The Opponent Reveals the Purpose

शेषवादी स्वाभिसन्धिमुद्घाटयति - **न व्यर्थ इति ।** शेषषष्ठ्यां ब्रह्मसम्बन्धिनी जिज्ञासा प्रतिज्ञाता भवति । तत्र यानि ब्रह्माश्रितानि लक्षणप्रमाणयुक्तिज्ञानसाधनफलानि तेषामपि विचारः प्रतिज्ञातो भवति । तज्जिज्ञासाया अपि ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थत्वेन ब्रह्मसम्बन्धित्वात् । कर्मणिषष्ठ्यां तु ब्रह्मकर्मक एव विचारः प्रतिज्ञातो भवतीत्यभिसन्धिना शेषषष्ठीत्युच्यते । अतो मत्प्रयासो न व्यर्थः ।

न व्यर्थः, ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचारप्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेत् न; प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानामर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात् ।

The opponent discloses the hidden intention:

Bhāṣya: na vyarthaḥ, brahmāśrita aśeṣavicārapratijñānārthatvāt iti cet

(The effort is) **not futile**, because the purpose is the **Pratijñāna** (declaration/topic statement) of **Aśeṣa Vicāra** (all comprehensive inquiry) that is **Brahmāśrita** (dependent on Brahma).

- **The Ṭīkā lists the objects of the comprehensive inquiry:**

Ṭīkā: śeṣaṣaṣṭhyāṃ brahmasambandhinī jijñāsā pratijñātā bhavati | tatra yāni brahmāśritāni lakṣaṇapramāṇayuktijñānasādhanaphalāni teṣāmapi vicāraḥ pratijñāto bhavati |

By taking **Śeṣa Ṣaṣṭhī**, the inquiry into all things associated with**Brahma** is brought forward. This includes the inquiry into **Lakṣaṇa** (definition/indicator), **Pramāṇa** (proof/shruti), **Yukti** (reasoning), **Jñāna** (shravanam/mananam etc./mahāvakya), **Sādhana** (vairāgya/tvam pada/tat pada), and **Phala** (result/fruit) - all of which are **Brahmāśrita**.

This is because the inquiry into these subordinates is also **Brahma-jñānārtha** (for the sake of the knowledge of Brahma).

If **Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī** is taken, only the inquiry whose object is **Brahma** (**Brahmakarmaka vicāraḥ**) would be declared. The opponent therefore asserts, **Mat-prayāso na vyarthaḥ** (My effort is not futile).

The Final Answer: Arthākṣiptatvam (Implication)

ब्रह्मतत्सम्बन्धिनां सर्वेषां विचारप्रतिज्ञानमर्थः फलं यस्य तत्त्वादित्यर्थः । त्वत्प्रयासस्येदं फलं न युक्तम् , सूत्रेण मुखतः प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणो विचारे प्रतिज्ञाते सति तदुपकरणानां विचारस्यार्थिकप्रतिज्ञाया उदितत्वादित्याह सिद्धान्ती - न प्रधानेति । सङ्गृहीतमर्थं सदृष्टान्तं व्याकरोति - ब्रह्म हीत्यादिना । 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व' इति मूलश्रुत्यनुसाराच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीत्याह - श्रुत्यनुगमाच्चेति । श्रुतिसूत्रयोरेकार्थत्वलाभाच्चेत्यर्थः ।

ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात्प्रधानम् । तस्मिन्प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि परिगृहीते, यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येवेति न पृथक्सूत्रयितव्यानि । यथा 'राजासौ गच्छति' इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति, तद्वत् । श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च । 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' (तै. उ. ३ । १ । १) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद्ब्रह्म' (तै. उ. ३ । १ । १) इति प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति । तच्च कर्मणिषष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेणानुगतं भवति । तस्माद्ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी ॥

The Siddhānta rejects the need for Śeṣa Ṣaṣṭhī:

Ṭīkā: tvatprayāsasyedaṃ phalaṃ na yuktam , sūtreṇa mukhataḥ pradhānasya brahmaṇo vicāre pratijñāte sati tadupakaraṇānāṃ vicārasyārthikapratijñāyā uditatvāt

The fruit (result) of your effort is **not proper** (**na yuktam**). Since the inquiry into the **Mukhyam Pradhānam Brahma** (the principal and primary Brahma) is directly stated (**śabdataḥ**) in the sūtra, the inquiry into its **Upakaraṇāni** (accessories/subordinates, like **lakṣaṇa** etc.) is **Ārthika Pratijñā** (declared by implication - **arthataḥ**).

The Collection Statement (Saṅgraha Vākya):

Bhāṣya: na; pradhānaparigrahe tadapekṣitānāmarthākṣiptatvāt |

No (need for Śeṣa Ṣaṣṭhī), because when the **Pradhāna** (principal item) is accepted, the items that are **Tad-apekṣitānām** (required by it) are **Arthākṣiptāḥ** (implied by the sense/meaning).

The Collection Statement explained with Illustration:

> **Bhāṣya: brahma hi jñānena āptum iṣṭatamatvāt pradhānam |**
>
> **Brahma** is the **Pradhāna** because it is the **Iṣṭatama** (most desired) object to be attained by **Jñāna** (knowledge).
>
> **Bhāṣya: tasminpradhāne jijñāsākarmaṇi parigṛhīte, yairjijñāsitairvinā brahma jijñāsitaṃ na bhavati, tānyarthākṣiptānyeveti na pṛthaksūtrayitavyāni |**
>
> When the principal (**Brahma**) is accepted as the object of inquiry, the subordinate things whose inquiry is **necessary** for the inquiry into **Brahma** to be fulfilled (i.e., **lakṣaṇa** etc.) are **Arthākṣiptāni** (implied) and **do not need to be separately stated** (**na pṛthak sūtrayitavyāni**).

Analogy:

> **Bhāṣya: yathā 'rājāsau gacchati' ityukte saparivārasya rājño gamanamuktaṃ bhavati, tadvat |**
>
> Just as when "The **Rājā** is going" is stated, the **Rājā's** journey with his entourage (**saparivārasya rājñaḥ gamanam**) is understood by implication.
>
> Similarly in order to fulfil inquiry into Brahman, inquiry into all subordinate items is implied.

- **Support from Śruti for Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī:**

> **Ṭīkā:'tadvijijñāsasva' iti mūlaśrutyanusārācca karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhītyāha**
>
> Following the **Mūla Śruti** (root scripture, e.g., the Taittirīya Upaniṣad's **Yato vā... Tad vijijñāsasva tad brahma**), **Karmaṇi Ṣaṣṭhī** is accepted. This alignment ensures that the **Śruti** and the **Sūtra** have **Eka-arthatva-lābha** (the same meaning).

Analysis of the Word Jijñāsā (Page 83)

जिज्ञासापदस्यावयवार्थमाह - ज्ञातुमिति । नन्वनवगते वस्तुनीच्छाया अदर्शनात्तस्या मूलं विषयज्ञानं वक्तव्यम् । ब्रह्मज्ञानं तु जिज्ञासायाः फलम् , तदेव मूलं कथमित्याशङ्क्याह - अवगतीति ।

ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म, फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः ।

Definition of Jijñāsā:

Bhāṣya: jñātumicchā jijñāsā | (Desire to know is jijñāsā.)

The Classic Objection:

Ṭīkā: nanvanavagate vastunīcchāyā adarśanāttasyā mūlaṃ viṣayajñānaṃ vaktavyam | brahmajñānaṃ tu jijñāsāyāḥ phalam , tadeva mūlaṃ katham?

Since desire (**icchā**) is not seen (**adarśanāt**) regarding a completely **Anavagata** (unknown) object, the **Mūlam** (root/cause) of desire must be some **Viṣaya-jñānam** (preliminary knowledge of the object). If **Brahma-jñānam** (complete knowledge) is the **Phalam** (fruit/result) of the inquiry, how can it be the **Mūlam** (cause) as well?

The Siddhānta's Resolution:

Bhāṣya: avagatiparyantaṃ jñānaṃ sanvācyāyā icchāyāḥ karma

The **Karma** (object) of the desire (**icchā**) denoted by the **San** suffix (in **jijñāsā**) is the **Jñānam** (knowledge) that extends **Avagati-Paryantam** (up to the point of complete, immediate, and certain realization, free from doubt). The desire is not for preliminary knowledge, but for the final, direct realization (**Aparokṣa Sākṣātkāra**).

The root is **Āpāta jñānam** (general/superficial knowledge), while the fruit is **Avagati paryantam jñānam** (knowledge culminating in direct realization).

The general knowledge comes from texts like the **Taittirīya Upaniṣad**:
Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti yat prayantyabhisaṃviśanti tadvijijñāsasva tadbrahmeti

- **Yataḥ (Ablative/Pañcamī):** Indicates Brahman is the Upādāna Kāraṇa (Material Cause) from which all beings are born.
- **Yena (Instrumental/Tṛtīyā):** Indicates the Nimitta Kāraṇa (Efficient Cause) for sustenance (sthiti). Once created, beings survive due to their own karma, but Brahman is the underlying efficient cause of that existence.
- **Yat prayantyabhisaṃviśanti:** Indicates the Laya Sthāna (Place of Dissolution).
    - Grammar Note: **Abhisaṃviśanti** is **Laṭ lakāra** (Present Tense).

Defining the Object of Inquiry (Karma and Phala)

आवरणनिवृत्तिरूपाभिव्यक्तिमच्चैतन्यमवगतिः पर्यन्तोऽवधिर्यस्याखण्डसाक्षात्कारवृत्तिज्ञानस्य तदेव जिज्ञासायाः कर्म, तदेव फलम् । मूलं त्वापातज्ञानमित्यधुना वक्ष्यत इति फलमूलज्ञानयोर्भेदान्न जिज्ञासानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । ननु गमनस्य ग्रामः कर्म, तत्प्राप्तिः फलमिति भेदात्कर्म एव फलमित्युक्तं तत्राह - फलेति । क्रियान्तरे तयोर्भेदेऽपि इच्छायाः फलविषयत्वात्कर्मैव फलमित्यर्थः ।

Bhāṣya defines the precise object of this desire.

avagatiparyantaṃ jñānaṃ sanvācyāyā icchāyāḥ karma (The object of the desire expressed by the suffix 'san' is knowledge that culminates in realization.)

1. Elucidation of Avagati (Realization)

Ṭīkā elaborates on the meaning of **Avagati**:

āvaraṇa nivṛttirūpa abhivyaktimat caitanyam avagatiḥ (Consciousness that is manifest upon the removal of the covering/ignorance.)

- **Process:** Even though **Caitanyam** (Consciousness) is ever-present, it is currently covered (āvṛta) by ignorance.
- **Avagati** refers to that Consciousness which shines forth explicitly when the veil (āvaraṇa) is removed.

2. Analyzing 'Paryantam' (Culmination/Limit)

- **Grammatical Analysis (Bahuvrīhi Samāsa): avagatiḥ paryanto'vadhir yasya saḥ avagatiparyantaḥ**.
- **Paryanta** means **Avadhi** (limit or boundary). The desire to know must continue until the frontier of realization is reached.
- **Nature of this Knowledge:** It is **Akhaṇḍa sākṣātkāra vṛtti jñānam** (Immediate, undivided mental modification taking the form of Brahman).
    - The inquiry should persist until the **Brahmākāra vṛtti** (thought wave in the form of Brahman) destroys the ignorance.

The Difference Between Root and Fruit

To answer the objection that "knowledge" cannot be both the cause and the result:

1. Mūlam (Root) vs. Phalam (Fruit)

- **Mūlam:** This is **Āpāta jñānam** (Superficial knowledge). It is knowledge mixed with doubt or hearing about the Truth without direct experience (parokṣa). It acts like a seed.
- **Phalam:** This is **Avagati** (Direct Realization). It is the result of the inquiry, like the fruit appearing on a tree after consistent watering and care.
    - **Analogy:** Just as one nurtures a seed until the fruit appears, one continues Śravaṇa (hearing) and Manana (reflection) until the **Akhaṇḍa sākṣātkāra vṛtti** arises.

2. Comparison with Action (Karma)

- **Example of Action: gamanasya grāmaḥ karma, tatprāptiḥ phalam**.
    - In the action of going, the **Karma** (object) is the Village (**Grāma**).
    - The **Phalam** (fruit) is the **Prāpti** (reaching/attainment) of the village.
    - Here, the object (village) and the fruit (reaching it) are distinct because the village is physically distant.
- **In Brahman Inquiry:** Bhāṣya states **Icchāyāḥ phala viṣayatvāt**.
    - Unlike the village, Brahman is already attained (being the Self). The "attainment" here is purely the removal of ignorance (attaining the attained).

- Therefore, the **Karma** (object) of the desire is Knowledge, and the **Phalam** (fruit) is **Avagati** (Realization).

Knowledge (Pramāṇa) vs. Realization (Phala)

ननु ज्ञानावगत्योरैक्याद्भेदोक्तिरयुक्तेत्यत आह - ज्ञानेनेति । ज्ञानं वृत्तिः अवगतिस्तत्फलमिति भेद इति भावः । अवगन्तुमभिव्यञ्जयितुम् । अवगतेः फलत्वं स्फुटयति - ब्रह्मेति । हिशब्दोक्तं हेतुमाह - निःशेषेति । बीजमविद्या आदिर्यस्यानर्थस्य तन्नाशकत्वादित्यर्थः ।

ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म । ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, निःशेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात् ।

A further objection arises: "Are Knowledge and Avagati not the same thing?"

1. Distinction in Function

Bhāṣya states: **Jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantum iṣṭam brahma**. (Brahman is desired to be known/realized through knowledge which acts as the means.)

- **Jñāna (as Means):** Here, "knowledge" refers to the **Vṛtti** (mental modification) generated by the **Pramāṇa** (scriptural evidence). This refers to the **Brahmākāra vṛtti**.
- **Avagati (as Result):** This is the **Phalam**—the manifestation of Consciousness resulting from that Vṛtti. The **Vṛtti** is the tool that removes ignorance. **Avagati** is the resulting liberation.

2. The Necessity of Avagati

Bhāṣya explains why **Avagati** is the result:

> **Brahmāvagatiḥ puruṣārthaḥ** (The realization of Brahman is the ultimate human goal.)

- **Reason: Niḥśeṣa saṃsāra bīja avidyā ādi anartha nibarhaṇāt**.
  - It completely removes the "seed of Samsara," which is **Avidyā** (Ignorance), the cause of subsequent suffering (**Anartha**).
  - **Nature of Avidyā:** It is **Anādi** (beginningless). Only knowledge can destroy this beginningless ignorance. Dharma, Artha, and Kāma cannot remove this root cause.

Mananam: Additional Notes by Bade Mahārāj Jī

अवगतेः फलत्वमिति - ननु अयुक्तम् एतद् पुरस्तात् अवगतिपर्यन्तस्य वृत्तिज्ञानस्येव तदेव फलमिति फलत्व अभिधानात् इति चेत् न, अवगतिपर्यन्त ज्ञानस्य फलत्वे तत् विशेषणस्य अवगतेरपि फलत्वात्| किञ्च पूर्वमिच्छाफलत्वं वृत्तेरुक्तमधुना तु वृत्तिफलत्वम् अवगतेः इति अविरोधः|

avagateḥ phalatvamiti - nanu ayuktam etad purastāt avagatiparyantasya vṛttijñānasyeva tadeva phalamiti phalatva abhidhānāt iti cet na, avagatiparyanta jñānasya phalatve tat viśeṣaṇasya avagaterapi phalatvāt| kiñca pūrvamicchāphalatvaṃ vṛtteruktamadhunā tu vṛttiphaltvam avagateḥ iti avirodhaḥ|

The Objection: Confusion Regarding the Fruit (Phalam)
A specific doubt is raised in the **Tippaṇī** (Commentary by "Bade Mahārāj Jī") regarding the definition of the fruit of inquiry.

The Objection (Nanu): Nanu ayuktam etat

- Previously, it was stated that **Avagati paryantam vṛtti jñānam** (Knowledge culminating in realization) is the fruit.
- The opponent argues: If knowledge (**Vṛtti Jñāna**) is the fruit, why is there now a distinction made between Knowledge and **Avagati**? Why not simply say that the **Vṛtti Jñāna** itself is the fruit?

The Resolution: Avagati as the Qualifier (Viśeṣaṇa)
The Siddhānta clarifies that there is no contradiction. The distinction relies on grammatical and logical analysis.

The Core Argument: Avagati paryanta jñānasya phalatve tad viśeṣaṇasya avagateḥ phalatvāt

- When the Bhāṣya states that "Knowledge ending in realization" is the fruit, the term **Avagati** (Realization) acts as the **Viśeṣaṇa** (Qualifier/Adjective) of that knowledge.
- Therefore, implicit in the statement is that **Avagati** itself is the core fruit.

Clarification of Terms:

- **Jñānam (Knowledge):** Refers to the **Brahmākāra Vṛtti** (mental modification in the form of Brahman).
- **Avagati (Realization):** Refers to the removal of the covering (ignorance) and the manifestation of Consciousness.
- **Conclusion:** The **Vṛtti** is the means, but it is the **Avagati** (the qualifier of that knowledge) that is the true desired result. As Bhāṣya mentions:

Avagantum iṣṭam brahma
(Brahman is desired to be known/realized [via Avagati].)

Elaboration: The Process from Vṛtti to Avagati
The text provides a deep psychological and experiential explanation of why **Vṛtti** is distinct from **Avagati**.

1. The Nature of Practice (Sajātīya Vṛtti)

- One engages in continuous contemplation (**Cintana**) generating thoughts such as:
  - "**Aham Brahmāsmi**" (I am Brahman).
  - "**Aham Akartā**" (I am a non-doer).
  - "**Jagat Upādāna**" (I am the material cause of the world).
  - "**Kūṭastha Akṣara**" (I am the immutable, imperishable Self).
- This is the practice of maintaining **Sajātīya Vṛtti** (a stream of similar thoughts pointing to the Truth).

2. The Obstacle (Vijātīya Vṛtti)

- While practicing, **Vijātīya Vṛttis** (dissimilar/opposing thoughts) continue to arise.
- **Examples of Knots (Granthis) and Obstacles:**
  - "My happiness comes from this object" (attachment).
  - "What will happen to my body?" (fear/attachment to body).
- **Partial Progress:** As one practices, some **Granthis** (knots of ignorance) begin to break. The conviction that happiness lies outside or that the body is the self begins to weaken.
- **The Persistence of Illusion:** However, the **Jagat Satyatva Buddhi** (the deep-seated intellect that the world is real) does not vanish completely just by having a thought.

3. The Final State (Avagati Paryantam)

- **Total Destruction of Ignorance:** The destruction of **Avidyā** is only possible when the **Brahmākāra Vṛtti** becomes:
  1. **Sthira** (Stable/Steady).
  2. **Paripakva** (Mature).
  3. **Pratibandha Rahita** (Free from obstructions/impediments).
- **Meaning of 'Avagati Paryantam':** The knowledge must be pursued until this state of unshakeable realization is reached. Mere intellectual understanding is not the end; the removal of the veil (**Avagati**) is the limit (**Paryanta**).

The Chain of Causality (Kārya-Kāraṇa Bhāva)
The **Tippaṇī** resolves the apparent contradiction regarding what is the "fruit" by establishing a causal chain.

Pūrvam icchā phalatvam vṛttau uktam adhunā tu vṛtti phalatvam avagatau iti avirodhaḥ

There is no contradiction (**Avirodha**) because the "fruit" depends on the level of analysis:

1. **Icchā (Desire) → Vṛtti (Knowledge/Study):**
    - Initially, the fruit of the desire to know is the engagement in the **Vṛtti** (study/contemplation).
    - Quote: **Icchā phalatvam vṛttau** (The fruit of desire is the Vṛtti).
2. **Vṛtti (Knowledge/Study) → Avagati (Realization):**
    - Once the **Vṛtti** is established, its fruit is **Avagati**.
    - Quote: **Vṛtti phalatvam avagatau** (The fruit of the Vṛtti is Realization).

Insight from Sureśvarācārya
Swamiji references **Sureśvarācārya** to describe the intensity of the required practice.

- **The Momentum of Vṛttis (Vega):**
    - Even if one does not actively try, the momentum of the **Brahmākāra Vṛttis** should be so strong that they flow automatically.
    - This is achieved through intense **Śravaṇa** (Hearing) and **Manana** (Reflection).
- **The Analogy of Identification:**
    - **Current State:** Just as we currently do not have to "try" or "make an effort" to think "**I am the body**" (it happens naturally and automatically),
    - **Goal State:** The thought "**I am Brahman**" should flow with the same natural spontaneity and effortlessness.
- **Conclusion:** Through this intense momentum, the **Vṛtti** culminates in **Avagati** (Realization), which is the ultimate fruit (**Phalam**).

Grammatical Nuances and Conclusion of Third Varṇaka (Page 84)

अवयवार्थमुक्त्वा सूत्रवाक्यार्थमाह - तस्मादिति । अत्र सन्प्रत्ययस्य विचारलक्षकत्वं तव्यप्रत्ययेन सूचयति । अथातशब्दाभ्यामधिकारिणः साधितत्त्वात्तेन ब्रह्मज्ञानाय विचारः कर्तव्य इत्यर्थः ॥

तस्माद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् ॥

1. The 'San' and 'Tavya' Suffixes

- **San Pratyaya:** Indicates desire. However, one cannot simply "command" a desire. Therefore, the suffix implies **Vicāra** (inquiry).
- **Tavya Pratyaya:** Found in phrases like **Draṣṭavyaḥ** or **Jijñāsitavyam**.
    - This suffix indicates that the inquiry (**vicāra**) has a target (**lakṣya**).
    - It implies a **Parisamkhyā Vidhi** (restrictive injunction): Inquiry should be directed only toward Brahman/Atman, not non-Self objects.

2. Conclusion of Third Varṇaka

- **Topic: Adhikārī Nirṇaya** (Determination of the Qualified Student).
- **Outcome:** Through the words **Atha** and **Ataḥ**, the qualifications (Sādhana Catuṣṭaya) and the qualified student have been established. Thus, the inquiry into Brahman is justified.

॥ इति तृतीयं वर्णकम् ॥

Here ends the Third Varnakam.

Introduction to Fourth Varṇaka: The Dilemma of Existence (Prasiddhi) (Page 85)

प्रथमवर्णके बन्धस्याध्यासत्वोक्त्या विषयादिप्रसिद्धावपि ब्रह्मप्रसिद्ध्यप्रसिद्ध्योर्विषयादिसम्भवासम्भवाभ्यां शास्त्रारम्भसन्देहे पूर्वपक्षमाह - **तत्पुनरिति । -** पुनःशब्दो वर्णकान्तरद्योतनार्थः । यदि वेदान्तविचारात्प्रागेव ब्रह्मज्ञानं तर्ह्यज्ञातत्वरूपविषयत्वं नास्ति, अज्ञानाभावेन तन्निवृत्तिरूपफलमपि नास्तीति न विचारयितव्यम् । अथाज्ञातं केनापि तर्हि तदुद्देशेन विचारः कर्तुं न शक्यते, अज्ञातस्योद्देशायोगात् ।

तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात् । यदि प्रसिद्धं न जिज्ञासितव्यम् । अथाप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति ।

The text now begins the Fourth Varṇaka.

The Pūrvapakṣa (Objection)

Bhāṣya: tatpunarbrahma prasiddham aprasiddhaṃ vā syāt |

Viṣaya: Is Brahman **Prasiddham** (Well-known) or **Aprasiddham** (Unknown)?

The opponent argues that the scripture should not commence because of a logical dilemma regarding the existence and knowledge of Brahman.

Scenario A: If Brahman is Known (Prasiddham) then absence of Subject (Viṣaya) and Result (Phala/Prayojana)

Ṭīkā: **yadi vedāntavicārāt prāgeva brahmajñānaṃ tarhi ajñātatvarūpaviṣayatvaṃ nāsti**

For something to be a subject of inquiry, it must be unknown. If **Brahma** is already known, it loses its status as a subject of inquiry.

- **Ajñātatva rūpa viṣayatvam nāsti**. (It cannot be the subject of inquiry because it is already known). If **Brahma** is known before the deliberation on Vedanta, then **Brahma** does not possess **ajñātatva-rūpa-viṣayatvam** (the nature of being a subject characterized by unknown-ness).
- **Conclusion:** A valid subject of inquiry must be unknown; if the unknown quality is absent, it is not a subject. Therefore, no effort is required for what is already known.

Ṭīkā: **ajñānābhāvena tannivṛttirūpaphalamapi nāstīti na vicārayitavyam**

If there is no ignorance regarding the subject, there can be no result derived from removing that ignorance.

- **Ajjñāna abhāvena tannivṛtti rūpa phalam api nāsti**. Due to the absence of ignorance (**ajñāna-abhāvena**), the fruit (**phala**) characterized by the removal of that ignorance (**tan-nivṛtti**) does not exist. Consequently, inquiry should not be undertaken (**na vicārayitavyam**).

Elaboration on the Nature of the Result (Phala):

- While the result (**phala**) is often described as the cessation of absolute sorrow and the attainment of supreme bliss, fundamentally, the purpose (**prayojana**) is **Avidyā-nivṛtti** (the removal of ignorance).
- If **Brahma** is already known (i.e., there is no **Avidyā** regarding **Brahma**), then the result of **Avidyā-nivṛtti** is impossible to achieve.

The Unity of Subject and Purpose: A crucial philosophical point is made regarding the non-difference between the Subject and the Purpose in the context of **Brahma**.

- The object that is the "Subject Matter" (**Viṣaya**) during the state of ignorance is the exact same object that becomes the "Purpose" (**Prayojana**) in the state of knowledge.
- **Key Principle:** The unknown subject is itself the known purpose.
- **Analogy (Svakaṇṭhābharaṇa / Kaṇṭha-cāmīkara-nyāya):**
    - Consider gold worn around one's own neck that is forgotten (unknown). In this state, the gold is the **Viṣaya** (subject to be found).
    - Once realized ("It is on my neck"), that same gold becomes the **Prayojana** (the attained goal).
    - Where the goal is attained purely through knowledge, the subject and purpose are identical.

Scenario B: If Brahman is Unknown (Aprasiddham) then absence of Result/Purpose (Phala/Prayojana)

Ṭīkā: **"ajñātam kenāpi tarhi taduddeśena vicāraḥ kartuṃ na śakyate"**
If **Brahma** is completely unknown to anyone, then it is impossible to conduct an inquiry directed toward It.

Ṭīkā: **"ajñātasya uddeśa-ayogāt"**
Inquiry cannot begin because one cannot target or aim at (**uddeśa**) something that is absolutely unknown (**ajñātasya**). If one has absolutely no knowledge of an entity, one cannot formulate the desire to inquire into it.

Summary of the Pūrvapakṣa (Objection)

The section establishes a logical deadlock to challenge the commencement of the **Brahma-Sūtra**:

1. **If Known:** No inquiry is needed (lack of Subject and Fruit).
2. **If Unknown:** No inquiry is possible (inability to target the subject).

Therefore, **Brahma-vicāra** (inquiry into Brahman) appears unjustified.

तथा च बुद्धावनारूढस्य विचारात्मकशास्त्रेण वेदान्तैश्च प्रतिपादनायोगात् । तत्प्रतिपाद्यत्वरूपः सम्बन्धो नास्तीति ज्ञानानुत्पत्तेः फलमपि नास्तीत्यनारभ्यं शास्त्रमित्यर्थः ॥

Ṭīkā: **tathā ca buddhau anārūḍhasya vicārātmaka śāstreṇa vedāntaiḥ ca pratipādana ayogāt | tat pratipādyatvarūpaḥ saṃbandho nāsti iti jñānānutpatteḥ phalam api nāsti iti anārabhyaṃ śāstram**

If **Brahman** has not ascended into the intellect (**Buddhi**) at all (is totally unknown), the **Vedānta** scriptures cannot expound upon it.

Consequence:

- There is no **Saṃbandha** (Relationship) of **Pratipādya-Pratipādaka** (The Expounded and the Expounder).
- Without this relationship, knowledge cannot arise (**Jñāna anutpatti**).
- Without knowledge, there is no Fruit (**Phalam nāsti**).
- Therefore, the Scripture should not be commenced (**anārabhyam śāstram**).

The Siddhānta: Establishment of General Knowledge

आपातप्रसिद्ध्या विषयादिलाभादारम्भणीयमिति सिद्धान्तयति - उच्यत इत्यादिना । प्रसिद्धं तावदित्यर्थः । अस्तित्वस्याप्रकृतत्वेनास्तिपदस्य प्रसिद्धिपरत्वात् । ननु केन मानेन ब्रह्मणः प्रसिद्धिः । न च 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति श्रुत्या सेति वाच्यम् ।

उच्यते — अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम् ।

The **Siddhānta** (Established View) refutes the objection by stating that **Brahman** is known in a general sense (**Āpāta Prasiddhi**) but unknown in its specific nature.

Bhāṣya: **asti tāvad brahma nitya śuddha buddha mukta svabhāvam sarvajñaṃ sarvaśakti samanvitam**

Brahman exists. Its nature is Eternal (**Nitya**), Pure (**Śuddha**), Awakened/Conscious (**Buddha**), and Free (**Mukta**). It is endowed with Omniscience (**Sarvajña**) and Omnipotence (**Sarvaśakti**).

This definition is not describing a distant entity but is pointing to "I" (the Self).

- **Upādhi (Limiting Adjunct):** Without any form of conditioning, I am **Nitya Śuddha**, etc. When associated with the **Upādhi** of **Māyā**, I am Omniscient and Omnipotent. If I am the **Nirguṇa** (Attributeless) **Brahman**, I must also be the substance of the **Saguṇa** (With attributes) **Brahman**.

Why use the word "Asti" (Exists)?

Ṭīkā: **astitvasya aprakṛtatvena asti padasya prasiddhi paratvāt**

The question was not about existence ("Does it exist?"), but about familiarity ("Is it known?"). Hence, the word **Asti** here is used to denote **Prasiddhi** (Fame/Familiarity).

Proof of Existence via Etymology (Vyutpatti) (Page 86)

ननु केन मानेन ब्रह्मणः प्रसिद्धिः । न च 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इति श्रुत्या सेति वाच्यम् । ब्रह्मपदस्य लोके सङ्गतिग्रहाभावेन तद्घटितवाक्यस्याबोधकत्वादित्याशङ्क्य ब्रह्मपदव्युत्पत्त्या प्रथमं तस्य निर्गुणस्य सगुणस्य च प्रसिद्धिरित्याह - **ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हीति ।** अस्यार्थः श्रुतौ सूत्रे च ब्रह्मपदस्य प्रयोगान्यथानुपपत्त्या कश्चिदर्थोऽस्तीति ज्ञायते, प्रमाणवाक्ये निरर्थकशब्दप्रयोगादर्शनात् । स चार्थो महत्वरूप इति व्याकरणान्निश्चीयते, 'बृहि वृद्धौ' इति स्मरणात् ।

ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते, बृंहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमात् ।

The opponent argues that quoting scripture like **satyam jñānam anantam brahma** is invalid if the word **Brahman** itself has no established meaning in the world (**Loke saṅgati graha abhāvena**). If the word is unknown, the sentence is meaningless (like a nonsense phrase).

To counter this, the **Bhāṣyakāra** establishes the meaning of **Brahman** through grammar and etymology before applying scriptural definition.

Bhāṣya: **brahma śabdasya hi vyutpādyamānasya nitya śuddhatvādayo arthāḥ pratīyante bṛṃhater dhātoḥ arthānugamāt**

Elaboration: When the word **Brahman** is derived, meanings like Eternal and Pure arise naturally because these meanings follow the root **Bṛh** (to grow/expand).

1. The Argument from Arthāpatti/Anyathānupapatti (Postulation)

Ṭīkā: **śrutau sūtre ca brahma padasya prayoga anyathā anupapattyā kaścit artho asti iti**

- **Logic:** The word **Brahman** is used in the **Śruti** (Vedas) and **Sūtras**.
- **Pramāṇa Vākya:** Authoritative scriptures do not use meaningless words (unlike a meaningless phrase like Jabagaḍaekoyana).
- **Conclusion:** Since the word is used in valid testimony, it must have a meaning. That meaning is confirmed by grammar.

2. The Grammatical Derivation

- **Root: Bṛhi Vṛddhau** (To grow/increase).
- **Suffix: Manin** (Referencing the formula sarva dhātubhyo manin).
- **Meaning: Mahatva** (Greatness).

The Nature of Greatness (Mahatva)

सा च वृद्धिर्निरवधिकमहत्वमिति सङ्कोचकाभावात् , श्रुतावनन्तपदेन सह प्रयोगाच्च ज्ञायते । निरवधिकमहत्वं चान्तवत्त्वादिदोषवत्त्वे सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणहीनत्वे च न सम्भवति, लोके गुणहीनदोषवतोरल्पत्वप्रसिद्धेः ।

The text distinguishes between relative greatness and absolute greatness.

Ṭīkā: **sā ca vṛddhiḥ niravadhika mahatvam iti saṅkocaka abhāvat**

- **Relative Greatness (Sāvadhika):** In the world, "greatness" is relative (e.g., a "large" fruit vs. a "large" mountain). It has a limit (**Avadhi**) and a constricting factor (**Saṅkocaka**).
- **Absolute Greatness (Niravadhika):** The greatness of **Brahman** has no limit. There is no constricting factor.

Conditions for Absolute Greatness:

1. **Freedom from Defects:** It cannot be **Antavat** (having an end/finite).
2. **Possession of All Attributes:** It cannot lack **Sarvajñatva** (omniscience).
    - **Reason:** Anything that is defective or lacks knowledge is established in the world as **Alpa** (small/limited).
    - Therefore, **Brahman** implies **Niravadhika Mahatva** (Limitless Greatness).

Detailed Definitions of Attributes of Brahman

अतो बृंहणाद्ब्रह्मेति व्युत्पत्त्या देशकालवस्तुतः परिच्छेदाभावरूपं नित्यत्वं प्रतीयते । अविद्यादिदोषशून्यत्वं शुद्धत्वम् । जाड्यराहित्यं बुद्धत्वम् । बन्धकालेऽपि स्वतोबन्धाभावो मुक्तत्वं च प्रतीयते । एवं सकलदोषशून्यं निर्गुणं प्रसिद्धम् । तथा सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणकं च तत्पदवाच्यं प्रसिद्धम् ।

Based on the etymology (**Vyutpatti**), the specific attributes of **Brahman** are derived.

The text defines the four key terms by negating the three types of limitations (**Pariccheda**):

1. Nityatvam (Eternality)

Ṭīkā: **ato bṛṃhaṇāt brahma iti vyutpattyā deśa kāla vastutaḥ paricchedābhāvarūpam nityatvam pratīyate**

Defined as the absence of limitation by **Deśa** (Space), **Kāla** (Time), and **Vastu** (Object).

- **Limitation by Time: Prāgabhāva** (prior non-existence) and **Pradhvaṃsābhāva** (posterior non-existence).
- **Limitation by Object: Anyonyābhāva** (mutual non-existence; distinction).
- **Limitation by Space: Atyantābhāva** (absolute non-existence in a specific locus).
- **Brahman** is free from all three, hence **Nitya**.

2. Śuddhatvam (Purity)

Ṭīkā: **avidyādi doṣa śūnyatvam**

- Freedom from defects starting with **Avidyā** (Ignorance).

3. Buddhatvam (Consciousness)

Ṭīkā: **jāḍya rāhityam buddhatvam**

- Freedom from **Jāḍya** (inertness); being of the nature of pure Consciousness.

4. Muktatvam (Freedom)

Ṭīkā: **bandha kāle satyapi bandhābhāva rūpam muktatvam ca pratīyate**

- **Elaboration:** Even during the time of perceived bondage (**Bandha kāle**), one is actually free. Bondage is false (**Mithyā**); the intrinsic nature (**Svabhāva**) is freedom.

Why Inquiry (Jijñāsā) is Still Necessary

ज्ञेयस्य कार्यस्य वा परिशेषेऽल्पत्वप्रसङ्गेन सर्वज्ञत्वस्य सर्वकार्यशक्तिमत्त्वस्य चालाभादिति । एवं तत्पदात्प्रसिद्धेरप्रमाणत्वेनापातत्वादज्ञानानिवर्तकत्वाज्जिज्ञासोपपत्तिरित्युक्त्वा त्वम्पदार्थात्मनापि ब्रह्मणः प्रसिद्ध्या तदुपपत्तिरत्याह - **सर्वस्येति ।**

सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः ।

If **Brahman** is known as "Absolute Greatness" and "Omniscient," why is inquiry needed?

1. Rejection of Objective Knowledge

Ṭīkā: **jñeyasya kāryasya vā pariśeṣe alpatva prasaṅgena sarvajñatvasya sarvakārya śaktimatvasya ca alābhāt**

- Anything that is an object of knowledge (**Jñeya**) or an effect (**Kārya**) is limited (**Alpa**), mortal (**Martya**), and perishable.
- Therefore, **Brahman** cannot be merely an object of intellect, or it would lose its status of Omnipotence and Greatness.

2. Status of Current Knowledge (Āpāta Jñāna)

Ṭīkā: **tat padāt prasiddheḥ aprāmāṇatvena āpātatvāt ajñāna anivartakatvāt jijñāsā upapattiḥ**

- The general knowledge we have is **Apramā** (non-definitive/invalid in a technical sense).
- **Why?** It is generated only by the word (**Pada mātra janya**), not by the valid sentence/logic (**Vākya**).
- **Effect:** This "Apparent Knowledge" (**Āpāta Jñāna**) does not remove ignorance (**Ajñāna anivartaka**).
- **Conclusion:** Since ignorance persists, the inquiry (**Jijñāsā**) is valid and necessary.

Identification of Brahman with the Self (Ātmā)

The final proof of **Brahman's** familiarity is its identity with the Self.

Bhāṣya: **sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstitva prasiddhiḥ**

Ṭīkā: **sarvasya lokasya yo ayam ātmā tad abhedāt brahmaṇaḥ prasiddhiḥ**

- The **Ātmā** (Self) of the entire world is **Brahman**. Since everyone knows "I am" (the Self is known), **Brahman** is technically known.
- **The Error:** We know the Self as the Ego/Body (**Ghaṭa** - pot concept), missing the underlying Reality (**Mṛttikā** - clay concept). The word "I" ultimately refers to **Brahman**, but due to attachment to name and form, we stop at the limited ego.
- **Brahman** is known by the term **Tat** (That). One might ask if **Brahman** is known by the term **Tvam** (You). The text clarifies it is also known as the **Tvam-padārtha** (the meaning of "You"). It is the Self of all worlds/beings.

Mananam: Additional Notes by Bade Mahārāj Jī

अप्रमाणत्वेनेति - अप्रमात्वेनेत्यर्थः । तत्त्वंच तस्याः पदमात्रजन्यत्वात्। आकाङ्क्षादिमद्वाक्यं हि प्रमाणं न पदमात्रमितिभावः। यद्वा अविचारितादेव पदाज्जातायास्तस्या न प्रमात्वमिति।वस्तुतस्त्वप्रमाणत्वेनेत्यस्याऽनिश्चयात्मकत्वेनेत्यर्थः।

apramāṇatveneti - apramātvenetyarthaḥ। | tattvaṃ ca tasyāḥ padamātrajanyatvāt।ākāṅkṣādimadvākyaṃ hi pramāṇaṃ na padamātramitibhāvaḥ।yadvā avicāritādeva padājjtāyāstasyā na pramātvamiti।vastutastvapramāṇatvenetyasyā'niścyātmakatvenetyarthaḥ।

The following points elucidate the specific gloss (**Ṭīkā**) regarding the term **apramāṇatvam** and why knowledge arising merely from a word, without the support of a sentence structure or inquiry, is considered invalid or insufficient to remove ignorance.

1. Definition and Cause of Invalidity

The discussion begins by defining the specific term found in the **Ṭīkā**.

- **Synonym:** The meaning of **apramāṇatvam** is equated to **apramātvam** (the state of being non-knowledge or invalid knowledge).
- **The Cause:** The reason for this invalidity is **padamātra-janyatvāt**—because the knowledge is generated solely by the word (**pada**) itself.
- **The Logic:** Even if the entity (**tat**) being described is well-known or established, the knowledge remains invalid if it relies strictly on the word alone.

2. The Process of Valid Verbal Testimony (Śabda Pramāṇa)

For knowledge to be considered valid proof (**pramāṇa**), it must traverse a specific cognitive sequence. Knowledge stopped at the "word" level is insufficient.

- **The Sequence of Understanding:**
    1. **Pada** (The Word/Term)
    2. **Padārtha** (The meaning of the word)
    3. **Vākyārtha** (The meaning of the sentence)

- **The Deficit:** If one possesses knowledge only of the **pada** (word) but has not integrated it into **padārtha** and finally **vākyārtha**, the necessary operation of the means of knowledge (**pramāṇa-vyāpāra**) has not occurred.
- **Result:** Until this full sequence is complete, the knowledge remains **apramāṇatvam** (invalid) or **āpātataḥ** (superficial/apparent).

3. Requisites of a Valid Sentence

The text clarifies that a word alone cannot be evidence; only a qualified sentence constitutes valid evidence.

- Indeed, a sentence endowed with expectancy (**ākāṅkṣā**), etc., is the evidence, not merely the word.
- **The Four Essential Requirements:** For **Śabda Pramāṇa** (verbal testimony) to be effective, four specific factors must combine to generate **vākyārtha** (sentence meaning):
    1. **Ākāṅkṣā** (Expectancy/Mutual requirement of words)
    2. **Yogyatā** (Competency/Logical compatibility)
    3. **Sannidhi** (Proximity/Contiguity in time)
    4. **Tātparya-jñānam** (Knowledge of the intention/purport)

Without the operation of these four factors, knowledge derived from a mere word is incapable of destroying ignorance (**ajñāna-nivṛtti**).

4. The Necessity of Inquiry (Vicāra)

An alternative explanation focuses on the lack of deliberation or inquiry.

- **Meaning:** Alternatively, knowledge arising from a word that is **avicārita** (un-inquired or undeliberated upon) constitutes **apramā** (non-valid knowledge).
- **Context of Brahma Sutra:** This highlights the necessity of the aphorism athA **ato brahma jijñāsā** (Then therefore the inquiry into Brahman).
- **Role of Vicāra:** Mere hearing is insufficient. In any subject, but specifically regarding **Brahman**, if there is no **vicāra** (deliberation/inquiry), there can be no removal of ignorance. One must engage in deep contemplation ("ghanghor vicāra") of the **Śāstra**.

5. The Ultimate Meaning: Uncertainty (Aniścaya)

The final and most substantial definition provided by the **Ṭīkā** (specifically attributed to the "Bade Maharaj Ji's" commentary) refines the understanding of **apramāṇatvam**.

- **Meaning: Apramāṇatvam** here essentially means **aniścayātmakam** (indecisive or lacking certainty).
- **Explanation:**
    - Even if one has heard the word, if there is no conviction (**niścaya**) regarding the nature of reality (e.g., "I am **Brahman**" or "This is the nature of **Brahman**"), the knowledge is not valid.
    - Even indirect knowledge (**parokṣa jñāna**) requires a level of certainty.

Essence: As long as the knowledge remains **aniścayātmaka** (uncertain/doubtful), it cannot

be termed as **pramāṇa-jñāna** (valid authoritative knowledge).

The Nature of Self-Evidence:

अहमस्मीति न प्रत्येतीति न, किन्तु प्रत्येत्येव । सैव सच्चिदात्मनः प्रसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ।

सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न 'नाहमस्मि' इति ।

Objection: How exactly is the **Ātman** known?

- **Response:** Everyone experiences their own existence. The knowledge "I am" is universal. No one ever experiences "I am not" (nāham asmi). Even if one does not verbally articulate it, the experience is continuous.
- **Ṭīkā: "Aham asmi iti na pratyeti iti na, kintu pratyeti eva."** It is not that one does not experience "I am"; rather, one definitely experiences it. This knowledge of the **Ātman** is as **Sat-cid-rūpa** (Existence and Consciousness).

Refutation of Śūnyavāda (Nihilism) (Page 88)

आत्मनः कुतः सत्तेति शून्यमतमाशङ्क्याह - **यदि हीति ।** आत्मनः शून्यस्य प्रतीतौ अहं नास्मीति लोको जानीयात् । लोकस्तु अहमस्मीति जानाति तस्मादात्मनोऽस्तित्वप्रसिद्धिरित्यर्थः ।

यदि हि नात्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात् , सर्वो लोकः 'नाहमस्मि' इति प्रतीयात् ।

The text addresses the skeptical view that the Self might be a void (Śūnya).

- **Objection:** Some may argue there is no "existence" (Sattā) of the **Ātman**, claiming it is void.
- **Rebuttal:**
  - **Ṭīkā: "Kutaḥ sattā iti śūnya matam āśaṅkya āha"**
  - **Bhāṣya: "Yadi hi na ātma astitva prasiddhiḥ syāt sarvo loko nāham asmi iti pratīyāt."**
  - **Explanation:** If the existence of the **Ātman** were not established, everyone would perceive themselves as "I am not" (nāham asmi), similar to perceiving "The pot is not" (ghaṭo nāsti). However, the perception is always "I am" (aham asmi).
  - **Ṭīkā: "ātmanaḥ śūnyasya pratītau satyam aham nāsmi iti lokaḥ jānīyāt... lokastu aham asmīti jānāti tasmāt ātmano astitva prasiddhiḥ."**
  - **Elaboration:** If the **Ātman** were void, people would know "I do not exist." But since people know "I am," the existence of the **Ātman** is known.
- **Caveat:** While the existence of **Ātman** is known, this general knowledge alone is insufficient to remove the covering of ignorance (**Avidyā**).

The Identity of Ātman and Brahman

आत्मप्रसिद्धावपि ब्रह्मणः किमायातं तत्राह - **आत्मा चेति ।** 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतेरिति भावः ।
आत्मा च ब्रह्म ।

Question: The **Ātman** is known, but what does this have to do with **Brahman**?

The Resolution: There is no difference between the two.

- **Ṭīkā: "'Ayam ātmā brahma' ityādi śruteḥ iti bhāvaḥ."**
- **Explanation:** Based on **Śruti** texts like the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad ("Ayam ātmā brahma") and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the Self is **Brahman**. It is not two separate entities (Self and God) that need to be united through practice. It is one Reality with two names based on conditioning (**Upādhi**):
    - Conditioned by **Pañcakośa** (Five Sheaths) = **Ātman**.
    - Conditioned by **Jagat-kāraṇatva** (Cause of the Universe) = **Brahman**.

Flaw shown by Opponent if Brahman is Known

प्रसिद्धिपक्षोक्तं दोषं पूर्वपक्षेण स्मारयति - **यदीति ।** अज्ञातत्वाभावेन विषयाद्यभावादविचार्यत्वं प्राप्तमित्यर्थः । यथा इदं रजतमिति वस्तुतः शुक्तिप्रसिद्धिस्तद्वत् अहमस्मीति सत्त्वचैतन्यरूपत्वसामान्येन वस्तुतो ब्रह्मणः प्रसिद्धिः, नेयं पूर्णानन्दब्रह्मत्वरूपविशेषगोचरा, वादिनां विवादाभावप्रसङ्गात् । न हि शुक्तित्वविशेषदर्शने सति रजतं रङ्गमन्यद्वेति विप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति । अतो विप्रतिपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धावपि विशेषस्याज्ञातत्वाद्विषयादिसिद्धिरिति सिद्धान्तयति - **न इत्यादिना ।**

यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम्; न । तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः ।

A logical objection is raised regarding the necessity of inquiry (**Jijñāsā**) if **Brahman** is already known.

- **The Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's View):**
    - **Quote: "yadi tarhi loke brahma ātmatvena prasiddham asti tato jñātameva iti ajijñāsyatvam punarāpannam."**
    - **Argument:** If **Brahman** is already known as the Self, it is a known object (jñāta). Therefore, it cannot be a subject of inquiry (ajijñāsyatvam). Inquiry is only for the unknown (ajñāta). If there is no "unknown-ness," there is no subject matter (Viṣaya), and consequently no purpose (Prayojana).
- **The Siddhānta (Solution): General vs. Specific Knowledge:**
    - **The Difference: Brahman** is known generally (Sāmānya) but unknown specifically (Viśeṣa).
    - **Quote: "vastutaḥ śukti prasiddhiḥ tadvat aham asmi iti sattva caitanya rūpatva sāmānyena vastuto brahmaṇaḥ prasiddhiḥ... neyam pūrṇānanda-brahmatva-rūpa-viśeṣa-gocarā, vādināṃ vivādābhāvaprasaṅgāt | "**
    - **Explanation:**
        - **Known (Sāmānya):** We know "I am" (**Sat**) and "I am conscious" (**Cit**).

        - **Unknown (Viśeṣa):** We do not know ourselves as **Pūrṇānanda** (Infinite Bliss/Limitless Brahman).
    - **Analogy:** Just as one sees a "this" in front of them (general knowledge) but mistakes the Mother-of-Pearl (Śukti) for silver (Rajat), we know that the Self exists but mistake its nature.
    - If the specific nature of **Brahman** as Fullness/Bliss was known, there would be no disagreement among schools of thought.
    - **Analogy:** If the specific nature of the rope (rajju) was known, one would not mistake it for a snake, a stick, or a water stream. Similarly, because the specific nature of **Ātman** is not realized, various misconceptions arise
    - **Bhāṣya: "Na; tad viśeṣam prati vipratipatteḥ"** The presence of conflicting views (Vipratipatti) regarding the specific nature confirms that inquiry is necessary. The object is not "non-existent"; it is simply not fully understood.

The Hierarchy of Misconceptions (The Views of Various Schools) (Page 89)

सामान्यविशेषभावः स्वात्मनि सच्चित्पूर्णादिपदवाच्यभेदात्कल्पित इति मन्तव्यम् । तत्र स्थूलसूक्ष्मक्रमेण विप्रतिपत्तीरुपन्यस्यति - **देहमात्रमित्यादिना ।** शास्त्रज्ञानशून्याः प्राकृताः । वेदबाह्यमतान्युक्त्वा तार्किकादिमतमाह - **अस्तीति ।** साङ्ख्यमतमाह - **भोक्तेति ।** किमात्मा देहादिरूपः उत तद्भिन्न इति विप्रतिपत्तिकोटित्वेन देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिशून्यान्युक्त्वा तद्भिन्नोऽपि कर्तृत्वादिमान्न वेति विप्रतिपत्तिकोटित्वेन तार्किकसाङ्ख्यपक्षावुपन्यस्याकर्तापीश्वराद्भिन्नो न वेति विवादकोटित्वेन योगिमतमाह - **अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वर इति ।** निरतिशयत्वं गृहीत्वा ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञत्वादिसम्पन्न इति योगिनो वदन्ति ।

देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः । इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे । मन इत्यन्ये । विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके । शून्यमित्यपरे । अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्यपरे । भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्तेत्येके । अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित् । आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे ।

The text details the specific conflicting views (Vipratipatti) regarding the **Ātman**, ranging from gross to subtle errors. These are described as "imagined differences" (kalpita bheda).

A. Materialist Views (Lokāyatika / Cārvāka):

1. **The Body as Self:**
    - **Bhāṣya: "deha mātram caitanyaviśiṣṭam ātmā iti prākṛtāḥ janāḥ lokāyatikāśca pratipannāḥ"**
    - **View:** The physical body, endowed with consciousness, is the Self.
    - **Logic:** People identify with the body (e.g., "I am here," "I am burnt").
2. **The Senses as Self:**
    - **Bhāṣya: "indriyāṇyeva cetanānyātmā iti apare."**
    - **View:** The senses are the conscious Self.
    - **Logic:** Identification through function (e.g., "I am seeing," "I am hearing").
3. **The Mind as Self:**
    - **Bhāṣya: "Mana iti anye."**
    - **View:** The mind is the Self.

B. Buddhist Views:

मुख्यो माध्यमिको विवर्तमखिलं शून्यस्य मेने जगत्
योगाचारमते तु सन्ति मतयस्तासां विवर्तोऽखिलः ।
अर्थोऽस्तिक्षणिकस्त्वसावनुमितो बुद्ध्यति सौत्रान्तिकः
प्रत्यक्षं क्षणभङ्गुरं च सकलं वैभाषिको भाषते ॥

The principal Madhyamika holds that the entire universe is a mere vivarta (appearance) of Śūnya (Emptiness). But in the Yogācāra doctrine, there are various viewpoints, and the whole world is the vivarta (manifestation) of those (i.e., of consciousness). The Sautrāntika asserts that external objects are unreal and momentary, and are only inferred through the mind. The Vaibhāṣika, however, declares that everything is directly perceived and perishes every moment (momentarily).

1. **Momentary Consciousness (Kṣaṇika Vijñānavāda / Yogācāra):**
   Bhāṣya: "Vijñānamātram kṣaṇikam ityeke."
   View: The Self is the intellectual sheath (**vijñānamaya kosha)** endowed with consciousness alone.This consciousness is momentary (kṣaṇika). The world is merely an appearance in this momentary consciousness.
2. **The Void (Mādhyamika / Śūnyavāda):**
   Bhāṣya: "Śūnyam iti apare."
   View: The ultimate reality is Void or Emptiness.

C. Vedic/Logical Schools (Tārkika - Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā): The Transmigrating Entity:
Bhāṣya: "asti dehādi vyatirikta saṃsārī kartā bhoktā iti apare"
View: The **Ātman** is distinct from the body (dehādi vyatirikta). However, it is a transmigrating entity (Samsārī), a doer (Kartā), and an enjoyer (Bhoktā).

D. Sāṅkhya School: The Enjoyer but Non-Doer:
Bhāṣya: "Bhoktā eva kevalam na kartā ityeke."
View: The **Ātman** (Purusha) is solely an enjoyer/witness (Bhoktā) but not a doer. Doership belongs to **Prakṛti/Pradhāna**.

E. Yoga School (Patañjali): The Distinct Entity and God:
Bhāṣya: "Asti tad vyatirikta īśvara sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiriti kecit."
View: The individual soul is a non-doer but an enjoyer. However, they posit a distinct **Īśvara** (God) who is separate from the individual soul.
Nature of Īśvara: Omniscient (Sarvajña), Omnipotent (Sarvaśakti), and untouched by afflictions (citing Yoga Sutras: kleśa karma vipāka...).

Maharṣi Patañjali speaks about **Īśvara** in a group of important aphorisms in **Samādhi Pāda (Chapter 1)** :

ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा ॥१.२३॥
īśvara-praṇidhānād vā
“Or (samādhi can be attained) by devotion and surrender to Īśvara.”

क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ॥१.२४॥
kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvaraḥ
“Īśvara is a special Puruṣa, untouched by obstacles (kleśas), actions (karma), their results, and latent impressions.”

तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबीजम् ॥१.२५॥
tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajña-bījam
“In Him lies the unsurpassed seed of all knowledge.”

पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्छेदात् ॥१.२६॥
pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālena-anavacchedāt
“Being unlimited by time, He is the Guru even of the ancients.”

तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः ॥१.२७॥
tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ
“His (Īśvara’s) designation is the sacred syllable Oṁ.”

The Siddhānta of Vedānta

भेदकोटिमुक्त्वा सिद्धान्तकोटिमाह - **आत्मा स भोक्तुरिति ।** भोक्तुर्जीवस्याकर्तुः साक्षिणः स ईश्वर आत्मास्वरूपमिति वेदान्तिनो वदन्तीत्यर्थः । विप्रतिपत्तीरुपसंहरति - **एवं बहवः इति ।** विप्रतिपत्तीनां प्रपञ्चो निरासश्च विवरणोपन्यासेन दर्शितः सुखबोधायेतीहोपरम्यते ।

आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे । एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः ।

The Vedāntic view reconciles the positions of the other orthodox schools and defines its own position with respect to these.

1. Elucidation in the Bhāṣya and Ṭīkā

Ṭīkā Introduction: The differences (**Bheda Koṭim**) are first presented, followed by the definitive statement of the ultimate principle (**Siddhānta Koṭim āha**).

Bhāṣya: **Ātmā sa bhoktuḥ iti apare** (Others say: That God - Īśvara is the Self of the experiencer - Jīva).

- **Ṭīkā** Clarification of the meaning: **Bhoktuḥ jīvasya akartuḥ sākṣiṇaḥ sa īśvaraḥ ātmā svarūpam iti vedāntino vadanti:** Of the experiencer (Jīva), who is the non-doer (as per Sāṅkhya) and the witness (**Drashtā**/**Sākṣī**, as per Yoga & Vedānta), that very **Īśvara** (accepted by Yoga as separate) is the **Ātman** (true nature/Self), so say the Vedantins.

- **Vedānta Conclusion:** The **Īśvara** accepted by the Yoga school is the essential, private nature (**svarūpam**) of the Jīva (experiencer) who is in reality the **akartā** (non-doer) and **sākṣī** (witness).
    - The **Ātman** is truly **akartā** (non-doer) and **abhoktā** (non-experiencer) in its own right, being identical with **Īśvara Svarūpa**.
    - This **svarūpa** is defined as **Nitya śuddha buddha mukta svabhāvam sarvajñam sarvaśakti samanvitam** (eternally pure, conscious, free by nature, endowed with omniscience and omnipotence).
        - **Sarvajñatva** and **Sarvaśaktitva** are qualifications that pertain to the **Ātman** when associated with the limiting adjunct (**upādhi**).
        - The actual unconditioned (**nirupādhika**) nature is **Nitya śuddha buddha mukta**.

2. Concluding the Discrepant Views

- **Bhāṣya: Evaṃ bahavo vipratipannā yukti vākya tad ābhāsa samāśrayāḥ santaḥ**: Thus, many people, relying on reasoning, Vedic statements, and their fallacious counterparts, hold diverse conflicting views.
- **Ṭīkā: vipratipattīnām prapañco nirāsaśca vivaraṇopanyāsena darśitāḥ sukhabodhāya iti iha uparamyate:** The detailed exposition (**prapañca**) and refutation (**nirāsa**) of these conflicting views are presented in/by the **Vivaraṇa** (a major commentary on the **Pañcapādikā**), for easy comprehension (**sukhabodhāya**). Therefore, further elaboration is ceased here (**iha uparamyate**).

The Use of Reasoning (Yukti) and Scriptural Texts (Śruti)

तत्र युक्तिवाक्याश्रयः सिद्धान्तिनः जीवो ब्रह्मैव आत्मत्वात् , ब्रह्मवत् इत्यादि युक्तेः, ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इत्यादिश्रुतेश्चाबाधितायाः सत्त्वात् ।

Type of Proof	Statement	Explanation
Yukti (Inference)	**Jīvo Brahmaiva Ātmatvāt Brahmavat** (The Jīva is verily Brahman, because it is the Self, like Brahman).	The **sādhya** (thing to be proved) is Brahmatva; the **hetu** (reason) is **Ātmatvam**; and the **dṛṣṭānta** (example) is Brahman.
Alternate Yukti	**Ātmā Brahma saccidānandarūpatvāt vyatirekeṇa ghaṭavat** (The Ātman is Brahman because it has the nature of existence, consciousness, and bliss, unlike a pot).	This is based on the proof: **Aham asmi sadā bhāmi kadācit nāham apriyaḥ** (I exist, I am conscious, and I am never disliked by myself). Being supremely loved (**priya**), the Self must be of the nature of **Ānanda** (Bliss).
Śruti	**Tat tvam asi** (That thou art); **Ayam ātmā Brahma** (This Self is Brahman).	These are **abādhita** (unsublated) scriptural statements, establishing the identity.

Opponent's Fallacious Proofs (Yukti Ābhāsa) and Scriptural Quotations (Vākya Ābhāsa)

अन्ये तु देहादिरात्मा, अहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात् , व्यतिरेकेण घटादिवदित्यादियुक्त्याभासम् , 'स वा एष पुरुषोन्नरसमयः' इन्द्रियसंवादे 'चक्षुरादयस्ते ह वाचमूचुः' 'मन उवाच', 'योऽयं विज्ञानमयः', 'असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्', 'कर्ता बोद्धा', 'अनश्नन्नन्यः', 'आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति' इति वाक्याभासं चाश्रिता इति विभागः । देहादिरनात्मा, भौतिकत्वात् , दृश्यत्वात् इत्यादिन्यायैः, 'आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्' इत्यादिसूत्रैश्चाभासत्वं वक्ष्यते ।

The opponents employ seemingly valid proofs, which Vedānta dismisses as fallacies (**ābhāsa**).

Opponent's View	Alleged Proof/Fallacy (Yukti Ābhāsa)	Alleged Scriptural Quote (Vākya Ābhāsa)
Dehātma (Body is Self)	**Dehādir ātmā ahampra tyayagocaratvāt vyatirekeṇa ghaṭādivat** (The body is the Self because it is the object of the 'I' notion, unlike a pot).	**Sa vā eṣa puruṣo annarasamayaḥ** (That Self is the being consisting of the essence of food - Taittirīya Upaniṣad).
Indriyātma (Senses are Self)	Senses engage in conversation/quarrel **(Indriya saṃvāde...)**, implying sentience.	**Indriya saṃvāde cakṣurādayaḥ te ha vācam ucuḥ** (Brihadāranyaka Upaniṣad)
Manātma (Mind is Self)	The mind is shown to speak.	**Mana uvāca** (Brihadāranyaka Upaniṣad)
Kṣaṇika Vijñāna	Consciousness is the Self.	**Yo'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu** (Brihadāranyaka Upaniṣad)
Śūnyavāda	The initial state was non-existent.	**Asad eva idam agra āsīt** (Non-existence alone was this in the beginning - Chāndogya/Taittirīya Upaniṣad).
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika	The Self is an agent/knower.	**Kartā boddhā** (Praśna Upaniṣad)
Sāṅkhya/Yoga	One experiences, the other watches, meaning Jīva and Īśvara.	**Anaśnan anyo'bhicākaśīti** (One not eating, merely watches - referring to Īśvara - Mundaka Upaniṣad).
Īśvaravāda	God controls from within.	**Ātmānam antaro yamayati** (He controls the self from within).

Vedāntic Refutation: All these quotes are taken out of context, lacking the true purport (**tātparya**) of the entire scripture. Therefore, they are **vākya-ābhāsa** (fallacious statements) and the arguments based on them are **sūtra-ābhāsa** (fallacious conclusions).

The Danger of Non-Inquiry (Page 92)

ननु सन्तु विप्रतिपत्तयस्तथापि यस्य यन्मते श्रद्धा तदाश्रयणात्तस्य स्वार्थः सेत्स्यति किं ब्रह्मविचारारम्भेणेत्यत आह - **तत्राविचार्येति ।** ब्रह्मात्मैक्यविज्ञानादेव मुक्तिरिति वस्तुगतिः । मतान्तराश्रयणे तदभावान्मोक्षसिद्धिः ।

तत्राविचार्य यत्किञ्चित्प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात्प्रतिहन्येत, अनर्थं चेयात् ।

If conflicting views exist, why must one inquire? Why not simply allow everyone to follow their faith?

Opponent's View: nanu santu vipratipattayaḥ, tathāpi yasya yanmate śraddhā tadāśrayeṇa tasya svārtha setsyati kiṃ brahma vicāra ārambheṇa: Let there be diverse views. If a person has **śraddhā** (faith) in a particular view, let him follow it and achieve his goal (**svārtha siddhiḥ**). What is the need to begin **Brahma Vicāra**?.

Vedānta's Reply (Bhāṣya): Tatra avicārya yat kiñcit pratipadyamānaḥ niśreyasāt pratihanyate anarthaṃ ca iyāt: A person who accepts anything as the **Ātman without inquiry (avicārya)**:

- **Niḥśreyasāt Pratihanyate:** Is obstructed (**pratihanyate**) from **Niḥśreyasa** (Ultimate Good/Liberation).
- **Anarthaṃ ca iyāt:** And inevitably meets with **Anartha** (Misery/Samsāra).

Ṭīkā on the necessity of correct knowledge: **brahmātmaikya vijñānād eva muktiḥ iti vastugati:** Liberation results only from the knowledge of identity with **Brahman**; this is the principle based on the true nature of reality (**vastugati siddhāntaḥ**)).

- Adopting a wrong view (**matāntara āśrayaṇa**) leads to the absence of the correct knowledge (**tadabhāvāt**) and thus the non-attainment of liberation (**mokṣasya asiddhiḥ**).

1. The Sin of Misidentifying the Self

किञ्चात्मानमन्यथा ज्ञात्वा तत्पापेन संसारान्धकूपे पतेत् , 'अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति' 'ये के चात्महनो जनाः' इति श्रुतेः, 'योऽन्यथा सन्तमात्मानमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते । किं तेन न कृतं पापं चौरेणात्मापहारिणा ॥' इति वचनाच्चेत्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: Kiñca ātmānam anyathā jñātvā tatpāpena saṃsārāndhakūpe patet

- Misunderstanding the **Ātman** (**ātmānam anyathā jñātvā**) is a great **Pāpa** (sin).
- Due to this sin, one falls into the **saṃsārāndhakūpa** (the dark well of **Saṃsāra**).

Śruti Proofs for Sin/Misery:

- This leads to the path of **Karma** (work/ritualism) for the mistaken 'Self' (body, mind, etc.), resulting in the state described in the **Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad** (**Andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti**) (They enter into blinding darkness).

- **Ātma-hananam:** Neglecting the true Self and identifying with the non-Self (like valuing a glittering stone over a diamond).
- **Iśāvāsya Upaniṣad: Ātmahano janā** (Slayers of the Self) enter **Asuryā nāma te lokā andhena tamasā āvṛtāḥ**: The worlds called **Asurya** enveloped in blinding darkness.
- **Smṛti Verse: yo'nyathā santam ātmānam anyathā pratipadyate, tena kiṃ pāpaṃ na kṛtaṃ caureṇa ātmahāriṇā**: What sin has not been committed by that thief who robs the Self (**ātmahāriṇā**), who conceives of the **Ātman**, which is of one nature, to be of another?
    - Definition of **Ātma-Hananam**: It is the **tiraskāra** (disregard or denial) of the **Ātman**. It is rejecting the understanding of "I am **Brahma**-svarūpa" (of the nature of **Brahman**).
    - Instead, it is accepting something else, the **anātmā** (non-self), as the **Ātman**. This misidentification constitutes the killing or harming of the Self.

2. The Necessity of Refuting Erroneous Views (Vipratipatti)

- The discussion on **Ātma-Hananam** is presented to establish that any **vipratipatti** (erroneous understanding or conflicting view) regarding the **Ātman** must be completely refuted (**khaṇḍita**).
- One should not abandon the **Śruti**-established (**Śruti**-pratipādya) and **Śāstra**-proven **Ātman** and grasp onto the **ātma-buddhi** (self-identity) in anything else. This is a fundamentally wrong path.
- **Khaṇḍana** (refutation) is not performed out of malice or ill-will towards followers of other systems (e.g., **Nyāya**, **Mīmāṃsaka**, **Sāṃkhya** etc.).
- The necessity for refutation arises because if the correct meaning of the **Śāstra** is not understood, one will be misled (**bhramita**) and end up on the wrong path.

Conclusion of the Brahma-Jijñāsā Sūtra's Meaning (Page 92)

अतः सर्वेषां मुमुक्षूणां निःश्रेयसफलाय वेदान्तविचारः कर्तव्य इतिसूत्रार्थमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति ।
तस्माद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते ॥ १ ॥

Conclusion: Ataḥ sarveṣām mumukṣūṇāṃ niśreyasaphalāya vedānta vicāraḥ kartavyaḥ iti sūtrārtham upasaṃharati: Therefore, for all **mumukṣus** (seekers of liberation), for the attainment of **niśreyasa-phala** (the fruit of liberation/highest good), **Vedānta-vicāra** (inquiry into the **Vedānta**) must be undertaken. This concludes the primary meaning of the Sūtra.

Analysis of the Term "Tasmāt" (Therefore)

बन्धस्याध्यस्तत्वेन विषयादिसद्भावादगतार्थत्वात्, अधिकारिलाभादापातप्रसिद्ध्या विषयादिसम्भवाच्च वेदान्तविषया मीमांसापूजिता विचारणा, वेदान्ताविरोधिनो ये तर्कास्तन्त्रान्तरस्थास्तान्युपकरणानि यस्याः सा निश्रेयसायारभ्यत इत्यर्थः ।

The passage contains the phrase "**Tasmāt Brahma-jijñāsopanyāsa-mukhena**. The word "**Tasmāt**" (therefore) is elaborated in the **Ṭīkā**.

Ṭīkā: bandhasya adhyastatvena viṣayādi sadbhāvāt agatārthatvāt adhikārilābhāt āpāta-prasiddhyā viṣayādi saṃbhavāt ca

Elaboration of **Tasmāt**: The word "**Tasmāt**" is justified because:

- **Bandha** (bondage) is **adhyasta** (superimposed).
- There is the **sadbhāva** (existence) of **Viṣaya-ādi** (subject matter and purpose).
- The **Brahman** is **agatārtha** (not already accomplished or inquired into), as the **Dharma-jijñāsā** (inquiry into **Dharma**) did not cover it.
- **Adhikāri-lābha** (availability of a qualified seeker) is established (this was discussed in the **Tṛtīya Varṇaka** - Third section/interpretation).
- There is **Āpāta-prasiddhi** (initial, superficial fame/knowledge) of **Brahman**, which makes the inquiry possible (**Viṣayādi saṃbhava**). If it were completely known, inquiry would be unnecessary; if completely unknown, it would be impossible. The removal of all possible objections (**virodha**) necessitates the inquiry, hence "**Tasmāt**."

Definition of Mīmāṃsā
Bhāṣya: The **Bhāṣya** mentions "**Vedānta-viṣaya Mīmāṃsā**".
Definition: Mīmāṃsā means **pūjita vicāra** (reverential or respected inquiry/investigation).

- **Pūjā** here means **ādara** (respect/reverence).
- This inquiry is motivated by a genuine desire to know (**jijñāsu bhāva**), not merely to oppose.
- Sometimes, the **Ācārya** himself raises a question in the manner of **sthūna-nikhanana-nyāya** (maxim of shaking the post to secure its stability) to firm up the understanding.

The Bhāṣya Statement on the Inquiry's Scope and Means

Bhāṣya:Tasmāt Brahma-jijñāsopanyāsa-mukhena Vedānta-vākya-mīmāṃsā tad-avirodhi-tarkopakaraṇā niśreyasa-prayojanā prastūyate: Therefore, through the introduction (**upanyāsa-mukhena**) of the inquiry into **Brahman** (**Brahma-jijñāsā**), the reverential investigation of **Vedānta** sentences (**Vedānta-vākya-mīmāṃsā**) is presented/commenced.

- It is characterized by having **tad-avirodhi-tarkopakaraṇā** (arguments/logic that are **not** contradictory to that **Brahman** as its auxiliary tools).
- Its **prayojana** (purpose) is **niśreyasa** (liberation/highest good).

Ṭīkā - Elaboration of Tarka: **vedānta avirodhinaḥ ye tarkāḥ tantra antarasthāḥ tāni upakaraṇāni yasyāḥ sā niśreyasāya ārabhyate**: The arguments (**tarkāḥ**) that are **avirodhī**

(not contradictory) to the **Vedānta**, which are found in other systems (**tantrasthāḥ**), become the **upakaraṇa** (tools/aids) of the **Mīmāṃsā**. The **Mīmāṃsā** is commenced for the purpose of **niśreyasa**.

Resolving the Absence of the Term "Vicāra" (Inquiry/Investigation)

ननु सूत्रे विचारवाचिपदाभावात्तदारम्भः कथं सूत्रार्थ इत्यत आह - **ब्रह्मेति ।** ब्रह्मज्ञानेच्छोक्तिद्वारा विचारं लक्षयित्वा तत्कर्तव्यतां ब्रवीतीति भावः ।

Purva-pakṣa (Objection): nanu sūtre vicāra-vācipadābhāvāt tad-ārambhaḥ kathaṃ sūtrārtha ityataḥ - Since the Sūtra does not contain a word meaning "**vicāra**" (it uses **jijñāsā**), how can the meaning of the Sūtra be the commencement of **vicāra**?

Siddhānta (Resolution): "**Brahma-jijñāsa upanyāsa-mukhena** (By means of the expression of the desire for the knowledge of **Brahman**), **vicāram lakṣayitvā** (by **lakṣaṇā** or indication, the desire for knowledge indicates the means to knowledge, which is **vicāra**), **tat-kartavyatāṃ bravīti iti bhāvaḥ** (the intention is that the performance of that **vicāra** is being stated)."

Summary of the First Sūtra's Interpretations

एवं प्रथमसूत्रस्य चत्वारोऽर्थाः व्याख्यानचतुष्टयेन दर्शिताः । सूत्रस्य चानेकार्थत्वं भूषणम् । नन्विदं सूत्रं शास्त्राद्बहिः स्थित्वा शास्त्रमारम्भयति अन्तर्भूत्वा वा । आद्ये तस्य हेयता, शास्त्रासम्बन्धात् । द्वितीये तस्यारम्भकं वाच्यम् । न च स्वयमेवारम्भकम् , स्वस्मात्स्वोत्पत्तेरित्यात्माश्रयात् । न चारम्भकान्तरं पश्याम इति । उच्यते - श्रवणविधिना आरब्दमिदं शास्त्रं शास्त्रान्तर्गतमेव शास्त्रारम्भं प्रतिपादयति । यथाध्ययनविधिर्वेदान्तर्गत एव कृत्स्नवेदस्याध्ययने प्रयुङ्क्ते तद्वदित्यनवद्यम् ॥ १ ॥

Ṭīkā: Evaṃ prathama-sūtrasya catvāro arthāḥ vyākhyāna-catuṣṭayena darśitāḥ

The four meanings (i.e., the four **Varṇakas**) of the first Sūtra have been shown by the fourfold explanation:

- **Viṣaya** (**Brahman**) and **Prayojana** (**Mokṣa**).
- **Agatārthatva** (non-accomplishment elsewhere)regarding **Brahman** in comparison to **Dharma-jijñāsā**.
- **Adhikārī** (qualified seeker).
- **Prasiddha** (known) nature of **Brahman** (**Āpāta-prasiddhi**).

On Multiple Meanings: "Sūtrasya anekārthatvaṃ bhūṣaṇaṃ (na tu dūṣaṇam)" - A Sūtra having multiple meanings is an ornament, not a flaw. This is because a Sūtra is described as **viśvato-mukham** (having faces everywhere/multifaceted).

Question of the Sūtra's Locus (Inside or Outside the Śāstra)

Pūrva-pakṣa (Objection): nanu idaṃ sūtram śāstrād bahis-sthitvā śāstram ārambhayati? antar-bhūtvā vā? - Is this Sūtra situated outside the **Śāstra** while commencing it, or is it internal (**antarbhūta**) to the **Śāstra**?

- **Option 1 (Outside): "Ādye tasya heyatā śāstra-asaṃbandhāt"** - If it is outside, it is rejected (**heya**) because it has no connection to the **Śāstra**.
- **Option 2 (Inside): "Dvitīye tasya ārambhakam vācyam"** - If it is inside, then the commencement/reason for studying this Sūtra must be stated. (Who commanded the study of Athaato Brahma-jijñāsā?)
- **Further Objection:** It cannot be **svayam-ārambhakam** (commencing itself) because of **ātmāśraya-doṣa** (fallacy of self-dependence).

Siddhānta (Resolution): śravaṇa-vidhinā ārabdham idaṃ śāstrāṃ śāstrāntargatam eva śāstrārambhaṃ pratipādayati: The Sūtra is commenced by the **Śravaṇa-vidhi** (injunction to hear/study, e.g., **"ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ"**) and, being **śāstrāntargata** (within the **Śāstra**), it proclaims the commencement of the **Śāstra**. Just as the **Adhyayana-vidhi** (**svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ**) which is within the **Veda (Śāstra)**, compels the study of the entire **Veda** (**kṛtsnasya vedasya adhyayane prayunkte**), similarly, the **Śravaṇa-vidhi** causes the study of the Sūtra, which in turn causes the study of the **Śāstra**.

Conclusion: "Iti anavadyam" - Thus, there is no fault (**doṣa-rahitam**).

प्रथमसूत्रं समाप्तम् || १ ||

The first sūtra is concluded. || 1 ||

॥ इति चर्तुथं वर्णकम् ॥

Here ends the Fourth Varnakam.

Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 2. Sūtra 2.

Transition to the Second Sūtra and the Second Adhikaraṇa (Page 97)

प्रथमसूत्रेण शास्त्रारम्भमुपपाद्य शास्त्रमारभमाणः पूर्वोत्तराधिकरणयोः सङ्गतिं वक्तुं वृत्तं कीर्तयति - ब्रह्मेति । मुमुक्षुणा ब्रह्मज्ञानाय वेदान्तविचारः कर्तव्य इत्युक्तम् । ब्रह्मणो विचार्यत्वोक्त्या अर्थात्प्रमाणादि विचाराणां प्रतिज्ञातत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मप्रमाणं ब्रह्मयुक्तिरित्यादिविशिष्टविचाराणां विशेषणब्रह्मज्ञानं विना कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् , तत्स्वरूपज्ञानायादौ लक्षणं वक्तव्यम् , तन्न सम्भवतीत्याक्षिप्य सूत्रकृतं पूजयन्नेव लक्षणसूत्रमवधारयति - किं लक्षणकमिति ।

ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम् । किंलक्षणकं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्मेत्यत आह भगवान्सूत्रकारः —

The first **Adhikaraṇa** (topic of discussion) is completed with the first Sūtra.

Ṭīkā: prathama-sūtreṇa śāstrārambham upapādya śāstram ārabhamāṇaḥ pūrvottarādhikaraṇayoḥ saṅgatiṃ vaktum vṛttam kīrtayati: Having established the commencement of the **Śāstra** by the first Sūtra, the **Bhāṣyakāra** (or the author commencing the **Śāstra**) describes what has been covered (**vṛttam kīrtayati**) to state the **saṃgati** (connection) between the preceding and succeeding **Adhikaraṇas**.

Summary of Previous Adhikaraṇa: "Brahma jijñāsitavyam iti uktam" - It has been stated that **Brahman** must be sought after/inquired into.

- **Ṭīkā: mumukṣuṇā Brahma-jñānāya Vedānta-vicāraḥ kartavyaḥ iti uktam** - It is stated that a **mumukṣu** must perform **Vedānta-vicāra** for the knowledge of **Brahman**.
- **Need for Lakṣaṇa (Definition):**
  - **Vicāra** (investigation) includes **viśiṣṭa-vicāra** (detailed/specific inquiry) like **Brahma-pramāṇam**, **Brahma-yukti**, etc.
  - The **viśiṣṭa-vicāra** is impossible without **viśeṣaṇa-brahma-jñānam** (knowledge of **Brahman** as the defining attribute - its **lakṣaṇa**).
  - **Tad-svarūpa-jñānāya** (for the knowledge of its essential nature), **ādau lakṣaṇam vaktavyam** (a definition must be stated at the beginning).
- **Introduction of the Second Sūtra:** The next Sūtra is introduced by raising an objection (**ākṣipya**) that **lakṣaṇa** is impossible, thereby revering the Sūtrakāra (**sūtra-kṛtam pūjayan**) and introducing the definition Sūtra (**lakṣaṇa-sūtram avatārayati**).

The Second Sūtra's Introduction in the Bhāṣya (Page 98)

किमाक्षेपे । नास्त्येव लक्षणमित्यर्थः । आक्षेपेणास्योत्थानादाक्षेपसङ्गतिः । लक्षणद्योतिवेदान्तानां स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां लक्ष्ये ब्रह्मणि समन्वयोक्तेः श्रुतिशास्त्राध्यायपादसङ्गतयः । तथा हि 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादिवाक्यं विषयः । तत्किं ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं न वेति सन्देहः । तत्र पूर्वपक्षे ब्रह्मस्वरूपासिद्ध्या मुक्त्यसिद्धिः फलं , सिद्धान्ते तत्सिद्धिरिति भेदः । यद्यप्याक्षेपसङ्गतौ पूर्वाधिकरणफलमेव फलमिति कृत्वा पृथङ्न वक्तव्यम् । तदुक्तम् -

'आक्षेपे चापवादे च प्राप्त्यां लक्षणकर्मणि । प्रयोजनं न वक्तव्यं यच्च कृत्वा प्रवर्तते' इति ।

Bhāṣya: kim-lakṣaṇakaṃ punaḥ tat brahma - What is the definition/characteristic of **Brahman**?

Ṭīkā: "**kim ākṣepe**" - The word **kim** (what) here is used in the sense of objection/impossibility (**ākṣepa**), suggesting "What definition can there be?"

- **Saṃgati:** The connection (**saṃgati**) is **ākṣepa-saṃgati** (connection by objection), as the next step is necessitated by an objection to the previous conclusion.

Explanation of the Fourfold Saṃgati for the Second Adhikaraṇa

Ṭīkā: lakṣaṇadyotivedāntānāṃ spaṣṭa-brahma-liṅgānāṃ lakṣye brahmaṇi samanvaya ukteḥ śruti-śāstrādhyāya-pāda-saṃgatayaḥ

Meaning: All four types of connections (**saṃgatayaḥ**) are stated simultaneously:

- **Śruti-Saṃgati** (Connection to **Śruti**): The coordination (**samanvaya**) of all **Śrutis** in **Brahman**.
- **Śāstra-Saṃgati** (Connection to **Śāstra**): The entire **Brahma-Sūtra** (**Śāstra**) is based on the knowledge of **Brahman**, and its definition is essential.
- **Adhyāya-Saṃgati** (Connection to the Chapter): The first chapter is the **Samanvaya Adhyāya**, focused on coordinating **Vedānta** statements in **Brahman**.
- **Pāda-Saṃgati** (Connection to the Section): This **Pāda** (section) deals with **Vedānta** statements that have **spaṣṭa-brahma-liṅgāḥ** (clear signs of **Brahman**) and are **lakṣaṇa-dyoti** (indicating the definition/characteristic).

Subject Matter (Viṣaya) and Result (Phala) of the Second Adhikaraṇa

- **Viṣaya-Vākya (The sentence under discussion): "Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante**" (from the **Taittirīya Upaniṣad**).
- **Doubt (Saṃdeha/saṃśaya): Tat kiṃ brahmaṇo lakṣaṇaṃ vakti na vā iti saṃdehaḥ** - Does that sentence state the definition of **Brahman** or not?
    - The use of the clear word **Brahma** in the subsequent phrase (**tad brahma iti tad vijijñāsasva**) makes it an extremely appropriate **Śruti** for commencing the inquiry.
- **Pūrva-pakṣa-phalam: Brahma-svarūpāsiddhyā mukti-asiddhiḥ phalam** - If the nature of **Brahman** is not established, liberation is not accomplished.
- **Siddhānta-phalam: Siddhānte tu tat-siddhiḥ iti bhedaḥ** - In the **Siddhānta**, the accomplishment of that (**siddhi**) is the result.

Rule for Stating the Result (Phala) in Ākṣepa-Saṃgati

Rule: When the connection is **ākṣepa-saṃgati** or **apavāda-saṃgati** or **prāpti** or **lakṣaṇa-karma**, the result (**phalam**) of the preceding **Adhikaraṇa** is the result of the succeeding one.

- Therefore, a separate statement of the result (**pṛthak-nirvacana**) is not strictly necessary.

Quote: ākṣepe cāpavāde ca prāptyāṃ lakṣaṇa-karmaṇi | prayojanaṃ na vaktavyaṃ yacca kṛtvā pravartate || (This śloka is mainly from **Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā** context, used in **Kṛtvā-Cintā-Adhikaraṇa**.)

- **Ākṣepa-Saṃgati:** When an **Adhikaraṇa** starts by objecting to a principle established in the previous one (e.g., the objection to the eternality of sound in **Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā**). The goal remains the same (e.g., establishing the self-validity of the **Veda**).
- **Apavāda-Adhikaraṇa:** Where there is an exception (**apavāda**) to a general rule (**utsarga**), e.g., **Smṛti** is generally authoritative as it is **Veda**-based, but not where it contradicts the **Śruti**. The main result is still the fruit of **Śruti**-karma.
- **Prāpti-Sūtra:** Where a rule is applied by extension (**atideśa**) or inclusion (**prāpti**), the result of the main subject (**aṅgī**) is the fruit, not the subordinate part (**aṅga**).
- **Lakṣaṇa-Karma:** Where the definition is stated incidentally (**prasaṅgavaśāt**).
- **Kṛtvā-Cintā-Adhikaraṇa:** Where an idea is temporarily accepted for discussion even if it is not the **siddhānta** (**asiddhānta-viṣaya**). No separate result needs to be stated as the view is merely an abhyupetyavāda (acceptance for the sake of argument).

Clarification on Apavāda

Although stating the purpose is not technically required in an **Apavāda**, the **Ṭīkā** notes: **Ṭīkā: tathāpi spaṣṭārtham uktam iti mantavyam**

Explanation: Nevertheless, the purpose is stated for the sake of clarity (spaṣṭārtham).

Illustrative Example of Apavāda:

- **Śruti** (Scripture) is a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa).
- **Smṛti** (Traditional texts) is also valid as long as it does not contradict **Śruti**. Thus, acts prescribed by **Smṛti** (smārta karma) should be performed.
- **The Exception (Apavāda):** However, where **Smṛti** contradicts **Śruti**, it is not a valid means of knowledge. This invalidation is the **Apavāda**.

Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's View) regarding the Definition of Brahman

तत्र नेति प्राप्तम् , जन्मादेर्जगद्धर्मत्वेन ब्रह्मलक्षणत्वायोगात् । न च जगदुपादानत्वे सति कर्तृत्वं लक्षणमिति वाच्यम् , कर्तुरुपादानत्वे दृष्टान्ताभावेनानुमानाप्रवृत्तेः । न च श्रौतस्य ब्रह्मणः श्रुत्यैव लक्षणसिद्धेः किमनुमानेनेति वाच्यम् , अनुमानस्य श्रुत्यनुग्राहकत्वेन तदभावे तद्विरोधे वा श्रुत्यर्थासिद्धेः । न च जगत्कर्तृत्वमुपादानत्वं वा प्रत्येकं लक्षणमस्त्विति वाच्यम् , कर्तृमात्रस्योपादानाद्भिन्नस्य ब्रह्मत्वायोगात् , वस्तुतः परिच्छेदादिति प्राप्ते,

The text explores the objection raised against the possibility of defining Brahman.

1. Question about Defining Brahman

Ṭīkā: tat kiṃ brahmaṇo lakṣaṇaṃ vakti na vā

Explanation: The opponent had earlier raised a question: “Does the scripture define Brahman or not?”

2. Reasoning for the Objection

Ṭīkā: na iti prāptam (It is obtained that Scripture does not define Brahman). **janmāder jagad-dharmatvena brahma-lakṣaṇatva-ayogāt:** Creation, birth, etc. (**janmādi**) are properties of the world (**jagad-dharma**). Since these belong to the world, they cannot serve as the definition (**lakṣaṇa**) of Brahman.

3. Rejection of the Siddhānta's Proposed Definition

The **Siddhānta** proposes a definition: **jagat-upādānatve sati kartṛtvam** (Brahman is that which is both the material cause and the efficient cause/creator of the world).

The **Pūrvapakṣa** rejects this: **kartur upādānatve dṛṣṭānta-abhāvena anumāna-apravṛtteḥ**

Explanation: There is no example (**dṛṣṭānta**) in the world where the creator/agent (kartā) is also the material cause (upādāna).

- Example: A potter (kulāla) is the creator of a pot, but not its material cause (clay).
- Because there is no supporting example, **Anumāna** (Inference) cannot be established.
- **Logic:** A definition (lakṣaṇa) functions as the logical reason (hetu) in an inference (e.g., "Earth is distinct from others because it has smell"). To establish this inference, one needs an example (dṛṣṭānta). The opponent claims no such example exists for a single entity being both material and efficient cause.

4. The Debate on Scripture vs. Inference

A. The Siddhānta's Stance on Scripture

Siddhānta: śrutasya brahmaṇaḥ śruta-lakṣaṇa-siddhau kim anumānena: Since Brahman and Its definition are established by **Śruti** (Scripture, e.g., yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante), what is the need for inference (anumāna)? Scripture is an independent authority.

B. The Pūrvapakṣa's Reliance on Inference

Pūrvapakṣa: anumānasya śruti-anugrāhakatvāt tad-abhāve tad-virodhe vā śruti-artha-asiddheḥ: Inference acts as a supporter/auxiliary (anugrāhaka) to **Śruti**.

- If inference is absent, or if inference contradicts **Śruti**, the meaning of the scripture cannot be established.
- Argument: If a scriptural statement contradicts logic or perception (e.g., "The sacrificial post is the sun"), it is relegated to **Arthavāda** (eulogy) rather than fact.
- Therefore, the opponent argues that without a logical example supporting the "Creator + Material Cause" theory, the scriptural statement regarding creation is merely a restatement of duality or an **Arthavāda**, not a proof of Brahman.

5. Critique of Single Characteristics

The opponent further argues that one cannot simply attribute separate definitions to Brahman. **Pūrvapakṣa: kartṛ-mātrasya upādānāt bhinnasya brahmatva-ayogāt vastutaḥ paricchedāt:** If Brahman is only the creator and the material cause is something else, Brahman would be distinct from the material. This distinction creates a limitation by an object (**vastutaḥ pariccheda**). A limited entity cannot be Brahman (Infinite).

The Response by Siddhānta

पुरुषाभ्यूहमात्रस्यानुमानस्याप्रतिष्ठितस्यातीन्द्रियार्थे स्वातन्त्र्यायोगात् , अपौरुषेयतया निर्दोषश्रुत्युक्तोभयकारणत्वस्य सुखादिदृष्टान्तेन सम्भावयितुं शक्यत्वात् , तदेव लक्षणमिति सिद्धान्तयति - जन्माद्यस्य यतः इति ।

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ २ ॥

1. Limitations of Mere Logic

Bhāṣya: puruṣa-abhyūha-mātrasya anumānasya apratiṣṭhitasya atīndriyārthe svātantrya-ayogāt: Mere human reasoning (**puruṣa-ūha**) is unstable (**apratiṣṭhita**). It cannot function independently regarding the **atīndriya** (suprasensuous/transcendental) reality, i.e., Brahman.

2. Authority of Scripture

Bhāṣya: apauruṣeyatayā nirdoṣa-śrutyā ukta-ubhaya-kāraṇatvasya: Śruti is **apauruṣeya** (of non-human origin) and therefore flawless. This flawless scripture establishes Brahman as having both types of causality (**ubhaya-kāraṇatva**—Material and Efficient).

3. Providing the Example (Addressing the Logician)

To satisfy the opponent's demand for a logical example (**dṛṣṭānta**) where the agent is also the material cause: **Bhāṣya:sukhādi dṛṣṭāntena sambhāvayituṃ śakyatvāt:** It is possible to establish this using the example of happiness/pleasure (**sukha**).

- Logic (based on Nyāya system): In the **Nyāya** philosophy, **Sukha** (pleasure) resides in the **Ātman** via the relation of inherence (**samavāya**). Thus, **Ātman** is the material cause (**samavāyi-kāraṇa**) of pleasure. **Ātman** is also the agent/doer (**nimitta**) of that pleasure through karma.
- Thus, even in the opponent's view, one entity (Self) can be both material and efficient cause.
- Alternative Vedāntic Examples: The spider (**ūrṇanābhi**) creating the web from itself, or the dreamer creating the dream world.

Analysis of Sūtra 1.1.2.2 (Page 95)

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ २ ॥
janmādyasya yataḥ (2)

Padaccheda (Word Split): **janmādi, asya, yataḥ (tad brahma)**.

Padārthokti: (Meanings of the Terms):

- **janmādi**: Origin (janma), Sustenance (sthiti), and Dissolution (bhaṅgam/laya).
- **asya**: Of this (**jagataḥ** - the observable world).
- **yataḥ**: From which (**yasmāt**).

Meaning: That from which the birth, sustenance, and dissolution of this world proceed is Brahman. This Sūtra provides the **Lakṣaṇa** (Definition) of Brahman.

Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā (Verse Analysis)

A summary verse is discussed which outlines the five components (adhikaraṇa-aṅga) of this section.

लक्षणं ब्रह्मणो नास्ति किंवाऽस्ति, नहि विद्यते ॥ जन्मादेरन्यनिष्ठत्वात्सत्यादेश्चाप्रसिद्धितः ॥ १ ॥

lakṣaṇaṃ brahmaṇo nāsti kiṃvā'sti, nahi vidyate ||
janmāderanyaniṣṭhatvātsatyādeścāprasiddhitaḥ || 1 ||

ब्रह्मनिष्ठं कारणत्वं स्याल्लक्ष्मं स्रग्भुजङ्गवत् ॥ लौकिकान्येव सत्यादीन्यखण्डं लक्षयन्ति हि ॥ २ ॥

brahmaniṣṭhaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ syāllakṣma sragbhujaṅgavat ||
laukikānyeva satyādīnyakhaṇḍaṃ lakṣayanti hi || 2 ||

Verse Explanation:

1. **Viṣaya (Subject): brahmaṇo lakṣaṇam** (The definition of Brahman).
2. **Saṃśaya (Doubt): nāsti kiṃ vā asti** (Does a definition exist or not?).
3. **Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent):**
   nahi vidyate, janmādeḥ-anya-niṣṭhatvāt satyādeḥ ca aprasiddhitaḥ
   - **janmādi-anya-niṣṭhatvāt**: Creation, etc., resides in the "other" (the world), not Brahman.
   - **satyādeḥ aprasiddhitaḥ**: Terms like "Truth" (Satyam), "Knowledge" (Jñānam), etc., are not well-known in the world in the sense Vedānta uses them (e.g., "Satyam" usually implies speaking the truth, not absolute existence).
4. **Siddhānta (Conclusion): brahma-niṣṭhaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ syāt lakṣmaṃ**
   - The causality of the universe rests in Brahman; thus, it is the definition.
5. **Elaboration:**
   srag-bhujaṅgavat: Like the snake appearing in the garland. The garland (**srak**) is the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) for the illusory appearance of the snake (**bhujaṅga**). Similarly,

Brahman is the substratum for the world. This implies the world is a superimposition (vivarta) and is **mithyā** (illusory).

6. **laukikāni eva satyādīni akhaṇḍaṃ lakṣayanti hi:** The very words used in worldly transactions (Truth, Knowledge, etc.) are used to indicate the Indivisible (**Akhaṇḍa**) Brahman by stripping away limitations (e.g., Truth = that which is never negated).

The Nature of Causality (Ubhaya-Kāraṇatva) (Page 101)

अत्र यद्यपि जगज्जन्मस्थितिलयकारणत्वं लक्षणं प्रतिपाद्यते तथाप्यग्रे 'प्रकृतिश्च' इत्यधिकरणे तत्कारणत्वं न कर्तृत्वमात्रं किन्तु कर्तृत्वोपादानत्वोभयरूपत्वमिति वक्ष्यमाणं सिद्धवत्कृत्योभयकारणत्वं लक्षणमित्युच्यत इति न पौनरुक्त्यम् ।

A final clarification is made regarding the type of cause defined in the Sūtra.

Objection: The definition "Cause of birth, etc." usually implies only the material cause (Upādāna). How do we know it implies the efficient cause (Nimitta) as well?

Answer: Ṭīkā: agre 'prakṛtiśca' iti adhikaraṇe tat kāraṇatvam na kartṛtvamātraṃ kintu kartṛtva upādānatva ubhayarūpatvam iti vakṣyamāṇaṃ siddhavat kṛtya ubhayakāraṇatvam lakṣaṇam iti ucyate iti na paunaruktyam: Based on a future Sūtra (1.4.23 **prakṛtiśca pratijñā...**), it is established that Brahman is the Material Cause (**Prakṛti**) as well as the agent.

- **Siddhavat-kṛtvā:** Treating the future conclusion as established here, the commentary asserts that this definition refers to **ubhaya-kāraṇatvam** (Both Material and Efficient Causality). Therefore, there is no redundancy (**na punaruktam**) between this and future sections; here the definition acts as a general indicator utilizing both aspects of causality.

Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's Objection)

ननु जिज्ञास्यनिर्गुणब्रह्मणः कारणत्वं कथं लक्षणमिति चेत् , उच्यते - यथा रजतं शुक्तेर्लक्षणं यद्रजतं सा शुक्तिरिति, तथा यज्जगत्कारणं तद्ब्रह्मेति कल्पितं कारणत्वं तटस्थं सदेव ब्रह्मणो लक्षणमित्यनवद्यम् ॥

The opponent raises a question regarding the nature of the **Brahman** being inquired into.

Ṭīkā: The Question: **Nanu jijñāsyaṃ nirguṇa brahmaṇaḥ kāraṇatvaṃ katham lakṣaṇam iti cet:** If the object of inquiry is attributeless Brahman, how can causality be its definition?

The Dilemma:

1. **Saguna Brahma (Brahma with attributes):** If the object of inquiry in Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā is **Saguṇa Brahma**, then knowledge of it will not lead to **Mokṣa** (Liberation). Knowledge of **Saguṇa Brahma** is not the direct cause of liberation.
2. **Nirguna Brahma (Attributeless Brahma):** If the object is **Nirguṇa Brahma** (which is required for the goal of Moksha), it cannot be a "cause." Causality (**Kāraṇatvam**) is an attribute/quality (**Guṇa**). An attributeless entity cannot possess the quality of being a cause.

Siddhānta (Resolution): Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa

The text resolves this by explaining that causality is a superimposition used to indicate **Brahma**.

Ṭīkā: The analogy in the answer: **Yathā rajataṃ śukterlakṣaṇam:** Just as silver is the definition/indicator of the nacre.

Logic: Bādha Samānādhikaraṇya (Co-location by Negation)

- **The statement: Yad rajatam sā śuktiḥ** (That which is silver is nacre).
- This uses **Bādha Samānādhikaraṇya**. We negate the appearance of silver to point out the nacre.
- Application to Brahman: **Yad jagat kāraṇaṃ tad brahma**: That which is the cause of the world is Brahma.
- Just as silver is negated to show nacre, the world and its causality are negated to reveal **Brahma**.

Conclusion on Causality: **Kalpitaṃ kāraṇatvam taṭasthaṃ sadeva brahmaṇo lakṣaṇam ityanavadyam**: Causality is an imagined/superimposed attribute. As a Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa, it flawlessly defines Brahma.

Mananam: Types of Definitions: Swarūpa vs. Taṭastha

There are two types of definitions used in Vedanta.

1. Swarūpa Lakṣaṇa (Essential Definition)

- **Definition: tad abhinnatve sati tad bodhakatvaṃ svarūpalakṣaṇam**.
- It describes the essential nature of the object and is non-different from the object itself (e.g., **Satyam Jñānam Anantam**).

2. Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa (Accidental/Associated Definition)

- **Definition: tad bhinnatve sati tad bodhakatvaṃ taṭasthalakṣaṇam**.
- It is different from the object but functions as an indicator to point it out.
- **Etymology: Taṭe tiṣṭhati iti taṭastham**: That which stands on the bank/shore. It remains distinct from the river (the flow) but indicates the river.

The Carrom Game Analogy:

- **Swarūpa Lakṣaṇa:** Like striking the target directly in carrom.
- **Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa:** Like striking the target via a rebound (banking off the side). It hits something else first (the "other"), but the ultimate goal is to hit the target. Even though

it is indirect ("other"), it must eventually reach the target (**Lakṣya**) to be considered a definition.

Grammatical Analysis of "Janmādi" (Page 101-102)

सूत्रं व्याचष्टे - **जन्मेत्यादिना ।** बहुव्रीहौ पदार्थाः सर्वे वाक्यार्थस्यान्यपदार्थस्य विशेषणानि । यथा चित्रगोर्देवदत्तस्य चित्रा गावः तद्वदत्रापि जन्मादीति नपुंसकैकवचनद्योतितस्य समाहारस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गस्य जन्म विशेषणम् , तथा च जन्मनः समासार्थैकदेशस्य गुणत्वेन संविज्ञानं यस्मिन् बहुव्रीहौ स तद्गुणसंविज्ञान इत्यर्थः । तत्र यज्जन्मकारणं तद्ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मत्वविधानमयुक्तम् , स्थितिलयकारणाद्भिन्नत्वेन ज्ञाते ब्रह्मत्वस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् । अतो जन्मस्थितिभङ्गैर्निरूपितानि त्रीणि कारणत्वानि मिलितान्येव लक्षणमिति मत्वा सूत्रे समाहारो द्योतित इति ध्येयम् ।

जन्म उत्पत्तिः आदिः अस्य — इति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः । जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः । श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावत् — 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' (तै. उ. ३ । १ । १) इति, अस्मिन्वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात् । वस्तुवृत्तमपि — जन्मना लब्धसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसम्भवात् ।

The term **Janmādi** is analyzed to understand how it defines **Brahma**.

Bhāṣya: **Janma utpattiḥ ādiḥ asya iti tadguṇa saṃvijñāno bahuvrīhiḥ:** Birth is the beginning of this; it is a Bahuvrīhi compound of the Tadguṇa saṃvijñāna type.

1. Samāsa (Compound) Classifications

- **Avyayībhāva:** First word is dominant. (pūrvapada pradhāna)
- **Tatpuruṣa:** Second word is dominant. (uttarapada pradhāna)
- **Dvandva:** Both words are dominant (Ubhayapada pradhāna).
- **Bahuvrīhi:** Refers to a third/other entity (Anyapada pradhāna).

2. Tadguṇa Saṃvijñāna Bahuvrīhi

Ṭīkā: Bahuvrīhau padārthāḥ sarve vākyārthasya anya padārthasya viśeṣaṇāni: In Bahuvrīhi, all words become adjectives for the other entity being described. This specific type of **Bahuvrīhi** implies that the attributes (qualities) mentioned in the compound are included when the object is grasped.

- **Example 1 (Tadguṇa): Lambakarṇam ānaya** (Bring the long-eared one). When you bring the person/animal, the long ears come with them. The attribute is retained.
- **Example 2 (Atadguṇa - Contrast): Dṛṣṭasāgaram ānaya** (Bring the one who has seen the ocean). When the person comes, the ocean does not come with them. Or **Citragum ānaya** (Bring the owner of speckled cows) — only the owner comes, not necessarily the cows.

Application to the Sutra: In Janmādi, the term Janma (birth) is not discarded. The definition includes birth, sustenance, and dissolution together to define Brahma. If one only said "Cause of Birth," it is insufficient because Brahma is also the cause of sustenance and dissolution.

Ṭīkā: Sthiti laya kāraṇāt bhinnatve jñāte brahmatvasya jñātum aśakyatvāt: If known as distinct from the cause of sustenance and dissolution, Brahma cannot be fully known.

Ṭīkā: ato janmasthitibhaṅgairnirūpitāni trīṇi kāraṇatvāni militānyeva lakṣaṇamiti matvā sūtre samāhāro dyotita iti dhyeyam: Therefore, all three—Janma, Sthiti, Bhaṅga—must be combined (Militvā) to form the definition.

Grammatical Note:

Janmādi is treated as a neuter singular (Napuṃsaka Ekavacana) because it functions as a Samāhāra Dvandva (collective grouping) regarding the three states (Birth, Stay, Dissolution) within the logic of the definition.

Elaborations on "Asya" (The World) (Page 102-103)

नन्वादित्वं जन्मनः कथं ज्ञातव्यम् , संसारस्यानादित्वादित्यत आह - जन्मनश्चेति । मूलश्रुत्या वस्तुगत्या चादित्वं ज्ञात्वा तदपेक्ष्य सूत्रकृता जन्मन आदित्वमुक्तमित्यर्थः । इदमः प्रत्यक्षार्थमात्रवाचित्वमाशङ्क्योपस्थितसर्वकार्यवाचित्वमाह - अस्येतीति । वियदादिजगतो नित्यत्वात् न जन्मादिसम्बन्ध इत्यत आह - षष्ठीति । विषयादिमहाभूतानां जन्मादिसम्बन्धो वक्ष्यत इति भावः ।

अस्येति प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितस्य धर्मिण इदमा निर्देशः । षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्मसम्बन्धार्था ।

1. The Question of Beginninglessness

Ṭīkā: Nanu āditvaṃ janma kathaṃ jñātavyam saṃsārasya anāditvāt: Since Saṃsāra is beginningless/anādi, how can it have a birth/beginning?

Bhāṣya (Answer): **janmanaḥ ca āditvaṃ śruti nirdeśāpekṣam vastuvṛttāpekṣam ca:** The origin/birth is stated based on the instruction of Śruti and stating nature of things.

- **Scriptural Authority:** The sequence is based on the text **Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante** (From whom these beings are born...).
- **Vastuvṛtta** (Nature of things): In the natural order of things, a pot implies a sequence: Birth → Existence → Destruction. One cannot have destruction before birth. Thus, Janma is naturally the beginning (Ādi).

2. The Meaning of "Idam" (This)

The Sutra uses **Asya** (of this), which corresponds to the pronoun **Idam**.

Ṭīkā: Idamaḥ pratyakṣārtha mātra vācitvam āśaṅkya … Doubting that "Idam" refers only to objects of direct perception...

- **Idam vs. Tat: Idam** refers to what is near (**Sannikṛṣṭa**), while **Adas** refers to what is remote (**Viprakṛṣṭa**).

  इदमस्तु सन्निकृष्टे समीपतरवर्ति चैतदो रूपम् ।
  अदसस्तु विप्रकृष्टे तदिति परोक्षे विजानीयात् ॥

idamastu sannikṛṣṭe samīpataravarti caitado rūpam ।
adasastu viprakṛṣṭe taditi parokṣe vijānīyāt ॥

- **Clarification:** Here, **Idam** (Asya) refers to the entire universe brought into the intellect via perception and inference (**Pratyakṣādi sannidhāpitasya**).
- Inclusion of Eternal Entities: **Ṭīkā: viyadādijagato nityatvāt na janmādi saṃbandha iti:** One might argue space/Akāśa is eternal and has no birth. The definition covers even Viyadādi (Space/Ether, etc.). Unlike the Nyaya philosophy where Space, Time, Soul, and Atoms are eternal, in Vedanta, everything other than Brahma is created/anitya.

3. The Genitive Case (Ṣaṣṭhī)

Bhāṣya: **ṣaṣṭhī janmādidharmasambandhārthā:** The word is Asya (Genitive/Sixth case).

Ṭīkā: viṣayādimahābhūtānāṃ janmādisambandho vakṣyata iti bhāvaḥ: It indicates the relationship between the universe (the Dharmī) and its attributes (birth, etc.).

Elaborations on "Yataḥ" (The Cause) (Page 103)

ननु जगतो जन्मादेर्वा ब्रह्मसम्बन्धाभावान्न लक्षणत्वमित्याशङ्क्य तत्कारणत्वं लक्षणमिति पञ्चम्यर्थमाह - यत इतीति । यच्छब्देन सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमानन्दरूपं वस्तूच्यते 'आनन्दाद्ध्येव' इति निर्णीतत्वात् । तथा च स्वरूपलक्षणसिद्धिरिति मन्तव्यम् । पदार्थमुक्त्वा पूर्वसूत्रस्थब्रह्मपदानुषङ्गेण तच्छब्दाध्याहारेण च सूत्रवाक्यार्थमाह - अस्येत्यादिना ।

यत इति कारणनिर्देशः । अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति, तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः ।

The word **Yataḥ** corresponds to the Ablative case (**Pañcamī**), indicating the cause.

Ṭīkā: Objection: **jagato janmādeḥ vā brahmasambandha abhāvāt na lakṣaṇatvam:** If there is no direct relationship between the world's birth and Brahman (since they are distinct), how is this a definition?

Ṭīkā: Resolution: **tat kāraṇatvam lakṣaṇam iti pañcamyartham:** Being the cause of that [world] is the definition, this is indicated by the fifth case.

yat śabdena satyaṃ jñānam anantam ānandaṃ rūpam vastūcyate: By the word Yataḥ, the entity that is Truth, Knowledge, Infinity, and Bliss is indicated.

- Although the specific creation text (**Yato vā imāni...**) does not explicitly list **Satyam Jñānam**, it points back to the definition given in the **Brahma Vallī** of the Taittiriya Upanishad (**Satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma**).
- **Inclusion of Ānanda:** The inquiry concludes with **Ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante** (For truly, beings are born from Bliss). Thus, **Ānanda** is also established as the nature of **Brahma**.

Conclusion: Through this **Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa** (causality), the **Swarūpa Lakṣaṇa** (Existence-Consciousness-Bliss) is established.

Vedic Context (Taittirīya Upaniṣad - Bhṛgu Vallī):

- The text references the dialogue where Bhṛgu approaches his father Varuṇa asking to know Brahman (**adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti**).
- Varuṇa provides indicators (liṅga) rather than a direct definition: **annam prāṇaṃ mano vāk cakṣu** (Food, Prana, Mind, Speech, Eye).
- Varuṇa instructs Bhṛgu to perform **tapas** (inquiry/austerness), which here implies **anvaya-vyatireka** (reasoning through concomitance and discontinuance).
- **Progression of Understanding:** Bhṛgu progresses through identifying Brahman as **Anna** (Matter), **Prāṇa** (Vital Force), **Manas** (Mind), and **Vijñāna** (Intellect).
- **Final Realization:** Bhṛgu realizes **ānando brahmeti vyajānāt** (He knew Bliss as Brahman). The definition based on the origin of the universe (Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa) leads to the realization of the essential nature (Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa) defined as **satyam jñānam anantam brahma**.

Analysis of the World (Jagat)

The **Bhāṣya** provides a detailed breakdown of the attributes of the world (**jagat**) to prove that its cause must be Omniscient and Omnipotent.

Bhāṣya: asya jagato nāmarūpābhyāṃ vyākṛtasya aneka-kartṛ-bhoktṛ-saṃyuktasya pratiniyata-deśa-kāla-nimitta-kriyā-phalāśrayasya manasāpyacintyaracanārūpasya janma-sthiti-bhaṅgaṃ yataḥ sarvajñāt sarvaśakteḥ kāraṇād bhavati tad brahma ...

Translation/Elaboration of Attributes:

1. **Nāmarūpābhyāṃ vyākṛtasya:** The world is differentiated by Name and Form.
2. **Aneka-kartṛ-bhoktṛ-saṃyuktasya:** It is associated with manifold agents (doers) and enjoyers.
3. **Pratiniyata-deśa-kāla-nimitta-kriyā-phalāśrayasya:** It is the locus of actions and their fruits, which are strictly regulated by fixed space, time, and efficient causes. The system of karma is perfect. Every soul receives the exact fruit of their action at the precise time and place required. No one escapes their results, nor do they receive results for actions not done.
4. **Manasāpyacintya-racanā-rūpasya:** Its design and structure are inconceivable even by the mind.

Inference of the Nature of the Cause:

- Such a complex world cannot arise from inert matter.
- **Refutation:** This description negates the theories of the **Cārvāka** (Materialists), **Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika** (Atoms/Paramāṇu), **Sāṅkhya** (Inert Pradhāna), and **Śūnyavādins** (Void).
- **Conclusion:** The cause must be **Sarvajña** (Omniscient) and **Sarvaśakti** (Omnipotent).

The Analogy of the Potter

कारणस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादिसम्भावनार्थानि जगतो विशेषणानि । यथा कुम्भकारः प्रथमं कुम्भशब्दाभेदेन विकल्पितं पृथुबुध्नोदराकारस्वरूपं बुद्धावालिख्य तदात्मना कुम्भं व्याकरोति - बहिः प्रकटयति, तथा परमकारणमपि स्वेप्सितनामरूपात्मना व्याकरोतीत्यनुमीयत इति मत्वाह - **नामरूपाभ्यामिति ।** इत्थम्भावे तृतीया ।

The **Ṭīkā** explains that the adjectives used for the world serve to demonstrate the probability of the Creator's omniscience.

Ṭīkā: kāraṇasya sarvajñatva-ādi-saṃbhāvanārthāni jagato viśeṣaṇāni: The adjectives of the world are for the purpose of showing the probability of the omniscience of the cause.

The Analogy (Dṛṣṭānta): Ṭīkā: yathā kumbhakāraḥ prathamaṃ kumbha-śabdābhedena vikalpitam pṛthu-budhnodarākāra-svarūpaṃ buddhau ālikhya tadātmanā kumbhaṃ vyākaroti

- Explanation: Just as a potter, before making a pot, first resolves in his mind the shape (having a broad base and belly) and the concept identical with the word "pot" (**buddhau ālikhya** - holding it in the intellect), and then manifests it externally.
- Application to Brahman: **tathā parama-kāraṇaṃ api svepsita-nāma-rūpātmanā vyākaroti**. Similarly, the Supreme Cause manifests the world which It has visualized/seen (**īkṣitaṃ**) through name and form.
- This supports **Satkāryavāda**: The effect exists in the cause prior to manifestation.

Grammatical Analysis: Name and Form

- **Phrase: nāma-rūpābhyāṃ** (By name and form).
- **Case Usage:** The Instrumental case (**Ṭṛtīyā**) used here is **Itthambhāve Ṭṛtīyā** (Instrumental indicating a characteristic or sign), not the instrumental of agency/means (karaṇa).
- **Analogy: jaṭābhiḥ tāpasaḥ** (An ascetic identified by matted locks). The locks are a sign (**jñāpaka**) of the ascetic, not the creator of the ascetic. Similarly, Name and Form characterize the manifested world.
    - **Nāma** = The designator/word (Vācaka).
    - **Rūpa** = The object/meaning (Vācya).
    - This implies the world consists of everything possessing sound, touch, form, taste, and smell.

Refutation of Hiraṇyagarbha as the Ultimate Cause

आद्यकार्यं चेतनजन्यम् , कार्यत्वात् , कुम्भवदिति प्रधानशून्ययोर्निरासः । हिरण्यगर्भादिजीवजन्यत्वं निरस्यति - अनेकेति । श्राद्धवैश्वानरेष्ट्यादौ पितापुत्रयोः कर्तृभोक्त्रोर्भेदात्पृथगुक्तिः । 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं सर्व एत आत्मनो व्युच्चरन्ति' इति श्रुत्या स्थूलसूक्ष्मदेहोपाधिद्वारा जीवानां कार्यत्वेन जगन्मध्यपातित्वान्न जगत्कारणत्वमित्यर्थः ।

The text uses logical inference to refute the idea that **Hiraṇyagarbha** (the Cosmic Mind/First Born) is the ultimate cause of the universe.

- **Logical Inference (Anumāna):**

    - **Pakṣa** (Subject): **ādyaṃ kāryam** (The first effect, i.e., Hiraṇyagarbha).
    - **Sādhya** (Probandum): **cetana-janyam** (Created by a conscious being).
    - **Hetu** (Reason): **kāryatvāt** (Because of it being an effect).
    - **Vyāpti** (Concomitance): Whatever is an effect is created by a conscious entity (like a pot).
- **Argument:**
    - **Ṭīkā: Hiraṇyagarbhādi-jīva-janyatvaṃ nirasyati**: This refutes the idea that the world is generated by Jīvas like Hiraṇyagarbha.
    - **Reasoning:**
        - The world contains "many doers or agents and enjoyers" (**aneka-kartṛ-bhoktṛ**). Hiraṇyagarbha, being a Jīva, does not have the capacity to distribute fruits to all these agents.
        - **Distinction of Doer and Enjoyer:** In rituals like **Śrāddha** (offering to ancestors) or **Vaiśvānara-iṣṭi** (for a son's birth), the doer (son/father) is different from the enjoyer (father/son). Only an Omniscient Ishvara can bridge this gap between the agent and the recipient of the fruit.
- **Scriptural Evidence:**
    - The distinction between the Supreme Brahman and Hiraṇyagarbha is established by scripture:
    - **Ṭīkā: yo brahmāṇaṃ vidadhāti pūrvaṃ yo vai vedāṃśca prahiṇoti tasmai** (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.18). (He who creates Brahmā [Hiraṇyagarbha] first and delivers the Vedas to him...).
    - **Ṭīkā: manaḥ sarve prāṇāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve devāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni vyuccaranti** (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.1.20). (From the Self, all vital forces, all worlds, all gods, and all beings issue forth).
- **Nature of Hiraṇyagarbha:**
    - **Ṭīkā: sthūla-sūkṣma-dehopādhi-dvārā jīvānāṃ kāryatvena jagat-madhya-pātitvāt na jagat-kāraṇatvam:** Jīvas (including Hiraṇyagarbha) are conditioned by gross and subtle bodies. Because they are "effects" (**kārya**) and exist within the created order (**jagan-madhya-pātitvāt**), they cannot be the ultimate cause of the universe.

The Consistency of Karma (Pratiniyata-Deśa-Kāla) (Page 104)

कारणस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सम्भावयति - **प्रतिनियतेति ।** प्रतिनियतानि व्यवस्थितानि देशकालनिमित्तानि येषां क्रियाफलानां तदाश्रयस्येत्यर्थः । स्वर्गस्य क्रियाफलस्य मेरुपृष्ठं देशः । देहपातादूर्ध्वं काल उत्तरायणमरणादिनिमित्तं च प्रतिनियतम् । एवं राजसेवाफले ग्रामादेर्देशादिव्यवस्था ज्ञेया । तथा च यथा सेवाफलं देशाद्यभिज्ञदातृकं तथा कर्मफलम् , फलत्वादिति सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिरिति भावः ।

The text elaborates on the precise regulation of the universe to inspire faith in the Omniscience of the Lord.

- **Structure of Karma:** The world is the locus (**āśraya**) of fruits of action regulated by:
    - **Deśa** (Place): e.g., **meru-pṛṣṭham** (The summit of Mount Meru—heaven).
    - **Kāla** (Time): e.g., **deha-pātād ūrdhvam** (After the fall of the body).

    - **Nimitta** (Efficient Cause): e.g., **uttarāyaṇa-maraṇa** (Death during the Northern Solstice).
- **Clarification on Uttarāyaṇa:**
    - It is noted that **uttarāyaṇa** here does not strictly refer to the calendar time (beginning Jan 14/15).
    - It refers to the **Abhimāni-devatā** (Presiding Deities) of the path (Light, Day, Shukla Paksha, etc.) as mentioned in the Bhagavad Gītā (8.24).
    - It serves as a **Nimitta** (instrumental cause) for attaining specific results, not just a measurement of time.
- **Conclusion:**
    - The phrase **pratiniyata…** highlights that the administration of the universe is perfect.
    - Just as the presiding deities manage their respective functions, the Supreme Lord manages the complex network of karma (karmaphaladātā).
    - The aspirant need not worry about the management of the world or the justice of results, as the Omniscient Lord ensures every action finds its appropriate fruit.
- **The Necessity of Knowledge:** If the fruit of action is this specific and calculated, the dispenser of the fruit (**Phaladātā**) must possess the knowledge of all these intricate details.
- **The Necessity of Power:** The dispenser must also be **Sarvaśakti** (All-powerful) to enforce the result. Even if a sinner does not want the result (suffering/hell), the Creator has the power to deliver it despite the Jīva's resistance. One cannot say "no" to **Īśvara**.

The Analogy of the King

एवं राजसेवाफले ग्रामादेर्देशादिव्यवस्था ज्ञेया । तथा च यथा सेवाफलं देशाद्यभिज्ञदातृकं तथा कर्मफलम् , फलत्वादिति सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिरिति भावः ।

Ṭīkā: evaṃ rājasevāphale grāmādeḥ deśādivyavasthā jñeyā

- Just as a King grants a village as a reward for service, knowing exactly who served him, with what intensity, and where the village is located, **Īśvara** grants the fruits of Vedic actions.
- **Ṭīkā** confirms this logic:
  yathā sevāphalaṃ deśādyabhijñadātṛkam tathā karmaphalam phalatvād iti sarvajñatvasiddhiḥ iti bhāvaḥ
- **Logic:**
    - **Pakṣa** (Subject): **Karmaphalam** (Fruit of action).
    - **Hetu** (Reason): **Phalatvāt** (Because it is a fruit/result).
    - **Sādhya** (What is to be proved): It comes from a giver who knows specific space/time (**deśādyabhijñadātṛkam**).
- **Conclusion:** The dispenser must know the precise **deśa**, **kāla**, and **nimitta** for all beings. Thus, **Īśvara** is established as **Sarvajña**.

Establishing the Omnipotence of the Creator (Sarvaśaktitvam)

सर्वशक्तित्वं सम्भावयति - मनसापीति ।

Bhāṣya: manasāpyacintyaracanārūpasya janmasthitibhaṅgam yataḥ sarvajñāt sarvaśakteḥ kāraṇāt bhavati: The universe possesses a design (**racanā**) that is inconceivable (**acintya**) even to the human mind. To create, sustain, and destroy such an infinite, complex cosmos requires infinite power. Thus, we must imagine/postulate infinite power (**ananta śakti**) in the cause.

Objection: The Six Modifications (Ṣaḍ-bhāvavikārāḥ)

नन्वन्येऽपि वृद्धिपरिणामादयो भावविकाराः सन्तीति किमिति जन्मादीत्यादिपदेन न गृह्यन्ते तत्राह - **अन्येषामिति ।** वृद्धिपरिणामयोर्जन्मनि अपक्षयस्य नाशेऽन्तर्भावः इति भावः ।

अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानामिह ग्रहणम् ।

An objection is raised regarding the definition of the changes in the universe.

Objection: Ṭīkā: nanu anyepi vṛddhipariṇāmādayo bhāvavikārāḥ santi iti kimiti janmādi ityādipadena na gṛhyante

The Query: Why does the Sūtra (**janmādyasya**) only mention three states: Origin (**Janma**), Sustenance (**Sthiti**), and Destruction (**Bhaṅga**)?

According to Yāska's Nirukta, there are six modifications of becoming:

- **Jāyate** (Is born)
- **Asti** (Exists)
- **Vardhate** (Grows)
- **Vipariṇamate** (Changes/Metamorphoses)
- **Apakṣīyate** (Decays)
- **Vinaśyati** (Perishes)

Why are **Vṛddhi** (growth), **Vipariṇāma** (change), and **Apakṣaya** (decay) excluded?

Bhāṣya Answer: anyeṣāmapi bhāvavikārāṇāṃ triṣveva antarbhāva iti janmasthitināśānām eva grahaṇam

- The other modifications are included (**antarbhāva**) within the three mentioned:
    - **Vṛddhi** and **Vipariṇāma** are included in **Janma** (or the process of existence/sustenance).
    - **Apakṣaya** is included in **Nāśa**.
- Therefore, mentioning three covers all six.

Discussion on Yāska's Nirukta vs. Śruti (Page 105)

ननु देहो 'जायते, अस्ति, वर्धते, विपरिणमते, अपक्षीयते, विनश्यति' इति यास्कमुनिवाक्यमेतत्सूत्रमूलं किं न स्यादत आह - यास्केति । यास्कमुनिः किल महाभूतानामुत्पन्नानां स्थितिकाले भौतिकेषु प्रत्यक्षेण जन्मादिषट्कमुपलभ्य निरुक्तवाक्यं

चकार । तन्मूलीकृत्य जन्मादिषट्ककारणत्वं लक्षणं सूत्रार्थ इति ग्रहणे सूत्रकृता ब्रह्मलक्षणं न सङ्गृहीतं किन्तु महाभूतानां लक्षणमुक्तमिति शङ्का स्यात्सा मा भूदिति ये श्रुत्युक्ता जन्मादयस्त एव गृह्यन्त इत्यर्थः । यदि निरुक्तस्यापि श्रुतिर्मूलमिति महाभूतजन्मादिकमर्थस्तर्हि सा श्रुतिरेव सूत्रस्य मूलमस्तु, किमन्तर्गडुना निरुक्तेनेति भावः ।

यास्कपरिपठितानां तु 'जायतेऽस्ति' इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले सम्भाव्यमानत्वान्मूलकारणादुत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युरित्याशङ्क्येत । तन्मा शङ्कि; इति या उत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, त एव गृह्यन्ते ।

Objection: Why not simply use Yāska's sentence as the root/source of this Sūtra since it lists all six explicitly?

Bhāṣya: yāska paripaṭhitānāṃ tu 'jāyate asti' ityādīnāṃ grahaṇe teṣāṃ jagataḥ sthitikāle saṃbhāvyamānatvāt. mūlakāraṇāt utpattisthitināśā jagato na gṛhītāḥ syuḥ.

Explanation:

- **Context of Yāska:** Yāska's list applies to entities within the created world during the time of sustenance (**sthitikāle**).
    - Example: A pot or a body is born, exists, grows, etc.
    - **Ṭīkā** notes: **mahābhūtānām utpannānāṃ sthitikāle bhautikeṣu...** (These changes are perceived in physical elements after they are created).
- **Context of Brahma Sūtra:** We are discussing the **Mūlakāraṇa** (Primal Cause) of the entire universe's origin, not just the changes of objects inside the universe.
- **The Risk:** If we rely on Nirukta, one might mistake the definition as applying to the material elements (**Mahābhūtas**) rather than **Brahma**. It would define the modification of elements, not the Absolute Cause.

Siddhānta (Conclusion):

- The Sūtra is based on **Śruti** (The Vedas), specifically Taittirīya Upaniṣad: **yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante...**
- Since **Śruti** mentions three (Creation, Sustenance, Dissolution), the Sūtra adopts three.

The "Antargaḍu" Analogy: Ṭīkā: yadi niruktasyāpi śrutirmūlam iti mahābhūtajanmādikam arthaḥ tarhi sā śrutiḥ eva sūtrasya mūlam astu, kimantargaḍunā niruktena

- Even if one argues that Nirukta is based on **Śruti**, why go through a middle-man?
- **Antargaḍu**: Refers to a useless fleshy growth (like the uvula or tonsils inside the throat/neck) that serves no purpose.
- Bringing Nirukta in between **Śruti** and the **Sūtra** is like a useless "Antargaḍu". We should go directly to the source (**Śruti**).

Rejection of Alternative Causes

यदि जगतो ब्रह्मातिरिक्तं कारणं स्यात्तदा ब्रह्मलक्षणस्य तत्रातिव्याप्त्यादिदोषः स्यात् , अतस्तन्निरासाय लक्षणसूत्रेण ब्रह्म विना जगज्जन्मादिकं न सम्भवति, कारणान्तरासम्भवादिति युक्तिः सूत्रिता । सा तर्कपादे (२.२) विस्तरेण वक्ष्यते ।अधुना

सङ्क्षेपेण तां दर्शयति - **न यथोक्तेत्यादिना ।** नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्येत्यादीनां च चतुर्णां जगद्विशेषणानां व्याख्यानावसरे प्रधानशून्ययोः संसारिणश्च निरासो दर्शितः । परमाणूनामचेतनानां स्वतः प्रवृत्त्ययोगात् , जीवान्यस्य ज्ञानशून्यत्वनियमेनानुमानात्सर्वज्ञेश्वरासिद्धौ तेषां प्रेरकाभावात् , जगदारम्भकत्वासम्भव इति भावः ।

न यथोक्तविशेषणस्य जगतो यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्त्वा, अन्यतः प्रधानादचेतनात् अणुभ्यः अभावात् संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि सम्भावयितुं शक्यम् ।

The **Bhāṣya** clarifies that no cause other than **Brahma** fits the complex description of the universe.

Bhāṣya: na yathoktaviśeṣaṇasya jagato yathoktaviśeṣaṇam īśvaram muktvā anyataḥ pradhānāt, acetanāt, aṇubhyo, abhāvāt, saṃsāriṇo vā, utpattyādi saṃbhāvayituṃ śakyam.

Detailed Refutation: The universe (with the 4 attributes: Name/form, Order, Design, etc.) cannot originate from:

1. **Pradhānāt / Acetanāt**: The Sāṅkhya concept of inert matter. Inert matter cannot design a complex world without intelligence.
2. **Aṇubhyaḥ**: The **Paramāṇu** (atoms) of the Vaiśeṣikas. As they are inert (**Acetana**), they cannot have independent impulse/movement (**svataḥ pravṛtti ayogāt**) to coordinate creation.
3. **Abhāvāt**: The **Śūnyavāda** (Void/Nihilism). Something cannot come from nothing.
4. **Saṃsāriṇaḥ vā**: The individual soul (**Jīva**) or even **Hiraṇyagarbha**.
    - **Reason: Jīvas** are limited in knowledge and power.
    - **Ṭīkā**: **jīvādanyasya jñānaśūnyatva niyamena...** (Anything other than Jīva is inert/knowledge-less, and Jīva is limited; therefore, a specific **Sarvajña Īśvara** is required).

Rejection of Svabhāva-vāda (Naturalism) (Page 107-108)

स्वभावादेव विचित्रं जगदिति लोकायतस्तं प्रत्याह - न चेति । जगत उत्पत्त्यादि सम्भावयितुं न शक्यमित्यन्वयः । किं स्वयमेव स्वस्य हेतुरिति स्वभाव उत कारणानपेक्षत्वम् । नाद्यः, आत्माश्रयात् । न द्वितीय इत्याह - विशिष्टेति । विशिष्टान्यसाधारणानि देशकालनिमित्तानि । तेषां कार्यार्थिभिरुपादीयमानत्वात्कार्यस्य कारणानपेक्षत्वं न युक्तमित्यर्थः । अनेपेक्षत्वे धान्यार्थिनां भूविशेषे वर्षादिकाले बीजादिनिमित्ते च प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यादिति भावः ।

न च स्वभावतः, विशिष्टदेशकालनिमित्तानामिहोपादानात् ।

Objection (Lokāyata/Materialist): Why seek a cause? The world is wonderful by nature (**svabhāvādeva vicitram jagat**). Fire is hot, water is cool; it just happens.

Bhāṣya Refutation: na ca svabhāvataḥ viśiṣṭadeśakālanimittānām iha upādānāt

- **The Argument:** The text mentions specific (**viśiṣṭa**) space, time, and causes.
- **Logic:**
    - **Option A: Svabhāva** means the thing is its own cause (**svayameva svasya hetuḥ**). This leads to the defect of **Atmāśraya** (Self-dependence/Circular logic).

    - **Option B: Svabhāva** means no cause is needed (**kāraṇa-anapekṣatvam**).
- **Refutation of Option B:**
    - If no cause were needed, farmers would not need specific seeds, soil (**bhūviśeṣa**), or seasons (**varṣādikāla**) to grow crops.
    - **vyatireka**: **anapekṣatve dhānyārthināṃ... pravṛttirna syāt**. (If independent of causes, those seeking grain would not strive for land and rain).
    - Since we see that results depend on specific antecedents, the "No Cause" theory is invalid.

The Opponent's Stand (Pūrvapakṣa): The Sufficiency of Inference (Page 108-109)

पूर्वोक्तसर्वज्ञत्वादिविशेषणकमीश्वरं मुक्त्वा जगत उत्पत्यादिकं न सम्भवतीति भाष्येण कर्तारं विना कार्यं नास्तीति व्यतिरेक उक्तः । तेन यत्कार्यं तत्सकर्तृकमिति व्याप्तिर्ज्ञायते । एतदेव व्याप्तिज्ञानं जगति पक्षे कर्तारं साधयत्सर्वज्ञेश्वरं साधयति किं श्रुत्येति तार्किकाणां भ्रान्तिमुपन्यस्यति - एतदेवेति । एतदेवानुमानमेव साधनं, न श्रुतिरिति मन्यन्त इति योजना । अथवा एतद्व्याप्तिज्ञानमेव श्रुत्यनुग्राहकयुक्तिमात्रत्वेनास्मत्सम्मतं सदनुमानं स्वतन्त्रमिति मन्यन्त इत्यर्थः ।

एतदेवानुमानं संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्तित्वादिसाधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणवादिनः ॥

The discussion begins with the **Pūrvapakṣa** (Opposing view, specifically the **Naiyāyika** and **Vaiśeṣika** schools) asserting that Scripture (**Śruti**) is unnecessary to prove the existence of **Īśvara**.

Core Argument: The existence of an Omniscient Creator can be established solely through **Vyāpti Jñāna** (knowledge of invariable concomitance) and **Anumāna** (inference).

Bhāṣya:Etadevānumānaṁ saṁsārivyatirikta īśvara astitvādi sādhanaṁ manyante

Explanation: The logicians believe that this specific inference alone is the means (**Sādhanam**) to establish the existence of **Īśvara**, who is distinct from the transmigrating soul (**Saṁsāri**).

Grammatical Analysis:

- The term used is **Īśvarakāraṇinaḥ**. The suffix here is the **Ini** Pratyaya.
- **Vigraha** (Etymological breakdown): **Īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṁ asya asti iti īśvarakāraṇin, te īśvarakāraṇinaḥ** (Those who hold the view that **Īśvara** is the cause).
- **Note:** Specifically, these logicians view **Īśvara** as the efficient cause (**Nimitta Kāraṇa**), unlike Vedānta which views Him as both material and efficient.

The Logician's Error:

- **Vyatirekī Vyāpti**: Without a Creator (**Kartā**), there is no Effect (**Kārya**).
- **Anvaya/Vyāpti**: **yad kāryam tat sakartṛkam** (Wherever there is an effect, there is a maker).

- **Application:** The World is an effect (works like a product); therefore, it must have a Maker (**Īśvara**).
- The **Bhāṣya** notes that Tārkikas (Logicians) might seize this argument to claim that **Īśvara** can be proved by **Anumāna** (Inference/Logic) alone, rendering **Śruti** unnecessary.
- The text calls this a "delusion of the Logicians" (**tārkikāṇām bhrāntim**), which will be addressed in the subsequent section.

The Misconception of the Logicians

- **Ṭīkā: Etadevānumānaṁ eva sādhanaṁ, na śrutiḥ iti manyante iti yojanā:** They believe inference is the only tool (**Eva sādhanam**) and rely on it independently (**Svatantra**), rejecting the necessity of **Śruti**.
- **The Vedāntin's Counter-View:**
    - Vedānta accepts inference only if it is **Śrutyanugrāhaka yukti** (reasoning that is subservient to and supportive of Scripture).
    - The logicians erroneously consider inference to be **Svatantra** (independent).

The Inference Logic (The Proof of Existence and Omniscience)

सर्वज्ञत्वमादिशब्दार्थः । यद्वा व्याप्तिज्ञानसहकृतमेतल्लक्षणमेवानुमानं स्वतन्त्रं मन्यन्त इत्यर्थः । तत्रायं विभागः व्याप्तिज्ञानात् जगतः कर्तास्तीत्यस्तित्वसिद्धिः । पश्चात्स कर्ता, सर्वज्ञः, जगत्कारणत्वात् , व्यतिरेकेण कुलालादिवदिति सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धिर्लक्षणादिति ।

The logicians categorize their proof into two stages: proving existence (**astitva**) and proving attributes (**Sarvajñatva** - Omniscience).

1. Proving Existence (Astitva Siddhi)

- **The Syllogism:**
    - **Vyāpti** (Universal Rule): **Yat kāryaṁ tat sakartṛkam** (Whatever is an effect must have a creator/agent).
    - **Application:** The world is an effect (**Kārya**).
    - **Conclusion:** Therefore, the Creator (**Kartā**) of the world must exist.
- **Popular Logic of the Logicians:** Just as "the earth (**Kshiti**), a sprout (**Aṅkura**) etc.must have a creator as they are an effect, like a pot", the universe is an effect (created) and therefore must have a creator.
- The logicians erroneously believe that this (**vyāpti)** inference and this (**lakshanam**) **sūtra** can independently establish the existence of **Īśvara**. **Śruti** is not necessary to prove existence.

2. Proving Omniscience (Sarvajñatva Siddhi)

Once the existence of a Creator is proved, the logicians use a second inference to prove He is All-Knowing.

- **Inference:**
    - **Pakṣa** (Subject): The Creator established in the previous inference.
    - **Sādhya** (Thing to be proved): He is **Sarvajña** (Omniscient).
    - **Hetu** (Reason): **Jagat kāraṇatvāt** (Because He is the cause of the universe).
- **Analogy (Dṛṣṭānta):**
    - **Kulālādivat** (Like a potter).
    - **Vyatireka Vyāpti** (Negative Concomitance):The logicians argue that there is no Omniscient being other than **Īśvara**. Therefore, they use negative analogies: "That which is not omniscient cannot be the creator of the world."
- **Alternative Logic: Yo yasya kartā sa tajjñaḥ** (Whoever is the maker of an object knows that object).
    - Since **Īśvara** is the maker of **Sarva** (everything), He must be **Sarvajña** (knower of everything).

The Vedāntin's Refutation (Siddhānta)

अत्र मन्यन्त इत्यनुमानस्याभासत्वं सूचितम् । तथाहि - अङ्कुरादौ तावज्जीवः कर्ता न भवति जीवाद्भिन्नस्य घटवदचेतनत्वनियमादन्यः कर्ता नास्त्येवेति व्यतिरेकनिश्चयात् , यत्कार्यं तत्सकर्तृकमिति व्याप्तिज्ञानासिद्धिः । लक्षणलिङ्गकानुमाने तु बाधः अशरीरस्य जन्मज्ञानायोगात् , यज्ज्ञानं तन्मनोजन्यमिति व्याप्तिविरोधेन नित्यज्ञानासिद्धेर्ज्ञानाभावनिश्चयात् , तस्मादतीन्द्रियार्थे श्रुतिरेव शरणम् । श्रुत्यर्थसम्भावनार्थत्वेनानुमानं युक्तिमात्रं न स्वतन्त्रमिति भावः ।

The Siddhāntin rejects the independent validity of this inference, calling it **Anumānābhāsa** (semblance of inference/fallacious reasoning).

1. The Flaw in the Example (Dṛṣṭānta Doṣa)

- **Argument: Aṅkurādau tāvad jīvaḥ kartā na bhavati:** In the case of a sprout (**Aṅkura**), we do not observe a **Jīva** (individual) creating it.
- **Vyatireka Rule: jīvād bhinnasya ghaṭavat acetanatva niyamāt anyaḥ kartā nāsti:** Anything distinct from a **Jīva** is observed to be inanimate (**Acetana**), like a pot. Therefore, there cannot be a creator other than the **Jīva**.
- **Conclusion:** The **Vyāpti Jñāna** (knowledge of concomitance) "Whatever is an effect has a creator" is unestablished (**Asiddha**) in the case of natural phenomena like sprouts.

2. The Argument of the Body (Śarīra Argument)

The inference that the Omniscient **Īśvara** is the creator of the universe is a **Bādhita** (contradicted) inference because of the nature of knowledge.

- **The Contradiction:aśarīrasya janyajñānāyogāt: Īśvara** is defined as **Aśarīra** (bodiless). A bodiless entity cannot have generated knowledge (**Janya Jñāna**).
- **The Rule of Knowledge:Yad jñānaṁ tat manojanyam:** All knowledge is generated by the mind (**Manas**). Since **Īśvara** has no body/mind, He cannot possess knowledge.

- **Refutation of Eternal Knowledge:** If the logician argues **Īśvara** has eternal knowledge, it contradicts the general rule that knowledge is a product of instrumentalities (like the mind).
- **Result: Jñāna abhāva niścayaḥ** (It is determined that there is an absence of eternal knowledge in an instrumentless entity). Thus, the inference fails to prove Omniscience.

The Role of Scripture vs. Logic

As independent inference is prone to defects and counter-arguments (**Bādha**), the **Bhāṣya** establishes the supremacy of Scripture.

1. Scripture as the Final Resort

- **Conclusion: Tasmād atīndriyārthe śrutireva śaraṇam:** Therefore, in matters beyond the senses (**Atīndriya**)—such as Dharma and Brahman—**Śruti** alone is the refuge/authority.

2. The Function of Inference

- **Śrutyartha sambhāvanārthatvena anumānam yukti mātram na svatantram:** Inference is not useless, but it is not independent. Inference functions as a **Yukti** (reasoning) to establish **Sambhāvanā** (possibility/plausibility) of the meaning of **Śruti**.
- **Example:** If **Śruti** declares the world is **Mithyā** (illusory), the intellect may doubt this due to the perception of the world's reality. Logic helps clarify how it is possible (e.g., using the rope-snake analogy), but it does not independently prove the truth.
- **Limits of Perception:** The eye sees a form, but the eye cannot judge "Truth" or "Falsity." Validity is a judgment of the intellect, aided by reasoning, which serves Scripture.

The Purpose of the Brahma Sūtras (Page 109-110)

नन्विदमयुक्तम् , श्रुतेरनुमानान्तर्भावमभिप्रेत्य भवदीयसूत्रकृतानुमानस्यैवोपन्यस्यत्वादिति वैशेषिकः शङ्कते - नन्विति । अतो मन्यन्ते इत्यनुमानस्याभासोक्तिरयुक्तेति भावः । यदि श्रुतीनां स्वतन्त्रमानत्वं न स्यात्तर्हि 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' इत्यादिना तासां तात्पर्यं सूत्रकृन्न विचारयेत् , तस्मादुत्तरसूत्राणां श्रुतिविचारार्थत्वात् जन्मादिसूत्रेऽपि श्रुतिरेव स्वातन्त्र्येण विचार्यते नानुमानमिति परिहरति - नेति ।

नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे । न; वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात्सूत्राणाम् । वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते । वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः, नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता ।

Ṭīkā: śruteḥ anumāna antarbhāvam abhipretya bhavadīya sūtrakṛtānumānasya eva upanyasyatvāt iti: A specific objection is raised by the **Vaiśeṣika**: "But the Sūtra author (Vyāsa) himself used inference in the Janmādyasya yataḥ sūtra!"

The Siddhāntin's Defense

Ṭīkā:yadi śrutīnāṃ svatantramānatvaṃ na syāttarhi 'tattu samanvayāt' ityādinā tāsāṃ tātparyaṃ sūtrakṛnna vicārayet

- **Argument:** If **Śruti** were not the independent authority, Maharṣi Veda Vyāsa would not have written the subsequent sūtra: **Tattu Samanvayāt** (But that [Brahman is known] because of the harmony [of scriptures]).
- **Bhāṣya Definition of Sūtras:**
  Vedānta-vākya-kusuma-grathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇām
    - **Translation:** The Sūtras are for the purpose of stringing together (**Grathana**) the flowers (**Kusuma**) which are the statements of the **Vedānta** (Upanishads).
    - **Implication:** The Sūtras act as the thread holding the Upanishadic declarations together. They do not seek to introduce independent inference but to organize Scriptural revelation.

The Methodology of the Brahma Sūtras

The **Bhāṣya** clarifies the specific function of the Sūtras, refuting the idea that they are meant to facilitate independent logical inference.

- **Bhāṣya: Vedāntavākyāni hi sūtrairudāhṛtya vicāryante**
- **Meaning: Udāhṛtya**: Cited/Quoted. **Vicāryante**: Are discussed/deliberated upon.
- The Sūtras do not function independently; they explicitly cite the sentences of the **Vedānta** (Upanishads) and deliberate upon them.
- The Sūtras act as a connecting thread. They quote the **Vedānta Vākya**, keep it in focus, and analyze it.
- **Rejection of Independent Inference:** Since the primary subject (**Mukhya Viṣaya**) is the scriptural statement itself, there is no need to introduce independent inference (**Anumāna**) between the Sūtra and the Upanishad.

The Cause of Brahman-Realization (Brahmāvagati)

The **Bhāṣya** establishes exactly how the realization of Brahman is achieved, distinguishing it from the result of logical inference.

- **Bhāṣya: vākyārtha vicāraṇā adhyavasānanirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatiḥ, na anumānādipramāṇāntara nirvṛttā**
- **Key Definitions:**
    - **Brahmāvagatiḥ**: The realization/knowledge of Brahman.
    - **Vākyārtha Vicāraṇa**: Inquiry into the meaning of the scriptural sentence.
    - **Adhyavasāna**: Firm determination/ascertainment.
    - **Nirvṛttā**: Accomplished/Born from.
- Realization is accomplished solely through the firm ascertainment derived from inquiring into the meaning of the Upanishadic sentences. It is **not** accomplished through other means of knowledge (**Pramāṇāntara**) such as inference (**Anumāna**).
- **Role of Intellect:** The realization occurs where the intellect attains a specific resolve (**Niścaya**) regarding the meaning of the sentence. This intellectual surrender/resolution in the text leads to **Sākṣātkāra** (direct realization).

- **Limitations of Logic:** One cannot attain **Brahma Jñāna** merely by excessive independent logical contemplation. The focus must be on the words of the **Śruti** aided by the **Bhāṣya** and **Ṭīkā**.

Examples of Scriptural Contemplation

Following examples illustrate how traditional **Ācāryas** focus entirely on the analysis of specific Mantras to produce vast Vedantic literature, rather than using independent logic.

- **Example 1: Pañcadaśī (Chapter 7 - Tṛptidīpaḥ)**
  - **Source Mantra: Ātmānaṃ ced vijānīyād ayam asmīti pūruṣaḥ...** (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.12).
  - **Elaboration:** Swami Vidyaranya wrote approximately 300 verses analyzing this single Mantra to explain the nature of the Self and desire.
- **Example 2: Pañcadaśī (Chapter 2 - Pañcamahābhūtaviveka)**
  - **Source Mantra: Sadeva somyedam agra āsīt...** (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1).
  - **Elaboration:** The entire chapter investigates this statement regarding Existence prior to creation.
- **Example 3: Pañcadaśī (Chapter 6 - Citradīpaḥ)**
  - **Source Mantra: Eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo'ntaryāmy eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya...** (Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Verse 6).
  - **Elaboration:** The texts elaborate extensively on this specific Mantra describing the Lord as the womb of all.

Conclusion: Whether it is independent works (**Prakaraṇa**) or commentaries, the method is always **Vākyārtha Vicāraṇa** (deliberation on the sentence meaning) leading to **Adhyavasāna** (firm conclusion).

The Goal of the Seeker and the Shastra

किं च मुमुक्षोर्ब्रह्मावगतिरभीष्टा यदर्थमस्य शास्त्रस्यारम्भः, सा च नानुमानात् , ‘तं त्वौपनिषदम्’ इति श्रुतेः । अतो नानुमानं विचार्यमित्याह - वाक्यार्थेति । वाक्यस्य तदर्थस्य च विचाराद्यध्यवसानं तात्पर्यनिश्चयः प्रमेयसम्भवनिश्चयश्च तेन जाता ब्रह्मावगतिर्मुक्तये भवतीत्यर्थः । सम्भवो बाधाभावः ।

The **Ṭīkā** expands on why inference is insufficient for the seeker of liberation.

- **Ṭīkā: kiñca mumukṣoḥ brahmāvagatiḥ abhīṣṭā yadartham asya śāstrasya ārambhaḥ. sā ca na anumānāt**
- **Explanation:**
  - **Mumukṣu**: The seeker of liberation.
  - **Abhīṣṭā**: Desired/Sought after.
  - **Śāstra**: The Brahma Sūtras.
  - The seeker desires **Brahmāvagati**. This **Śāstra** (Brahma Sūtra) was commenced specifically for that purpose. That realization cannot be attained through inference.
- **Distinction between Prakaraṇa and Śāstra:**

    - Texts like the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā are termed **Prakaraṇa Granthas**.
    - The Brahma Sūtra is termed **Śāstra** because it covers all comprehensive limbs: determining the qualified student (**Adhikāri**), the subject matter, logic (**Upapatti**), definitions of **Tat** and **Tvam**, establishing identity (**Aikya**), resolving contradictions, and explaining the means and fruit (**Sādhana** and **Phala**).

The Final Proof: Scriptural Testimony

The discussion concludes by citing a specific scriptural authority that limits the knowledge of the Self to the Upanishads.

- **Śruti: Tam tvaupaniṣadaṁ puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi** (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.26)
- Sage Yājñavalkya to Śākalya**:** "I ask you about that **Puruṣa** who is known only through the Upanishads (**Aupaniṣadam**)."
- **Implication:** Since the **Puruṣa** is explicitly defined as being known via the Upanishads, inference (**Anumāna**) is not the primary means of inquiry. The subject of inquiry is the Upanishadic sentence.

The Technical Process of Realization

The notes elaborate on the cognitive process required to reach **Brahmāvagati**.

1. The Progression of Understanding

To understand the sentence, one must follow the sequence:

1. **Pada Jñāna**: Knowledge of the individual words.
2. **Padārtha Jñāna**: Knowledge of the meaning of the words.
3. **Vākyārtha Jñāna**: Knowledge of the sentence's meaning.

2. Definition of Adhyavasāna (Firm Resolve)

The **Ṭīkā** defines **Adhyavasāna** as consisting of two distinct certainties:

- **Tātparya Niścaya**: Determination of the purport (true intent) of the scripture.
    - Achieved by: Using the six indicators (**Ṣaḍvidha Liṅga**) like Upakrama (commencement), Upasaṃhāra (conclusion), etc.
    - Result: Removes **Pramāṇa Asambhāvanā** (doubt regarding the validity of the means of knowledge).
- **Prameya Sambhava Niścaya**: Determination of the possibility of the object of knowledge.
    - Result: Removes **Prameya Asambhāvanā** (doubt regarding the object itself—e.g., "How can the world be false?").
    - Mechanism: This is where logic (**Yukti**) plays a subordinate role to show that the scriptural truth is plausible.

Definition of Sambhava

What does "Sambhava" mean in this context? **Bādhābhāvaḥ** (The absence of contradiction). To determine that the **Prameya** (Brahman/Oneness) is "possible" is to determine that it is not contradicted by other means of knowledge. This certainty, combined with the understanding of the sentence, leads to Liberation (**Mukti**).

- **The Result (Phala):**
    - **Vairāgya (Dispassion):** When the world is determined to be false (**Mithyā**) and the self is realized as **Ānanda-svarūpa** (nature of bliss), complete dispassion toward worldly objects arises naturally.
    - **Brahmāvagati:** From this certainty arises the direct realization of **Brahman**, leading to **Mukti** (Liberation).
- **Prameya-sambhava Definition:** It is the absence of any contradiction obstructing the knowledge "I am **Brahman**" (ahaṃ brahma asmi).

The Role of Inference (Anumāna) in Vedānta

ननु किमनुमानमुपेक्षितमेव नेत्याह - सत्सु त्विति ।

सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु, तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्याय अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् , न निवार्यते, श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् ।

Ṭīkā: kim anumānam upekṣitam eva

A **Pūrvapakṣa** (objection) is raised: Does the focus on scripture mean that **Anumāna** (inference/logic) is completely ignored?

Siddhānta View

Bhāṣya: satsu tu vedāntavākyeṣu jagato janmādikāraṇavādiṣu tadarthagrahaṇadārḍhyāya anumānamapi vedāntavākyāvirodhi pramāṇaṃ bhavat na nivāryate śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt

No, inference is not ignored. Inference that aids the understanding of scripture is accepted.

- Even though **Vedānta** sentences serve as the primary proof for the origin of the world from **Brahman**, inference is not rejected if it:
    1. Reinforces the grasp of the scriptural meaning (**Tad-artha-grahaṇa-dārḍhyāya**).
    2. Is not contradictory to **Vedānta** sentences (**Vedānta-vākya-avirodhi**).
- In this context, inference acts as a helpful auxiliary (**Sahāyam**) to confirm the meaning derived from **Śruti** (that **Brahman** is the cause of the world).

Inferences Supporting Non-Duality

विमतमभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानकम् , कार्यत्वादूर्णनाभ्यारब्धतन्त्वादिवत् , विमतं चेतनप्रकृतिकम् , कार्यत्वात् , सुखादिवदित्यनुमानं श्रुत्यर्थदार्ढ्याय अपेक्षितमित्यर्थः । दार्ढ्यं संशयविपर्यासनिवृत्तिः ।

To logically demonstrate that the world has a single, conscious material and efficient cause, two specific inferences are provided.

Inference 1: The Unified Cause

- **Pakṣa (Subject): Vimatam** (The disputed entity, i.e., the World/ **Jagat**).
- **Sādhya (Thing to be Proved): Abhinna-nimittopādānakam** (Having a material cause that is identical to the efficient cause).
- **Hetu (Reason): Kāryatvāt** (Because it is an effect/created entity).
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example): urṇanābhi-ārabdha-tantvādivat** (Like the web threads created by a spider).

Explanation:

- **Logic of Lāghava:** Just as constructing a house requires many workers, one might assume the vast universe requires many creators (**Gaurava** - heaviness/complexity). However, using the logic of simplicity (Lāghava), it is rational to posit a single Omniscient agent.
- **The Spider Analogy:** The spider is unique because it is both the intelligent maker (efficient cause) and the producer of the material (material cause) for its web.
- **Note on Validity:** This Hetu (being an effect) does not apply to a pot (Ghaṭa), where the potter and clay are different. Hence, the specific example of the spider is necessary to prove **Abhinna-nimittopādānakam**.

Inference 2: The Material Cause of Sentient Nature

- **Pakṣa (Subject): Vimatam** (The World).
- **Sādhya (Thing to be Proved): Cetana-prakṛtikam** (Having a sentient nature as its material/originating cause).
- **Hetu (Reason): Kāryatvāt** (Because it is an effect).
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example): Sukhādivat** (Like pleasure/happiness).

Explanation:

- **Prakṛti Definition:** Here, **Prakṛti** refers to the **Upādāna** (material cause) or that which initiates (Ārambhaka).
- **Example Related to Nyāya School:** In the Nyāya system (used here for argumentation), joy (Sukha) is an effect that resides in the **Ātman**. While Nyāya considers **Ātman** the substratum of knowledge rather than Knowledge itself, it still appears to be the "sentient base" in combination with knowledge. The inference argues that just as joy arises from a sentient locus, being an effect the world arises from a Conscious material Cause (**Brahman**).

The Purpose of Logic: Dārḍhyam (Firmness)

Why is this logic needed if Scripture is the authority? It is for **Dārḍhyam** (firmness).

- **Definition: Dārḍhyam** means **Saṃśaya-viparyāsa-nivṛttiḥ** (The complete removal of doubt and contrary notions).
- **The Goal:** The realization "I am **Brahman**" and "The world is **Mithyā**" must become so unshakeable that under no circumstance—not even a terminal illness or the deterioration of the body—can trigger the thought "I am this body."
- **Viparyāsa (Contrary Notion):** This is the habitual identification (e.g., "I am dying," "I am suffering"). Logic and reflection (**Manana**) are practiced during quiet moments to identify where these contrary notions infiltrate the mind and to cut them off before they take root.
- When this knowledge becomes completely steadfast, it results in **Sākṣātkāra** (direct realization) for the **Mahātmā** or seeker.

Mananam: Reflection on Jñāna Dārḍhyam (Firmness in Knowledge)

Dṛḍha Jñāna (Firm Knowledge) is that state where neither doubt nor contrary feelings remain. It is characterized by the unshakeable conviction that the world is **Mithyā** (illusory). This conviction must persist under all circumstances.

Testing Firmness: The Body-Identification Test

The true test of **Dṛḍha Jñāna** is that even in specific, challenging circumstances, the intellect should not revert to the contrary notion: "I am the body."

Illustrative Example: The Mahātmā and Disease

Consider a **Mahātmā** or an advanced **Sādhaka** who is aging.

- Someone informs them, or a diagnosis reveals, that there is a severe disease (e.g., cancer) in the body.
- **The Reaction of Firmness:** Because the intellect is established in the truth that "I am not the body" and "The body is **Mithyā**," the diagnosis does not trigger the thought "I am the body." No matter what happens to the physical form—good or bad—the identification does not return.
- **Action vs. Identification:** Necessary actions (medical treatment) may be taken, or they may not. However, if a thought arises such as "I am worried about the body," it is immediately witnessed and illuminated as an unnecessary modification (**Vṛtti**).
- **Immediate Cessation:** The moment such a thought arises, the seeker realizes, "What was the benefit of all this contemplation if I am still worried?" The **Vṛtti** is instantly dismissed.

Key Insight: The primary goal is to cut the specific **Vṛtti** that claims, "I am the body." By paying attention to the removal of this fundamental **Viparyāsa**, other minor doubts in life are automatically resolved.

The Subtle Obstacle: Anxiety for Liberation

A significant manifestation of **Viparyāsa** (contrary notion) is the anxiety regarding **Mokṣa** after significant study.

- **The Erroneous Thought:** "I have done so much **Śravaṇa** (hearing) and **Manana** (reflection); will I get **Mokṣa** or not?"
- **Analysis of the Error:**
    - This question implies a lack of **Dṛḍha Jñāna**.
    - Who is asking this? Is it **Brahma** asking if I will get **Mokṣa**? No.
    - The question implies the existence of the **Jīva** (individual self). It signifies that one still identifies as the limited self.
- **The Correct Attitude:** There should be no worry about the future based on the past. The thought "I am a **Jīva**" is the root of the anxiety.

Practice: Vigilance in Solitude

The removal of **Viparyāsa** requires conscious effort and cannot happen passively.

- This contemplation should occur when one is alone, when there is leisure (**Avakāśa**), and when the mind is free from pressure (e.g., after meals, when not preoccupied with worldly duties).
- **The Practice:** One must actively investigate: "Where does the contrary notion enter from?"
- **The Danger:** Even after reading many texts, **Viparyāsa** can enter for just two seconds and destroy one's **Niṣṭhā** (steadfastness), dragging the seeker back into worldly identification.
- **The Purpose of Inference:** All study, inference, and attention are solely for this purpose—to prevent the re-entry of contrary notions. If the mind is constantly busy with "I must do this" or "They said that," there is no space (**Avakāśa**) for **Viparyāsa Nivṛtti**.

Correlation with Scripture

The **Ṭīkā** validates this approach, stating that **Śruti** itself supports the use of reasoning to firm up knowledge.

Ṭīkā: śrutārthaḥ tarkeṇa saṃbhāvanīyaḥ

Explanation: This does not imply mere intellectual speculation. It refers to the process of **Śravaṇa** (hearing) followed by **Manana** (reflection). The meaning of the **Śruti** is to be made probable (ascertained as possible and true) through logic (**Tarka**). Logic is used here to remove the notion of impossibility regarding the truth (removing the "impossibility of the idea" — **Asaṃbhāvanā**).

Scriptural Authority for Reasoning (Chāndogya Upaniṣad) (Page 111)

‘मन्तव्यः’ इति श्रुतार्थस्तर्केण सम्भावनीय इत्यर्थः । यथा कश्चित् गान्धारदेशेभ्यश्चोरैरन्यत्रारण्ये बद्धनेत्र एव त्यक्तः केनचिन्मुक्तबन्धस्तदुक्तमार्गग्रहणसमर्थः पण्डितः स्वयं तर्ककुशलो मेधावी स्वदेशानेव प्राप्नुयात् एवमेवेहाविद्याकामादिभिः स्वरूपानन्दात् प्रच्याव्यस्मिन्नरण्ये संसारे क्षिप्तः केनचिद्दयापरवशेनाचार्येण नासि त्वं संसारी किन्तु ‘तत्त्वमसि’

इत्युपदिष्टस्वरूपः स्वयं तर्ककुशलश्चेत्स्वरूपं जानीयान्नान्यथेति । श्रुतिः स्वस्याः पुरुषमतिरूपतर्कापेक्षां दर्शयतीत्याह - पण्डित इति । आत्मनः श्रुतेरित्यर्थः ।

तथा हि — 'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः' (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । ५) इति श्रुतिः 'पण्डितो मेधावी गन्धारानेवोपसम्पद्येतैवमेवेहाचार्यवान्पुरुषो वेद' (छा. उ. ६ । १४ । २) इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यमात्मनो दर्शयति ।

Bhāṣya: Śrotavyo mantavyaḥ (The Self is to be heard and reflected upon).

Scripture itself advocates for the use of reasoning to aid understanding.

The Illustration from Chāndogya 6.14.2:

- **The Story:** A man is kidnapped from Gandhāra, blindfolded (**Abhinaddhākṣaḥ**), hands tied (**Baddhah**), and abandoned in a desolate forest (**Araṇye**). A compassionate person (**Kenacit muktabandhaḥ)** releases his bonds and points him in the right direction.
- **The Journey Back:** Being untied is not enough. To return to Gandhāra, the man must be:
    - **Taduktamārgagrahaṇasamarthaḥ**: Must possess the capacity to understand and follow the directions
    - **Paṇḍitaḥ:** Informed/Learned (capable of understanding the instructions).
    - **Medhāvī - svayam tarkakushalaḥ:** Intelligent/Skilled in logic (capable of deducing the path: "This is the way, that is a dead end").
- **The Application (Dārṣṭānta): The Forest of Saṃsāra:**

    The analogy is mapped onto the spiritual reality of the individual soul (Jīva).

    - **The Man:** The **Jīva** (Individual Soul).
    - **Thieves: Avidyā** (Ignorance) and **Kāma** (Desire).
    - **Abduction:** Loss of vision of one's true nature (**Svarūpānanda**).
    - **Forest: Saṃsāra**.
    - **Compassionate Liberator:** The **Ācārya** (Teacher), driven purely by mercy (**Dayāparavaśena**)
    - **Instruction: "Nāsi tvaṃ saṃsārī, kintu tat tvam asi"** (You are not a transmigratory soul; You are That).
- **Conclusion:** Just as the traveler needs his own intelligence (**Medhā**) to navigate the path after receiving direction, the spiritual aspirant needs **Tarka** (reasoning) to grasp the Self-knowledge.

Bhāṣya: Puruṣabuddhisāhāyyam ātmano darśayati (Scripture shows that human intellect/reasoning is its [Scripture's] own assistant).

The Mīmāṃsaka Objection (Page 112)

ननु ब्रह्मणो मननाद्यपेक्षा न युक्ता, वेदार्थत्वात् , धर्मवत् । किन्तु श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यादय एवापेक्षिता इत्यत आह - नेति । जिज्ञास्ये धर्म इव जिज्ञास्ये ब्रह्मणीति व्याख्येयम् । अनुभवो ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराख्यो विद्वदनुभवः । आदिपदान्मननिदिध्यासनयोर्ग्रहः । तत्र हेतुमाह - अनुभवेति ।

न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् । किन्तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम् , अनुभवावसानत्वाद्भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।

A new objection is raised regarding the necessity of **Manana** (reflection) for **Brahman**.

- **Ṭīkā: Pūrvapakṣa (Objection): Nanu brahmaṇo mananādyapekṣā na yuktā, vedārthatvāt, dharmavat**
- **Explanation:**
    - **Premise: Brahman** is a subject matter of the Veda (**Vedārtha**).
    - **Example: Dharma** (Religious Duty).
    - **Logic:** In **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā**, **Dharma** is known strictly through Veda. Independent reasoning is not permitted. If the Veda says "Do this," you do it. Interpretation relies only on six linguistic criteria: **Śruti, Liṅga, Vākya, Prakaraṇa, Sthāna, Samākhyā**.
    - **Vyāpti (Invariable Concomitance):** Wherever there is the quality of being a subject of Veda, there is independence from reasoning (**Mananādi-anapekṣatvam**).
    - **Conclusion:** Since **Brahman** is also **Vedārtha**, it should not require **Manana** (reflection/reasoning).

Siddhānta (The Vedantic Conclusion)

The **Bhāṣya** (Commentary) refutes the objection by establishing a fundamental difference between the inquiry into **Dharma** and the inquiry into **Brahman**.

A. Differences in Proofs (Pramāṇa)

Bhāṣya: Na dharmajijñāsāyām iva śrutyādaya eva pramāṇam brahmajijñāsāyām: In the inquiry into Brahman, Śruti and others are not the sole proofs, as they are in the inquiry into Dharma.

Bhāṣya: Kintu śrutyādayo'nubhavādayaśca yathāsaṃbhavam iha pramāṇam: But here (in Brahman inquiry), Śruti etc., and Experience (Anubhava) etc., are the proofs according to their applicability.

- **Elaboration on "Adi" (Etcetera):**
    - In the context of **Dharma Jijñāsā**, the term "Śruti-ādi" refers to the six exegetical markers: **Śruti**, **Liṅga**, **Vākya**, **Prakaraṇa**, **Sthāna**, and **Samākhyā**.
    - In the context of **Brahma Jijñāsā**, the meaning changes.

Ṭīkā: Ādipadāt mananānididhyāsanayorḥ grahaḥ": By the word 'ādi' (in Śrutyādayaḥ), Manana (reflection) and Nididhyāsana (contemplation) are to be grasped.

- **The Role of Experience (Anubhava):**
    - **Anubhava** (Experience) is cited as a valid proof in Vedanta.
    - **Madhusūdana Sarasvatī** (in Siddhāntabindu) clarifies that **Ātman** (The Self) is Experience itself.
    - It is impossible for **Ātman** never to be experienced because it is **Sākṣādaparokṣa** (Direct and Immediate) and **Svayaṃprakāśa** (Self-luminous Consciousness).

B. The Purpose of Scripture in Realization

If **Ātman** is self-evident, why is Scripture needed?

- Scripture (**Śruti**) is the proof for removing ignorance (**Avidyā**) covering the Self.
- **The "Obtainment":**

    आत्मा तु सततं प्राप्तोऽप्यप्राप्तवदविद्यया।
    तन्नाशे प्राप्तवद्भाति स्वकण्ठाभरणं यथा ।। (आत्मबोधः ४४)
    ātmā tu satataṃ prāpto'pyaprāptavadavidyayā|
    tannāśe prāptavadbhāti svakaṇṭhābharaṇaṃ yathā || (ātmabodhaḥ 44)

    - We feel we have "attained" the Self after knowledge, but the Self was continuously present (**satataṃ prāptaḥ**).
    - It appeared "unattained" (**aprāptavat**) only due to ignorance.
    - When ignorance is destroyed (**tannāśe**), it shines as if "attained" (**prāptavad bhāti**).
    - **"Svakaṇṭhābharaṇaṃ yathā"** Like a necklace around one's own neck. One may search for a necklace everywhere, thinking it is lost, while it is around their neck the whole time. The "finding" is simply the removal of the ignorance of its presence.
- **Nature of the Self:** It is **Nityopalabdhisvarūpa** (The nature of self eternal attainment/perception). It is not something that is sometimes available and sometimes not.

C. The Nature of the Knowledge (Phala/Fruit)

मुक्त्यर्थं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य शाब्दस्य साक्षात्कारावसानत्वापेक्षणात्प्रत्यग्भूतसिद्धब्रह्मगोचरत्वेन साक्षात्कारफलकत्वसम्भवात् , तदर्थं मननाद्यपेक्षा युक्ता । धर्मे तु नित्यपरोक्षे साध्ये साक्षात्कारस्यानपेक्षितत्वादसम्भवाच्च श्रुत्या निर्णयमात्रमनुष्ठानायापेक्षितम् ।

Ṭīkā: muktyarthaṃ brahmajñānasya śābdasya sākṣātkārāvasānatvāpekṣaṇāt pratyagbhūtasiddhabrahmagocaratvena sākṣātkāraphalakatvasambhavāt , tadarthaṃ mananādyapekṣā yuktā |

Bhāṣya: Anubhavāvasānatvāt bhūtavastuviṣayatvācca brahmajñānasya: Because the knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience (Anubhava) and relates to an already existing entity (Bhūtavastu).

1. **Anubhavāvasānatvāt:**
    - Knowledge of Brahman must end in direct realization (**Sākṣātkāra**).
    - It is not merely intellectual; it requires **Manana** and **Nididhyāsana** to remove doubts until the knowledge becomes firm.
    - **Purpose of Manana:** To achieve the strength (**Balam**) to reject non-Self subjects (wealth, status, enjoyment) and remain fixed in the Truth.
    - **The State of a Muni:** When one spontaneously contemplates the unity of Jīva and Brahman without effort, they are called a Muni.
2. **Bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt:**
    - Brahman is an existing reality (present in past, present, and future). It is not a future result to be produced.

Contrast with Dharma: Ṭīkā: Dharme tu nityaparokṣe sādhye sākṣātkārasyānapekṣitatvāt: In Dharma, however, which is eternally imperceptible and something to be accomplished (Sādhya), direct realization is not expected (nor possible).

- **Dharma** is **Sādhya** (something to be accomplished/produced in the future, e.g., heaven).
- **Dharma** is **Nityaparokṣa** (Eternally indirect/unseen). One cannot have a "direct perception" of merit/demerit or future heaven.
- Therefore, in Dharma, one relies solely on Scriptural injunctions (**Śruti**) for performance (**Anuṣṭhāna**). Logic and experience are not required.

Mananam: The Stages of Wisdom: Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

Swamiji referred to the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad** to define the progression of a knower of **Brahman**.

तस्माद् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्. बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिर् अमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः केन स्याद् येन स्यात् तेनेदृशः | (बृ. ३.५.१)

tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityaṃ nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset. bālyaṃ ca pāṇḍityaṃ ca nirvidyātha munir amaunaṃ ca maunaṃ ca nirvidyātha brāhmaṇaḥ kena syād yena syāt tenedṛśaḥ | (bṛ. 3.5.1)

The progression is described as follows:

A. Pāṇḍityam (Scholarship/Learning)

- This corresponds to **Śravaṇa**.
- The purpose of **Pāṇḍityam** is to attain **Bālya**.

B. Bālyam (Childlike State)

- **Definition of Strength (Balam):**
  - The capacity to **not** speak of or desire sense objects (**Viṣaya**).
  - **Viṣaya** includes wealth, prestige, or any enjoyable object.
- **Handling Prārabdha (Destiny):**
  - True strength is the ability to reject objects even if they arrive due to **Prārabdha**.
  - If one pursues objects willfully, the spiritual journey is still long.
  - If objects appear unasked (due to destiny) and the seeker has the capacity to negate/renounce them, that is **Bālya**.
- **Significance:** It signifies that **Śravaṇa** has been successful.

C. Muni (The Sage/Thinker)

- When one possesses the strength of **Bālya** and engages in **Manana**, all doubts regarding the subject are removed.
- **Definition of Nididhyāsana (State of a Muni):**
  - Being a **Muni** means reflection happens spontaneously ("automatically").
  - It is characterized by the constant contemplation of scriptural lines in the intellect throughout the day.
  - **Focus of Contemplation:** It is not thinking about just any scripture, but specifically those texts that establish the unity of the individual self and **Brahman** (**Jīva-Brahma-aikya-pratipādaka-śāstra**).
  - Contemplating other subjects does not qualify as **Nididhyāsana**.

The Six Mimamsa Indicators (Śrutyādi) (Page 113)

लिङ्गादयस्तु श्रुत्यन्तर्भूता एव श्रुतिद्वारा निर्णयोपयोगित्वेनापेक्ष्यन्ते न मननादयः अनुपयोगादित्यर्थः । निरपेक्षः शब्दः श्रुतिः । शब्दस्यार्थप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यं लिङ्गम् । पदं योग्येतरपदाकाङ्क्षं वाक्यम् । अङ्गवाक्यसापेक्षं प्रधानवाक्यं प्रकरणम् । क्रमपठितानामर्थानां क्रमपठितैर्यथाक्रमं सम्बन्धः स्थानम् । यथा ऐन्द्राग्न्यादय इष्टयो दश क्रमेण पठिताः दशमन्त्राश्च 'इन्द्राग्नी रोचना दिवि' इत्याद्याः तत्र प्रथमेष्टौ प्रथममन्त्रस्य विनियोग इत्याद्यूहनीयम् । संज्ञासाम्यं समाख्या । यथाध्वर्यवसंज्ञकानां मन्त्राणामाध्वर्यवसंज्ञके कर्मणि विनियोग इति विवेकः ।

General Principles of Scriptural Interpretation

The Hierarchy of Proofs (Pramāṇas) The text establishes the relationship between **Śruti** (direct scriptural statement) and other interpretative signs like **Liṅga** (indicative mark), etc.

- **Subordination to Śruti: Liṅga** and the other proofs are considered inherently contained within **Śruti** (**śrutyantar-bhūtā**). They are required only to assist in decision-making (nirṇaya) through the lens of **Śruti**.
- **The Principle of Weakness:** There is a hierarchy of strength among **Śruti**, **Liṅga**, **Vākya**, **Prakaraṇa**, **Sthāna**, and **Samākhyā**.
    - **Śruti** is the strongest.
    - Any proof that comes later (**para**) in the list is weaker (**durbala**) because it depends on the former. For example, **Samākhyā** depends on **Sthāna**, which eventually traces back to **Śruti** to confirm its validity.
- **Role of Reasoning (Manana):** In the context of **Dharma Śāstra** and these interpretative decisions, independent reasoning (**manana**) is not the primary requirement; the scriptural evidence is supreme.

The Mīmāṃsaka Perspective vs. Worldly View

- **Mīmāṃsakas:** True **Mīmāṃsakas** (experts in exegesis) are rare.
- **Laukika Buddhi (Worldly Intellect):** Most people possess a worldly intellect and prioritize action (**karma**) over deep contemplation. They question the need for extensive analysis (**manana**).
- **Misinterpretation of Gitā:** Such individuals often quote scriptures out of context to support their bias for action.
    - **Quote:** karmaṇai va hi saṃsiddhim āsthitā janakādayaḥ (Janaka and others attained perfection through action alone).
    - **Clarification:** In the proper scriptural context, "Perfection" (**Siddhi**) here refers to **Citta Śuddhi** (purification of the mind) through action, which leads to **Jñāna** (knowledge), eventually resulting in **Mokṣa** (liberation) via **Niṣṭhā** (steadfastness). It does not mean mechanical action yields liberation directly.

The Six Interpretative Signs (Ṣaḍ Liṅga)

The text explains the six indicators used in **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā** to determine the application (**Viniyoga**) of mantras to rituals. These are secondary in **Brahma Jijñāsā** but primary in **Dharma Jijñāsā**.

1. **Śruti (Direct Assertion):**
    - **Definition: "Nirapekṣaḥ ravaḥ śrutiḥ"** (The independent sound/word is Śruti).
    - It relies on no other proof.
2. **Liṅga (Indicative Power):**
    - **Definition: "Śabdasāmarthyaṃ liṅgam"** (The power/capacity of the word).
    - It refers to the conventional or meaningful capacity of a word to indicate an object (not Yogic/etymological meaning in this context).
3. **Vākya (Syntactical Connection):**
    - **Definition: "Padasamabhivyāhāro vākyam"** (**Vākya** is the connection of words where one word expects another compatible word to complete the sense. It is the "utterance together" (**samabhivyāhāra**) of words..
    - **"Padam yogyatarapadākāṅkṣam"** (A word expecting another compatible word).
    - Example: "The one whose ladle is made of Palāśa wood hears no evil."
4. **Prakaraṇa (Context):**
    - **Definition: "Aṅgavākyasāpekṣaṃ pradhānavākyam"** (The principal sentence which expects/requires subsidiary sentences).
    - **Prakaraṇa** refers to the context established by a principal sentence (**pradhāna vākya**) which requires a subsidiary sentence (**aṅga vākya**) to complete its purpose or meaning.
5. **Sthāna (Sequence/Position):**
    - **Definition: "Kramapaṭhitānām arthānāṃ kramapaṭhitair yathākramaṃ saṃbandhaḥ"** (The connection of items read in a sequence with other items read in a similar sequence).
    - Example: If there are ten sacrifices (like **Aindrāgni Iṣṭi**) mentioned in a sequence, and ten corresponding mantras mentioned in a sequence, the relationship is established by position: the first mantra belongs to the first sacrifice, the second to the second, and so on.
6. **Samākhyā (Name):**
    - **Definition: "Saṅjñāsāmyam"** (Similarity of name). **Samākhyā** is the connection established through the similarity of names or titles (**saṃjñā-sāmyam**).
    - Example: Mantras that are designated as **Adhvaryu** mantras are applied (**viniyoga**) to the actions performed by the **Adhvaryu** priest.

Conclusion on these 6: In Dharma, these define the ritual. In Brahman inquiry, they are useful in interpreting the texts, but they are weaker than direct experience.

Logical Refutation (Nyāya Analysis)

एवं तावद्ब्रह्म न मननाद्यपेक्षम् , वेदार्थत्वात् , धर्मवत् , इत्यनुमाने साध्यत्वेन धर्मस्यानुभवायोग्यत्वम् , अनपेक्षितानुभवत्वं चोपाधिरित्युक्तम् । उपाधिव्यतिरेकाद्ब्रह्मणि मननाद्यपेक्षत्वं चोक्तम् ।

The text addresses a logical breakdown of the Opponent's inference using the principles of Indian Logic (**Nyāya**).

Ṭīkā: brahma na mananādyapekṣam , vedārthatvāt , dharmavat: This statement sets up the core inference where the opponent tries to equate the study of Brahman with the study of Dharma.

Component	Technical Term	Description
Pakṣa (Subject)	**Brahman**	The entity about which a conclusion is being drawn.
Sādhya (Probandum)	**Mananādi-anapekṣatvam**	The property of not requiring reflection (Manana), etc.
Hetu (Reason)	**Vedārthatvāt**	Because it is the subject matter of the Veda.
Dṛṣṭānta (Example)	**Dharma**	Ritualistic duty/merit, which is known only from the Veda and not through reflection.

The Siddhāntin's Refutation via Upādhi:

Ṭīkā: ityanumāne sādhyatvena dharmasyānubhavāyogyatvam , anapekṣitānubhavatvaṃ copādhirityuktam

A valid inference must be free of **Upādhi**.

This is the definition of an **Upādhi**: **sādhya vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam**: it must pervade the **Sādhya** but not the **Hetu**.

The proponent identifies two **Upādhis** that make the opponent's reason (**Hetu**) defective (**Sopādhika**): **Anubhavāyogyatvam** (Unsuitability for experience) OR **Anapekṣitānubhavatvam** (The state of experience being unrequired).

Application of Upādhi:

Potential Upādhi	Sādhya-vyāpakatvam (In Dṛṣṭānta, does it cover the Sādhya?)	Sādhana-avyāpakatvam (In Pakṣa, does it fail to cover the Hetu?)	Conclusion
Anubhava-ayogyatvam (Ineligibility for direct experience)	Yes. In Dharma (**Dṛṣṭānta)**, where there is no need for reflection (**Sādhya**), there is also no possibility of direct experience (**Upādhi)**.	Yes. Brahman (**Pakṣa)** is the subject of Veda (**Hetu**) but is **NOT** ineligible for experience (**Upādhi**). It is **Anubhava-yogya**.	Valid **Upādhi**; the inference fails.
Anapekṣita-anubhavatvam (Non-expectation of experience)	Yes. In Dharma (**Dṛṣṭānta)** where reflection is not required (**Sādhya**), direct experience is also not an expected outcome (**Upādhi)**.	Yes. Brahman (**Pakṣa)** is the subject of Veda (**Hetu**) but does expect/require direct realization/experience (**Upādhi)**.	Valid **Upādhi**; the inference fails.

Conclusion:

- **Defective Reasoning:** The opponent's reason, **Vedārthatvāt** (being a Vedic subject), is considered **Sopādhika** because it is "tainted" by the conditions of the example (**Dharma**).
- **The Distinction:** The fundamental difference identified is that while both **Dharma** and **Brahman** are **Vedārtha** (Vedic subjects), **Dharma** is **Parokṣa** (beyond perception) and **Anubhava-ayogya**, whereas **Brahman** is the very nature of experience and is **Anubhava-yogya**.
- **Requirement of Manana:** Because **Brahman** is something to be "experienced" or "realized" (Anubhava), the process of **Manana** (reflection) is necessary to remove the intellectual obstacles to that experience, unlike in the case of ritualistic **Dharma**.

The Flaw of Equating Brahman with Dharma (Page 114)

तत्र यदि वेदार्थत्वमात्रेण ब्रह्मणो धर्मेण साम्यं त्वयोच्येत तर्हि कृतिसाध्यत्वं विधिनिषेधविकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च ब्रह्मणि धर्मवत् स्युरिति । विपक्षे बाधकमाह - पुरुषेत्यादिना ।

कर्तव्ये हि विषये नानुभवापेक्षास्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात् , …

If one insists that **Brahman** is like **Dharma** merely because both are **Vedārtha**, **Brahman** would inherit the specific characteristics of **Dharma** (Action), which is logically flawed.

Ṭīkā: tatra yadi vedārthamātreṇa brahmaṇo dharmeṇa sāmyaṃ tvayā ucyeta... tarhi kṛtisādhyatvaṃ vidhi-niṣedha-vikalpotsargāpavādāśca brahmaṇi dharmavatsyuḥ
If equivalence is drawn between **Brahman** and **Dharma**, **Brahman** would become:

- **Kṛtisādhya**: Something to be accomplished by action/effort.
- Subject to **Vidhi** (Injunctions) and **Niṣedha** (Prohibitions).
- Subject to **Vikalpa** (Options).
- Subject to **Utsarga** (General Rules) and **Apavāda** (Exceptions).

Note on Utsarga and Apavāda: The text illustrates this using grammar (**Vyākaraṇa**). The general rule (**Utsarga**) applies generally, but when a special rule or exception (**Apavāda**) appears, the exception takes precedence.

- Example: In the **Sandhi** rule **vṛddhireci**, the **Apavāda** (exception) applies first, blocking the general rule (**Guṇa**). If **Brahman** were like **Dharma**, it would be subject to these hierarchical rules of action, which is impossible for an absolute reality.

The Definition of Duty (Karma/Dharma)

पुरुषकृत्यधीना आत्मलाभ उत्पत्तिर्यस्य तद्भावाच्च धर्मे श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यमित्यन्वयः ।

… पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य ।

The text explicitly defines the nature of **Dharma** (duty/action) to contrast it with **Brahman**.

Bhāṣya: puruṣa adhīna ātmalābhattvāt ca kartavyasya
Explanation:

- The existence or "self-gain" (**Ātmalābha**) of a duty (**Kartavya**) is entirely **Puruṣādhīna** (dependent on the person/doer).
- Action is not self-existent; it requires a doer to bring it into being through effort (**Kṛti**).

Ṭīkā: puruṣakṛtyadhīnā ātmalābha utpattiryasya tadbhāvācca dharme śrutyādīnāmeva prāmāṇyamityanvayaḥ
Explanation:

- Since **Dharma** depends on human effort for its production (**Utpatti**), only scriptural injunctions (**Śrutyādis**) are the valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**) for it. It is not established by prior existence.

The Threefold Nature of Action (Freedom of Will)

धर्मस्य साध्यत्वं लौकिककर्मदृष्टान्तेन स्फुटयति - कर्तुमिति । लौकिकवदित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तं स्फुटयति - यथेति । दार्ष्टान्तिकमाह - तथेति । तद्बद्धर्मस्य कर्तुमकर्तुं शक्यत्वमुक्त्वा अन्यथाकर्तुं शक्यत्वमाह - उदित इति ।

कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म; यथा अश्वेन गच्छति, पद्भ्याम् , अन्यथा वा, न वा गच्छतीति । तथा 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति' 'उदिते जुहोति, अनुदिते जुहोति' इति विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः, विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च ।

Because action depends on the person (**Puruṣa-tantra**), the doer has choices. This is explained through the capacity for **Vikalpa** (option).

Bhāṣya: kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṃ śakyaṃ laukikaṃ vaidikaṃ ca karma
Explanation: Any action, whether secular (**Laukika**) or scriptural (**Vaidika**), can be:

- **Kartum**: Done.
- **Akartum**: Not done.
- **Anyathā vā kartum**: Done differently.

Examples:

- **Laukika (Secular): yathā aśvena gacchati padbhyām anyathā vā na vā gacchati:** One may travel by horse, by foot, or not go at all. This choice lies with the agent.
- **Vaidika (Scriptural): tathā atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇāti nātirātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇāti:** In the **Atirātra** sacrifice, one may take the vessel known as **Ṣoḍaśin** or not take it. Both are valid scriptural options.
- **Vaidika (Scriptural): udite juhoti anudite juhoti:** One may perform the **Agnihotra** after sunrise (**Udite**) or before sunrise (**Anudite**). This is a **Vyavasthita Vikalpa**. While there is an option, it is not arbitrary day-to-day. One cannot choose **udite** today and

anudite tomorrow. Once a specific resolve (vow) is taken to perform the ritual at a specific time (e.g., at sunrise), one must adhere to that specific method daily.

Validity of Injunctions and Prohibitions in Dharma

धर्मस्य साध्यत्वमुपपाद्य तत्र विध्यादियोग्यतामाह - विधीति । विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च विकल्पादयश्च धर्मे साध्ये येऽर्थवन्तः सावकाशा भवन्ति ते ब्रह्मण्यपि स्युरित्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: dharmasya sādhyatvamupapādya tatra vidhyādiyogyatām: Because **Dharma** is an accomplished result of action (**sādhya**) and depends on human effort (**puruṣa-kṛti-adhīna**), scriptural commands are meaningful.

1. Eligibility for Injunctions (Vidhi) and Prohibitions (Pratiṣedha)

Since **Dharma** is something to be accomplished, commands regarding it are logical.

Bhāṣya: vidhi-pratiṣedhāśca atra arthavantaḥ syuḥ

- **Explanation:** Injunctions and prohibitions become meaningful (**arthavat**) in the context of **Dharma**.
- **Analogy:** You cannot command distinct realities (like external noise), but you can command actions that are within human control (like closing a door to shut out the noise). Similarly, because **Dharma** depends on human will, **Vidhi** and **Pratiṣedha** have scope.

2. The Objection Regarding Brahman (Pūrvapakṣa)

Ṭīkā: vidhipratiṣedhāśca vikalpādayaśca dharme sādhye ye'rthavantaḥ sāvakāśā bhavanti te brahmaṇyapi syuḥ: The text presents an objection that if these rules apply to **Dharma**, they should also apply to **Brahman**.

- **Explanation:** The objector argues that just as injunctions, prohibitions, options (**vikalpa**), general rules (**utsarga**), and exceptions (**apavāda**) find scope in **Dharma** (which is **sādhya**), they should also apply to **Brahman**.

Categories of Scriptural Rules

'यजेत' 'न सुरां पिबेत्' इत्यादयो विधिनिषेधाः । व्रीहिभिर्यवैर्या यजेतेति सम्भावितो विकल्पः ग्रहणाग्रहणयोरैच्छिकः । उदितानुदितहोमयोर्व्यवस्थितविकल्पः । 'न हिंस्यात्' इत्युत्सर्गः, 'अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत' इत्यपवादः । तथा 'आहवनीये जुहोति' इत्युत्सर्गः, 'अश्वस्य पदे पदे जुहोति' इत्यपवाद इति विवेकः ।

The text details the specific types of scriptural statements that function within the realm of **Dharma**.

1. Injunction and Prohibition (Vidhi and Pratiṣedha)

- **Vidhi (Command): yajeta:** "One should sacrifice." This dictates an action to be performed.
- **Pratiṣedha (Prohibition): na surāṃ pibet:** "One should not drink alcohol." This dictates an action to be avoided.

2. Options (Vikalpa)

- **The Probable Option (Saṃbhāvita Vikalpa): vrīhibhir yavairvā yajeta**
  - **Explanation:** "One should sacrifice with rice (**vrīhi**) or with barley (**yava**)." This represents an option of choice based on desire/will (**icchā-anurūpa**). Just as one decides how much to donate or distribute at a feast based on their wish, the choice of material here is left to the agent.
- **Recalled Examples:** The text reiterates the **Ṣoḍaśī** vessel (taking or not taking) as an optional choice, and the **Agnihotra** timing (**udite/anudite**) as a systematic/fixed option (**vyavasthita vikalpa**).

3. General Rule and Exception (Utsarga and Apavāda)

The text explains how general rules can be set aside by specific exceptions in **Dharma**.

Example A: Violence in Sacrifice

- **Utsarga (General Rule): na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni:** "One should not harm any living being." This is the universal rule.
- **Apavāda (Exception): agnīṣomīyaṃ paśum ālabheta:** "One should kill the animal dedicated to Agni and Soma."**.** In the specific context of the **Agnīṣomīya** sacrifice, the prohibition against violence is set aside to allow for the ritual slaughter. The exception is given scope (**avakāśa**) over the general rule.

Example B: Location of Offering

- **Utsarga (General Rule): tathā āhavanīye juhoti:** Generally, one offers the oblation into the **Āhavanīya** fire.
- **Apavāda (Exception): aśvasya pade pade juhoti:** During the **Aśvamedha** (Horse Sacrifice), one offers oblations in the footprints of the horse as it walks.

The Impossibility of Options in Reality (Vastu) (Page 115)

एते ब्रह्मणि स्युरित्यत्रेष्टापत्तिं वारयति - न इत्यादिना भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् इत्यन्तेन । इदं वस्तु, एवम् , नैवम् , घटः पटो वेति प्रकारविकल्पः । अस्ति नास्ति वेति सत्तास्वरूपविकल्पः । ननु वस्तुन्यपि आत्मादौ वादिनामस्ति नास्तीत्यादिविकल्पा दृश्यन्ते तत्राह - विकल्पनास्त्विति । अस्तित्वादिकोटिस्मरणं पुरुषबुद्धिस्तन्मूला मनःस्पन्दितमात्राः संशयविपर्ययविकल्पा न प्रमारूपा इत्यक्षरार्थः ।

न तु वस्तु 'एवम् , नैवम्' 'अस्ति, नास्ति' इति वा विकल्प्यते । विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः ।

The detailed elaboration of these categories (**Vidhi**, **Pratiṣedha**, **Vikalpa**, **Utsarga**, **Apavāda**) serves to illustrate the nature of **Dharma** as Action (**Kriyā**).

- **The Pūrvapakṣa's Stance:** The objector claims these categories apply to **Brahman** as well (**ete brahmaṇi syuḥ**).
- **The Siddhānta (Rejection): iti atra iṣṭāpattim vārayati:** The **Bhāṣya** (Commentary) will proceed to reject this "acceptance" (**iṣṭāpatti**) by the objector. It denies that **Brahman** is subject to these categories of action, implying that **Brahman** is an existing reality (**siddha**), not something to be accomplished (**sādhya**).

In contrast to action, **Vastu** (an existent object/Reality) does not depend on the person. It cannot be toggled or altered by will.

Ṭīkā: idaṃ vastu, evam , naivam , ghaṭaḥ paṭo veti prakāravikalpaḥ | asti nāsti veti sattāsvarūpavikalpaḥ

Bhāṣya: na tu vastvevaṃ naivam asti nāstīti vā vikalpyate
Explanation: One cannot say regarding an object: "It is like this," "It is not like this," "It is," or "It is not." Reality does not tolerate options. You cannot choose for a pot (**Ghaṭa**) to be a cloth (**Paṭa**). **Sattā-svarūpa-vikalpa** (Option regarding existence/nature) is impossible in **Vastu**.

Ṭīkā: nanu vastunyapi ātmādau vādināmasti nāstītyādivikalpā dṛśyante

Bhāṣya: vikalpanāstu puruṣabuddhyapekṣā na vastuyāthātmyajñānaṃ puruṣabuddhyapekṣam
Explanation: Options (**Vikalpanā**) reside only in the human intellect (**Puruṣa Buddhi**), not in the object itself. Knowledge of the true nature of a thing (**Vastu-yāthātmya**) does not depend on the human intellect; it depends on the object.

Ṭīkā: manaspandita mātrāḥ saṃśaya viparyaya vikalpāḥ na pramārūpāḥ
Explanation: Doubts (**Saṃśaya**), errors (**Viparyaya**), and options (**Vikalpa**) regarding an object are merely **Manaspandita** (vibrations of the mind). They are not **Pramā** (valid knowledge).

True Knowledge is Vastu-Tantra (Object-Dependent)
अयं भावः धर्मो हि यथा यथा ज्ञायते तथा तथा कर्तुं शक्यते इति यथाशास्त्रं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षा विकल्पाः सर्वे प्रमारूपा एव भवन्ति, तत्साम्येन ब्रह्मण्यपि सर्वे विकल्पा यथार्थाः स्युरिति । तत्राप्येवमिति वदन्तं प्रत्याह - नेति । यदि सिद्धवस्तुज्ञानमपि साध्यज्ञानवत्पुरुषबुद्धिमपेक्ष्य जायेत तदा सिद्धे विकल्पा यथार्थाः स्युः, न सिद्धवस्तुज्ञानं पौरुषं किं तर्हि प्रमाणवस्तुजन्यम् , तथा च वस्तुन एकरूपत्वादेकमेव ज्ञानं प्रमा, अन्ये विकल्पा अयथार्था एवेत्यर्थः ।

न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । किं तर्हि ? वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् ।

Ṭīkā: dharmo hi yathā yathā jñāyate tathā tathā kartuṃ śakyate iti yathā śāstram puruṣabuddhyapekṣāḥ vikalpāḥ sarve pramārūpā eva bhavanti
Explanation:

- In the realm of **Dharma** (Action), options that depend on human intellect are considered valid (**Pramārūpā**) because they follow scripture (**Yathā śāstram**). "As it is known, so it can be done."

- However, if one applies this logic to **Brahman** (Reality), imagining that Brahman can be "this way or that way," it leads to error.

The text establishes that valid knowledge must correspond to the object as it is, independent of the knower's will.

Ṭīkā: na siddhavastujñānaṃ pauruṣaṃ kiṃ tarhi pramāṇavastujanyam , tathā ca vastuna ekarūpatvādekameva jñānaṃ pramā, anye vikalpā ayathārthā evetyarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: na vastuyāthātmyajñānaṃ puruṣabuddhyapekṣam | kiṃ tarhi ? vastutantrameva tat |
Explanation:

- Knowledge of an existing thing (**Siddha-vastu**) does not depend on the person's will. It is **Vastu-tantra** (dependent entirely on the object).
- The "I" (the person) is not the primary factor; the object is.
- Since the object has only one form (**Ekarūpatvāt**), knowledge of it can only be one. Alternative views are false (**Ayathārtha**).

The Example of the Post (Sthāṇu)

अत्र दृष्टान्तमाह - नहि स्थाणाविति । स्थाणुरेवेत्यवधारणे सिद्धे सर्वे विकल्पा यथार्था न भवन्तीत्यर्थः । तत्र यद्वस्तुतन्त्रं ज्ञानं तद्यथार्थम् , यत्पुरुषतन्त्रं तन्मिथ्येति विभजते - तत्रेति ।

न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् 'स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति । तत्र 'पुरुषोऽन्यो वा' इति मिथ्याज्ञानम् । 'स्थाणुरेव' इति तत्त्वज्ञानम् , वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् । एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम् ।

To illustrate the difference between mental projection (**Puruṣa-tantra**) and factual knowledge (**Vastu-tantra**), the example of a tree stump/post (**Sthāṇu**) is used.

- **Bhāṣya: na hi sthāṇāvekasmin sthāṇurvā puruṣo'nyo vā iti tattvajñānaṃ bhavati**
  Explanation:
  - Looking at a post and thinking, "Is this a post, or a man, or something else?" is not **Tattva-jñāna** (knowledge of truth).
  - Thinking it is a man or a ghost is **Mithyā-jñāna** (false knowledge) because it is a projection of the mind.
- **Bhāṣya: sthāṇureveti tattvajñānam**
  Explanation:
  - The conclusion "It is certainly a post" (**Sthāṇureva**) is the only true knowledge because it corresponds to the reality and depends on the object of the knowledge.
- **Ṭīkā: yad puruṣatantram tat mithyā**
  Explanation:
  - A clear division is made: That which is **Puruṣa-tantra** (dependent on the person, like imagining the post is a man) is **Mithyā** (false).

    - That which is **Vastu-tantra** (dependent on the object, i.e., "It is a post") is **Tattva-jñāna** (Truth).

Applying the analogy (Atideśa) to the subject matter:

- Meditations (**Upāsanā**) regarding a symbol (e.g., viewing a physical object as a deity) may be **Puruṣa-tantra** and valid within the context of injunctions.
- However, knowledge of **Brahman** is **Vastu-tantra**. Just as the post is what it is regardless of what one thinks, **Brahman** is the ultimate Reality.
- Therefore, the options, injunctions, and "doing" associated with **Dharma** do not apply to **Brahman**.

Bhāṣya: evaṃ bhūta-vastu-viṣayāṇāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ vastu-tantram | tatraivaṃ sati brahma-jñānam api vastu-tantram eva bhūta-vastu-viṣayatvāt |

Explanation: Because **brahman** is an existing reality, the knowledge of it is governed by the object itself, making it **yathārtham** (valid/true).

The Logical Inference (Anumāna)

स्थाणावित्यर्थः । स्थाणावुक्तन्यायं घटादिष्वतिदिशति - एवमिति । प्रकृतमाह - तत्रैवं सतीति । सिद्धेऽर्थे ज्ञानप्रमात्वस्य वस्त्वधीनत्वे सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुजन्यमेव यथार्थं न पुरुषतन्त्रं भूतार्थविषत्वात् , स्थाणुज्ञानवदित्यर्थः । अतः साध्येऽर्थे सर्वे विकल्पाः पुन्तन्त्रा न सिद्धेऽर्थे इति वैलक्षण्यात् न धर्मसाम्यं ब्राह्मण इति मननाद्यपेक्षा सिद्धेति भावः ।

तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् ।

To prove that **brahma-jñāna** is not dependent on human will, the following syllogism is constructed:

- **Pakṣa (Subject): brahma-jñānam**
- **Sādhya (Probandum): na puruṣa-tantram** (Not dependent on the person) / **vastu-tantram** (Object-dependent).
- **Hetu (Reason): bhūtārtha-viṣayatvāt** (Because it concerns a pre-existing reality).
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example): sthāṇu-jñānavat** (Like the knowledge of a post).

Ṭīkā: ataḥ sādhye'rthe sarve vikalpāḥ puruṣa-tantrāḥ na siddhe'rthe iti vailakṣaṇyāt | na dharma-sāmyaṃ brahmaṇa iti |

Explanation: In things yet to be achieved (**sādhya**), like rituals, choices and alternatives (**vikalpa**) exist. However, **brahman** is not like **dharma**; it is an existing reality where no such human-directed alternatives apply.

The Opponent's Argument: Brahman as an Object of Perception

ननु तर्हि ब्रह्म प्रत्यक्षादिगोचरम् , धर्मविलक्षणत्वात् , घटादिवत् । तथा च जन्मादिसूत्रे जगत्कारणानुमानं विचार्यम् , सिद्धार्थे तस्य मानत्वात् , न श्रुतिः, सिद्धार्थे तस्या अमानत्वेन तद्विचारस्य निष्फलत्वादिति शङ्कते - नन्विति । प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेव प्राप्तमिति कृत्वा प्रमाणान्तरस्यैव विचारप्राप्ताविति शेषः ।

ननु भूतवस्तुत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेवेति वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा अनर्थिकैव प्राप्ता ।

The **Pūrvapakṣin** (opponent) argues that if **Brahman** is defined as being distinct from **Dharma** (ritual merit/duty), it must necessarily fall within the scope of perception and inference, much like a physical object.

The Logical Syllogism

Ṭīkā: brahma pratyakṣādigocaram , dharmavilakṣaṇatvāt , ghaṭādivat |

The opponent posits a relationship based on the difference between **Dharma** and **Brahman**:

- **Dharma** is **Parokṣa** (beyond direct perception).
- **Brahman** is **Dharma-vilakṣaṇa** (distinct/different from **Dharma**).
- Therefore, **Brahman** must be **Pratyakṣādi-gocara** (perceivable/knowable through other means), just like a pot (**Ghaṭa**).

If **Brahman** is distinct from **Dharma**, then **Brahman** must be an object of perception and other means of knowledge, like a jar or similar objects.

The opponent establishes a rule: **Yatra yatra dharma-vilakṣaṇatvaṃ tatra tatra pratyakṣādi-gocaratvam**—wherever there is a distinction from **Dharma**, there is the property of being an object of perception.

Why Inference Over Scripture?
Ṭīkā: janmādisūtre jagatkāraṇānumānaṃ vicāryam , siddhārthe tasya mānatvāt , na śrutiḥ, siddhārthe tasyā amānatvena tadvicārasya niṣphalatvāt

Bhāṣya: bhūtavastutve brahmaṇaḥ pramāṇāntaraviṣayatvameveti vedāntavākyavicāraṇā anarthikaiva prāptā |

Based on the above logic, the opponent suggests that the second **Sūtra** of the **Brahmasūtra** (**Janmādyasya yataḥ**) should be viewed as a tool for logical inference regarding the cause of the universe, rather than a reflection on scriptural revelation.

Therefore, in the **Janmādi Sūtra**, the inference regarding the cause of the universe is to be deliberated upon [rather than **Śruti**].

The opponent argues that **Śruti** is not required for things that are already established facts (**Siddha-artha**).

- **Siddha-vastu:** An existing entity (like **Brahman**).
- **Sādhya-vastu:** Something to be accomplished (like **Dharma** through rituals).

Since **Brahman** is an existing reality, it should be graspable by human reason and inference, **Śruti** is not required.

The argument made by the opponent is that because **Brahman-jñāna** (knowledge of **Brahman**) is **Vastu-tantra** (dependent on the object itself) and concerns an existing reality (**Bhūta-vastu-viṣayatvāt**), it must be accessible via other **Pramāṇas**.

If **Brahman** is an existing entity, it must be the object of other means of knowledge; thus, the deliberation on Vedantic sentences becomes redundant.

Just as the **Himālaya** is a **Siddha-vastu** (an established fact), any statement describing it (e.g., "It is the king of mountains located in the North") can be verified by perception first. If **Brahman** is similarly "ready-made," the study of **Śruti** is considered **Anarthikā** (purposeless).

The Siddhāntin's Rebuttal: Questioning the Inference (Page 118)

अत्र पूर्वपक्षी प्रष्टव्यः, किं यत्कार्यं तद्ब्रह्मजमित्यनुमानं ब्रह्मसाधकं किं वा यत्कार्यं तत्सकारणमिति । नाद्यः, व्याप्त्यसिद्धेरित्याह - नेति । ब्रह्मण इन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वात्प्रत्यक्षेण व्याप्तिग्रहायोगान्न प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमित्यर्थः । इन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वं कुत इत्यत आह - स्वभावत इति । 'पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयम्भूः' इति श्रुतेः, ब्रह्मणो रूपादिहीनत्वाच्चेत्यर्थः ।

न; इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन सम्बन्धाग्रहणात् । स्वभावतो विषयविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि, न ब्रह्मविषयाणि ।

Ṭīkā: kiṃ yatkāryaṃ tadbrahmajamityanumānaṃ brahmasādhakaṃ kiṃ vā yatkāryaṃ tatsakāraṇamiti

The **Siddhāntin** (proponent of the established view) challenges the **Pūrvapakṣin** to clarify the nature of their inference. Two options are presented:

1. **Brahma-janyatvam:** Whatever is an effect is born specifically from **Brahman**.
2. **Sakāraṇatvam:** Whatever is an effect must have a cause (without specifying **Brahman**).

Negation of Option 1

Ṭīkā: nādyaḥ, vyāptyasiddheḥ … brahmaṇa indriyāgrāhyatvātpratyakṣeṇa vyāptigrahāyogānna pramāṇāntaraviṣayatvamityarthaḥ

If the opponent chooses the first option—that the universe is born of **Brahman**—they face the problem of **Asiddhi** (unestablished ground). To have a valid inference, one must have seen the relationship between the cause and the effect before (like fire and smoke).

Because **Brahman** is not graspable by the senses, it is impossible to apprehend a pervasive relation (**Vyāpti**) through perception; therefore, it cannot be an object of any other means of knowledge.

Feature	Fire-Smoke (Vahni-Dhūma)	Brahman-Universe
Visibility	Both are perceivable.	Brahman is not perceivable
Vyāpti	Established in a kitchen.	Cannot be established via senses.
Pramāṇa	Inference (Anumāna) works.	Only Śruti works.

Why is **Brahman** not the subject of any other proof (**Pramāṇāntara-aviṣaya**).

- Because **Brahman** is **Indriya-agrāhya** (beyond sensory perception), no universal rule (**Vyāpti**) can be established by human observation to link the world to **Brahman**.
- Therefore, any "inference" used in the **Brahmasūtras** must actually be rooted in **Śruti**.
- **Śruti** is the independent and primary **Pramāṇa** for knowing the nature of **Brahman**.

How is it that **Brahman** does not become the object of any other means of knowledge?

Bhāṣya: svabhāvato viṣayaviṣayāṇi indriyāṇi na brahmaviṣayāṇi

By their very nature, the senses are directed toward objects (**Viṣaya**); they are not directed toward **Brahman**. This means the senses are "object-oriented" and cannot make **Brahman** their object of perception.

Grammatical Analysis of the Compound

The term **Viṣayaviṣayāṇi** must be understood through its **Samskṛta** dissolution (**Vigraha**).

- The first word **Viṣaya** refers to the five-fold objects of perception: sound (**Śabda**), touch (**Sparśa**), form (**Rūpa**), taste (**Rasa**), and smell (**Gandha**).
- **Vigraha**: viṣaya viṣayo yeṣāṃ indriyāṇāṃ tāni indriyāṇi viṣayaviśayāṇi (Those senses whose objects are only the worldly objects).
- Applying this to **Brahmaviṣayāṇi**: brahma viṣayo yeṣām indriyāṇāṃ tāni indriyāṇi (Those senses whose object is **Brahman**).
- Since the word **Na** (negation) is used, it implies that the senses do not have **Brahman** as their objective domain.

Scriptural Support for Sensory Limitations

The role of the commentator (**Ṭīkākāra**) is to provide scriptural evidence (**Śruti**) to reinforce the statements made in the **Bhāṣya**.

Ṭīkā: **parāñci khāni vyatṛṇatsvayambhūḥ’ iti śruteḥ, brahmaṇo rūpādihīnatvāccetyarthaḥ** |

This verse from the **Kaṭhopaniṣad** confirms that the Self-existent Lord created the senses with an outgoing tendency (**Parāñci**), which is why they look outward and not at the inner self or **Brahman**.
Aśabdamasparśamarūpamavyayam: This **Mantra** provides proof that **Brahman** is

devoid of sound, touch, form, and decay. Because the senses can only perceive things with attributes like form and sound, they are incapable of perceiving the attributeless **Brahman**.

The Failure of Inference (Anumāna) and Pervasion (Vyāpti)

इन्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वेऽपि व्याप्तिग्रहः किं न स्यादत आह - सति हीति । तन्नास्तीति शेषः । इदं कार्यं ब्रह्मजमिति व्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणोऽतीन्द्रियत्वान्न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ।

सति हीन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः इदं ब्रह्मणा सम्बद्धं कार्यमिति गृह्येत । कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणम् — किं ब्रह्मणा सम्बद्धम् ? किमन्येन केनचिद्वा सम्बद्धम् ? — इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम् ।

Ṭīkā: **indriyāgrāhyatve'pi vyāptigrahaḥ kiṃ na syāt**

Bhāṣya: **indriyaviṣayatvena sambandhāgrahaṇāt**

A doubt is raised: even if the senses cannot directly perceive **Brahman**, can we not know **Brahman** through inference by establishing a relationship (**Vyāpti**) between the world (effect) and **Brahman** (cause)?

In any inference, a relationship (**Vyāpti**) must be established through perception. For example, we see the relationship between smoke and fire. However, if **Brahman** were a sense object, only then could we perceive a relationship such as "this effect is related to **Brahman**."

Ṭīkā: **idaṃ kāryaṃ brahmajaṃ iti vyāpti pratyakṣaṃ brahmaṇo atīndriyatvād na sambhavatītyarthaḥ**

The direct perception of a pervasion (such as "this world/effect is born of **Brahman**") is impossible because **Brahman** is supersensuous (**Atīndriya**). Since the cause (**Brahman**) is not perceived, the relationship of "cause-and-effect" cannot be established via direct perception.

Negation of Option 2

द्वितीये कारणसिद्धावपि कारणस्य ब्रह्मत्वं श्रुतिं विना ज्ञातुमशक्यमित्याह - कार्यमात्रमिति ।

Bhāṣya: **kāryamātrameva tu gṛhyamāṇam — kiṃ brahmaṇā sambaddham ? kimanyena kenacidvā sambaddham ? — iti na śakyaṃ niścetum |**

Now the second option is negated: An effect has some cause (**Sakāraṇakam**). While logic can prove that the world must have a cause, it cannot prove that the cause is specifically **Brahman**.

When we perceive the effect (the world) through our senses, we can only know the effect itself. We cannot ascertain whether it is related to **Brahman** or to something else entirely. No matter how much we speculate or use inference, a definitive certainty (**Niścaya**) is impossible without **Śruti**. Therefore, **śruti** (scripture) is the primary and indispensable means of knowledge.

anumāna (inference) is used only in a secondary (**guṇataḥ**) role to establish possibility (**sambhāvanā**).

The Prime Importance of Śruti and the Secondary Role of Anumāna (Page 119)

सम्बद्धं कृतं यस्मात् श्रुतिमन्तरेण जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेति निश्चयालाभस्तस्मात्तल्लाभाय श्रुतिरेव प्राधान्येन विचारणीया, अनुमानं तूपादानत्वादिसामान्यद्वारा मृदादिवत् ब्रह्मणः स्वकार्यात्मकत्वादिश्रौतार्थसम्भावनार्थं गुणतया विचार्यमित्युपसंहरति - तस्मादिति ।

तस्माज्जन्मादिसूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थम् । किं तर्हि ? वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम् ।

The conclusion is that the primary means of knowledge for the cause of the universe is the Vedic text.

Ṭīkā: **yasmāt śrutim antareṇa jagatkāraṇaṃ brahma iti niścaya alābhaḥ tasmāt tallābhāya śrutireva prādhānyena vicāraṇīyā**: Since it is impossible to gain the certain knowledge that **Brahman** is the cause of the universe without **Śruti**, therefore, for the sake of obtaining that knowledge, **Śruti** alone must be primarily investigated.

The Role of Inference (Anumāna)

Inference is not completely discarded, but it is relegated to a secondary status (**Guṇatayā**).

Ṭīkā: **anumānam tu upādānatvādi-sāmānyadvārā mṛdādivat brahmaṇaḥ svakāryātmakatvādi śrautārtha-sambhāvanārthaṃ guṇatayā vicāryam**

Inference is considered as a secondary tool to show the possibility (**Sambhāvanā**) of the scriptural meaning. Just as we see clay as the material cause of a pot, inference suggests the possibility that there is a material cause for the world. It supports the scriptural truth but cannot replace it.

Mananam: Additional Notes by Bade Mahārāj Jī (svakāryātmakam)

अनुमानं त्विति - ब्रह्मस्वकार्यात्मकम् उपादानत्वात् मृद्वदिति, जगत्स्वोपादानजन्यं कार्यत्वात् घटवत् इत्यादि अनुमानन्तु श्रौतार्थस्य अद्वितीयब्रह्मणः असम्भावनादि निवृत्त्यर्थं विचार्यम् इत्यर्थः |

anumānaṃ tviti - brahmasvakāryātmakam upādānatvāt mṛdvaditi, jagatsvopādānajanyaṃ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat ityādi anumānantu śrautārthasya advitīyabrahmaṇaḥ asambhāvanādi nivṛttyarthaṃ vicāryam ityarthaḥ |

Explanation:
brahma svakāryātmakam upādānatvāt mṛdvat

Brahman is of the nature of its own effect, due to being the material cause, like clay.

This infers: Brahman is svakāryātmakam (of the form of its effect), as the upādāna (material cause), like clay in a pot. The world is Brahman-formed, non-different in essence, but not absolutely identical (to avoid dvaita or absolute abheda).

Another anumana:
jagat svopādāna-janyaṃ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat

The world is generated from its material cause, because it is an effect, like a pot.

These inferences support the shruti's meaning of **advitīya** brahman (non-dual Brahman) by removing impossibility (asambhāvanā):
anumānantu śrautārthasya advitīyabrahmaṇaḥ asambhāvanādi nivṛttyartham

The inference is for the possibility of the shruti's meaning of non-dual Brahman, to remove impossibility.

It should be considered gaunatayā (secondarily).

Purpose of the Sūtra

The discussion concludes by defining the purpose of the second **Sūtra** of the **Brahmasūtra** (**Janmādyasya yataḥ**).

Bhāṣya: **tasmāt janmādi-sūtraṃ na anumānopanyāsārtham| kiṃ tarhi vedāntavākyapradarśanārtham|**: Therefore, the **Janmādi Sūtra** is not intended to present a formal independent inference. Instead, its purpose is to point towards and showcase the **Vedānta** sentences (the Upaniṣadic declarations) that reveal **Brahman** as the cause of the universe.

Subject Matter of Brahma Sūtra (Sūtra 2) (Page 119)

एतत्सूत्रस्य विषयवाक्यं पृच्छति - किं पुनरिति । इह ब्रह्मणि लक्षणार्थत्वेन विचारयितुमिष्टं वाक्यं किमित्यर्थः । अत्र हि प्रथमसूत्रे विशिष्टाधिकारिणो ब्रह्मविचारं प्रतिज्ञाय ब्रह्मज्ञातुकामस्य द्वितीयसूत्रे लक्षणमुच्यते । तथैव श्रुतावपि मुमुक्षोर्ब्रह्मज्ञातुकामस्य जगत्कारणत्वोपलक्षणानुवादेन ब्रह्म ज्ञाप्यत इति श्रौतार्थक्रमानुसारित्वं सूत्रस्य दर्शयितुं सोपक्रमं वाक्यं पठति - भृगुरिति ।

किं पुनस्तद्वेदान्तवाक्यं यत् सूत्रेणेह लिलक्षयिषितम् ? 'भृगुर्वै वारुणिः । वरुणं पितरमुपससार । अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति' (तै. उ. ३ । १ । १) इत्युपक्रम्याह — 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद्ब्रह्मेति । ' (तै. उ. ३ । १ । १) तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यम् — 'आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति । आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति' (तै. उ. ३ । ६ । १) इति । अन्यान्यप्येवंजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि ॥ २ ॥

1. The Inquiry into the Subject Sentence (Viṣaya Vākya)

The discussion begins by identifying the specific **Vedānta** passage that the second **sūtra** (**Janmādyasya yataḥ**) intends to characterize and examine.

- **Definition of Lilakṣayiṣitam:** The term **lilakṣayiṣitam** refers to the desire of the **sūtra** to define or characterize **Brahman**. It is derived from the desire (**icchā**) to provide a definition (**lakṣaṇa**).
- **The Objective:** The purpose is to investigate the intended statement (**iṣṭam vākya**m) that serves as the basis for defining **Brahman** (**brahmaṇi lakṣaṇārthatvena vicārayitum**).

2. Contextual Linkage with the First Sūtra

There is a logical progression from the first **sūtra** to the second:

- **The Promise (Pratijñā):** The first **sūtra**, **Athāto Brahmajijñāsā**, establishes the eligibility (**adhikāra**) and the commitment to inquire into **Brahman**.
- **The Qualified Inquirer (Viśiṣṭa Adhikārī):** It is settled that **Brahmavicāra** (deliberation on **Brahman**) is meant for the **viśiṣṭa adhikārī**.
    - **Indicator of Eligibility:** If one possesses a genuine interest or taste (**ruci**) in **Brahmavicāra**, they are considered a qualified seeker. Lack of interest indicates that one has not yet become a **viśiṣṭa adhikārī**.
- **Transition to Definition:** Having promised the inquiry (**pratijñāya**), the second **sūtra** proceeds to provide the definition (**lakṣaṇam ucyate**) of **Brahman** for the benefit of the **mumukṣu** (seeker of liberation) who desires to know **Brahman** (**brahma-jñātukāmasya**).

3. The Viṣaya Vākya: Taittirīya Upaniṣad (Bhṛgu Vallī)

The **sūtra** follows the order of the revealed scripture (**śrautārtha-kramānu-sāritva**). To demonstrate this, the opening passage of the **Bhṛgu Vallī** is cited.

Bhāṣya: bhṛgurvai vāruṇiḥ | varuṇaṃ pitaramupasasāra | adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti' (tai. u. 3 | 1 | 1)

Bhṛgu and Varuṇa: Bhṛgu, the son of **Varuṇa** (hence called **Vāruṇiḥ**), approached his father to learn about **Brahman**.

Ṭīkā: adhīhi smāraya upadeśa ityarthāḥ (Instruct or cause to remember).

4. The Definition of Brahman

Following the request, the father provides the definition which serves as the core **viṣaya vākya**:

Bhāṣya: yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante | yena jātāni jīvanti | yatprayantyabhisaṃviśanti | tadvijijñāsasva | tadbrahmeti | (tai. u. 3 | 1 | 1)

- "That from which these beings are born, that by which they live after being born, and that into which they enter upon departing—seek to know That; That is **Brahman**."
- **Function of World-Causality:** The causality of the universe (**jagat-kāraṇatva**) acts as an **upalakṣaṇa** (an indicative mark) to point towards the essential nature of **Brahman**.

5. The Concluding Decision (Nirṇaya Vākya)

The inquiry concludes with the realization of the nature of **Brahman** as Bliss (**Ānanda**).

Bhāṣya: ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante | ānandena jātāni jīvanti | ānandaṃ prayantyabhisaṃviśanti (tai. u. 3 | 6 | 1)

Conclusion: It is from **Ānanda** (Bliss/ **Brahman**) that all beings are born, by **Ānanda** they are sustained, and into **Ānanda** they merge.

6. Scope of Application

While the **Taittirīya** passage is the primary example, the notes emphasize that all similar scriptural passages serve as examples (**udāhartavyāni**) for this **sūtra**.

- **Qualities of Brahman to be understood through these passages:**
  - **Nitya** (Eternal)
  - **Śuddha** (Pure)
  - **Buddha** (Awakened/Conscious)
  - **Mukta-svabhāva** (Ever-free by nature)
  - **Sarvajña** (All-knowing)
- These passages describe the **Svarūpa** (essential nature) and the **Kāraṇa** (cause) of the universe.

Purpose of "Adhīhi" and Unity of Brahman (Page 120)

अधीहि स्मारय उपदिशेत्यर्थः । अत्र येनेत्येकत्वं विवक्षितम् , नानात्वे ब्रह्मत्वविधानायोगात् । यज्जगत्कारणं तदेकमित्यवान्तरवाक्यम् । यदेकं कारणं तद्ब्रह्मेति वा यत्कारणं तदेकं ब्रह्मेति वा महावाक्यमिति भेदः । किं तर्हि स्वरूपलक्षणमित्याशङ्क्य वाक्यशेषान्निर्णीतो यतःशब्दार्थः सत्यज्ञानानन्द इत्याह - तस्य चेति । 'यः सर्वज्ञः' 'तस्मादेतद्ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते' 'विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' इत्यादि शाखान्तरीयवाक्यान्यप्यस्य विषय इत्याह - अन्यान्यपीति । एवं जातीयकत्वमेवाह - नित्येति । तदेवं सर्वासु शाखासु लक्षणद्वयवाक्यानि जिज्ञास्ये ब्रह्मणि समन्वितानि, तद्धिया मुक्तिरिति सिद्धम् ॥ २ ॥

अन्यान्यप्येवंजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावसर्वज्ञस्वरूपकारणविषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि ॥ २ ॥

The tika clarifies the meaning of "adhīhi" as:

Ṭīkā: adhīhi smāraya upadiśa ityarthaḥ: "Adhīhi" means to remind or instruct.

Ṭīkā: yenaikatvaṃ vivakṣitam. nānātve brahmatva-vidhānāyogāt: By which unity is intended. Because in multiplicity, the designation of Brahmanhood is impossible.

A critical point arises regarding the grammar of the word **yena** (by which) in the phrase **yena jātāni jīvanti**.

- **Singular vs. Plural:** The use of the singular **yena** indicates that the cause of the universe is one, not many.
- **Reasoning:** If there were many creators (**nānātva**), they would be limited (**paricchinna**). Brahman, by definition, is unlimited.
- **Distinction in Sentences:**
    1. **Avāntara-vākya (Intermediate Sentence):** The statement "That which is the cause of the world is one" (**yad jagat kāraṇam tadekam**). In this specific context, **Avāntara-vākya** refers to the secondary or indirect aim (**gauṇa-tātparya**).
    2. **Mahāvākya (Great Sentence):** The statement "That which is the cause is the one Brahman" (**yadekaṃ kāraṇaṃ tadbrahma** or **yad kāraṇaṃ tadekaṃ brahma**). This represents the primary or ultimate aim (**mukhya-tātparya**).

Definitions of Brahman: Taṭastha and Svarūpa

Ṭīkā: kiṃ tarhi svarūpalakṣaṇamityāśaṅkya vākyaśeṣānnirṇīto yataḥśabdārthaḥ satyajñānānanda iti

The text distinguishes between the accidental/indicative definition and the essential nature of Brahman.

- **Taṭastha-lakṣaṇa (Indicative Definition):** The attribute of being the cause of the birth, sustenance, and dissolution of the world. This is what is provided in the second **Sūtra**.
- **Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa (Essential Definition):** To avoid the doubt "What is the nature of this cause?", the text points to other passages.

- **Vākya-śeṣa (Remaining portion):** The conclusion of the **Bhṛguvalli** identifies Brahman as Bliss:
  Bhāṣya: ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante | ānandena jātāni jīvanti | ānandaṃ prayantyabhisaṃviśanti' (tai. u. 3 | 6 | 1)

Correlation with other Upaniṣads:

- **Taittirīya (Brahmānandavalli): Satyamjñānamanantaṃ brahma** (Truth, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman).
- **Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad:** Describes Brahman as **Sarvajña** (All-knowing) and **Sarvavit** (All-perceiving).
  Bhāṣya: yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit yasya jñānamayaṃ tapaḥ | tasmādetadbrahma nāma rūpamannaṃ ca jāyate || (mu. 1.1.10)
- **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad:** Defines Brahman as **Vijñānamānandaṃ brahma (3.9.28)** (Knowledge and Bliss is Brahman) and describes the emanation of all beings like sparks from a fire.
- **Chāndogya Upaniṣad: Sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam (6.2.1)** (Existence alone, dear one, was this in the beginning, one without a second). And **sanmūlāḥ somya imāḥ prajāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ (6.8.5)** (All these creatures have existence as root, existence as abode, existence as foundation—tatastha).

The Concept of Gati-sāmānya (Uniformity of Teaching)

The inclusion of various branch-specific (**śākhāntara**) texts serves a dual purpose:

1. **Synthesis:** To show that all **Upaniṣads** have the same **Samanvaya** (consistent flow/agreement).
2. **Universal Definition:** To prove that whether the ultimate reality is called **Ātman**, **Sat**, **Bhūmā**, or **Akṣara**, the definition of being the source of creation remains constant across all Vedic branches. This uniformity is called **Gati-sāmānya**.

Bhāṣya: anyāni api evam jātīyakāni vākyāni nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāva sarvajña-svarūpa-kāraṇa-viṣayāṇi udāhartavyāni: Other similar sentences describing Brahman as eternal-pure-enlightened-liberated nature, all-knowing form, cause-subject, should be cited.

Ṭīkā: sarvāsu śākhāsu lakṣaṇa-dvaya-vākyāni jijñāsye-brahmaṇi samanvitāni. tad dhiyā muktiḥ iti siddham: In all branches, sentences with dual characteristics are harmonized in the Brahman to be inquired into. Liberation is established through that knowledge.

इति द्वितीयसूत्रम् ||२||

iti dvitīyasūtram ||2||

Thus concludes the Second Sutra.

Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 3. Sūtra 3.

The Invocation (Maṅgalācaraṇa) (Page 124)

Before delving into the third **Sūtra**, the **Ṭīkākāra** (commentator) offers an auspicious prayer dedicated to Lord **Rāma**, establishing him as the ultimate source of knowledge.

यस्य निःश्वसितं वेदाः सर्वार्थज्ञानशक्तयः ।
श्रीरामं सर्ववेत्तारं वेदवेद्यमहं भजे ॥ १ ॥

yasya niḥśvasitaṃ vedāḥ sarvārthajñānaśaktayaḥ |
śrīrāmaṃ sarvavettāraṃ vedavedyamahaṃ bhaje || 1 ||

Key Pointers from the Invocation:

- **The Nature of the Vedas:** The **Vedas** are described as the **niśvasita** (breath) of the Supreme. This implies that the creation of the **Vedas** is as effortless as breathing.
- **The Power of the Vedas:** They are **sarvārtha-jñāna-śaktayaḥ**—possessing the power to illuminate the meaning of all objects and goals.
- **Attributes of Rāma:**
    - **Sarvavit/Sarvavettā:** He is the all-knower. His omniscience is the prerequisite for the manifestation of the **Vedas**.
    - **Vedavedya:** He is the ultimate reality to be known through the **Vedas**.
- **The Act of Worship (Bhaje):** Important thing to note that "worship" here is not merely external ritual but an internal identification (**atmatvena**) and service through the writing of the **Ṭīkā**.

Transition and Connection (Saṅgati)

वृत्तानुवादेन सङ्गतिं वदन्नुत्तरसूत्रमवतारयति - **जगदिति ।** चेतनस्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वोक्त्या सर्वज्ञत्वमर्थात्प्रतिज्ञातं सूत्रकृता, चेतनसृष्टेर्ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वात् । तथा च ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञम् , सर्वकारणत्वात् , यो यत्कर्ता स तज्ज्ञः, यथा कुलाल इति स्थितम् ।

जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्युपक्षिप्तम् , तदेव द्रढयन्नाह —

Ṭīkā: vṛtta anuvādena saṅgatiṃ vadan uttarasūtram avatārayati: The text explains how the second **Sūtra** (**Janmādyasya yataḥ**) leads logically to the third.

The Argument for Omniscience

Ṭīkā: cetanasya brahmaṇo jagatkāraṇatvoktyā sarvajñatvamarthātpratijñātaṃ sūtrakṛtā, cetanasṛṣṭerjñānapūrvakatvāt | tathā ca brahma sarvajñam , sarvakāraṇatvāt , yo yatkartā sa tajjñaḥ, yathā kulāla iti sthitam |

Bhāṣya: **jagatkāraṇatvapradarśanena sarvajñaṃ brahmetyupakṣiptam , tadeva draḍhayannāha —**

- **Logic from the 2nd Sūtra:** The second **Sūtra** established **Brahman** as the cause of the world (**Jagat-kāraṇatva**).
- **Inherent Omniscience:** Because **Brahman** is a conscious (**Cetana**) cause, and creation requires knowledge, **Brahman** is implied to be all-knowing (**Sarvajña**).
- **Reinforcement in the 3rd Sūtra:** The third **Sūtra** is introduced to firmly establish (**draḍhayan**) this omniscience by providing a specific reason: **Brahman** is the source of the **Śāstra** (Scriptures).

The Definition of Śāstrayonitvāt

तदेवार्थिकं सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रधानादिनिरासाय वेदकर्तृत्वहेतुना द्रढयन्नाहेत्यर्थः । हेतुद्वयस्यैकार्थसाधनत्वात् , एकविषयत्वमवान्तरसङ्गतिः । यद्वा वेदस्य नित्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः सर्वहेतुता नास्तीत्याक्षेपसङ्गत्या वेदहेतुत्वमुच्यते ‘अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरसः’ इति वाक्यं विषयः तत्किं वेदहेतुत्वेन ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्वं साधयति उत न साधयति इति सन्देहः ।

The term **Śāstrayonitvāt** is broken down to explain the relationship between **Brahman** and the **Vedas**.

Definition of Yoni: In this context, **Yoni** means the **Upādāna Kāraṇam** (material/source cause). **Brahman** is the source from which the **Śāstra** arises.

Ṭīkā: hetudvayasya ekārthasādhanatvāt , ekaviṣayatvam avāntarasaṅgatiḥ |

Avāntara Saṅgati (Subordinate Connection): There are two primary reasons (**Hetu**) that prove **Brahman's** omniscience:

1. **Sarvakāraṇatva:** Being the cause of everything in the universe.
2. **Vedakartṛtva:** Being the author/source of the **Vedas**.

The Syllogism: Just as a potter (**Kulāla**) must know everything about the pot he creates, the creator of the universe and the **Vedas** must be all-knowing.

Addressing the Mīmāṃsaka Objection

Ṭīkā: yadvā vedasya nityatvādbrahmaṇaḥ sarvahetutā nāstītyākṣepasaṅgatyā vedahetutvamucyate

A significant philosophical conflict is addressed regarding the "eternity" of the **Vedas**.

The Objection: The **Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas** argue that the **Vedas** are **Nitya** (eternal). If they are eternal, they cannot have a cause (**Kāraṇa**). Therefore, they argue, **Brahman** cannot be the cause of the **Vedas**.

The Vedāntic Response: Even if the **Vedas** are considered eternal in their flow, they manifest from **Brahman** at the start of every creation cycle. This manifestation is effortless (**Niḥśvāsa-rūpa**).

Scriptural Basis (Viṣaya Vākya)

Ṭīkā: ‘asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametadyadṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo'tharvāṅgirasaḥ’ iti vākyaṃ viṣayaḥ

The foundational scriptural text for this **Sūtra** is taken from the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad** (2.4.10).

- **Meaning:** "The **Ṛgveda**, **Yajurveda**, **Sāmaveda**, and **Atharvaveda** are the breath of this Great Being."
- **Interpretation of "Breath":** The use of the word **Niḥśvasita** (breath) signifies that the production of the **Vedas** required no strenuous effort (**Ayāsa**) from **Brahman**.

The Doubt (Saṃśaya)

Ṭīkā: tatkiṃ vedahetutvena brahmaṇaḥ sarvajñatvaṃ sādhayati uta na sādhayati iti sandehaḥ |

To focus on the central inquiry of this **Sūtra**, a doubt is raised:

Doubt: Does the fact that **Brahman** is the cause of the **Vedas** successfully prove its omniscience (**Sarvajñatvam**), or is this reasoning insufficient?

The analysis on this **Sūtra** will focus on proving that because the **Vedas** reveal all knowledge, their source must inherently possess that total knowledge.

Ṭīkā: tatra vyākaraṇādivad vedasya pauruṣeyatve mūlapramāṇasāpekṣatvena aprāmāṇyāpātāt na sādhayatīti pūrvapakṣe jagaddhetoḥ cetanatva asiddhiḥ phalam |

- The opponent argues that if **Brahman** is the "author" of the **Vedas**, then the **Vedas** become **Pauruṣeya** (personal/authored).
- Like grammar (**Vyākaraṇa**), authored works depend on a prior source of knowledge (**mūla-pramāṇa-sāpekṣatvam**). This implies the **Vedas** would lack independent authority (**aprāmāṇya**).
- **The Result (Phalam)**: In the **Pūrvapakṣa**, the cause of the universe would not be proven as a conscious, omniscient being (**cetana-asiddhi**).

The Siddhānta:

Ṭīkā: siddhānte tatsiddhiḥ |

- **Brahman**'s status as the source of the **Vedas** confirms its omniscience and consciousness (**cetantva-siddhi**).
- The **Vedas** illuminate all things. The source of such an illuminating power must necessarily be all-knowing.

Contextual Links (Saṅgatis)

अस्य वेदान्तवाक्यस्य स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गस्य वेदकर्तरि समन्वयोक्तेः श्रुतिशास्त्राध्यायपादसङ्गतयः । एवमापादं श्रुत्यादिसङ्गतय ऊह्याः ।

The text explains the various links (**Saṅgatis**) of this **Sūtra** with the broader framework of study:

Ṭīkā: **asya vedāntavākyasya spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgasya vedakartari samanvayokteḥ śrutiśāstraadhyāyapādasaṃgatayaḥ**

Explanation: The **Ṭīkā** emphasizes that this **Vedānta** sentence contains clear markers of **Brahman** (**Spaṣṭa-Brahma-liṅga**). It establishes a "one-meaning" relationship (**ekārtha-bodhakatva**) between the **Śruti** (the breath of the Great Being) and the **Sūtra** (which identifies **Brahman** as the cause of **Śāstra**).

पूर्णानन्दी टीका: प्रकृतवेदान्तवाक्यस्य यः समन्वयः तत् प्रतिपादकत्वात् इत्यर्थः | वेदान्त वाक्यस्य इति अनेन विषयवाक्यस्य स्वरूपस्य अस्य महतो भूतस्य इत्यादि श्रुतेः तृतीयसूत्रस्य च वेदकर्तृत्व रूपैकार्थ बोधकत्वरूपा संगतिः प्रदर्शिता | स्पष्टब्रह्मलिंगकस्य इति विशेषणेन सूत्रस्य प्रथमपादस्य च स्पष्टब्रह्मलिंगक श्रुत्यर्थप्रतिपादकत्वरूपा संगतिः प्रदर्शिता | वेदकर्तरि इति अनेन सूत्रस्य शास्त्रस्य चैकार्थप्रतिपादकत्वरूपा सङ्गतिदर्शिता |

pūrṇānandī ṭīkā: prakṛtavedāntavākyasya yaḥ samanvayaḥ tat pratipādakatvāt ityarthaḥ | vedānta vākyasya iti anena viṣayavākyasya svarūpasya asya mahato bhūtasya ityādi śruteḥ tṛtīyasūtrasya ca vedakartṛtva rūpaikārtha bodhakatvarūpā saṃgatiḥ pradarśitā | spaṣṭabrahmaliṃgakasya iti viśeṣaṇena sūtrasya prathamapādasya ca spaṣṭabrahmaliṃgaka śrutyarthapratipādakatvarūpā saṃgatiḥ pradarśitā | vedakartari iti anena sūtrasya śāstrasya caikārthapratipādakatvarūpā saṅgatidarśitā |

Saṅgati Type	Connection Description
Śruti Saṅgati	Direct link to the **Viṣaya Vākya** ("**Asya mahato bhūtasya...**"). The direct link between the **Sūtra** and the Upaniṣadic sentence. The **Sūtra** interprets the specific "breath" metaphor as divine authorship.
Śāstra Saṅgati	The alignment with the entire **Brahma Sūtra Śāstra**. Since the science of **Vedānta** aims to contemplate Brahman, and this **Sūtra** establishes Brahman as the source of all knowledge (**Sarvajña**), it is perfectly consistent with the goal of the **Śāstra**.
Adhyāya Saṅgati	This pertains to the **Samanvaya Adhyāya** (the Chapter on Reconciliation). The goal is to show that all Vedānta passages converge upon Brahman. Since this mantra and **Sūtra** both describe the non-dual (Advaita) Brahman as the source, the chapter-level connection is achieved.
Pāda Saṅgati	This **Sūtra** belongs to the first **Pāda**, which is reserved for texts with **Spaṣṭa-Brahma-liṅga** (clear characteristics of Brahman). Because the word "**Asya**" in the Śruti points directly and clearly to Brahman, it fits the criteria for this specific section.

Ṭīkā: evamāpādaṃ śrutyādisaṅgataya ūhyāḥ |

In this way, **Saṅgati** can be understood for all the **Sūtra** which will be covered in the **Śāstra.**

The Inference for Omniscience (Anumāna) (Page 125)

वेदे हि सर्वार्थप्रकाशनशक्तिरुपलभ्यते, सा तदुपादानब्रह्मगतशक्तिपूर्विका तद्गता वा, प्रकाशनशक्तित्वात् । कार्यगतशक्तित्वाद्वा, प्रदीपशक्तिवदिति वेदोपादानत्वेन ब्रह्मणः स्वसम्बद्धाशेषार्थप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यरूपं सर्वसाक्षित्वं सिध्यति ।

The text provides a logical argument for **Brahman**'s omniscience based on the "power of illumination" (**Prakāśana-śakti**). The core argument establishes that the **Vedas** possess an inherent power to reveal all objects of knowledge. This power is not independent but is derived from its source.

Ṭīkā: vede hi sarvārthaprakāśanaśaktirupalabhyate, sā tadupādānabrahmagataśaktipūrvikā tadgatā vā, prakāśanaśaktitvāt |

Explanation:

1. The **Vedas** possess the power to reveal/illuminate all things (**Sarvārtha-prakāśana-śakti**).
2. This power must originate from its material/efficient cause (**Upādāna-kāraṇa**), which is **Brahman**.
3. Therefore, **Brahman** inherently possesses the capacity to illuminate/know all things.

The Inference (Anumāna): The inference provides two pairs of **Sādhya-Hetu** for the same **Pakṣa.**

1. **Pakṣa** (Subject): **vedasya sarvārthaprakāśanaśaktiḥ**: The **Veda**'s power to reveal all things.
2. **Sādhya-Hetu (Pair 1)**:
   tadupādānabrahmagataśaktipūrvikā: Is preceded by the power of its material cause, **Brahman**.
   Prakāśana-śaktitvāt: Because it is a power of illumination and this power of **Brahman** is available in **Vedas**.
3. **Sādhya-Hetu (Pair 2)**:
   tadgatā: The power is in the **Brahman**
   Kāryagata-śaktitvāt: because the **Vedas** are effects of **Brahman**, the power of Brahman alone is functioning even though it is in **Vedas**.

   Dṛṣṭānta (Example): Like the light of a lamp (**Pradīpa-śakti**). If a cloth soaked in oil is lit (a torch), its light reveals things not because of the cloth itself, but because of the fire (the cause) from which the power was derived.

Explanation: Just as the light of a torch (māśal) originates from the fire/lamp (**Pradīpa**) it was lit from, the revealing power of the **Veda** is derived from its source, **Brahman**. Since the **Veda** reveals everything, **Brahman**, being its source, is the Universal Witness (**Sarva-sākṣī**).

By being the **Upādāna** (material cause) of the **Veda**, **Brahman**'s status as the one who possesses the capacity to reveal every single object related to Him is proved. This is the definition of **Sarva-sākṣitva**.

- Unlike a limited knower (**Pramātā**) who knows only what is currently related to their senses, **Brahman** is related to everything (**Aśeṣārtha**).
- This relates to the **Gītā** verse: **Kṣetrajñaṃ cāpi māṃ viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu** (Know Me as the Knower in all fields). As the witness of all fields (**Kṣetra**), **Brahman** is the **Sarva-sākṣī**.

Authorship and Divine Creation (Pauruṣeyatva Debate) (Page 125)

यद्वा यथा अध्येतारः पूर्वक्रमं ज्ञात्वा वेदं कुर्वन्ति, तथा विचित्रगुणमायासहायोऽनावृतानन्तस्वप्रकाशचिन्मात्रः परमेश्वरः स्वकृतपूर्वकल्पीयक्रमसजातीयक्रमवन्तं वेदराशिं तदर्थांश्च युगपज्जानन्नेव करोतीति न वेदस्य पौरुषेयता । यत्र ह्यर्थज्ञानपूर्वकं वाक्यज्ञानं वाक्यसृष्टौ कारणं तत्र पौरुषेयता, अत्र च यौगपद्यान्न सा, अतो वेदकर्ता वेदमिव तदर्थमपि स्वसम्बद्धं नान्तरीयकतया जानातीति सर्वज्ञ इति सिद्धान्तयति - शास्त्रेति ।

A unique problem arises: If **Brahman** is the "author" of the **Vedas**, do the **Vedas** become **Pauruṣeya** (created by a person)?

- **The Conflict**: **Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika** schools consider **Īśvara** the author, making **Vedas Pauruṣeya**. **Mīmāṃsakās** claim they are eternal with no author. **Vedānta** provides a distinct perspective: **Brahman** is the author, yet the **Veda** remains **Apauruṣeya**.
- **The Teacher Analogy**: A teacher does not "create" the **Vedas**; they recite them exactly as they heard them from their own teacher, maintaining the precise sequence (**Anupūrvī**), phonetics (**Svara**), and duration (**Hrasva-dīrgha-pluta**).

Ṭīkā: **yathā adhyetāraḥ pūrvakramaṃ jñātvā vedaṃ kurvanti, tathā vicitraguṇamāyāsahāyo'nāvṛtānantasvaprakāśacinmātraḥ parameśvaraḥ svakṛtapūrvakalpīyakramasajātīyakramavantaṃ vedarāśiṃ tadarthāṃśca yugapajjānanneva karotīti na vedasya pauruṣeyatā |**

Explanation: Just as students and teachers reproduce the **Veda** by knowing the previous sequence, **Parameśvara**—aided by the power of **Māyā**—manifests the **Vedas**. He does this by remembering the specific sequence (**Krama**) of the **Vedas** from the previous cycle (**Pūrva-kalpa**).

- **Key Attributes of the Creator**: He is **Anāvṛta** (unveiled), **Ananta** (infinite), **Svaprakāśa** (self-luminous), and **Cinmātra** (pure consciousness).
- **Sajātīya-krama**: The creation is a "similar sequence" to the previous one. Even though **Brahman** manifests it, He is not a "composer" in the human sense because He follows an eternal template based on the sequence of the previous cycle (**Pūrva-kalpīya-krama**).

Ṭīkā: **yatra hyarthajñānapūrvakaṃ vākyajñānaṃ vākyasṛṣṭau kāraṇaṃ tatra pauruṣeyatā, atra ca yaugapadyānna sā, ato vedakartā vedamiva tadarthamapi svasambaddhaṃ nāntarīyakatayā jānātīti sarvajña iti siddhāntayati**

Explanation: **Pauruṣeyatva** (human authorship) exists where a person first understands a concept (**Artha-jñāna**), then conceptualizes a sentence (**Vākya-jñāna**), and then uses that as a cause to create a sentence. (e.g., "Devadatta goes to the village").

Siddhānta (Conclusion): In the case of **Īśvara**, there is **Yugapad-jñāna** (simultaneous knowledge). **Brahman** knows the words of the **Vedas** and their meanings simultaneously, without the step-by-step cognitive process of human composition.

Because of this simultaneity (**Yaugapadya**), the flaw of **Pauruṣeyatva** does not apply to the **Veda**. **Brahman** knows the **Veda** and its meaning as being essentially related to Himself (**Svasambaddham**) without any mediation (**Nāntarīyakatayā**).

Analysis of Sūtra 1.1.3.3 (Page 122)

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥ ३ ॥
śāstrayonitvāt || 3 ||

Padārthokti: (Meanings of the Terms):

The **Sūtra** is composed of the compound **Śāstrayoni**. The meaning changes based on the grammatical structure (**Samāsa**) applied. The text explores two distinct interpretations (**Varṇakas**).

1. Ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa Interpretation (Varṇaka 1)

In this view, the compound is dissolved as: **Śāstrasya yoniḥ** (The origin/cause of the **Śāstra**).

- **Yoni** here means **Kāraṇa** (cause/source), specifically the **Nimitta-kāraṇa** (instrumental cause).
- **Logic**: If **Brahman** is the source of the **Vedas**, and the **Vedas** contain knowledge of all things, then **Brahman** must be **Sarvajña** (all-knowing).
- **Significance**: This establishes **Brahman**'s **Sarvajñatvam** (omniscience).

2. Bahuvrīhi Interpretation (Varṇaka 2)

In this view, the compound is dissolved as: **Śāstraṃ yonir yasmin tat** (That for which the **Śāstra** is the source of knowledge/proof).

- **Yoni** here means **Pramāṇa** (valid means of knowledge/proof).
- **Logic**: An object is established through its definition (**Lakṣaṇa**) and its proof (**Pramāṇa**).
    - **Sūtra** 1.1.2 provided the **Lakṣaṇa** (definition: creator of the universe).
    - **Sūtra** 1.1.3 provides the **Pramāṇa** (**Śāstra** is the only proof).
- **Significance**: This establishes that **Brahman** cannot be known through independent logic or perception, only through the **Vedas**.

Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā Verses For First Varṇaka (Page 122)

न कर्तृ ब्रह्म वेदस्य किं वा कर्तृ, न कर्तृ तत् ।
विरूप नित्यया वाचेत्येवं नित्यत्वकीर्तनात् (नित्यत्ववर्णनात्) ॥ १
na kartṛ brahma vedasya kiṃ vā kartṛ, na kartṛ tat |
virūpa nityayā vācetyevaṃ nityatvakīrtanāt (nityatvavarṇanāt) || 1

कर्तु निःश्वसिताद्युक्तेर्नित्यत्वं पूर्वसाम्यतः ।
सर्वावभासिवेदस्य कर्तृत्वात्सर्वविद्भवेत् ॥ २
kartu niḥśvasitādyukternityatvaṃ pūrvasāmyataḥ |
sarvāvabhāsivedasya kartṛtvātsarvavidbhavet || 2

Verse Explanation:

1. **Viṣaya (Subject): brahmaṇaḥ sarvavidvatvam** (All-knowing nature of Brahman).
2. **Saṃśaya (Doubt): na kartṛ brahma vedasya kiṃ vā kartṛ** (Is **Brahman** the author or not?).
3. **Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent):**
   na kartṛ tat | virūpa nityayā vācetyevaṃ nityatvakīrtanāt
   - According to the **Śruti** ("**Virūpa nityayā vācā**"), the **Vedas** are described as "eternal speech." If they are eternal, they cannot have an author. Therefore, **Brahman** cannot be the **Veda-kartā**.
4. **Siddhānta (Conclusion): kartu niśvasitādyukternityatvaṃ pūrvasāmyataḥ | sarvāvabhāsivedasya kartṛtvātsarvavidbhavet**

   The **Siddhānta** (conclusion) responds that the **Śruti** describes the **Vedas** as being "breathed out" (**Niśvasita**) by **Brahman**.

   Reconciliation of Eternality: The "eternality" mentioned in scriptures refers to **Pūrva-sāmyataḥ**—the consistency of the sequence. Just as a river like the **Gaṅgā** flows continuously and appears the same, the **Vedas** are manifested in every cycle (**Kalpa**) with the same sequence.

   Proof of Omniscience: Because the **Veda** reveals everything (**Sarvāvabhāsi**), the one who manifests it must be all-knowing (**Sarvavid**).

Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā Verses For Second Varṇaka (Page 123)

अस्त्यन्यमेयताप्यस्य किं वा वेदैकमेयता ।
घटवत्सिद्धवस्तुत्वाद् ब्रह्मान्येनापि मीयते ॥ १

astyanyameyatāpyasya kiṃ vā vedaikameyatā |
ghaṭavatsiddhavastutvād brahmānyenāpi mīyate || 1

रूपलिङ्गादिराहित्यान्नास्य मान्तरयोग्यता ।
तं त्वौपनिषदेत्यादौ प्रोक्ता वेदैकमेयता ॥२

rūpaliṅgādirāhityānnāsya māntarayogyatā |
taṃ tvaupaniṣadetyādau proktā vedaikameyatā || 2

Verse Explanation:

1. **Viṣaya (Subject): brahmaṇaḥ vedaikameyatā** (Nature of **Brahman**'s "knowability" (**Meayatā**).
2. **Saṃśaya (Doubt): asti anyameyatāpi asya kiṃ vā vedaikameyatā** (The central question is whether **Brahman** is known only through the **Vedas** or if other instruments of knowledge, such as inference (**Anumāna**), can also grasp it.).
3. **Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent):**
   ghaṭavatsiddhavastutvād brahmānyenāpi mīyate : The opponent posits that since **Brahman** is a **Siddha Vastu** (an already existing entity) and not a **Sādhya** (something to be accomplished through action), it should be perceivable by other means, just like a pot (**Ghaṭavat**). Their logical syllogism is:
   - **Pratijñā** (Proposition): **Brahman** is **Anyameyam** (knowable by other means).
   - **Hetu** (Reason): Because it is a **Siddha Vastu**.
4. **Siddhānta (Conclusion): rūpaliṅgādirāhityānnāsya māntarayogyatā |**
   taṃ tvaupaniṣadetyādau proktā vedaikameyatā:

   - **Lack of Form: Brahman** is devoid of **Rūpa** (color/form), making it inaccessible to perception (**Pratyakṣa**).
   - **Lack of Indicators:** It lacks **Liṅga** (logical marks/signs), meaning there is no **Hetu** (middle term) to facilitate inference (**Anumāna**).
   - **Scriptural Authority:** In the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad**, during the debate between **Śākalya** and **Yājñavalkya**, **Brahman** is specifically called **Aupaniṣadam** (knowable only through the **Upaniṣads**). Another mantra from **amṛtabindu upaniṣad** is also quoted: **nirvikalpamanantaṃ ca hetudṛṣṭāntavarjitam | aprameyamanādiṃ ca yajjñātvā mucyate budhaḥ || 9|**

The Greatness of the Vedas (Page 126)

शास्त्रं प्रति हेतुत्वात् , ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वकारणं च इति सङ्गतिद्वयानुसारेण सूत्रयोजनामभिप्रेत्य पदानि व्याचष्टे - महत इति । हेतोः सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धये वेदस्य विशेषणानि । तत्र ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्च महत्त्वम् , हितशासनात्शास्त्रत्वम् । शास्त्रशब्दः शब्दमात्रोपलक्षणार्थ इति मत्वाह - अनेकेति । पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राणि शिक्षाकल्पव्याकरणनिरुक्तच्छन्दोज्योतिषाणि षडङ्गानि इति दश विद्यास्थानानि वेदार्थज्ञानहेतवः । तैरुपकृतस्येत्यर्थः । अनेन मन्वादिभिः परिगृहीतत्वेन वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं सूचितम् । अबोधकत्वाभावादपि प्रामाण्यमित्याह - प्रदीपवदिति ।

महत ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य अनेकविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत्सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म ।

Ṭīkā: **śāstraṃ prati hetutvāt , brahma sarvajñaṃ sarvakāraṇaṃ ca iti saṅgatidvayānusāreṇa sūtrayojanāmabhipretya padāni vyācaṣṭe**

The **Sūtra** is interpreted through two primary perspectives to establish the nature of **Brahman**:

1. **Brahman** as the cause (**Kāraṇa**) of the **Śāstra**.
2. **Brahman** as the entity that is revealed exclusively by the **Śāstra**.

By being the cause of the scriptures, **Brahman**'s omniscience (**sarvajñatvam)** and status as the universal cause (**Sarvakāraṇatvam**) are validated.

Bhāṣya: mahata ṛgvedādeḥ śāstrasya anekavidyāsthānopabṛṃhitasya pradīpavatsarvārthāvadyotinaḥ sarvajñakalpasya yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ brahma |

Ṭīkā: **hetoḥ sarvajñatvasiddhaye vedasya viśeṣaṇāni**

Brahman is the source (**Yoni**) of the great body of knowledge starting with the **Ṛgveda**. To prove **Brahman**'s omniscience, the greatness of these scriptures is characterized by following adjectives:

- **Extensiveness:** They are "Great" (**Mahataḥ**) because they are vast in both volume (**Granthataḥ**) and meaning (**Arthataḥ**).
- **Supplemented by many Secondary branches of knowledge:** The expansion (**Upabṛmhaṇam**) of the Vedic truth occurs through various secondary sciences.
- **Illumination:** Like a lamp (**Pradīpavat**), the **Śāstra** illuminates all objects and truths (**Sarvārtha-avadyotinaḥ**).
- **Near-Omniscience:** The scripture is described as **Sarvajña-kalpa**, meaning it is "virtually omniscient" due to the infinite knowledge it contains.

Definition and Purpose of Śāstra

Ṭīkā: hitaśāsanātśāstratvam

The term **Śāstra** is derived from the root **"शास्" (śās)** meaning "to instruct" or "to command" (**Śāsati**). It refers to that which instructs regarding what is truly beneficial (**Hitam**) for a being.

The Nature of "Benefit" (Hitam)

The scriptures guide individuals away from wasting their lives in pursuit of transient worldly status or material gains, which lose value as one ages. Instead, the **Śāstra** urges the use of one's physical and mental strength while young to attain true knowledge (**Jñāna**).

The Ten Vidyāsthānas (Foundations of Knowledge)

Ṭīkā: śāstraśabdaḥ śabdamātra upalakṣaṇārtha iti

The term **Śāstra** acts as an **Upalakṣaṇa** (a representative term) for the entire collection of sacred words. The expansion (**Upabṛmhaṇa**) of the Vedic truth occurs through various secondary sciences.

Ṭīkā: purāṇanyāyamīmāṃsādharmaśāstrāṇi śikṣākalpavyākaraṇaniruktacchandojyotiṣāṇi ṣaḍaṅgāni iti daśa vidyāsthānāni vedārthajñānahetavaḥ |

The ten foundations of knowledge that serve as tools to understand the meaning of the Vedas (**Vedārtha-jñāna-hetavaḥ**) are:

1. **Purāṇa:** Historical and mythological stories that expand on Vedic truths.
2. **Nyāya:** Logic and reasoning.
3. **Mīmāṁsā:** Rules of interpretation (both **Pūrva** and **Uttara**).
4. **Dharmaśāstra:** Codes of conduct and ethics (e.g., **Manusaṃhitā**, **Yājñavalkyasmṛti**).
5. **Śikṣā:** Phonetics and pronunciation.
6. **Kalpa:** Ritual instructions.
7. **Vyākaraṇa:** Grammar.
8. **Nirukta:** Etymology and lexicography.
9. **Chandas:** Prosody and meter.
10. **Jyotiṣa:** Astronomy and timing of rituals.

Ṭīkā: tairupakṛtasyetyarthaḥ | anena manvādibhiḥ parigṛhītatvena vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ sūcitam | abodhakatvābhāvādapi prāmāṇyamityāha - pradīpavaditi |

These sciences are essential because, without them, the deep intent of the Vedas remains inaccessible. They establish the authority (**Prāmāṇya**) of the Vedas by showing how the sages (like **Manu**) accepted and expanded upon the Vedic wisdom.

Brahman as the Omniscient Source

सर्वार्थप्रकाशनशक्तिमत्वेऽप्यचेतनत्वात्सर्वज्ञकल्पत्वं योनिरुपादानं कर्तृ च । ननु सर्वज्ञस्य यो गुणः सर्वार्थज्ञानशक्तिमत्वं वेदस्य तदन्वितत्वेऽपि तद्योनेः सर्वज्ञत्वं कुत इत्यत आह - **न हीति ।**

न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतः सम्भवोऽस्ति ।

The logical argument presented is that the cause must be superior to or equal to the effect in terms of knowledge.

The Concept of Sarvajña-kalpa

While the Vedas contain all knowledge, they are referred to as **Sarvajña-kalpa** (almost omniscient) rather than simply **Sarvajña**.

- The suffix **-kalpa** (or **-deśya**) denotes "slightly less than" or "resembling."
- This is used because the Vedas, as words/sounds, are technically insentient (**Acetana**).
- **Brahman**, being the conscious creator and the "womb" (**Yoni**) of this knowledge, is the truly Omniscient (**Sarvajña**) being.

Bhāṣya: na hīdṛśasya śāstrasya ṛgvedādilakṣaṇasya sarvajñaguṇānvitasya sarvajñādanyataḥ sambhavo'sti |

Such a scripture, characterized by the qualities of the **Ṛgveda** and imbued with the quality of omniscience, cannot possibly originate from anyone other than an Omniscient Being (**Sarvajña**). Therefore, **Brahman** is the material and efficient cause (**Upādāna** and **Nimitta Kāraṇa**) of the entire corpus of knowledge.

The Principle of Causal Potency

उपादाने तच्छक्तिं विना कार्ये तदयोगाद्वेदोपादानस्य सर्वज्ञत्वम् , अनुमानं तु पूर्वं दर्शितम् । न चाविद्यायास्तदापत्तिः । शक्तिमत्वेऽप्यचेतनत्वादिति भावः ।

The primary argument for the omniscience of **Brahman** rests on the nature of the material cause. If a specific power is found in an effect, that power must inherently reside in its cause.

Ṭīkā: upādāne tacchaktiṃ vinā kārye tadayogādvedopādānasya sarvajñatvam

- **Logic**: If a certain capacity or power (**śakti**) is absent in the material cause (**upādāna**), it cannot manifest in the effect (**kārya**).
- **Application**: The **Vedas** possess the power to reveal all things (**sarvārtha-prakāśana-śakti**). Therefore, the source from which the **Vedas** originated—**Brahman**—must possess that omniscience.
- **Previous Inference**: Reference is made to the analogy of a lamp (**pradīpa**). Just as a lamp's light is rooted in its source, the revelatory power of the **Veda** is rooted in the consciousness of **Brahman**.

Refutation of Avidyā as the Omniscient Cause

Ṭīkā: na cāvidyāyāstadāpattiḥ | śaktimatve'pyacetanatvāditi bhāvaḥ |

A question arises: If **avidyā** (ignorance/cosmic illusion) is considered a material cause (**pariṇāmī-upādāna**) for the world and the **Vedas**, could **avidyā** also be called omniscient?

- **The Objection**: Since **avidyā** is a cause, it should logically inherit the trait of omniscience.
- **Resolution**: Even though **avidyā** possesses certain powers (**śaktimattva**), it is inherently insentient (**acetana**). Omniscience is a characteristic of consciousness. Therefore, this definition applies only to **Brahman**, who is sentient, and not to the inert **avidyā**.

The Inference of the Superior Knower (Page 127)

वेदः स्वविषयादधिकार्थज्ञानवज्जन्यः प्रमाणवाक्यत्वात् , व्याकरणरामायणादिवदित्यनुमानान्तरम् । तत्र व्याप्तिमाह - यद्यदिति ।

यद्यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्सम्भवति, यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततोऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके ।

A new logical inference (**anumānāntaram**) is introduced to prove that the creator of a text must know more than the text itself.

Ṭīkā: vedaḥ svaviṣayādadhikārthajñānavajjanyaḥ pramāṇavākyatvāt , vyākaraṇarāmāyaṇādivadityanumānāntaram |

Logic Breakdown

Component	Description
Pakṣa (Subject)	The Vedas.
Sādhya (Probandum)	Being produced by one who has knowledge greater than the subject matter **(svaviṣayād adhikārtha-jñānavaj-janya)**.
Hetu (Reason)	Because it is a valid/authoritative statement/text **(pramāṇa-vākyatva)**.
Dṛṣṭānta (Example)	Grammar **(Vyākaraṇa)** by **Pāṇini** or the **Rāmāyaṇa** by Vālmīki.

Examples:
    - **Maharṣi Pāṇini** composed the **Vyākaraṇa**. His knowledge was not limited only to what he wrote; he knew far more than the text reveals.
    - **Maharṣi Vālmīki** was omniscient; his knowledge exceeded the verses of the **Rāmāyaṇa**.
- **Conclusion**: Since the **Veda** is a valid means of knowledge, it must have been produced by a being (**Brahman/Īśvara**) whose knowledge exceeds the vast information contained within the **Vedas**.

While **Brahman** is ultimately attributeless (**nirguṇa**), in the context of being a "Generator" (**janaka**) or "Creator," we must refer to **Īśvara** (God with attributes).

The relationship of producer and the produced (**janya-janaka-bhāva**) requires the association with an adjunct (**upādhi**). Thus, **Saguṇa Brahman** (**Īśvara**) is the one from whom the **Vedas** emerge.

Linguistic and Semantic Analysis of "Vistaraḥ"

विस्तरः शब्दाधिक्यम् , अनेनार्थतोऽल्पत्वं वदन् कर्तुर्ज्ञानस्यार्थाधिक्यं सूचयति, दृश्यते चार्थवादाधिक्यं वेदे ।

The discussion dives into the linguistic precision of the **Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra** (**Śaṅkarācārya Ji**) regarding the word **Vistara** (vast/expanded).

This highlights the extreme care taken by the **Bhāṣyakāra** to use grammatically precise terminology that aligns with the **Sūtras** and the nature of scriptural revelation.

The Logical Invariable Concomitance (Vyāpti)

The core logic presented is that the producer of a branch of knowledge is always more knowledgeable than the knowledge presented in the text itself.

Bhāṣya: yad yad vistarārthaṃ śāstraṃ yasmāt puruṣaviśeṣāt sambhavati, yathā vyākaraṇādi pāṇinyādeḥ jñeyaikadeśārtham api, sa tataḥ api adhikataravijñānaḥ iti prasiddhaṃ loke|

Universal Principle: Whatever extensive scripture (**vistarārtha-śāstra**) originates from a specific person (**puruṣa-viśeṣa**), that person is known in the world to possess significantly greater knowledge (**adhikatara-vijñāna**) than the scripture itself.

- **The Scope of Knowledge**: The text represents only a "single portion" (**jñeya-ekadeśa**) of the author's total understanding.
- **The Example of Pāṇini**: The **Vyākaraṇa** (Grammar) composed by Sage **Pāṇini** covers vast linguistic rules, yet **Pāṇini** himself possessed knowledge that went far beyond the rules of grammar he codified.

Grammatical Precision: Vistara vs. Vistāra
A technical distinction is made regarding the word **Vistara** to emphasize its connection to "Shastra" or "Speech."

- **Suffix Application**: In general contexts, the root **stṝñ ācchādane** (to spread) with the prefix **vi** takes the suffix **Ghañ**, resulting in **Vistāra** (meaning general expansion).
- **The Exception**: According to the rule **prathane vāvaśabde (3.3.33)**, when the expansion refers to "speech" (**śabda**) or a "treatise" (**śāstra**), the **Ghañ** suffix is prohibited.
- **The Result**: The suffix **Ap** is used (via **ṝdorap 3.3.57**), resulting in the term **Vistara**. Therefore, the **Bhāṣyakāra** specifically uses the term **Vistara** to denote that the **Vedas** are an expansion of "Word/Knowledge."

The Multi-dimensional Knowledge of Sages
The discussion uses the example of Sage **Patañjali** to illustrate how a single author can be a master of diverse fields, proving that the author's consciousness is the reservoir for multiple "Vistara" Shastras.

Speech (**Vāk**): **Mahābhāṣya** (Grammar): Purification of Language
Mind (**Manas**): **Yoga Sūtras**: Purification of Consciousness
Body (**Kāya**): **Ayurveda** (Medical Texts): Purification of the Physical Frame

Patañjali is described as **cittajñā-viśeṣa** (one with specialized knowledge of the psyche). His ability to write on these three distinct areas proves that the "Knower" (**jñātā**) is always superior to the "Known" (**jñeya**) expressed in a specific book.

Quantitative Word Abundance vs. Qualitative Meaning

The **Ṭīkā** provides a profound insight into why a text—even one as vast as the **Veda**—is considered "lesser" than the author's knowledge.

Ṭīkā: vistaraḥ śabdādhikyam , anena arthato'lpatvaṃ vadan karturjñānasya arthādhikyaṃ sūcayati, dṛśyate ca arthavādādhikyaṃ vede |

- **Vistara as Word Abundance**: Here, **Vistara** refers to the great number of words (**śabdādhikyam**) used in the scripture.
- **Limited Expressed Meaning (Arthato'lpatvam)**: Despite the vast number of words, the actual meaning conveyed is often a small fraction of the author's intent or total wisdom.
- **The Case of Arthavāda**: In the **Vedas**, there are lengthy passages called **Arthavāda** (praise or stories). While these contain many words, their ultimate purpose is often just to convey a single point—the recommendation of a ritual or the prohibition of an act.
- **The Infinite Knower**: If a human author like **Pāṇini** or **Patañjali** knows more than their texts, then the Source of the **Vedas** (the **Ananta-Jñāna** or Infinite Knowledge of **Brahman**) must be absolutely omniscient.

The **Vedas** are characterized by:

1. **Śabdādhikyam**: A vastness of words.
2. **Pramāṇa-vākyatvam**: Being a valid means of knowledge.
3. **Arthavāda-ādhikyam**: An abundance of explanatory and illustrative passages.

Since these are present, the generator of these texts must be a **Puruṣa-viśeṣa** (Brahman/Ishvara) who is **Sarvajña** (Omniscient), as the cause must contain the potency of the effect to a superior degree.

The Principle of Authorial Superiority (Page 128)

अत्रैषा योजना - यद्यच्छास्त्रं यस्मादाप्तात्सम्भवति स ततः शास्त्रादधिकार्थज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धम् , यथा शब्दसाधुत्वादिर्ज्ञेयैकदेशोऽर्थो यस्य तदपि व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेरधिकार्थज्ञात्सम्भवति ।

It is an established worldly principle that the author of a comprehensive science (**Śāstra**) possesses more knowledge than what is contained in a specific portion of that science.

Bhāṣya: yadyad vistarārthaṃ śāstraṃ yasmāt puruṣaviśeṣāt sambhavati yathā vyākaraṇādi pāṇinyādeḥ jñeyaikadeśārtham api sa tataḥ api adhikataravijñānaḥ iti prasiddham loke

Explanation:

- **The Analogy of Pāṇini:** Just as Sage **Pāṇini** is the source of the vast science of Grammar (**Vyākaraṇa**), his personal knowledge is not limited to just grammar.
- **Extended Knowledge:** It is inferred that Sage **Pāṇini** likely possessed knowledge of **Dharmaśāstra**, **Jyotiṣa**, and other sciences like **Nyāya** or **Vedānta**.
- **Conclusion:** The work produced (Grammar) represents only a fraction (**Ekadeśa**) of the author's total wisdom. Therefore, **Brahman**, being the source of the Vedas, must be omniscient.

Ṭīkā: atraiṣā yojanā - yad yad śāstraṃ yasmād āptātsambhavati sa tataḥ śāstrāt adhikārthajñāna iti prasiddham

Explanation: Word Planning (Yojanā): The commentary clarifies the syntactic connection. Whatever **Śāstra** originates from a reliable authority (**Āpta Puruṣa**), that authority famously possesses knowledge exceeding the content of that **Śāstra**.

The Nature of the Vedas (Page 128)

यद्यल्पार्थमपि शास्त्रमधिकार्थज्ञात्सम्भवति तदा 'अस्य महतः' इत्यादिश्रुतेर्यस्मान्महतोऽपरिच्छिन्नाद्भूतात्सत्याद्योनेः सकाशात् अनेकशाखेत्यादिविशिष्टस्य वेदस्य पुरुषनिःश्वासवदप्रयत्नेनैव सम्भवः तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्वं चेति किमु वक्तव्यमिति । तत्र वेदस्य पौरुषेयत्वशङ्कानिरसार्थं श्रुतिस्थनिःश्वसितपदार्थमाह - अप्रयत्नेनेति । प्रमाणान्तरेणार्थज्ञानप्रयासं विना निमेषादिन्यायेनेत्यर्थः ।

किमु वक्तव्यम् — अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नस्य देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यवर्णाश्रमादिप्रविभागहेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य अप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिःश्वासवत् यस्मान्महतो भूतात् योनेः सम्भवः — 'अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतत् यदृग्वेदः' (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । १०) इत्यादिश्रुतेः — तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं चेति ॥

The Vedas are described as the source of all knowledge, covering the comprehensive divisions of the universe.

Bhāṣya: kimu vaktavyam aneka-śākhā-bheda-bhinnasya deva-tiryaṅ-manuṣya-varṇāśramādi-pravibhāga-hetoḥ ṛgvedādyākhyasya…

Explanation:

- **Vedic Scope:** The Vedas originally consisted of numerous branches (**Aneka Śākhā**—specifically 1,180 branches).
- **Source of All Divisions:** The Vedas provide the causative basis for the classification of:
    - **Beings:** Deities (**Deva**), Animals (**Tiryak**), and Humans (**Manuṣya**).
    - **Social Order:** Classes (**Varṇa**) and Stages of Life (**Āśrama**).
- **Transformation via Sādhana:** The Vedas define one's current state (based on **Prārabdha**) and the means (**Sādhana**) to achieve future goals.
    - Example: **Viśvāmitra**, originally a King (**Kṣatriya**), became a **Brahmarṣi** through **Tapas** (austerity). The specific methods (Speech, Body, Mind) to alter one's nature are found within the Vedas.

Effortless Creation (The Breath Analogy)

The manifestation of the Vedas from **Brahman** is described as being as effortless as human breathing (**Niśvasita**), distinguishing it from human composition which requires effort.

Bhāṣya: asya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitam etad yad ṛgvedaḥ ...

Ṭīkā: Pramāṇāntareṇa arthajñāna-prayāsaṃ vinā nimeṣādi-nyāyena

Explanation:

- **The "Breath" Metaphor: Brahman** manifests the Vedas like a man breathing out—without conscious exertion or "thinking."
- **Comparison to Human Authors:** A human author (e.g., **Vyāsa** writing the **Mahābhārata**) must exert effort to recall names, lineages, and ensure consistency (e.g., verifying the names of queens or sons). **Brahman** faces no such struggle.
- **Līlā Nyāya:** This creation is akin to "play" (**Līlā**) or the blinking of an eye (**Nimeṣa**)—automatic and effortless.

Limitation of Inference (Anumāna)

अत्रानुमानेन 'यः सर्वज्ञः' इति श्रुत्युक्तसर्वज्ञत्वदार्ढ्याय पाणिन्यादिवद्वेदकर्तरि अधिकार्थज्ञानसत्तामात्रं साध्यते न त्वर्थज्ञानस्य वेदहेतुत्वं निःश्वसितश्रुतिविरोधात् , वेदज्ञानमात्रेणाध्येतृवद्वेदकर्तृत्वोपपत्तेश्च ।

The text argues that logic alone is insufficient to prove **Brahman**'s specific nature; scriptural authority is required.

Ṭīkā: atra anumānena yaḥ sarvajñaḥ iti śrutyukta-sarvajñatva-dārḍhyāya pāṇinyādivad vedakartari adhikārtha-jñāna-sattā-mātraṃ sādhyate na tu arthajñānasya veda-hetutvam. niśvasita-śruti-virodhāt, vedajñānamātreṇa adhyetṛvat vedakartṛtvaḥ upapatteśca

Explanation:

- **Inference vs. Revelation:** Inference can only prove that the creator of the Vedas has "superior knowledge" (like **Pāṇini**). It suggests an agent who "knows the meaning and then composes."
- **The Conflict:** This implies effort, which contradicts the **Śruti** that calls the Vedas a "Breath" (**Niśvasita**).
- **Resolution:** Therefore, the specific nature of effortless creation is known only through the **Śruti**, not just inference.

Comparative Analysis: Īśvara vs. Adhyetā (Page 129)

इयान् विशेषः - अध्येता परापेक्षः, ईश्वरस्तु स्वकृतवेदानुपूर्वीं स्वयमेव स्मृत्वा तथैव कल्पादौ ब्रह्मादिष्वाविर्भावयन् अनावृतज्ञानत्वात्तदर्थमप्यवर्जनीयतया जानातीति सर्वज्ञ इत्यनवद्यम् ॥

The discussion distinguishes between the Supreme Lord (**Īśvara**) and the human student/reciter (**Adhyetā**).

Ṭīkā: Iyān viśeṣaḥ adhyetā parāpekṣaḥ īśvarastu svakṛta-vedānupūrvīm svayameva smṛtvā tathaiva kalpādau brahmādiṣu āvirbhāvayan anāvṛta-jñānatvāt ...

Explanation:

Feature	Human Student (Adhyetā)	Supreme Lord (Īśvara)
Source of Knowledge	Dependent on a teacher (**Parāpekṣah**).	Self-sourced and independent.
Sequence (Ānupūrvī)	Learns the sequence from the Guru.	Remembers the sequence from previous Kalpas.
Knowledge Access	Requires study and effort.	Possesses unveiled knowledge (**Anāvṛta-jñāna**).
Role	Receiver of knowledge.	The Guru of all (manifests knowledge to Brahmā).

The Concept of Ānupūrvī

- **Definition: Ānupūrvī** refers to the immutable sequence of syllables, accents (**Svara**), and words in the Veda (e.g., Śanno mitraḥ śaṃ varuṇaḥ...).
- **Immutability:** This sequence does not change between cosmic cycles (**Kalpas**). The **Upaniṣads** available today are identical to those in previous creations.
- **Process: Īśvara** recalls this exact sequence at the start of creation and manifests it to **Brahmā**.

The Syllogism (The Necessity of a Teacher for Humans)

An oft quoted scholarly Verse provides an inference for the necessity of a teacher for humans:

वेदाद्यध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययन-पूर्वकम् ।
वेदाध्ययन-सामान्यात् अधुनाऽध्ययनं यथा ॥

vedādyadhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayana-pūrvakam | vedādhyayana-sāmānyāt adhunā'dhyayanaṃ yathā ||

Explanation:

- **Pakṣa (Subject):** All study of the Vedas (**Vedādi adhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ**).
- **Sādhya (What is to be proved):** Is preceded by learning from a Guru (**Guru adhyayana-pūrvakaṃ)**.
- **Hetu (Reason):** Because it is "Study of the Vedas" (**Vedādhyayana-sāmānyāt**).
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example):** Just as study is done today (**Adhunā'dhyayanaṃ yathā**).
- **Conclusion:** This logic applies to all **Jīvas**, proving they need a Guru. It does not apply to **Īśvara**, who is the original teacher.

The Contents of the "Breath" (Vedic Corpus) - Quote from Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad

स यथार्द्रैधाग्नेरभ्याहितात्पृथग्धूमा विनिश्चरन्त्येवं वा अरेऽस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरस इतिहासः पुराणं विद्या उपनिषदः श्लोकाः सूत्राण्यनुव्याख्यानानि व्याख्यानान्यस्यैवैतानि निश्वसितानि ॥ बृ.उ. २.४.१० ॥

sa yathārdraidhāgnerabhyāhitātpṛthagdhūmā viniścarantyevaṃ vā are'sya mahato bhūtasya niśvasitametadyadṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo'tharvāṅgirasa itihāsaḥ purāṇaṃ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇyanuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānānyasyaivaitāni niśvasitāni || Bṛ 2.4.10 ||

The sub-note details what constitutes the "Breath" of the Great Being by quoting the mantra from **Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.**

The following are identified as the Niśvasita (breath) of Brahman:

1. **Ṛgveda**
2. **Yajurveda**
3. **Sāmaveda**
4. **Atharvaveda**
5. **Itihāsa** (History within the Vedas, e.g., stories of Indra, not the Mahābhārata).
6. **Purāṇa** (Cosmic narratives within the Vedas).
7. **Vidyā** (Knowledge).
8. **Upaniṣadaḥ**.
9. **Ślokāḥ** (Verses like Tad eṣa śloko bhavati).
10. **Sūtrāṇi** (Aphorisms within the texts).
11. **Anuvyākhyānāni** (Explanations).
12. **Vyākhyānāni** (Commentaries).

Conclusion of First Varṇaka: This establishes **Brahman**'s attributes of absolute Omniscience (**Sarvajñatva**) and Omnipotence (**Sarvaśaktimatva**).

॥ इति प्रथमवर्णकम् ॥

The Second Interpretation (Dvitīya Varṇaka): Śāstra as the Evidence for Brahman (Page 130)

अधुना ब्रह्मणो लक्षणानन्तरं प्रमाणजिज्ञासायां वर्णकान्तरमाह - अथवेति । लक्षणप्रमाणयोर्ब्रह्मनिर्णयार्थत्वादेकफलकत्वं सङ्गतिः ।

अथवा (शास्त्रयोनित्वात्) यथोक्तमृग्वेदादिशास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे । शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्माधिगम्यत इत्यभिप्रायः ।

After establishing **Brahman** as the cause of the **Śāstra**, the discussion shifts to the second meaning: **Śāstra** is the only **Pramāṇa** (valid means of knowledge) for **Brahman**.

Grammatical Analysis

Bhāṣya: śāstraṃ yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ pramāṇam asya brahmaṇaḥ yathāvat svarūpādhigame

Explanation:

- **Compound Breakdown:** The compound **Śāstrayonitvāt** is analyzed as Śāstram Yoniḥ Yasya or Śāstram Yoniḥ Yasmin.
- **Meaning: Śāstra** is the **Yoni** (Evidence) for the correct understanding (**Yathāvat Svarūpādhigama**) of **Brahman**.
- **Brahman** cannot be known through perception or other means; Scripture is the sole evidence.

Consistency (Saṅgati)

The text explains the logical connection between the second and third Sūtras.

Explanation:

- **Integration:** Object determination requires both a Definition (**Lakṣaṇa**) and Proof (**Pramāṇa**).
- **Sūtra 1.1.2 (Janmādyasya yataḥ):** Provided the **Lakṣaṇa** (Definition) of **Brahman** (That from which creation, etc., proceeds).
- **Sūtra 1.1.3 (Śāstrayonitvāt):** Provides the **Pramāṇa** (Proof) that **Brahman** exists and is known through Veda.
- **Result (Phala):** Both sūtras share the same goal: **Brahma-nirṇaya** (The decisive determination of Brahman).

After the definition (**Lakṣaṇa**) of **Brahman** was provided in the previous **Sūtra** (1.1.2), the natural inquiry arises regarding the valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**) to know this **Brahman**.

Bhāṣya: **Athavā yathoktaṃ ṛgvedādi śāstraṃ yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ pramāṇam asya brahmaṇo yathāvat svarūpa adhigame**: Or, the mentioned Scriptures, Rigveda etc., are the source (cause/proof) for the correct understanding of the nature of this Brahman.

Ṭīkā: **lakṣaṇapramāṇayoḥ brahmanirṇayārthatvāt ekaphalakatvaṃ saṅgatiḥ:** The result (**Phalam**) of both the second and third **Sūtra** is the same: the determination of **Brahman**. Since they have a single fruit (result), there is a connection between the two.

Second Varṇaka (Second Interpretation)

'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषम्' इति श्रुतिर्ब्रह्मणो वेदैकवेद्यत्वं ब्रूते न वेति संशये, कार्यलिङ्गेनैव लाघवात्कर्तुरेकस्य सर्वज्ञस्य ब्रह्मणः सिद्धेर्न ब्रूते इति प्राप्ते वेदप्रमाणकत्वात् ब्रह्मणो न प्रमाणान्तरवेद्यत्वमिति सिद्धान्तयति - शास्त्रयोनित्वादिति ।

This **Varṇaka** establishes that Scripture (Vedas/Upanishads) is the sole proof for **Brahman**, refuting the idea that Logic/Inference (**Anumāna**) is sufficient.

1. Viṣaya Vākya (Subject Statement)

The Scriptural statement under consideration is from the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad**:

Ṭīkā: **Taṃ tvaupaniṣadaṃ puruṣaṃ pṛcchāmi**: "I ask you about that Person (Puruṣa) who is known only through the Upaniṣads."

This statement asserts that the Self (**Puruṣa**), Consciousness is known exclusively through the **Upaniṣads**.

2. Saṃśaya (Doubt)

Ṭīkā: **Iti śrutiḥ brahmaṇo vedaikavedyatvaṃ brūte navā**: Does the Śruti declare that Brahman is known only through the Vedas, or not?

3. Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's View)

Ṭīkā: **kāryaliṅgenaiva lāghavāt karturekasya sarvajñasya brahmaṇaḥ siddheḥ na brūte iti prāpte**

The opponent claims that **Brahman** can be established through Inference (**Anumāna**), so **Śruti** is not exclusively required.

- **Argument from Effect (Kāryaliṅga):** The world is an effect (**Kārya**). Every effect must have a creator.
- **Argument from Parsimony (Lāghava):** It is simpler (logical parsimony) to assume a single creator rather than many.
- **Inference:** Since the one omniscient Creator (Brahman) is established merely by the sign of the effect (the world) and the law of parsimony, the Śruti does not need to declare it (as the sole proof).

The opponent argues: **Yat kāryam tat sakartṛkam** (Whatever is an effect has a creator). Through this invariable association (**Vyāpti**), the creator is established as One and Omniscient. Therefore, **Brahman** is inferred, not exclusively known by Veda.

4. Siddhānta (Conclusion)

Ṭīkā: **Vedapramāṇakatvāt brahmaṇo na pramāṇāntaravedyatvam**

The **Siddhāntin** refutes the independent validity of inference as the means. Since Brahman has the Veda as its proof, it is not known by other proofs (like independent inference).

Limitation of Inference (Anumāna) and the Argument of Complexity (Page 130)

तद्व्याचष्टे - यथोक्तमिति । सर्वत्र पूर्वोत्तरपक्षयुक्तिद्वयं संशयबीजं द्रष्टव्यम् । अत्र पूर्वपक्षे अनुमानस्यैव विचार्यतासिद्धिः फलं सिद्धान्ते वेदान्तानामिति भेदः । अनुमानादिना ब्रह्मसिद्धिः पूर्वसूत्रे प्रसङ्गान्निरस्ता । किञ्च विचित्रप्रपञ्चस्य प्रासादादिवदेककर्तृकताबाधान्न लाघवावतारः । न च सर्वज्ञत्वात्कर्तुरेकत्वसम्भवः । एकत्वज्ञानात्सर्वज्ञत्वज्ञानं ततस्तदित्यन्योन्याश्रयमभिप्रेत्याह - शास्त्रादेवेति ।

Ṭīkā: Atrā pūrvapakṣe anumānasya eva vicāryatā siddhiḥ phalam. Siddhānte vedāntānām.: Here, in the case of the Pūrvapakṣa the result is establishing Inference as the subject of inquiry. In the Siddhānta, it is establishing the Vedānta texts (as the subject).

The text explores why Inference (**Anumāna**) alone is insufficient to establish **Brahman**, even though the previous **Sūtra** incidentally refuted the reliance on independent inference.

1. The Argument of Parsimony (Lāghava) vs. Complexity:The **Pūrvapakṣin** (opponent) argues for a single creator based on **Lāghava** (Law of Parsimony/Simplicity). They claim it is logical to assume one creator rather than many. However, the **Siddhāntin** refutes this by pointing to the complexity of the world (**Vicitra Prapañca**).

- **The Palace Analogy (Prāsādādivat):** The text uses the analogy of constructing a large building or palace (**Prāsāda**). A complex structure is not built by a single person but by many individuals with limited, specific knowledge:
    - A plumber attends to waterworks.
    - A mason attends to cement.
    - A carpenter attends to wood.
    - An electrician attends to wiring.

  Conclusion: Each worker has limited knowledge restricted to their specific task. They do not possess the knowledge of the whole.

2. Refutation of the Single Creator Theory based on Logic

Ṭīkā: **kiñca vicitra prapañcasya prāsādādivat anekakartṛkatva bādhāt na lāghavāvatāraḥ:** Moreover, due to the complex nature of the universe, like a palace, the idea of a single creator is obstructed (bādhāt) by the reality of multiple agents; thus, the argument of parsimony (Lāghava) does not hold.

Explanation: If one observes the world's complexity, the logical inference (based on examples like a palace) would suggest many limited creators, not one Omniscient God. Therefore, the **Pūrvapakṣin** cannot use Logic to prove there is only **One** Creator.

Moreover, a logical fallacy is committed by the **Pūrvapakṣin** when they try to prove that the Creator is both **One** (**Ekatva**) and **Omniscient** (**Sarvajñatva**) using inference alone.

- **Logic Refutation (The Flaw of Circularity/Anyonyāśraya):** The opponent claims the creator is **One** due to **Lāghava** (parsimony) and **Omniscient** because he created everything. The **Siddhāntin** argues this leads to mutual dependence:
    1. **Ekatva jñānāt sarvajñatva jñānam**: You know he is Omniscient only if you first know he is One (if there were many, their knowledge might be partial).
    2. **Sarvajñatva jñānāt ekatva jñānam**: You know he is One only if you first know he is Omniscient (an omniscient being is sufficient alone).
- **Tataḥ tat iti anyonyāśrayam** "Therefore, there is the defect of mutual dependence."

Because logic fails to independently establish the specific nature of **Brahman** (as one and omniscient) without circularity, we must rely on Scripture.

Bhāṣya: **Śāstrādeva pramāṇāt jagato janmādikāraṇaṃ brahma adhigamyate iti abhiprāyaḥ**: The intention is that Brahman is understood as the cause of the world's origin, etc., solely from the valid means of Scripture.

The **Siddhāntin** emphasizes that while the conclusion (One Omniscient Creator) may appear the same, the method of arrival matters. The independent path of Inference is flawed; the path of **Śruti** (Apauruṣeya Pramāṇa) is valid.

The Necessity of the Third Sūtra (Ākṣepa) (Page 131)

किं तच्छास्त्रमिति तदाह - शास्त्रमिति । पृथगारम्भमाक्षिपति - किमर्थमिति । येन हेतुना दर्शितं ततः किमर्थमित्यर्थः । जन्मादिलिङ्गकानुमानस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणोपन्यासशङ्कानिरासार्थं पृथक्सूत्रमित्याह - उच्यत इति ॥ ३ ॥ (Page 131)

शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे — ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (तै. उ. ३ । १ । १) इत्यादि । किमर्थं तर्हीदं सूत्रम् , यावता पूर्वसूत्र एव एवंजातीयकं शास्त्रमुदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम् । उच्यते — तत्र सूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्यानुपादानाज्जगतोजन्मादिसूत्रेण केवलमनुमानमुपन्यस्तमित्याशङ्क्येत; तामाशङ्कां निवर्तयितुमिदं सूत्रं प्रववृते — ‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’ इति ॥ ३ ॥

A question arises regarding the redundancy of this **Sūtra**.

Objection: In the previous **Sūtra** (**Janmādyasya yataḥ**), the scripture (**Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante**) was already quoted.

Bhāṣya: Yāvatā pūrvasūtre eva evaṃ jātīyakaṃ śāstraṃ udāhṛtya śāstrayonitvaṃ brahmaṇo darśitam: Since scripture of this nature was cited in the previous Sūtra, showing that Brahman has scripture as its source, why is this Sūtra necessary?

Ṭīkā: janmādi liṅgaka anumānasya svātantryeṇa upanyāsa śaṅkā nirāsārtham pṛthak sūtram: This separate Sūtra is to remove the doubt that the previous Sūtra might have been established by independent inference, based on the sign of the world's creation, alone.

If this **Sūtra** were absent, one might mistake the definition of **Brahman** as a purely logical deduction. This **Sūtra** clarifies that **Brahman** is known only through **Śāstra**.

॥ इति द्वितीयवर्णकम् ॥

Adhyāya 1. Pāda 1. Adhikaraṇa 4. Sūtra 4.

वेदान्ताः सिद्धब्रह्मपरा उत कार्यपरा इति निष्फलत्वसापेक्षत्वयोः प्रसङ्गाप्रसङ्गाभ्यां संशये पूर्वसूत्रे द्वितीयवर्णकेनाक्षेपसङ्गत्या पूर्वपक्षमाह - कथं पुनरित्यादिना । **(Page 134)**

कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते, यावता 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्' (जै. सू. १ । २ । १) इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम् ।

This section begins a discussion that connects to the **Samanvaya** (Harmony) principle, raising an objection based on **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā**.

Pūrvapakṣa (Mīmāṃsā Objection): The Objection of Uselessness and Dependence

Ṭīkā: Vedāntāḥ siddhabrahmaparā uta kāryaparā: Are the Vedānta texts meant for an already existing (Siddha) Brahman, or are they meant for action (Kārya)?

The opponent questions the validity of **Vedānta** texts based on the purpose of the Vedas.

Ṭīkā: The Dilemma: niṣphalatvasāpekṣatvayoḥ prasaṅgāprasaṅgābhyāṃ saṃśaye pūrvasūtre dvitīyavarṇakenākṣepasaṅgatyā pūrvapakṣamāha

- **If Vedānta is Siddha-para (about an existing Brahman):** It leads to **Niṣphalatva** (fruitlessness/uselessness) and **Sāpekṣatva** (dependence on other proofs).
- **If Vedānta is Kārya-para (about action/ritual):** It avoids these faults (**Aprasaṅga**), as actions yield results (like heaven) and are known only through Scripture (independent).

The opponent (specifically the **Bhāṭṭa** Mīmāṃsaka school) argues that if Vedānta describes **Brahman** (an already existing entity), it is invalid for two main reasons:

1. Niṣphalatva (Uselessness)

- **Argument:** The Veda is meant for **Sādhya** (that which is to be accomplished, i.e., Karma/Action).
- **Logic:** An already existing thing (**Siddha**) does not require a scriptural injunction. Knowledge of a table or pot doesn't produce a religious merit (Puṇya) or result (Svarga).
- **Conclusion:** If Vedānta speaks of an existing **Brahman**, it serves no purpose; hence, the texts are **Niṣphala**.

2. Sāpekṣatva (Dependence)

- **Argument:** If an object already exists, it can ideally be known by other valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇāntara**) such as **Pratyakṣa** (Perception) or **Anumāna** (Inference).
- **Analogy (The River Bank):** If someone says, "There are five fruits on the bank of the river":

    - This is a **Siddha Vastu** (existing fact).
    - This fact can be verified by the eyes (**Cakṣuḥ**) or other senses.
    - The words merely confirm what can be known by perception.
- **Conclusion:** If **Brahman** is an existing entity, it should be knowable by other proofs. Therefore, the Scripture becomes **Sāpekṣa** (dependent on other proofs) rather than being the unique, independent authority (**Nirapekṣa**).

In contrast, regarding **Svarga** (Heaven) or **Dharma** (Ritual merit), the Veda is the only proof; thus, it is independent.

This objection connects to the previous **Sūtra** (**1.1.3 Śāstrayonitvāt**) via **Ākṣepa Saṅgati** (Connection by Objection).

- **Previous Conclusion:** The previous **Sūtra** established **Śāstrayonitvāt**—that Scripture is the unique source/proof (**Pramāṇa**) for **Brahman**.
- **Bhāṣya: katham punaḥ brahmaṇaḥ śāstrapramāṇakatvaṃ ucyate:** How can it be said again that Scripture is the proof of Brahman?
- **Logic:** If **Brahman** is **Siddha** (existing), it is knowable by other means. If it is knowable by other means, you cannot claim **Śāstra** is the exclusive source (**Yoni**). Thus, the definition of **Brahman** having Scripture as its valid means is challenged.

The Mīmāṃsā Authority: Jaimini Sūtra 1.2.1

The **Pūrvapakṣa** relies heavily on the fundamental rule of the **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā** philosophy to invalidate Vedānta passages that merely describe **Brahman**.

- **Bhāṣya (Quoting Jaimini Sūtra 1.2.1): Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām**: Since the Veda (**Āmnāya**) is for the purpose of action (**Kriyā**), those parts which are not for action are meaningless (**Anarthakya**).
- **Elaboration:**
    - The Veda is **Kriyārtha** (meant for action/ritual).
    - Passages that do not assert an action (e.g., stories, simple statements of fact, **Arthavāda**) are **Atadarthānām** (not for that purpose).
    - Therefore, such passages are **Anarthakya** (useless/invalid) unless they can be tied to a ritual.
- **Opponent's Application:** Since Vedānta texts describe **Brahman** (which is not an action), they fall into the category of **Anarthakya** (useless statements) and are merely **Arthavāda** (praise/glorification) without independent validity.

The text explains how Mīmāṃsakas handle non-action texts versus how they view Vedānta.

- **Mīmāṃsā Solution for Arthavāda:**
    - **Quote (Mīmāṃsā view): Vidhinā tu ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnām syuḥ (Jaimini Sūtra 1.2.7)**: But by distinct unity of syntax (**Ekavākyatā**) with the injunction (**Vidhi**), they (non-action texts) should be taken as praise (**Stuti**) for the injunctions.

    - **Explanation:** They save the validity of stories or descriptive texts by saying these texts praise a specific deity or accessory of a ritual, thereby encouraging the performance of the action (**Vidhi**).
    - **Crucial Point:** They accept **Āmnāyasya Kriyārthatvāt** (Veda is for action) as an absolute rule.
- **The Vedānta Problem:**
    - The Vedāntin cannot use this logic because Vedānta texts (like the **Mahāvākya**s) are not praising a ritual. They are asserting the nature of Reality.
    - **Opponent's Conclusion:** Therefore, Vedānta texts are invalid (**Anarthakya**) because of **Akriyārthatvāt** (absence of action).

Siddhānta: Introduction to Samanvaya (Harmony)

'सदेव सोम्य' इत्यादीनां सर्वात्मत्वादिस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयोक्तेः, श्रुत्यादिसङ्गतयः ।

The **Siddhānta** begins to counter this by establishing the independent validity of Vedānta texts through **Samanvaya** (Harmony).

- **Ṭīkā: Sadeva somya ityādīnāṃ sarvātmatvādi spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgānāṃ brahmaṇi samanvayokteḥ śrutyādisaṅgatayaḥ**: Because of the statement of the harmony (Samanvaya) in Brahman of texts like 'Sadeva somya...' which possess clear signs of Brahman (Spaṣṭa Brahma Liṅga) such as the Self of all (Sarvātmatva).
    - **Spaṣṭa Brahma Liṅga:** Clear indicators/signs of **Brahman**.
    - **Sarvātmatva:** The quality of being the Self of all (referenced in the Upaniṣad: Aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvam).
    - The first **Pāda** (chapter section) deals with these "Clear Signs."

The Fourfold Connection (Saṅgati)

The text emphasizes the necessity of understanding the connections (**Saṅgati**) before studying the **Sūtra**.

1. **Śruti Saṅgati:** Connection with the specific Scriptural texts (e.g., **Chāndogya Upaniṣad** passages like Tat Tvam Asi).
2. **Śāstra Saṅgati:** Connection with the entire Vedānta Śāstra.
3. **Adhyāya Saṅgati:** Connection with the Chapter (Samanvaya Adhyāya).
4. **Pāda Saṅgati:** Connection with the Section (Spaṣṭa Brahma Liṅga).

Pūrva-pakṣa Analysis

The Debate in the Ṭīkā and Bhāṣya

पूर्वपक्षे वेदान्तेषु मुमुक्षुप्रवृत्त्यसिद्धिः, सिद्धान्ते तत्सिद्धिरिति विवेकः । कथमित्याक्षेपे हेतुः - यावतेति ।

कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते, यावता 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्' (जै. सू. १ । २ । १) इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम् ।

1. The Divergence of Motivation (Pravṛtti)

The **Ṭīkā** highlights the distinction between the opponent and the proper conclusion regarding the seeker's motivation.

- **Pūrva-pakṣa: Ṭīkā: vedānteṣu mumukṣupravṛttiḥ asiddhiḥ** (The motivation of the seeker in Vedanta is not established).
    - **Reason:** The opponent claims Vedanta is fruitless (**niṣphala**) because it does not lead to action.
- **Siddhānta: Ṭīkā: siddhānte tatsiddhiriti vivekaḥ**: The texts clearly establish **Brahman** through the **Ṣaḍ-liṅga** (six indicators like Upakrama-Upasaṃhāra, etc.), as seen in statements like "Sadeva somya..." (implying the Self of all). Therefore, the seeker (mumukṣu) has an inclination/motivation to study Vedanta.

2. The Bhāṣya's Query

Bhāṣya: kathaṃ punarityādinā... (How is this possible...?)

Explanation: The Bhāṣya questions how one can assert that the seeker has no motivation. The answer lies in the definition of Scripture itself as provided by the opponent.

The Definition of Scriptural Purpose (Śāstrasya Kriyāparatvam)

यतो जैमिनिसूत्रेण शास्त्रस्य वेदस्य क्रियापरत्वं दर्शितमतोऽक्रियार्थत्वाद्वेदान्तनामानर्थक्यं फलवदर्थशून्यत्वं प्राप्तमित्यन्वयः ।

The text elaborates on the logical ground (Hetu) provided by the opponent:

Bhāṣya: yāvatā āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām iti kriyāparatvaṃ śāstrasya pradarśitam

1. Meaning of Kriyāparatvam (Action-Orientation)

- Scripture (**Śāstra/Veda**) is demonstrated to be **kriyā-para** (intent on action). That wherein the main purport/subject matter is action.
- **Analogy:** Just as in the **Gītā** ("śraddhāvān labhate jñānam... tatparaḥ"), **tatpara** means one is entirely devoted to that specific thing. Similarly, the Veda is devoted solely to action.

2. The Consequence for Vedanta

- **Ṭīkā: ato'kriyārthatvād vedāntānām ānarthakyam phalavad-artha-śūnyatvam prāptam:** Because Vedanta texts are not action-oriented (**akriyārthatvāt**), they possess **ānarthakyam** (uselessness).
- **Definition of Ānarthakyam:** Being devoid of a fruitful purpose (**phalavad-artha-śūnyatvam**). Meaning must be **phalavat** (possessing fruit/result); if it is merely an assertion without a result, it is purposeless.

Mīmāṃsā Framework supporting the Objection

सूत्रस्यायमर्थः - प्रथमसूत्रे तावद्वेदस्याध्ययनकरणकभावनाविधिभाव्यस्य फलवदर्थपरत्वमुक्तम् । 'चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः' इति द्वितीयसूत्रे धर्मे कार्ये चोदना प्रमाणमिति वेदप्रामाण्यव्यापकं कार्यपरत्वमवसितम् ।

The **Ṭīkā** analyzes the derivation of this view from the first two sutras of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

1. The First Sūtra: Athāto Dharma Jijñāsā

- **Interpretation:** In the first sutra, it is stated that the Veda is concerned with **Dharma**, which is to be established through:
    - **Adhyayana-vidhi:** The injunction to study.
    - **Bhāvanā:** The productive force (divided into **Śābdī** and **Ārthī**).
    - **Vidhis:** Four types (Utpatti, Viniyoga, Prayoga, Adhikāra).
- **Result:** The Karma Kanda (ritual section) is proven to have **phalavad-artha-paratvam** (intent on fruitful meaning). Vedanta is accused of lacking this.

2. The Second Sūtra: Codanā Lakṣaṇo'rtho Dharmaḥ

Ṭīkā: 'codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmaḥ' iti dvitīyasūtre dharme kārye codanā pramāṇamiti vedaprāmāṇyavyāpakaṃ kāryaparatvamavasitam

- **Statement: dharme kārye codanā pramāṇam** (In Dharma, which is an action/duty, the injunction is the valid means of knowledge).
- **Key Deduction: veda prāmāṇya vyāpakam kāryaparatvam avasitam**
    - **Vyāpaka (Pervader):** Action-orientation (**kāryaparatvam**).
    - **Vyāpya (Pervaded):** Validity of the Veda (**veda-prāmāṇyam**).
    - **The Invariable Concomitance (Vyāpti):** "Wherever there is Vedic validity, there is action-orientation." (**yatra yatra veda-prāmāṇyam tatra tatra kāryaparatvam**).
    - **Negative Concomitance (Vyatireka):** If there is no action, there is no validity.

The Problem of Arthavāda (Eulogy/Statement of Fact) (Page 135)

तत्र 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा' इत्याद्यर्थवादानां धर्मे प्रामाण्यमस्ति न वेति संशये आम्नायप्रामाण्यस्य क्रियार्थत्वेन व्याप्तत्वात् , अर्थवादेषु धर्मस्याप्रतीतेः अक्रियार्थानां तेषामानर्थक्यं निष्फलार्थत्वम् ।

The discussion moves to how the Mīmāṃsā deals with non-action texts within the Karma Kanda to set a precedent for Vedanta.

1. The Example

- **Ṭīkā: vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā** (Vayu is indeed the swiftest deity).
- **The Doubt (Saṃśaya): arthavādānāṃ dharme prāmāṇyam asti na vā**: Do these eulogistic sentences have validity in Dharma or not?
    - **Reason for Doubt:** There is no verb of action (like juhoti or yajeta) in the sentence "Vayu is the swiftest deity." It appears to be a mere statement of fact.

2. The Pūrva-pakṣa Stance on Arthavāda

- Since Vedic validity is pervaded by Action (**kriyārthatvena vyāptatvāt**), and these sentences lack action, they suffer from **ānarthakyam** (uselessness).
- **Conclusion: Ṭīkā: arthavādeṣu dharmasya apratīteḥ akriyārthānāṃ teṣāṃ ānarthakyam**: Since Dharma is not known in Arthavāda, and they are devoid of action, they are useless/fruitless.

The Resolution: Syntactic Unity (Ekavākyatā) (Page 135)

न चाध्ययनविध्युपात्तानां निष्फले सिद्धेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यं युक्तम् , तस्मादनित्यमेषां प्रामाण्यमुच्यते । व्यापकाभावाद्व्याप्यं प्रामाण्यं नास्त्येवेति यावत् । एवं पूर्वपक्षेऽपि 'विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात्स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः' इति सूत्रेण सिद्धान्तमाह - क्रियापरत्वमिति । अनित्यमिति प्राप्ते दर्शितमित्यर्थः । वायुर्वै क्षिप्रतमगामिनी देवता तद्देवताकं कर्म क्षिप्रमेव फलं दास्यति, इत्येवं विधेयार्थानां स्तुतिरूपार्थेन द्वारेण 'वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत' इत्यादिविधिवाक्येनैकवाक्यत्वादर्थवादाः सफलाः स्युः । स्तुतिलक्षणया सफलकार्यपरत्वात्प्रमाणमर्थवादा इति यावत् ।

The opponent cannot discard **Arthavāda** entirely because they are part of the Veda which must be studied.

1. Adhyayana Vidhi (The Rule to Study)

- **Objection: Ṭīkā: naca adhyayana vidhi upāttānāṃ niṣphale siddhe'rthe prāmāṇyam yuktam**
- The injunction **svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ** (One's own branch of Veda must be studied) covers the entire text. It is not logical to study something that has no fruit (**niṣphala**).
- Therefore, a purpose must be found for Arthavāda to preserve the "eternality" (nityatvam) of the Veda.

2. The Siddhānta of Mīmāṃsā (Jaimini Sūtra 1.2.7)

- **Mīmāṃsā Sūtra: vidhinā tvekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ**
- **Meaning:** Because of **Ekavākyatā** (syntactic unity/being one sentence) with the **Vidhi** (injunction), the **Arthavādas** serve the purpose of **Stuti** (praise) for the injunctions.

3. Application of the Rule

- The statement of fact (**vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā**) is connected to the injunction (**vāyavyaṃ śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ** - "One desiring prosperity should sacrifice a white animal to Vayu").
- **Logic:**
  - **Fact:** Vayu is the swiftest deity.
  - **Implication:** If you perform the action for this deity (**tad-devatākam karma**), the result will be given swiftly (**kṣipram eva phalaṃ dāsyati**).
  - **Result:** The Arthavāda acts as **Stuti** (praise) to encourage the performer.
- **Conclusion: arthavādāḥ saphalāḥ syuḥ** (The Arthavādas become fruitful).

4. Śakti vs. Lakṣaṇā

- The text functions through **Lakṣaṇā** (implication/secondary meaning) rather than **Śakti** (direct power of the word).

- **Direct Meaning (Śakti):** Vayu travels fast.
- **Implied Meaning (Lakṣaṇā):** Praise of the deity to encourage the ritual action.
- **Definition: stuti lakṣaṇayā saphalakāryaparatvāt pramāṇam arthavādāḥ** (Arthavādas are a valid means of knowledge because they are intent on a fruitful action through the implication of praise).

Application to Vedanta (The Pūrva-pakṣa Strategy) (Page 136)

नन्वध्ययनविधिगृहीतानां वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यं न युक्तमित्यत आह - कर्त्रिति । न वयं वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यं साधयामः किन्तु लोके सिद्धस्य मानान्तरवेद्यत्वान्निष्फलत्वाच्च सिद्धब्रह्मपरत्वे तेषां मानान्तरसापेक्षत्वनिष्फलत्वयोः प्रसङ्गादप्रामाण्यापातात् , कार्यशेषकर्तृदेवताफलानां प्रकाशनद्वारा कार्यपरत्वं वक्तव्यमिति ब्रूमः ।

अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यम् , अक्रियार्थत्वात् । कर्तृदेवतादिप्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रियाविधिशेषत्वम् , उपासनादिक्रियान्तरविधानार्थत्वं वा ।

The opponent now applies this "Arthavāda logic" to Vedanta texts to "save" them from uselessness while denying them independent authority on Brahman.

1. The Argument

- **Challenge: Ṭīkā: adhyayana vidhi gṛhītānāṃ vedāntānām ānarthakyam na yuktam**: It is not proper for Vedanta texts, which are grasped by the rule of study, to be useless.
- **Proposed Solution:** Just as **Arthavāda** serves the Ritual Injunctions, Vedanta texts must serve the Rituals.

2. The Role of Vedanta according to Pūrva-pakṣa

- **Bhāṣya: ato vedāntānām akriyārthatvāt kartṛ-devatādi-prakāśanārthatvena vā kriyāvidhi-śeṣatvam:** Vedanta texts function to **illumine/reveal** the Agent (**Kartṛ**) and the Deity (**Devatā**).
- By revealing the nature of the agent (Self/Jīva) and the deity (Īśvara), they become subsidiary (**Śeṣa**) to the Ritual Injunction (**Kriyā-vidhi**), which is the Principal (**Śeṣī**).

3. Rejection of Independent Validity

- **Clarification: Ṭīkā: na vayaṃ vedāntānām ānarthakyam sādhayāmaḥ**: We do not argue that Vedanta is useless.
- **The Real Issue: Ṭīkā: kintu loke siddhasya mānāntara-vedyatvāt niṣphalatvācca**
    - **Siddha vs. Sādhya:** Brahman is an existing entity (**Siddha**), not something to be produced.
    - **Mānāntara Vedyatva:** Existing things (like pots) can be known by other means of knowledge (perception, inference). If Vedanta tells us what can be known otherwise, it is redundant.
    - **Niṣphalatva:** Mere knowledge of an existing thing has no fruit.
- **Conclusion:** If Vedanta is treated as independent knowledge of Brahman, it becomes redundant or useless (**apramāṇyāpātāt**).

4. Final Pūrva-pakṣa Proposal

- **To establish validity: Ṭīkā: kārya-śeṣa kartṛ-devatā-phalānāṃ prakāśana dvārā kāryaparatvaṃ vaktavyam**
- Vedanta's validity lies in being **Kārya-para** (action-oriented) by means of illuminating the Agent, Deity, and Fruit which are subsidiary to the Action (**Kārya-śeṣa**).
    - **Tvam-pada (You):** Praises the Agent (Kartṛ - the Jīva).
    - **Tat-pada (That):** Praises the Deity (Devatā - Īśvara).
    - **Vividiṣanti Sentences:** Praise the result/fruit.
- All these are **Stāvaka** (eulogies/praisers) to support the injunctions of sacrifice.

The Initial Argument and Its Flaw: Vedānta as Subsidiary to Karma

ननु कर्मविशेषमनारभ्य प्रकरणान्तराधीतानां वेदान्तानां कथं तच्छेषत्वम् , मानाभावादित्यरुच्या पक्षान्तरमाह - उपासनेति । मोक्षकामोऽसद्ब्रह्माभेदमारोप्य अहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्युपासीत इत्युपासनाविधिः, आदिशब्दाच्छ्रवणादयः । तत्कार्यपरत्वं वा वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः । ननु श्रुतं ब्रह्म विहायाश्रुतं कार्यपरत्वं किमर्थं वक्तव्यमिति तत्राह - नहीति ।

न हि परिनिष्ठितवस्तुप्रतिपादनं सम्भवति; प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वात्परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनः ।

Initially, the opponent attempted to subordinate **Vedānta** to **Karma** (ritual action).

- **The Initial Claim: Vedānta** sentences act as **Karma-śeṣa** (subsidiary to rituals) by revealing the nature of the **Kartṛ** (agent/doer) and **Devatā** (deity), which are necessary components for the performance of rituals.
- **The Logic:** Even sentences describing the nature of reality (like Tattvamasi) ultimately serve to praise or establish the agent and deity, thereby supporting the ritualistic process (Vidhi).

The Objection to the Initial Argument

However, this view faces a logical defect regarding the context of the texts.

Ṭīkā: nanu karmaviśeṣam anārabhya prakaraṇāntara adhītānām vedāntānām katham tat śeṣatvam

Explanation: The objection is raised: How can **Vedānta** be a subsidiary (śeṣa) to **Karma** when it does not begin with a specific ritual injunction?

- **Prakaraṇāntara (Different Context): Vedānta** is studied in a completely distinct context (prakaraṇa) from the **Karma-kāṇḍa**.
- **Logical Disconnect:** A subsidiary relationship (śeṣa-śeṣi bhāva) usually requires proximity or a direct textual link. Since **Vedānta** stands apart from the commencement of specific rituals, linking it as a subordinate element to **Karma** is baseless.
- **Mānābhāva:** There is **Mānābhāvāt** (a lack of valid proof or evidence) to support this specific connection.

The Shift in Argument: From Ritual to Upāsanā

Recognizing the weakness of the first argument, the **Pūrvapakṣa** shifts their position.

Ṭīkā: māna abhāvāt iti arucyā pakṣāntaram āha

Aruci (Dissatisfaction): The opponent feels **Aruci** (dissatisfaction/distaste) with their own previous explanation. Or not paying too much importance (**Aruci)** to the earlier stance, a new stance is proposed. In this thought, forcing **Vedānta** to be a subsidiary of physical rituals is an "over-extension" (Atiprasaṅga) and logically unsound.

- **Pakṣāntaram (Alternative View):** Consequently, they propose a new perspective.

Bhāṣya: Upāsanādi kriyāntara vidhānārthatvaṃ vā

- **The New Proposition:** If **Vedānta** cannot be subservient to physical rituals, it must be for the purpose of ordaining a different type of action: **Upāsanādi** (meditations, worship, etc.).

The Rationale: Mental Action (Mānasī Kriyā)

The text explains why the opponent insists on linking **Vedānta** to **Upāsanā**.

- **The Necessity of Kriyā (Action):** The underlying Mimamsa rule is that scripture is valid only if it pertains to action (**Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt**).
- **Physical vs. Mental:**
    - **Bhautika Kriyā:** Physical actions (like **Agni-kārya**—fire rituals). The link between **Vedānta** and these was proven weak.
    - **Mānasī Kriyā:** Mental actions. **Upāsanā** is classified here as a mental activity.
- **Independence Denied:** The opponent refuses to accept **Vedānta** as an independent source of knowledge (**Svatantra**). They argue it must be tied to some form of injunction to do something. If not a physical act, it must be a mental act of meditation.

The Formulation of the Injunction (Vidhi)

The opponent now reinterprets the Great Sentences (like Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi) not as statements of fact, but as injunctions for meditation.

Ṭīkā: mokṣa kāmo asad brahma abhedam āropya ahaṃ brahmāsmi iti upāsīta iti upāsanāvidhiḥ

The Injunction: "One who is **Mokṣa kāmaḥ** (desirous of liberation) should meditate 'I am **Brahman**' by superimposing non-difference (abhedam āropya) on the **Asad Brahma**."

- **Interpretation of "Asad Brahma":**
    - For the **Bhāṭṭa** school (followers of Kumarila Bhatta), a **Brahman** distinct from the universe does not actually exist.
    - **Asad (Non-existent):** They view **Brahman** as **Avidyamānam** (not existing as a substantial entity).

    - **The Process:** Despite regarding **Brahman** as technically non-existent or unreal in the empirical sense, the injunction requires the seeker to superimpose the idea of **Brahman** upon the self for the sake of the **Upāsanā**.
- **Summary of View:** Thus, **Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi** is not a revelation of truth, but a command to perform the mental action of viewing oneself as **Brahman** to achieve **Mokṣa**.

The Meaning of "Ādi" and the Injunction of Action

The discussion begins by clarifying a term used in the **Bhāṣya** regarding the purpose of **Vedānta**.

Bhāṣya: Upāsanādi kriyāntara vidhānārthatvam vā

Ṭīkā: Ādi śabdāt śravaṇādayaḥ tat kārya paratvaṃ vā vaktavyam ityarthaḥ

The Explanation: The word **Ādi** (et cetera) in the phrase **Upāsanādi** implies that **Vedānta** sentences ordain not just **Upāsanā** (meditation) but also **Śravaṇa** (listening/study) as mandatory actions.

The Opponent's View: The opponent argues that **Vedānta** must be **Tat-kārya-param**—it must be dedicated to injunctions of action. Even **Śravaṇa** is viewed by them as a ritualistic injunction to be performed, rather than a means of direct knowledge.

The Siddhāntin's Query: The **Siddhāntin** questions this necessity:

Ṭīkā: Nanu śrutaṃ brahma vihāya aśrutaṃ kārya paratvaṃ kimarthaṃ vaktavyam?: Why abandon **Brahman**, which is directly heard in the scriptures, to fabricate a dependency on action (**Kārya**) which is not the primary import? If **Jñāna** (knowledge) of **Brahman** is possible directly, why insist on **Upāsanā**?

The Argument Against "Pariniṣṭhita Vastu" (Established Reality) (Page 137)

परितः समन्तान्निश्चयेन स्थितं परिनिष्ठितं कृत्यनपेक्षम् । सिद्धमिति यावत् । तस्य प्रतिपादनमज्ञातस्य वेदेन ज्ञापनम् , तन्न सम्भवति, …

The **Pūrvapakṣa** argues that the Veda cannot possibly have an already established entity (**Brahman**) as its subject.

Bhāṣya: Na hi pariniṣṭhita vastu pratipādanaṃ saṃbhavati pratyakṣādi viṣayatvāt

Definition of Pariniṣṭhita:

- **Siddham:** That which is accomplished/existing.
- **Kṛti-anapekṣam:** That which does not depend on human action/effort to exist.
- **Explanation: Pari** = **Samantāt** (completely/all around); **Ni** = **Niścayena** (with certainty); **Sthitam** = **Sthitam** (established). It refers to the **Siddha Vastu** (Brahman).

- **The Objection:**
    - The Veda functions to reveal the unknown (**Ajñāta-jñāpanam**).
    - A **Pariniṣṭhita Vastu** (established thing) is fundamentally capable of being known by other means like perception (**Pratyakṣādi viṣayatvāt**).
    - **Ṭīkā:** The Logic**: Tasya pratipādanam ajñātasya vedena jñāpanam tat na saṃbhavati:** If it is already established, it is potentially knowable by other proofs (**Mānāntara**). Therefore, the Veda need not and does not reveal it.

Mananam: Additional Points to Reflect on Upāsanā

1. The View of Other Schools (Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāṭṭa, Bhāskara)

Various schools, such as those of **Bhartṛprapañca**, the **Bhāṭṭa** Mīmāṃsakas (followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa), and the **Bhedābheda** vāda of **Bhāskarācārya**, hold a specific view regarding **Mokṣa**:

- **Rejection of Jñāna-Mokṣa:** They do not accept that **Jñāna** (knowledge) alone leads to immediate liberation.
- They argue that one requires knowledge, but liberation is not attained solely through it. Instead, after obtaining knowledge, one must perform **Upāsanā**.
- By performing this meditation, after dropping the physical body, one attains **Brahma-bhāva** (the state of **Brahman**) or reaches **Brahmaloka**, where one eventually becomes liberated. This is known as **Krama-mukti** (gradual/sequential liberation).

2. Two Specific Views in Naiṣkarmyasiddhi

The text references **Sureśvarācārya's Naiṣkarmyasiddhi** (Chapter 1, mulam and commentary for verse 67), which details these erroneous views:

View A: Meditation for Becoming

- One studies **Vedānta**, but this study does not yield liberating knowledge. Therefore, one must perform the **Upāsanā** of **"Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi"** daily and for a long duration (**Dīrghkāla**).
- Just as meditating on a deity makes one become that deity (e.g., meditating on **Agni** makes one **Agni**), constantly thinking "I am **Brahman**" will eventually lead to attaining **Brahman** after death.
- This leads to **Brahmaloka**, not immediate **Mokṣa**.

View B: Strengthening Weak Knowledge

- One studies **Vedānta** and gains knowledge (**Jñāna**). However, this knowledge is claimed to be incapable of destroying ignorance (**Ajñāna-nivṛtti**).
- Because the knowledge is considered "weak," one must perform **"Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi" Upāsanā** to reinforce it.
- This view is very common among confused seekers who feel, "I have knowledge, but my ignorance isn't gone, so I must meditate." The text clarifies that this is a

Pūrvapakṣa (incorrect view) resulting from a lack of proper **Śravaṇa** (scriptural listening).

3. Prasaṅkhyāna-vāda: The Doctrine of Continuous Meditation

The most powerful **Pūrvapakṣa** discussed in the **Upadeśasāhasrī** (Chapter 18) as **Prasaṅkhyāna-vāda**.

The Doctrine: The proponent argues that after gaining knowledge from the scripture, one must engage in **Prasaṅkhyāna**—the mechanical repetition of **"Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi"**.

The Error: The opponent believes that rote repetition acts as the means to liberation.

The Siddhānta (Correction):

- **Repetition vs. Clear Understanding:** Mechanical repetition is **Upāsanā**, not **Jñāna**. **Jñāna** is defined as a clear understanding that is free from doubt (**Saṃśaya**) and error (**Viparyaya**), and cannot be negated by any other **Pramāṇa** (means of knowledge).
- **Role of Repetition in Vedānta:** When **Vedānta** speaks of repetition (**Āvṛtti**), as in the sūtra **Āvṛtti-asakṛd-upadeśāt,** it refers to the repetition of the means of knowledge (**Śravaṇa** and **Manana**) to gain clarity, not the parrot-like repetition of a phrase without understanding.
- **Jñāna vs. Upāsanā:** One must keep these two distinct. Mixing them leads to confusion. **Nididhyāsana** is not mechanical repetition; it is the removal of obstacles to established understanding.

4. Misinterpretation of Scriptural Terms

Seekers often get confused by specific terms in the scriptures if they do not follow the **Bhāṣya** (commentary).

- **The "Upāsīta" Confusion:**
  - In the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad** (Vidyā Sūtra), the phrase **"Ātmetyeva upāsīta"** occurs. A superficial reader sees the word **Upāsīta** and assumes it prescribes a meditation (**Upāsanā**).
  - **Bhāṣya Interpretation:** The commentary clarifies that in this specific context, **Upāsīta** refers to **Jñāna** (Knowledge), not meditation.
- **Gītā Example:** Similarly, in Chapter 12 of the Bhagavad Gītā, the word **Paryupāsate** is used regarding the **Akṣara** (Imperishable). While it uses a verb related to worship/meditation, the context confirms it refers to **Jñāna**.
- **Importance of Commentaries:** Without studying the **Bhāṣya** and **Ṭīkā**, a seeker cannot distinguish whether a section is a **Jñāna-prakaraṇa** (context of knowledge) or an **Upāsanā-prakaraṇa** (context of meditation).
- **Sat-karma Paripāka:** It requires the maturity of good deeds (**Sat-karma**) and God's grace to focus on the essential meaning. Without it, the mind gravitates toward non-essentials or misinterpretations.

5. Distinctions in Phala (Fruit): Jñāna vs. Upāsanā

- **Uniformity of Jñāna-Phala:** If there are multiple Knowers (**Jñānī**), the result of their knowledge—**Mokṣa** (liberation)—is identical for all. There is no gradation in liberation.
- **Diversity of Upāsanā-Phala:** However, their external circumstances, powers (**Siddhis**), and body conditions may differ vastly. This is due to:
    - Differences in **Upāsanā** performed in the past.
    - Differences in **Citta-śuddhi** (mental purity).
    - **Prārabdha** (destiny).
- **Examples:**
    - One **Jñānī** may be famous and surrounded by people; another may remain unknown and solitary.
    - The **Chāndogya Upaniṣad** mentions results like "laughing, playing, rejoicing with women" (Jakṣan krīḍan ramamāṇaḥ...). These are fruits of specific **Upāsanās**, not the definition of **Jñāna-Mokṣa**.
    - Some may have healthy bodies; others may have diseased bodies.
- **Conclusion:** These external differences belong to the realm of **Upāsanā** and **Karma**, not **Jñāna**. One should not judge the validity of a person's Knowledge based on these external signs.

The Purpose of Upāsanā in Scripture

A potential objection can be raised regarding the presence of **Upāsanā** in the Upaniṣads.

- **The Common Ground:** Both the Opponent and the **Siddhāntin** acknowledge that Upaniṣads (like **Īśa**, **Kaṭha**, **Chāndogya**, **Bṛhadāraṇyaka**) are filled with **Upāsanā** mantras.
- **The Conflict:** If both accept **Upāsanā**, why is there a debate?
- **The Resolution:** The **Siddhāntin** clarifies the specific purpose of these injunctions:
    - **Anukampayā:** They are prescribed out of compassion.
    - **Citta-śuddhi:** They are meant for seekers whose minds are impure or "weak" and cannot grasp the subtle **Vedānta** directly. Without **Upāsanā**, such seekers would understand nothing.
    - **Not the Ultimate Goal:** Therefore, **Upāsanā** is a preparatory step, not the **Tātparya** (ultimate purport) of the text.

Quote (Māṇḍūkya Kārikā 3.16):

> **आश्रमास्त्रिविधा हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टदृष्टयः ।**
> **उपासनोपदिष्टेयं तदर्थमनुकम्पया ॥ १६ ॥**
>
> **āśramāstrividhā hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭadṛṣṭayaḥ |**
> **upāsanopadiṣṭeyaṃ tadarthamanukampayā || 16 ||**

Explanation: Seekers are of three types of vision: lower (**Hīna**), middle (**Madhyama**), and superior (**Utkṛṣṭa**). The teaching is adjusted accordingly.

The Three Types of Arthavāda (Glorification)

मानन्तरयोग्येऽर्थे वाक्यस्य संवादे सत्यनुवादकत्वात् , 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्' इति वाक्यवत् । विसंवादे च बोधकत्वात् , 'आदित्यो यूपः' इति वाक्यवदित्यर्थः ।

The opponent uses the classification of **Arthavāda** to dismiss statements about existing facts as mere restatements or metaphors.

Following verse describes three types of **Arthavāda** statements**:**

विरोधे गुणवादः स्याद् अनुवादोऽवधारिते |
भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानाद् अर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ||

virodhe guṇavādaḥ syād anuvādo'vadhārite |
bhūtārthavādastaddhānād arthavādastridhā mataḥ ||

The three types of statements are:

1. **Guṇavāda (Metaphor based on Quality):**
    - **Condition: Virodhe** (When there is a contradiction with direct perception).
    - **Example: "Ādityo yūpaḥ"** (The sacrificial post is the Sun).
    - **Explanation:** Perception shows the post is wood, not the Sun. This contradiction means the text is a metaphor: the post is bright/glorious like the Sun. This is **Abodhakatvāt** (literally nonsensical if taken as fact), hence interpreted figuratively.
2. **Anuvāda (Restatement):**
    - **Condition: Avadhārite** (When the fact is already ascertained by other means).
    - **Example: "Agnir himasya bheṣajam"** (Fire is the medicine for frost/cold).
    - **Explanation:** This is **Mānāntara yogya** (knowable by other proofs). We know fire cures cold through perception; the Veda merely repeats it.
3. **Bhūtārthavāda (Statement of Fact):**
    - **Condition: Taddhānāt** (When it is neither contradicted nor already known).
    - **Example: "Vajrahastaḥ Purandaraḥ"** (Indra holds the thunderbolt in his hand).
    - **Explanation:** This is not known by perception (we cannot see Indra), nor is it contradicted.

The Opponent's Conclusion: The opponent argues that if **Brahman** is a **Siddha Vastu** (established thing), it must be **Mānāntara yogya** (knowable by perception like a pot). Thus, Vedic statements about it would merely be **Anuvāda** (useless repetition).

The Concomittance (Anumāna) and its Fallacy (Page 137-138)

सिद्धो न वेदार्थः, मानान्तरयोग्यत्वाद्घटवदित्युक्त्वा निष्फलत्वाच्च तथेत्याह - तदिति । सिद्धज्ञापने हेयोपादेयागोचरे फलाभावाच्च तन्न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः । फलं हि सुखाव्याप्तिर्दुःखहानिश्च । तच्च प्रवृत्ति निवृत्तिभ्यां साध्यम् । ते चोपादेयस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रयत्नकार्यस्य हेयस्य निवृत्तिप्रयत्नकार्यस्य ज्ञानाभ्यां जायेते, न सिद्धज्ञानादिति भावः । तर्हि सिद्धबोधिवेदवादानां साफल्यं कथमित्याशङ्क्य 'आम्नायस्य' इत्यादिसङ्ग्रहवाक्यं विवृणोति - **अत एवेति ।**

तत्प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थाभावात् । अत एव 'सोऽरोदीत्' इत्येवमादीनामानर्थक्यं मा भूदिति 'विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात्स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः' (जै. सू. १ । २ । ७) इति स्तावकत्वेनार्थवत्त्वमुक्तम् ।

The opponent constructs a logical inference to prove that **Brahman** cannot be the subject of the Veda.

The Anumāna (Inference):

- **Pratijñā (Proposition): Siddho na vedārthaḥ** (An established thing is not the subject of Veda).
- **Hetu (Reason): Mānāntara yogyatvāt** (Because it is capable of being known by other proofs).
- **Dṛṣṭānta (Example): Ghaṭavat** (Like a pot).
    - Analysis: A pot is a **Siddha** object. It is knowable by perception (**Mānāntara yogya**). Therefore, it requires no Veda to reveal it.

The Siddhāntin's Rebuttal (Hetvābhāsa - Fallacy):

- **The Fallacy: Svarūpāsiddhi** (The reason does not exist in the subject).
- **Explanation:**
    - **Pakṣa** (Subject): **Brahman** (The **Siddha Vastu**).
    - **Hetu** (Reason): **Mānāntara yogyatvam** (Knowability by other proofs).
    - **Defect:** While **Brahman** is **Siddha** (established), it is **NOT** knowable by other proofs (**Mānāntara ayogya**). Therefore, the reason "Because it is knowable by other proofs" does not exist in **Brahman**.

The Argument of Fruitlessness (Niṣphalatva)

The final argument of the **Pūrvapakṣa** in this section concerns the utility (**Phala**) of such knowledge.

Bhāṣya: tat pratipādane ca heya-upādeya rahite puruṣārtha abhāvaḥ

The Argument: Even if the Veda reveals **Brahman**, there is no **Puruṣārtha** (human goal) in it because an established entity is **Heyopādeya-rahita** (devoid of being rejected or acquired).

- You cannot acquire it (it is already **Siddha**).
- You cannot reject it.

Definition of Phala (Result):

Ṭīkā: sukhāvāptiḥ duḥkha hāniśca tacca pravṛtti nivṛttibhyām sādhyam

- **Mechanism:** True fruit (Happiness/Removal of Sorrow) is achieved only through **Pravṛtti** (active engagement to acquire the desirable/Upādeya) or **Nivṛtti** (active withdrawal to reject the undesirable/Heya).
- **Dependence on Action:** This requires knowledge of how to act (**Prayatna**).
- **The Conclusion:** Since **Brahman** is **Siddha**, it involves no **Pravṛtti** or **Nivṛtti**. Therefore, mere knowledge of it is **Niṣphala** (fruitless).

The **Siddhāntin** then asks: **"Siddha bodhi veda vādānāṃ sāphalyaṃ katham?"** (How can Vedic sentences revealing an established fact be fruitful?).

Resolution through Arthavāda (Bhāṣya and Ṭīkā)

सिद्धवस्तुज्ञानात्फलाभावादेवेत्यर्थः । ‘देवैर्निरुद्धः सोऽग्निररोदीत्’ इति वाक्यस्याश्रुजत्वेन रजतस्य निन्दाद्वारा ‘बर्हिषि न देयं’ इति सफलनिषेधशेषत्ववत् वेदान्तानां विध्यादिशेषत्वं वाच्यमित्यर्थः ।

The **Ṭīkā** elucidates the **Bhāṣya** by referring to the summary sentence (saṃgraha-vākya) regarding the purpose of the Vedas.

Bhāṣya (Reference): āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām (tasmād anityam): Because the Scripture is for the purpose of action, those (parts) not having that purpose are meaningless/purposeless.

Bhāṣya: ata eva ‘so'rodīt’ ityevamādīnām ānarthakyaṃ mā bhūt iti ‘vidhinā tvekavākyatvātstutyarthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ’ (jai. sū. 1 | 2 | 7) iti stāvakatvena arthavattvamuktam: Therefore, lest sentences like "He wept" become meaningless, they are interpreted as having the nature of injunctions by way of eulogization.

- **Interpretation as Stuti (Praise):** To prevent meaninglessness (**ānarthakyam mā bhūt**), descriptive sentences act as **Stuti** (praise) or **Nindā** (censure).
- **Syntactical Unity (Ekavākyatā):** These sentences achieve validity by forming a single syntactical unit (**ekavākyatā**) with the injunctive sentences (**vidhi-vākya**).
    1. If they are not actions themselves, they function to praise the action enjoined or condemn the action prohibited.
- **Types of Vākyas:** As established previously, sentences can be:
    1. **Guṇavāda:** When there is a contradiction with perception (interpreted figuratively).
    2. **Anuvāda:** When the matter is established by other proofs.
    3. **Bhūtārthavāda:** A statement of a factual past event (like "He wept").

Ṭīkā: siddha-vastu-jñānāt phalābhāvāt: Because there is no fruit from the mere knowledge of an established object (in the context of Karma-Kāṇḍa).)

Since mere knowledge of a factual story yields no result, these sentences must connect with a **Vidhi** to become fruitful.

The Example of "So'rodīt" (Agni Wept)

To illustrate how a factual story functions as **Nindā** (censure) to support a prohibition, the text analyzes the Vedic sentence **so'gnir arodīt** ("That Agni wept").

The Narrative (Kathānaka): A war occurred between the **Devas** and **Asuras**. The **Devas** deposited their wealth/ornaments with **Agni** for safekeeping and went to war. Upon returning, they asked for their wealth back. **Agni**, having consumed it (as fire consumes everything), had nothing to give and attempted to flee. **Agni** was intercepted by the **Devas** (**devairniruddhāḥ**). When forced to return the wealth he did not have, **Agni** wept (**so'gnirarodīt**).

The Derivation of Silver (Rajata):

- **Agni**'s tears generated Silver.
- Hence, Silver (**rajata**) is considered **aśru-ja** (born of tears) and consequently full of sorrow.

The Ritual Application (Viniyoga):

Ṭīkā: iti vākyasya aśrujatvena rajatasya nindā-dvārā barhiṣi na deyam iti saphala-niṣedha-śeṣatvavat: This sentence, by censuring silver as being born of tears, becomes subsidiary to the fruitful prohibition: "Silver should not be given in the Barhis (sacrifice)."

- **Logic:** Since silver is born of tears (grief), it is inauspicious.
- **Result:** The entire story serves a single purpose: **Nindā** (censure) of silver.
- **Connection:** This censure supports the prohibition: "One should not give silver in the **Barhis** sacrifice."
- **Significance:** A sentence that seemed fruitless (a story about crying) becomes fruitful (saphala) by becoming a subsidiary (śeṣa) to the prohibition (niṣedha).

Extension to Vedānta:

Ṭīkā: vedāntānām vidyā-śeṣatvam vācyam: Similarly, it should be said that Vedānta sentences are subsidiary to knowledge (or injunctions regarding knowledge).

The Discussion on Mantras (Page 138-139)

ननु तेषां मन्त्रवत्स्वातन्त्र्यमस्तु नार्थवादवद्विध्येकवाक्यत्वमित्याशङ्क्य दृष्टान्तासिद्धिमाह - मन्त्राणां चेति । प्रथमाध्याये प्रमाणलक्षणेऽर्थवादचिन्तानन्तरं मन्त्रचिन्ता कृता 'इषे त्वा' इति मन्त्रे 'छिनद्मि' इत्यध्याहाराच्छाखाच्छेदनक्रियाप्रतीतेः, 'अग्निर्मूर्धा' इत्यादौ च क्रियासाधनदेवतादिप्रतीतेः मन्त्राः श्रुत्यादिभिः क्रतौ विनियुक्ताः, ते किमुच्चारणमात्रेणादृष्टं कुर्वन्तः क्रतावुपकुर्वन्ति उत दृष्टेनैवार्थस्मरणेनेति सन्देहे चिन्तादिनाप्यध्ययनकालावगतमन्त्रार्थस्य स्मृतिसम्भवाददृष्टार्था मन्त्रा इति प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तः - 'अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थः' इति लोकवेदयोर्वाक्यार्थस्याविशेषान्मन्त्रवाक्यानां दृष्टेनैव स्वार्थप्रकाशनेन क्रतूपकारकत्वसम्भवात् , दृष्टे सम्भवति अदृष्टकल्पनानुपपत्तेः, फलवदनुष्ठानापेक्षितेन क्रियातत्साधनस्मरणेन द्वारेण मन्त्राणां कर्माङ्गत्वम् ।

मन्त्राणां च 'इषे त्वा' इत्यादीनां क्रियातत्साधनाभिधायित्वेन कर्मसमवायित्वमुक्तम् ।

The text moves to a new objection regarding the independence of **Mantras**, contrasting them with **Arthavāda**.

Objection:Ṭīkā: nanu teṣāṃ mantravat svātantryam astu na arthavādavat vidhi ekavākyatvam

Objection: Let them (Vedānta sentences) have independence like Mantras.

Argument: Arthavāda sentences rely on **Vidhi** (injunctions). However, **Mantras** are seen as independent. Therefore, Vedānta sentences should also be independent.

- **The Logic of Independence:** In the world, entities are judged by their utility (**viniyoga**) in action. If a person or object has no utility in an action, they are deemed useless (**anarthakam**). Vedānta (Knowledge) claims independence because the qualified aspirant (adhikārī) is capable of contemplation (cintana) and self-control, unlike those who require the rod of injunctions.

Refutation of Mantra Independence:

The Pūrvapakṣa challenges the example given by the objector, stating that Mantras are not independent but are also subservient to the action.

Bhāṣya: mantrāṇām ca ‘iṣe tvā’ ityādīnāṃ kriyā-tat-sādhana-abhidhāyitvena karma-samavāyitvam uktam: It has been stated that Mantras constitute an inherent part of the Karma because they denote the action and its means.

Ṭīkā: prathamādhyāye pramāṇalakṣaṇe'rthavādacintānantaraṃ mantracintā kṛtā ‘iṣe tvā’ iti mantre ‘chinadmi’ ityadhyāhārācchākhācchedanakriyāpratīteḥ, ‘agnirmūrdhā’ ityādau ca kriyāsādhanadevatādipratīteḥ mantrāḥ śrutyādibhiḥ kratau viniyuktāḥ

Examples of Mantra Subordination:

1. **"Iṣe tvā..."** (The first mantra of the **Taittirīya Saṃhitā 1.1.1**):
    - **Context:** Cutting a **Palāśa** branch for the sacrifice.
    - **Meaning:** "I cut thee for the sake of a good act"
    - **Function:** It is not merely for recitation; it is a **karaṇa** (tool) for the act of cutting (chinadmi).
    - **Connection:** The mantra is connected via the act of cutting the branch, which is a tool for the ritual.
2. **"Agni Mūrdhā..."**:
    - **Function:** This mantra conveys the deity (Devatā), describing **Agni** (or the Virāṭ Puruṣa) whose head is the heavens.
    - **Connection:** By revealing the deity of the sacrifice, it becomes useful to the **Kratu** (sacrifice).

Conclusion: Mantras are connected to the ritual (kratu-viniyukta) because they illuminate the action (kriyā), the means (sādhana), or the deity (devatā).

Dṛṣṭa (Seen) vs. Adṛṣṭa (Unseen) Results of Mantras

A critical discussion arises from the **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā** regarding the specific function of Mantras.

The Doubt (Saṃdeha):

Ṭīkā: te kimuccāraṇa mātreṇa adṛṣṭaṃ kurvantaḥ kratau upakurvanti uta dṛṣṭena eva arthasmaraṇena iti sandehe Do mantras produce an **Adṛṣṭa** (unseen/spiritual result) merely by articulation (**uccāraṇa-mātreṇa**)?

- Or do they provide a **Dṛṣṭa** (seen/visible result) by reminding one of the meaning (**artha-smaraṇa**)?

Pūrvapakṣa (Mīmāṃsā View):

Ṭīkā: cintā ādināpi adhyayanakāla avagatamantrārthasya smṛtisambhavāt adṛṣṭārthā mantrā iti prāpte: Since the meaning of the Mantra is already comprehended during the time of study, and memory (can function without the mantra), the Mantras must be for an unseen purpose (Adṛṣṭa).

- **Argument:** The student learns the meaning during the study period (adhyayana-kāla). During the sacrifice, they can remember the meaning mentally. Therefore, chanting the mantra again must be for generating **Adṛṣṭa** (merit/punya).

Siddhānta (Vedanta Conclusion):

Ṭīkā: 'aviśiṣṭastu vākyārthaḥ' iti lokavedayoḥ vākyārthasya aviśeṣānmantravākyānāṃ dṛṣṭenaiva svārthaprakāśanena kratūpakārakatvasambhavāt : The sentence meaning is indistinct (between sentences in Veda and in the World)... Since Mantras provide the visible result (**Dṛṣṭa)** of revealing their own meaning, (one should accept that). When remembered in the context of a sacrifice they provide the unseen (**Adṛṣṭa)** result.

Key Principle:

Ṭīkā: dṛṣṭe sambhavati adṛṣṭa-kalpanā anupapatteḥ: When a visible result is possible, the postulation of an unseen result is not reasonable.

- **Function:** The visible function of a mantra is **Svārtha-prakāśana** (illuminating its own meaning).
- **Mechanism:** It reminds the performer of the action and its means at the time of performance (prayoga-kāla).
- **Rejection of Adṛṣṭa:** Just as food has the visible result of filling the stomach, Mantras have the visible result of meaning-recall. **Adṛṣṭa** is only assumed when no visible result exists.

The Subsidiary Nature of Mantras in Rituals

The text highlights the functional relationship between Mantras and the performance of rituals (**Karma**).

Ṭīkā: phalavad-anuṣṭhānāpekṣitena kriyā-tat-sādhana-smaraṇena-dvāreṇa mantrāṇāṃ karmāṅgatvam

- The text discusses how Mantras become an integral part (**Aṅga**) of the ritual action. The performance of a ritual is expected to yield specific results (**Phalavad-anuṣṭhāna**). For the ritual to be successful, the performer must remember the specific action (**Kriyā**) and the means/instruments (**Sādhana**) to perform it. This remembrance is facilitated through the Mantras.
- Since the performer has previously studied the Mantras (Adhyayana), reciting them during the ritual triggers the memory: "This implies such-and-such meaning/action."
- Because the Mantras serve the essential function of reminding the performer of the action and its means—which is required for the fruitful completion of the ritual—Mantras obtain the status of being a subsidiary to the Karma (**Karmāṅgatvam**).

The Rule (Niyama):

Ṭīkā: 'mantrairevārthaḥ smartavyaḥ' iti niyamaḥ tu adṛṣṭārthaḥ: However, the restriction that "the meaning must be remembered through the mantra alone" is for an unseen purpose.

- While the content is for a visible result (memory), the restriction (that one must not use a translation or merely think about it, but must use that specific mantra) produces **Adṛṣṭa**.
- **Importance of Phonetics:** If the Mantra is not recited exactly as it is—for instance, if a short vowel (**Hrasva**) is made long (**Dīrgha**), or if the intonation (**Svara**) changes from **Udātta** (high pitch) to **Anudātta** or **Svarita**—the specific **Adṛṣṭa** is not produced.
- Consequently, such a recitation yields no benefit for the ritual.

Contrast with Vedānta: The text notes that in contexts like **Vedānta**, where the goal is a seen result (**Dṛṣṭa-phala** i.e., immediate knowledge/realization), the strict rule of **Adṛṣṭa** regarding mantras may not apply in the same way. However, in the context of Ritual Karma, the precise recitation is mandatory.

Padaikavākyatā vs. Vākyaikavākyatā

तथा चार्थवादानां स्तुतिपदार्थद्वारा पदैकवाक्यत्वं विधिभिः, मन्त्राणां तु वाक्यार्थज्ञानद्वारा तैर्वाक्यैकवाक्यत्वमिति विभागः ।

This section outlines the technical distinction in how **Arthavāda** (eulogistic passages) and **Mantras** connect with the **Vidhi** (injunctive sentences).

Ṭīkā (Classification): arthavādānām stuti-padārtha-dvārā padaikavākyatvam vidhibhiḥ

For Arthavādas, the syntactic unity is "Padaikavākyatā" through the meaning of "Praise" (or Censure).

Arthavāda: The entire story or description boils down to a single concept or "word" (pada)—either **Stuti** (Praise) or **Nindā** (Censure). This single concept then connects to the Vidhi.

- Many sentences ===> One Idea (Praise/Blame) ===> Connects to Vidhi.

Ṭīkā: mantrāṇāṃ vākyārtha-jñāna-dvārā taiḥ vākyaikavākyatvam: For Injunctions and Mantras, the syntactic unity is "Vākyaikavākyatā" through the knowledge of the sentence meaning.

Mantra: Mantras retain their sentence structure and meaning. They illuminate the details of the action (what to cut, which deity to invoke). They connect to the Karma as complete sentences.

- Mantra sentence meaning ===> Illuminates Action Details ===> Connects to Vidhi.

Summary of the Division:

1. **Arthavāda** ===> **Padaikavākyatā** (Unity of Padārtha/Concept).
2. **Mantra** ===> **Vākyaikavākyatā** (Unity of Sentence Meaning)

The Pūrvapakṣa (Objection): Validity of Vedanta (Page 140)

नन्वस्तु कर्मप्रकरणस्थवाक्यानां विध्येकवाक्यत्वम् , वेदान्तानां तु सिद्धे प्रामाण्यं किं न स्यादिति तत्राह - न क्वचिदिति । वेदान्ता विध्येकवाक्यत्वेनैवार्थवन्तः, सिद्धार्थावेदकत्वात् , मन्त्रार्थवादादिवदित्यर्थः ।

न क्वचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेणार्थवत्ता दृष्टा उपपन्ना वा ।

The opponent challenges the validity of Vedanta if it is not connected to action.

Ṭīkā: nanu astu karmaprakaraṇasthavākyānāṃ vidhi-ekavākyatvam , vedāntānāṃ tu siddhe prāmāṇyaṃ kiṃ na syāt: May it be so that **Arthavāda** and **Mantra** are valid only because they connect to a **vidhi**, why can't Vedanta statements (which reveal Brahman) be meaningful independent of **vidhi**?

Bhāṣya: Na kvacid api vedavākyānāṃ vidhisaṃsparśam antareṇa arthavattā dṛṣṭā upapannā vā: Nowhere has it been seen (**dṛṣṭā**), nor is it logical (**upapannā**), that Vedic sentences have meaningfulness (**arthavattā**) without contact with an injunction (**vidhi-saṃsparśam**).

The Argument: The Flawed Generalization (Vyāpti): The opponent creates a universal rule:

- Where there is **siddhārtha-āvedakatvam** (revealing of an established fact), there is **vidhyekavākyatvenaiva-arthavantatvam** (meaningfulness of statement by unity with an injunction).
- **Example: Mantrārthavādādivat** (Like Mantras and Arthavadas). Since Mantras describe facts but serve rituals, Vedanta must do the same.

The Siddhānta (Rebuttal): The Validity of Valid Knowledge

अन्यत्रादृष्टापि वेदान्तेषु कल्प्यतामिति तत्राह - उपपन्ना वेति। नेत्यनुषङ्गः । सिद्धे फलाभावास्योक्तत्वादिति भावः । तर्हि ब्रह्मण्येव स्वार्थे विधिः कल्प्यतां कृतं वेदान्तानां विध्यन्तरशेषत्वेनेत्यत आह - न चेति । ननु 'दध्ना जुहोति' इति सिद्धे दधनि विधिर्दृष्टस्तत्राह - क्रियेति । दध्नः क्रियासाधनस्य प्रयुज्यमानतया साध्यत्वाद्विधेयता, निष्क्रियब्रह्मणः कथमप्यसाध्यत्वान्न विधेयत्वमित्यर्थः । भाट्टमतमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति ।

न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः सम्भवति, क्रियाविषयत्वाद्विधेः ।

The Vedantin rejects the Mimamsa demand to subordinate knowledge to action.

A. The Flaw in the "Unseen" Argument (Adṛṣṭā)

Ṭīkā: Anyatra adṛṣṭāpi vedānteṣu kalpyatām: Even if unseen elsewhere, it should be accepted in Vedanta.

The opponent argued that because independent validity is not "seen" elsewhere in the Veda, it cannot exist in Vedanta.

The Counter-Analogy:

- River water (Ganga, Yamuna) is sweet.
- One cannot generalize that "all water is sweet" and claim the Ocean must be sweet.
- **Observation:** The Ocean is salty despite the rivers being sweet.

Application: Just because other parts of the Veda (Karma Kanda) depend on **vidhi**, it does not mean Vedanta (Jñāna Kanda) must also depend on **vidhi**.

B. The Flaw in Logic (Upapannā)

The opponent argued that independent validity is not logical.

- **Response: Ṭīkā: siddhe phala abhāvāsya uktatvāt iti bhāvaḥ**: If Vedanta is forced to be subsidiary to action, it loses its specific fruit (Moksha). If Brahman is merely a detail in a ritual, the text becomes meaningless regarding liberation.

C. Rejection of Vidhi in Brahman

Ṭīkā: tarhi brahmaṇyeva svārthe vidhiḥ kalpyatāṃ kṛtaṃ vedāntānāṃ vidhi-antara-aśeṣatven iti

The opponent suggests: If there is no ritual act, let us imagine a **vidhi** within Brahman itself (e.g., a command to know or meditate).

Bhāṣya: Na ca pariniṣṭhite vastusvarūpe vidhiḥ saṃbhavati: And an injunction is not possible regarding the nature of a thing that is eternally established (**pariniṣṭhita**).

D. The "Dadhna Juhoti" Analysis

Ṭīkā: nanu ‘dadhnā juhoti’ iti siddhe dadhani vidhiḥ dṛṣṭaḥ tatra: In the sentence **dadhnā juhoti** ("He sacrifices with curd"), curd (dadhi) is a **siddha vastu** (established thing), yet it is used in a **vidhi**. Why not Brahman?

The opponent cites an example where an established thing has an injunction.

Siddhānta Response:

- Curd is established, but it can function as a **kāraka** (factor of action/instrument). It can be obtained, processed, and used to produce a result (sādhya).
- **Bhāṣya: Kriyāviṣayatvād vidheḥ:** Because injunctions have action as their object. Brahman is **niṣkriya** (actionless). It cannot be a doer (kartā), an instrument, or a fruit of action.
- **Ṭīkā: Niṣkriya-brahmaṇaḥ katham api asādhyatvāt na vidheyatvam:** Since the actionless Brahman cannot be a 'thing to be accomplished' in any way, it cannot be the object of an injunction. Brahman is realized only as the Self (**Aham**). One cannot "do" the Self; one is the Self. Therefore, Brahman is never a goal to be achieved (sādhya) through action.

Summary of the Bhaṭṭa (Mimamsa) Position (Page 141)

भाट्टमतमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति ।

तस्मात्कर्मापेक्षितकर्तृदेवतादिस्वरूपप्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं वेदान्तानाम् । अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयान्नैतदभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि स्ववाक्यगतोपासनादिकर्मपरत्वम् ।

The **Bhāṣya** summarizes the opponent's view (Kumarila Bhatta's school) regarding the **Samānvaya** (Harmony) Sutra.

- **Bhāṣya: Tasmāt karmāpekṣita-kartṛ-devatādi-svarūpa-prakāśanena kriyāvidhi-śeṣatvaṃ vedāntānām:** Therefore, Vedanta texts are subsidiary to ritual injunctions because they reveal the nature of the agent (kartā) and deity (devatā) required for the ritual (karma). If they cannot connect to external rituals, perhaps they are subsidiary to **upāsanā** (mental actions/meditations) mentioned within the Vedanta texts themselves.

Analysis of Sūtra 1.1.4.4

स्वयमेवारुचिं वदन्पक्षान्तरमाह - अथेति ।

तस्मान्न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वमिति प्राप्ते, उच्यते —

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥
tattu samanvayāt || 4 ||

Padārthokti: (Meanings of the Terms):

Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā Verses For First Varṇaka (Page 132)

वेदान्ताः कर्तृदेवादिपरा ब्रह्मपरा उत |
अनुष्ठानोपयोगित्वात्कर्त्रादिप्रतिपादकाः || १ ||
vedāntāḥ kartṛdevādiparā brahmaparā uta | anuṣṭhānopayogitvātkartrādipratipādakāḥ || 1 ||

भिन्नप्रकरणालिङ्गषट्काच्च ब्रह्मबोधकाः |
सति प्रयोजनेऽनर्थहानेऽनुष्ठनतोऽत्र किम् || २ ||

bhinnaprakaraṇāliṅgaṣaṭkācca brahmabodhakāḥ | sati prayojane'narthahāne'nuṣṭhanato'tra kim || 2 ||

Verse 1: The Topic and Doubt

- **Viṣaya (Subject):** All Vedanta texts.
- **Saṃdeha (Doubt): kartṛdevādiparāḥ uta brahma-parāḥ?**
    - Do they propound agents, deities, and means (subservient to action)?
    - Or are they dedicated to Brahman (independent)?
- **Pūrvapakṣa:** They describe agents/deities because they must be useful for **anuṣṭhāna** (performance of action).

Verse 2: The Siddhānta Decision

- **Decision: Vedāntāḥ brahmaparāḥ**: Vedanta texts are dedicated to Brahman.
- **Reason 1: Bhinna-prakaraṇāt**: Because the context is different. Vedanta is distinct from the Karma Kanda.
- **Reason 2: Liṅga-ṣaṭkācca:** Due to the six indicatory marks of purport: Upakrama-Upasaṃhāra, etc..
- **Reason 3: Sati prayojane:** There is a distinct purpose/fruit.
    - **Fruit: Anartha-hāneḥ**: Destruction of suffering/evil.
- **Rebuttal to Action: Anuṣṭhānataḥ atra kim:** What is the use of ritual performance here? For the one seeking Brahman, ritual action is not the means.

Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā Verses For Second Varṇaka (Page 133)

प्रतिपत्तिं विधित्सन्ति ब्रह्मण्यवसिता उत |
शास्त्रवात्ते विधातारो मननादेश्च कीर्तनात् || ३ ||
pratipattiṃ vidhitsanti brahmaṇyavasitā uta |
śāstravātte vidhātāro mananādeśca kīrtanāt || 3 ||

नाकर्तृतन्त्रेऽस्ति विधिः शास्त्रत्वं शंसनादपि |
मननादेः पुरा बोधात् ब्रह्मण्यवसितास्ततः || ४ ||

nākartṛtantre'sti vidhiḥ śāstratvaṃ śaṃsanādapi |
mananādeḥ purā bodhāt brahmaṇyavasitāstataḥ || 4 ||

A specific school (**Ekadeśin**) argues that knowledge needs a "doing" component to be effective.

Verse 3: The Topic and Doubt: The Ekadeśin View:

- **Viṣaya (Subject):** Vedanta gives only indirect (**parokṣa**) knowledge.
- **Vidhātāro mananādeḥ.** (They ordain/command reflection and meditation).
- They argue that after hearing (**śravaṇa**), one must perform **manana** and **nididhyāsana** as a duty (**vidhi**) to turn knowledge into experience.
- They take **Śāsanāt Śāstram** as the definition of **śāstra** – Scripture is that which rules, commands, or ordains action.
-

Verse 4: The Siddhānta Response (Verse 4):

- **No Vidhi in Knowledge: Na akartṛ-tantre asti vidhiḥ:** There is no injunction in matters not dependent on the agent. Knowledge is objective (vastu-tantra), not subjective (puruṣa-tantra).
- **Definition of śāstra: Śāstratvaṃ śaṃsanāt:** It is a Scripture because it reveals/informs about the established reality, not because it commands action.
- **Role of Manana: Mananādeḥ purā bodhāt:** Reflection etc., come before realization. **Manana** and **Nididhyāsana** are not actions to be done after realizing Brahman to make it "real." Rather, they remove obstacles (like **asambhāvanā** - impossibility) before the firm knowledge (bodha) takes place.
- **Conclusion: Tattvamasi ityādayo vedāntāḥ brahmaṇi avasitāḥ:** Statements like "That Thou Art" culminate in Brahman itself, without requiring further action.

Padārthokti: (Meanings of the Terms): Tattu Samanvayāt (Page 141)

सिद्धान्तसूत्रं व्याचष्टे - तुशब्द इति । तद्ब्रह्म वेदान्तप्रमाणकमिति प्रतिज्ञातेऽर्थे हेतुं पृच्छति - कथमिति । हेतुमाह - समिति । अन्वयतात्पर्यविषयत्वं तस्मादित्येव हेतुः ।

तुशब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । तद्ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रादेवावगम्यते । कथम् ? समन्वयात् ।

The **Sūtra** contains three distinct words (padas): **Tat**, **Tu**, and **Samanvayāt**.

1. The Word 'Tu' (But)

Bhāṣya: **tu-śabdaḥ pūrvapakṣa-vyāvṛttyarthaḥ:** The word **Tu** is used to refute or exclude the **Pūrvapakṣa** (the opponent's view).

2. The Word 'Tat' (That/Brahma)

This refers to **Brahma**, regarding whom the proposition was made.

Bhāṣya: **tad brahma sarvajñaṃ sarvaśakti jagad-utpatti-sthiti-laya-kāraṇam. vedānta-śāstrād-eva avagamyate**

- **Brahma** is defined as **Sarvajñam** (All-knowing), **Sarvaśakti** (All-powerful), and the cause of the creation, sustenance, and dissolution of the world (**Jagat-utpatti-sthiti-laya-kāraṇam**).
- Such **Brahma** is known only through the **Vedānta Śāstra**. **Brahma** is **Vedānta-pramāṇakam** (i.e., **Vedānta** is the only valid means of knowledge for **Brahma**; it is not the object of other means of knowledge).

3. The Word 'Samanvayāt' (Because of Concordance)

The opponent asks: **katham**: How is it known that **Brahma** is known only through **Vedānta**? The answer is the reason (**Hetu**) given in the **Sūtra**: **Samanvayāt**.

- **Etymology: Sam** (prefix) + **Anvayāt**.
- **Meaning: Anvaya** here means **Tātparya-viṣayatvam** (Being the subject of the purport/intention).
- **Samanvayāt** means **Tātparya-viṣayatvāt** – Because **Brahma** is the subject matter of the purport of the texts.

Elaboration on Tātparya and Akhaṇḍārtha

तात्पर्यस्य सम्यक्त्वमखण्डार्थविषयकत्वं सूचयितुं संपदं प्रतिज्ञान्तर्गतमेव ।

The ṭīkā delves into the precise meaning of the "concordance" mentioned in the **Sūtra**.

The Meaning of the Prefix 'Sam':

- **Sam** indicates **Samyaktvam** (Completeness/Correctness).
- It indicates **Akhaṇḍārtha-viṣayakatvam** – The fact that the texts have an "Indivisible Meaning" as their subject.
- The **Vedānta** sentences are uniform in their purport: they all reveal the one, indivisible (**Akhaṇḍa**) **Brahma**.

Ṭīkā: **sūcayituṃ saṃpadaṃ:** The word **Sam** is included to indicate that the purport is about the Indivisible Reality.

Logical Proof (Anumāna) for Brahma being the Subject of Vedānta

तथा चाखण्डं ब्रह्म वेदान्तजप्रमाविषयः, वेदान्ततात्पर्यविषयत्वात् , यो यद्वाक्यतात्पर्यविषयः स तद्वाक्यप्रमेयः, यथा कर्मवाक्यप्रमेयो धर्म इति प्रयोगः ।

The ṭīkā establishes the proposition through an inference (**Anumāna** or **Prayoga**).

- **Pakṣa** (Subject): **Akhaṇḍam Brahma** (The Indivisible **Brahma**).
- **Sādhya** (What is to be proved): **Vedāntaja-pramā-viṣayatvam** (It is the object of the knowledge generated by **Vedānta**).
- **Hetu** (Reason): **Vedānta-tātparya-viṣayatvam** (Because it is the subject of the purport of **Vedānta**).
- **Vyāpti** (Invariable Concomitance):
  Ṭīkā: **yo yad-vākya-tātparya-viṣayaḥ, sa tad-vākya-prameyaḥ:** Whatever is the subject of the purport of a specific sentence is the object of knowledge (**Prameya**) of that sentence.
- **Dṛṣṭānta** (Example): **Dharma**: Just as **Dharma** is the object of knowledge of the **Karma-kāṇḍa** sentences because it is their purport, **Brahma** is the object of **Vedānta** because it is their purport.

The Nature of the Sentence: Saṃsṛṣṭa vs. Asaṃsṛṣṭan (Page 142)

वाक्यार्थस्याखण्डत्वं - असंसृष्टत्वम् । वाक्यस्य चाखण्डार्थकत्वं - स्वपदोपस्थिता ये पदार्थास्तेषां यः संसर्गस्तदगोचरप्रमाजनकत्वम् । न चेदमप्रसिद्धम् ।

The ṭīkā explains the concept of **Akhaṇḍārtha** (indivisible meaning) by contrasting it with relational sentences.

1. Saṃsṛṣṭa (Relational/Contacted)

- In ordinary language, sentences imply a relationship (**Samsarga**) between words.
- **Example:** "The man with a stick" (**Daṇḍī Puruṣaḥ**).
  - Here, there is a **Viśeṣaṇa** (Attribute/Stick) and a **Viśeṣya** (Substantive/Man). That is called **Viśiṣṭa** (qualified). Same way **Saṃsṛṣṭa** (associated/mixed) which has relation (**saṃsarga**) with something..

2. Asaṃsṛṣṭa (Non-Relational)

- **Brahma** is **Asaṃsṛṣṭa** (Unrelated). It has no contact or relation with anything else.
- Therefore, the meaning of **Vedānta** sentences regarding **Brahma** is **Asaṃsṛṣṭa** (Non-relationality).
- **Definition of Akhaṇḍa-vākya-artha:**
  Ṭīkā: sva-pada-upasthitāḥ ye padārthāḥ teṣāṃ yaḥ saṃsargaḥ tad-agocara-pramā-janakatvam
  - A sentence that generates knowledge which does not have as its object the relationship (**Samsarga**) between the meanings presented by its own words.
  - **Clarification**: that while the original might read gocara, the correct interpretation for **Akhaṇḍārtha** is **tad-agocara** (not making that relationship the object).

Validating the Akhaṇḍārtha Vākya (The Moon Analogy)

प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्र इत्यादि लक्षणवाक्यानां लोके लक्षणया चन्द्रादिव्यक्तिमात्रप्रमाहेतुत्वात् । सर्वपदलक्षणा चाविरुद्धा सर्वैरर्थवादपदैरेकस्याः स्तुतेर्लक्ष्यत्वाङ्गीकारात् ।

The opponent argues that such non-relational sentences are unknown (**Aprasiddha**) in language. The **Siddhāntin** refutes this using a common example (**Dṛṣṭānta**).

Ṭīkā: **prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ ityādi-lakṣaṇa-vākyānāṃ loke lakṣaṇayā candrādi-vyakti-mātra-pramā-hetutvāt**

- **The Scenario:** Someone asks, "Which is the moon?" (**Kaḥ Candraḥ?**).
- **The Answer:** "The most shining one is the moon" (**Prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ**).
- **Analysis:**
    - This is a definition sentence (**Lakṣaṇa Vākya**).
    - It does not mean "The moon possesses shiningness" (relational).
    - It points merely to the **Vyakti-mātra** (the entity/individual itself) via secondary implication (**Lakṣaṇā**).
    - Similarly, **Vedānta** sentences like **Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma** use distinct words not to describe attributes, but to point to the one indivisible **Brahma** via **Lakṣaṇā**.
- **Conclusion:**
  Ṭīkā: **sarva-pada-lakṣaṇā ca (eka pade) aviruddhā**
    - It is not contradictory for all words in a sentence to have their implication (**Lakṣaṇā**) pointing to a single entity (one pada).
    - Even in **Arthavāda** (eulogy) sections of the Veda, all praise words have their implication in one word.

Determination of Purport (Tātparya Nirṇaya) (Page 142-143)

तथा सत्यज्ञानादिपदैरखण्डं ब्रह्म भातीति न पक्षासिद्धिः । नापि हेत्वसिद्धिः, उपक्रमादिलिङ्गैर्वेदान्तानामद्वितीयाखण्डब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यनिर्णयात् । तत्र छान्दोग्यषष्ठे उपक्रमं दर्शयति - सदेवेति ।

सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येणैतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि — 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा. उ. ६ । २ । १) 'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ. उ. १ । १ । १) 'तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः' (बृ. उ. २ । ५ । १९) 'ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्' (मु. उ. २ । २ । १२) इत्यादीनि ।

Ṭīkā: **satya-jñānādi padaiḥ akhaṇḍaṃ brahma bhāti iti na pakṣa asiddhiḥ**: The **Vedānta** sentences like **Satyam Jñānam etc.** indeed prove indivisible **Brahma**. Thus there is no absence of reasoning in **Pakṣa** (Subject).

Ṭīkā: **nāpi hetu-asiddhiḥ, upakramādiliṅgaiḥ vedāntānām advitīyākhaṇḍabrahmaṇi tātparyanirṇayāt:** The logical reason (**Hetu**) mentioned earlier—that **Vedānta** has **Brahma** as its purport—is not unproven (**Asiddha**). The purport is determined by the **Upakramādi-liṅga** (The six marks of purport, starting with the beginning).

Bhāṣya: **sarveṣu hi vedānteṣu vākyāni tātparyeṇa etasya arthasya pratipādakatvena samanugatāni:** In all **Vedānta** texts, the sentences run together harmoniously (**Samanugatāni**), demonstrating that their purport is solely the establishing of this specific meaning (the **Akhaṇḍa Brahma**).

Clarification on Tātparya:

- The true purport is only to reveal "I am **Brahma**" (**Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi**).
- Other narratives (stories of creation, dialogues like Janaka-Yājñavalkya, etc.) are secondary (**Arthavāda**) or preparatory steps to lead the mind to the main point. They are translations of the dualistic intellect to guide it to non-duality.
- One who grasps this central purport avoids getting lost in the "forest of words" (**Śabda-jālam**).

Example of Upakrama (Beginning):

Ṭīkā: **tatra chāndogya-ṣaṣṭhe upakramaṃ darśayati**

- The ṭīkā points to the 6th Chapter of the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad**.
- **Quote:** Sadeva somya idam agra āsīt, ekam evādvitīyam (O Somya, in the beginning, this was Existence alone, One only without a second).
- This marks the **Upakrama** (commencement) establishing the Non-dual Reality.

Determining Purport: The Six Indicators (Ṣaḍ-vidha Liṅga)

To ascertain that the specific purport (**Tātparya**) of the Vedanta scriptures is indeed the Non-dual, Indivisible (**Advitīya Akhaṇḍa**) Brahman, one must utilize the six linguistic indicators.

The Verse of the Six Liṅgas

A well known verse defining these indicators:

उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम्।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये॥

upakramopasaṃhārāvabhyāso'pūrvatā phalam|
arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyanirṇaye||

1. **Upakrama-Upasaṃhāra:** The Beginning and the Conclusion (taken as one distinct indicator of consistency).
2. **Abhyāsa:** Repetition.
3. **Apūrvatā:** Originality/Uniqueness (Knowledge not available through other means).
4. **Phalam:** Fruit/Result.
5. **Arthavāda:** Eulogy/Praise (or condemnation of the opposite).
6. **Upapatti:** Demonstration/Reasoning/Logic.

Case Study: Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Chapter 6)

उद्दालकः पुत्रमुवाच - हे सोम्य प्रियदर्शन, इदं सर्वं जगत् , अग्रे उत्पत्तेः प्राक्काले सदबाधितं ब्रह्मैवासीत् ।

The ṭīkā utilizes the dialogue between the sage **Uddālaka Āruṇi** and his son **Śvetaketu** to demonstrate these indicators.

Ṭīkā: uddālakaḥ putram uvāca - he somya priyadarśana,

- **The Teacher:** Sage **Uddālaka Āruṇi**.
- **The Student: Śvetaketu**.
- **The Address:** The father addresses the son as **Somya**.

1. The First Liṅga: Upakrama-Upasaṃhāra (Beginning & Conclusion)

एवकारेण जगतः पृथक्सत्ता निषिध्यते । सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदनिरासार्थं ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ इति पदत्रयम् ।

This indicator looks at the consistency between the opening statement and the closing statement of a section.

Upakrama (The Beginning): The section begins with the statement: “**Sadeva somyedam agra āsīt” (Chā. u. 6|2|1):** "O Somya, in the beginning (before creation), this was Sat (Existence) alone."

The State Before Creation:

Ṭīkā: **idaṃ sarvaṃ jagat , agre utpatteḥ prākkāle sadabādhitaṃ brahma eva āsīt | evakāreṇa jagataḥ pṛthaksattā niṣidhyate |** Before creation, the world was not distinct from **Sat** (Existence). The separate existence of the world is negated (**Jagataḥ pṛthak sattā niṣidhyate**). The world existed as Brahman itself, devoid of name and form (**Nāma-rūpa**).

Negation of Differences (Bheda): Ṭīkā: **sajātīyavijātīyasvagatabhedanirāsārthaṃ ‘ekamevādvitīyam’ iti padatrayam |** The phrase **Ekam evādvītīyam** (One only without a second) is used to negate the three types of differences in Brahman (**Sat**).

वृक्षस्य स्वगतो भेदः पत्रपुष्पफलादिभिः ।
वृक्षान्तरात्सजातीयो विजातीयः शिलादितः ॥ (पञ्चदशी २.२०)

vṛkṣasya svagato bhedaḥ patrapuṣpaphalādibhiḥ |
vṛkṣāntarātsajātīyo vijātīyaḥ śilāditaḥ || (pañcadaśī 2.20)

- **Sajātīya Bheda** (Difference within the same species): E.g., One tree vs. another tree.
- **Vijātīya Bheda** (Difference from a different species): E.g., A tree vs. a stone (**Pāṣāṇa**).
- **Svagata Bheda** (Internal difference): E.g., Within a single tree, the distinction between leaves, flowers, and fruits.
- By saying "One without a second," the scripture asserts that **Sat** is free from all three differences.

Saguṇa vs. Nirguṇa Brahman:

- Bhagavān Ādi Śaṅkarācārya in the **Bhāṣya** (for Chandogya Upanishad 6.2.2) argues that the Brahman mentioned in the **Upakrama** must be **Nirguṇa** (Attributeless). If it were **Saguṇa**, the proposition (**Pratijñā**) of Non-dual, Indivisible (**Advitīya Akhaṇḍa**) Brahman would be contradicted by the ascertainment of the purport through 6 indicators (**Tātparya Nirnaya**).
- Since the text states "before creation," the realm of **Māyā** (which causes duality/attributes) is not yet active or distinct. If the beginning were **Saguṇa** (with attributes), the conclusion would also have to be **Saguṇa**, contradicting the Vedantic stance of Non-duality.
- **Doubt:** How can the world (which involves modification) arise from **Sat** which is described as **Niravayavam** (partless), **Niṣkalam** (without parts), **Niṣkriyam** (actionless), and **Śāntam** (peaceful)?
- **Bhāṣya Explanation:** The creation is not a literal transformation but an appearance, similar to the rope appearing as a snake (**Rajju-sarpa vat**).
    - Just as the rope remains a rope despite the snake illusion, Brahman remains **Nirguṇa** even during the perception of the world ("Jaise ka taisa" - As it was, so it is).
    - The modification is merely verbal: **Vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam**.

Upasaṃhāra (The Conclusion): The section concludes with:

एवमद्वितीयं ब्रह्मोपक्रम्य ‘ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्’ इत्युपसंहरति ।

Ṭīkā: **evamadvitīyaṃ brahmopakramya ‘aitadātmyamidaṃ sarvam’ ityupasaṃharati |**

Aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyam sa ātmā tat tvam asi (Chā. u. 6|8|7-16) "All this has That as its Self. That is the Truth. That is the Self. That Thou Art."

- **Meaning of Aitadātmyam:** The entire world has **Sat** as its Self (**Etena ātmanā ātmavān**). The world derives its existence/selfhood solely from Brahman.
- **Consistency (Ekarūpyam):** The text begins with "One without a second" (**Advitīya**) and ends with "All this is That" (**Aitadātmyam**). This unity of focus constitutes the first **Liṅga**.

2. The Second Liṅga: Abhyāsa (Repetition)

इदमुपक्रमोपसंहारैकरूप्यं तात्पर्यलिङ्गम् , यथा ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इति नवकृत्वोऽभ्यासः ।

Ṭīkā: **idamupakramopasaṃhāraikarūpyaṃ tātparyaliṅgam , yathā ‘tattvamasi’ iti navakṛtvo'bhyāsaḥ |**

The second indicator is the repetition of the central teaching to enforce the point and remove doubts.

The Phrase: Tat Tvam Asi (Chā. u. 6|8|7-16) : That Thou Art.
Frequency: It is repeated **9 times** (**Nava-kṛtvaḥ**).
Purpose of Repetition:

- **Abhyāsa** does not strictly mean repeating the exact same sentence (like "Tat Tvam Asi") mechanically multiple times. It refers to the repetition of the same purport or idea, even if expressed through different words or contexts.
- **Saṃśaya-nivṛtti** (Removal of doubt): Each repetition addresses a specific doubt raised by Śvetaketu regarding how the individual can be identical to the universal **Sat**.
- Once the understanding is complete (**Vijñātam**), the instruction ceases.

The Analogies (Dṛṣṭānta) used in the 9 Repetitions:

The text outlines that different analogies are used for each repetition to clarify the "That Thou Art" identity:

1. **Madhu-makṣikā (Honey and Bees):** Bees collect nectar from various trees, but once it becomes honey, the distinct "identities" of the nectars are lost.
2. **Rivers and Ocean:** Rivers flow into the ocean and lose their individual names and forms, yet they remain water.
3. **The Tree:** When a tree is cut, sap (life) flows, but the life force (**Jīva**) does not die; only the body dies.
4. **The Banyan Seed:** A massive tree manifests from a subtle, almost invisible seed.
5. **Salt in Water:** Salt dissolved in water is invisible but pervasive (known through taste/experience).
6. **The Gandhāra Man:** A blindfolded man led away from home requires a teacher to remove the blindfold and point the way (representing the necessity of the Guru).
7. **The Dying Man:** At death, speech merges into mind, mind into prana, prana into fire (heat), and fire into the Supreme Deity.
8. **The Heated Axe test** (Truth alone saves one from being burnt/bound).

While the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad** makes it easy to spot by repeating the specific phrase **Tat Tvam Asi**, in other Upaniṣads, one must look for the repetition of the central meaning (identity of Jīva and Brahman) across different verses.

3. The Third Liṅga: Apūrvatā (Originality/Uniqueness)

रूपादिहीनाद्वितीयब्रह्मणो मानान्तरायोग्यत्वादपूर्वत्वमुक्तम् - ‘अत्र वाव किल सत्सोम्य न निभालयसे’ इति । सङ्घाते स्थितं प्रत्यग्ब्रह्म न जानासीत्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: **rūpādihīnādvitīyabrahmaṇo mānāntarāyogyatvādapūrvatvamuktam - ‘atra vāva kila satsomya na nibhālayase’ iti | saṅghāte sthitaṃ pratyagbrahma na jānāsītyarthaḥ |**

Apūrvatā refers to the knowledge that is unique to the scripture and cannot be gained through any other means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**) such as perception (**Pratyakṣa**) or inference (**Anumāna**).

- **Nature of Brahman:** Brahman is described as **Rūpādi-hīna** (devoid of form, smell, etc.) and **Advitīya** (non-dual).
- **Reasoning:** Because Brahman lacks attributes like form, it is **Mānāntara-ayogya** (unfit/unavailable for other means of knowledge). Therefore, the specific knowledge of Brahman is the unique domain of Vedanta.

Illustration in Chāndogya Upaniṣad

The ṭīkā highlights a specific verse to demonstrate **Apūrvatā** in the context of the dialogue between sage Uddālaka and Śvetaketu.

Atra vāva kila sat somya na nibhālayase (Chā. u. 6|13|2)

Meaning: Atra: In this very body/aggregate (**Saṅghāte**)**.** O Somya, you do not perceive/know the **Sat** (Existence/Brahman) that resides within this very body/aggregate as the immediate Self (**Pratyak-brahma**).

Conclusion: Since the student cannot perceive the Self residing within through ordinary means, and it requires scriptural instruction, this constitutes **Apūrvatā**.

The 4th Chapter of the Gita to explain **Apūrvatā**.

- **Context:** The lineage of Yoga was lost (**Yogo naṣṭaḥ parantapa**).
- **Uniqueness:** Krishna reveals the ancient knowledge again. Since it was lost and not available through other means at that time, its revelation by the Lord represents **Apūrvatā**.

4. The Fourth Liṅga: Phalam (Fruit/Result) (Page 144)

'तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये अथ सम्पत्स्ये' इति ब्रह्मज्ञानात्फलमुक्तं विदुषः । तस्य यावत्कालं देहो न विमोक्ष्यते तावदेव देहपातपर्यन्तो विलम्बः । अथ देहपातानन्तरं विद्वान् ब्रह्म सम्पत्स्यते । विदेहकैवल्यमनुभवतीत्यर्थः ।

The ṭīkā identifies the fruit of this knowledge as liberation.

Ṭīkā: **'tasya tāvadeva ciraṃ yāvanna vimokṣye atha sampatsye' (Chā. u. 6|14|2)**

Meaning: For the knower (**Viduṣaḥ**), the delay in absolute liberation is only as long as the body does not fall.

Meaning of the terms:

- **Tāvad eva ciram:** The delay is only until the body drops (**Deha-pāta-paryantaḥ vilambaḥ**).
- **Vimokṣye:** A Vedic form (**Chāndasa prayoga**) for **Vimokṣyate**.
- **Sampatsye:** A Vedic form for **Sampatsyate**.
- **Atha:** After the fall of the body (**Deha-pātānantaram**).

- The knower is already a **Jīvanmukta** (liberated while living). Upon the death of the body, they attain **Videha-kaivalyam** (bodiless absolute liberation). There is no preparation or waiting required; the process is natural, like waiting for a fruit to fall.

5. The Fifth Liṅga: Arthavāda (Eulogy/Praise)

'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य' इत्याद्यद्वितीयज्ञानार्थोऽर्थवादः ।

Arthavāda involves praise to encourage the intake of knowledge or to highlight the glory of the subject matter.

Example 1: Entry of Brahman

Ṭīkā: **Anena jīvena ātmanānupraviśya (Chā. u. 6|3|2)**

- **Explanation:** The **Sat** (Brahman) entered into the creation in the form of the individual soul (**Jīva-rūpeṇa**). This "entry" refers to Brahman becoming available in the aggregate (body/mind) as the **Cidābhāsa** (reflection of consciousness). This glorifies the human system as the locus where Brahman is realized.

Example 2: All-Knowledge (Sarva-Vijñāna)

Yenāśrutaṃ śrutaṃ bhavatyamataṃ matam avijñātaṃ vijñātam (Chā. u. 6|1|3): By which the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known.

Significance:

- This is an **Arthavāda** praising the knowledge of the One Cause.
- It does not mean one becomes omniscient in a worldly sense (knowing every specific detail of physics or chemistry).
- Implication: By knowing the Material Cause (**Upādāna kāraṇa**), one realizes that all effects (the world) are merely names and forms (Mithyā). The curiosity regarding the infinite details of the universe ceases because the substratum (Adhiṣṭhāna) is known.

6. The Sixth Liṅga: Upapatti (Reasoning)

मृदादिदृष्टान्तैः प्रकृत्यतिरेकेण विकारो नास्तीत्युपपत्तिरुक्ता ।

Upapatti refers to the logical demonstration or support provided to establish the truth.

"Yathā somya ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syāt vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttiketyeva satyam" (Chā. u. 6|1|4)

Logic Used:

- **Ṭīkā**: **Mṛdādi-dṛṣṭānte hi prakṛti-atirekeṇa vikāro nāsti:** In the example of clay, there is no modification (effect) that exists apart from or independent of the material cause (**Prakṛti**). The effect has no separate existence (**Sattā**) from the cause.

Application of Liṅgas in Other Upaniṣads

बृहदारण्यके मधुकाण्डोपसंहारवाक्यं सदात्मनो निर्विशेषत्वार्थमाह - तदेतदिति । मायाभिर्बहुरूपं तद्ब्रह्म । एतदपरोक्षम् । अपूर्वं कारणशून्यम् । अनपरं कार्यरहितम् । अनन्तरं जात्यन्तरमस्य नास्तीत्यनन्तरम् । एकरसमित्यर्थः । अबाह्यमद्वितीयम् ।

'आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्' (ऐ. उ. १ । १ । १) 'तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम्अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः' (बृ. उ. २ । ५ । १९) 'ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्' (मु. उ. २ । २ । १२) इत्यादीनि ।

The ṭīkā notes that while these six indicators (**Ṣaḍ-vidha Liṅgāni**) are visible in every Vedanta text (**Prati-vedāntam**), they may appear collectively (**Samastāni**) or individually/partially (**Vyastāni**).

A. Aitareya Upaniṣad (Upakrama/Beginning)

Bhāṣya: Ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīt nānyat kiñcana miṣat (ai. u. 1 | 1 | 1): In the beginning, verily, this was Atman alone, one only; nothing else winked/moved.

Analysis of Terms:

- **Eka:** Negates **Sajātīya Bheda** (difference within the same species).
- **Eva:** Emphasizes uniqueness.
- **Na Anyat:** Negates **Vijātīya Bheda** (difference from other species) and **Svagata Bheda** (internal difference).

B. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Upasaṃhāra of Madhu Kāṇḍa)

Bhāṣya: Tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ayam ātmā brahma sarvānubhūḥ (bṛ. u. 2 | 5 | 19)

The ṭīkā provides the definitions for these terms to show how they establish the Non-dual Brahman.

- **Apūrvam:**
  - **Definition: Pūrvam na vidyate yasya tat apūrvam.**
  - Meaning: That which has no antecedent. It is **Kāraṇa-śūnyam** (devoid of a cause).
- **Anaparam:**
  - **Definition: Aparam na vidyate yasya tat anaparam.**
  - Meaning: That which has nothing following it. It is **Kārya-rahitam** (devoid of being an effect).
- **Anantaram:**
  - **Definition: Jātyantaraṃ asya nāsti iti anantaram.**

    - Meaning: There is no different species or gap within it. It is **Ekarasam** (of one homogeneous essence).
- **Abāhyam:**
    - **Definition:** It has no exterior. This establishes it as **Advitīyam** (Non-dual).
- **Ayam:**
    - **Definition:** This term establishes **Aparokṣatvam** (Immediacy/Directness). It refers to the Self as "This" (present and direct).

Mananam: Reflections on Sādhanā

1. Stages of Sādhanā: The Progression from Gross to Subtle

Swamiji delineated the trajectory of spiritual practice (**Sādhanā**) based on the age, physical capacity, and intellectual maturity of the seeker (**Sādhaka**).

A. Physical Sādhanā (Sthūla Sādhanā)

In the initial stages, or for younger seekers (approx. 20–24 years old), the practice is predominantly physical due to the health and resilience of the body.

- **Karma Yoga:** Engaging in selfless service (**Seva**).
- **Physical Austerities (Tapas):** The young body is capable of withstanding dualities like heat and cold.
- **Pilgrimages:** Activities such as **Narmadā Parikramā**, **Cār Dhām Yātrā**, or visiting various **Tīrtha Kṣetra** (pilgrimage sites) are suitable for this stage.

B. The Role of Memorization (Kaṇṭhastha)

Concurrent with physical discipline, the younger stage is identified as the prime time for memorization.

- **Capacity of Intellect (Medhā):** In youth, the retentive power is high; whatever is heard (**Śravaṇa**) is quickly grasped (**Grahaṇa**).
- **What to Memorize:**
    - **Sūtras** (aphorisms).
    - **Lakṣaṇa Vākyas** (Definitions): Specifically, definitions regarding the elements (**Pṛthvī**, etc.) and comparisons (**Sādṛśya**).
    - **Gītā Ślokas** (Verses from the Bhagavad Gita).
    - **Prakaraṇa Grantha** (Introductory texts) verses.
- **Rationale:** Even if the capacity for deep analytical inquiry (**Vicāra**) is not yet fully developed, the capacity to memorize is at its peak. This creates a repository of knowledge for later use.

2. The Transition to Inquiry (Vicāra Pradhāna Sādhanā)

As the seeker matures, the focus shifts from the physical body to the intellect.

A. The Shift in Capability

- **Decline of Physicality:** With age, the ability or interest in rigorous physical **Tapas** decreases.
- **Rise of Intellect:** The capacity to question ("Why is it so?", "How is this?") and the ability to understand complex answers increases.
- **Vicāra:** This marks the beginning of inquiry-predominant practice.

B. Expansion of Intellectual Material

The depth of inquiry depends on the extent of one's study (**Śravaṇa**).

- **Initial Stage:** If one has only studied introductory texts like **Tattva-bodha**, the material available for contemplation is limited to the concepts within those few texts.
- **Advanced Stage:** Upon completing the **Prasthāna-traya** (The three institutes: Upaniṣads, Gītā, Brahma Sūtras) and potentially the **Bṛhat-prasthāna** (advanced dialectical texts), the "material for thought" becomes vast.

C. Comparative Reflection (Anusandhāna)

A seeker with a sharp memory (**Smaraṇa-śakti/Medhā**) and extensive study can engage in profound, mature thought (**Prauḍha Vicāra**) by cross-referencing texts:

- Comparing statements from the **Upaniṣads**.
- Correlating with **Pañcadaśī**.
- Referencing **Vivekacūḍāmaṇi** and **Upadeśa-sāhasrī**.
- Referencing **Advaita Siddhi** (phonetically referred to in text).
- **Result:** Such a seeker finds no need for physical wandering (pilgrimages), as they become established in Brahman (**Brahmaniṣṭha**) and well-versed in scriptures (**Śrotriya**).

3. Eligibility and Individual Differences (Adhikāri Bheda)

Swamiji emphasized that **Sādhanā** must be tailored to the individual's current capacity.

- **Respecting Levels:** One should not look down upon lower or different forms of practice. Capacities regarding physical endurance, intellectual digestion, and memory vary.
- **The Ultimate Goal:** The definition of **Brahma-jijñāsā** (Desire to know Brahman) implies **Vicāra** (Inquiry). Therefore, regardless of the starting point, the seeker must eventually elevate themselves to the level of inquiry.
- **Practical Limitations:**
    - A 50-year-old with health issues is unfit for rigorous pilgrimages like **Narmadā Parikramā**.
    - Conversely, a physically active person may lack the mental discipline to sit for hours in contemplation.

4. Modes of Inquiry and Teaching

There are differences between guided inquiry and independent inquiry, highlighting the difficulty of the latter.

- **Guided Inquiry:** Studying a text with the aid of **Bhāṣya** (Commentary) and **Ṭīkā** (Gloss) makes inquiry easier as the path is laid out.
- **Independent Inquiry:** Being given only a **Mantra** or **Śloka** and told to "reflect on this" is much harder. It requires the seeker to independently source material and arguments from other places, demanding a highly alert and sharp intellect (**Buddhi**).

The Challenge of Stability

Swamiji also noted the difficulty of maintaining long-term spiritual relationships (Guru-Śiṣya) essential for deep study.

- **Duration:** Deep study requires stability for long periods (e.g., 5–6 years).
- **Obstacles:** Interpersonal conflicts (**Rāga-Dveṣa**) often cause students to leave quickly.
- **Metaphor:** The text humorously quotes **Ekam evādvītīyam** ("One alone without a second") to describe a teacher left alone after students depart due to conflicts.
- **Teacher's Sadhana:** It is a difficult **Sādhanā** for a teacher to manage a student, tolerating their defects and modifications (**Vikāra**) while guiding them.

Mananam: Elaboration of Akhaṇḍārtha (Indivisible Meaning) from Pūrṇānandī Ṭīkā

The Analogy: The Brightest Light is the Moon

The ṭīkā delves deeply into the classic Vedantic analogy **prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ** ("The most excellent/brightest light is the Moon"). This analogy was previously introduced in the **Ṭīkā** to explain the concept of **akhaṇḍārtha-bodhaka** (knowledge of the indivisible/non-relational entity).

1. Analysis from Pūrṇānandī Ṭīkā

Swamiji refers to the **Pūrṇānandī Ṭīkā**, which provides an extensive elaboration on this analogy.

Hetu-garbha Viśeṣaṇa: The term **prakṛṣṭa** (excellent/brightest) is described as an adjective pregnant with reasoning (hetu-garbha).

- **Prakṛṣṭa (Excellent):** Through **lakṣaṇā** (implication), this word indicates a specific light by stating its quality of excellence (**prakarṣa**) as opposed to non-excellence (**aprakarṣa**). It functions as a distinguishing adjective (**prakāśa-viśeṣaṇa**).
- **Prakāśa (Light):** The word "light" generally denotes a universal genus. However, here, through **lakṣaṇā**, it moves from the general notation (**sāmānya-abhidhāna**) to point to a specific individual entity (**vyakti-viśeṣa**).

Sāmānādhikaraṇya (Co-referentiality):

- There is a co-referential relation between the words "Light" (**prakāśa**) and "Moon" (**candra**).
- The term **prakṛṣṭa** qualifies the light.
- Ultimately, the word "light" fulfills its meaning by pointing to the specific individual object, the Moon, where this quality resides.

Analysis from Vākyavṛtti (Rāmānandī Commentary)

The ṭīkā refers to the **Vākyavṛtti** and its commentary by **Rāmānanda Ācārya** (referred to as **Rāmānandī**), which establishes that this statement is not about relationships (**saṃsarga**) but about identity.

1. The Context of the Inquiry

In a night sky (heavenly sphere) filled with many lights/luminaries, a specific question arises. **kaḥ candra nāma?** (Which one is named the Moon?) or **kaḥ candraḥ?** (Who is the Moon?). **The Answer: prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ** (The most excellent light is the Moon).

2. Rejection of Relational Meaning (Saṃsarga)

The commentary argues that this sentence does not have a relational import

(**saṃsṛṣṭa-arthatva**).

Commentary: tatra na tāvat candrasya prakṛṣṭa-prakāśa saṃsargo'rthaḥ... na hi tatra saṃsargāṃśo jijñāsitaḥ.

Explanation: The meaning is not the connection (**saṃsarga**) between the Moon and the excellent light. The inquirer did not ask about the relationship ("What is the connection?"). The inquirer did not ask about the nature/attributes (**kīdṛśaḥ**) of the Moon. If the question were about attributes, one would ask **kīdṛśaḥ candraḥ** (What is the Moon like?). However, the question is simply **kaḥ candraḥ** (Which is the Moon?).

3. The Mimamsa of Question and Answer (Vicāra)

A subtle philosophical analysis is presented regarding how to interpret the question word **kim** (which/who) in the context of **akhaṇḍārtha**.

The Logic of Implication

Objection: One might argue that we should apply **lakṣaṇā** (implication) to the question word **kim** to mean **kīdṛśaḥ** (what kind), thereby making the answer (which describes a quality) fit the question.

Refutation: This is rejected. **Commentary: naca uttara-sāmarthyāt kiṃ-śabdasya kīdṛśa-lakṣaṇeti vācyam... uttarasya akhaṇḍārtha upapattau:** One cannot force an implied meaning on the question just to suit the answer, especially when the answer can be perfectly understood as **akhaṇḍārtha** (indivisible identity).

It is improper to say that without **lakṣaṇā** in all words, the understanding of indivisible meaning cannot occur. It is better to keep the primary meaning of the question intact ("Which is it?") rather than twisting it.

asañjāta-virodhitva mukhyārthatā aucityāt: It is appropriate to maintain the primary meaning (**mukhyārtha**) of the opening question (`kim` as "which", not "what kind") to avoid contradiction at the start (**upakrama**).

4. The Knowledge Status of the Inquirer

The text clarifies exactly what the questioner knows and does not know, which necessitates the **akhaṇḍārtha** (identity) response.

Commentary: candro nāma kaścit candra-pada-vācyaḥ candratva-jātimān candra itara-vyāvṛttaḥ... ityādikaṃ jānāmi... candraṃ paraṃ na jānāmi tameva jijñāse.

Explanation:

- **What is Known:** The inquirer knows that there is a word "Moon" (**candra-pada**), that it possesses the universal class of "Moon-ness" (**candratva-jāti**), and that it is distinct from other things (**itara-vyāvṛtta**).
- **What is Unknown:** The inquirer says, "I do not know the Moon itself (the specific object)."
- **The Desire:** "I desire to know that specific object alone" (**tameva jijñāse**). This is a

clear experience of desiring knowledge of the object itself (**candra-mātra-jñāna-jijñāsā**).

5. The Two Levels of Purport (Tātparya)

The text explains why the phrase "brightest light" is used if the only goal is to identify the Moon.

Objection: If the inquirer wants to know the object, isn't using "brightest light" (**prakṛṣṭa-prakāśa**) inappropriate?

Resolution:

Commentary: tena vinā candra ityāvatā tat-jijñāsā nivartaka bodhasya janayitum aśakyatayā... avāntara-tātparyam.

Explanation: Without using the description "brightest light," it is impossible to generate the knowledge that removes the inquirer's ignorance.

Hierarchy of Purport:

Avāntara Tātparya (Intermediate Purport): The description "brightest light" has an intermediate purpose. It serves only to distinguish the object from others (**tad-vaiśiṣṭya-bodha**).

Parama Tātparya (Supreme Purport): The ultimate intention is solely the knowledge of the Moon itself (**candra-bodha**).

Comparison: This is different from a sentence like "The blue lotus" (**nīlam utpalam**), where the redness or blueness is an attribute. Here, "brightest light" is **svarūpa-mātra** (definition of the essential nature) to identify the object, similar to how **Brahman** is defined as **Satyam Jñānam Anantam**.

6. Additional Scholarly References

Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka: Swamiji mentioned that this specific sentence (**prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ candraḥ**) is discussed in immense detail in the **Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka**.

Reference to Kāśikānanda Jī:

- A great scholar (Mahāmaṇḍaleśvara), known as **Ānanda Pañcānana** or **Kāśikānanda Jī**, wrote a preamble/message in the first volume of the **Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka**.
- This section includes a rigorous **Mīmāṃsā** (inquiry) solely on this sentence.

Conclusion: This analogy is crucial for understanding **Brahman**, as **Brahman** is also **asaṃsṛṣṭa** (unrelated/absolute), just as the meaning of the Moon in this example is non-relational.

Application to Scriptural Testimony (Śruti)

Just as the Moon analogy points to a single object, the Upanishads point to the indivisible **Brahman**.

Uniformity Across Vedas

The **Bhāṣya** establishes that all four Vedas have the same purport regarding **Brahman**.

The Four Scriptural Proofs (One from each Veda):

- **Ṛg Veda: ātmā vā idameka** …
- **Yajur Veda: tadetadbrahma ...**
- **Sāma Veda: sadeva somya ...**
- **Atharva Veda (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad): brahmaivedam amṛtaṃ purastāt brahma paścāt ...**

Textual Analysis of the Muṇḍaka Verse (Page 145)

ऋग्यजुःसामवाक्यानुक्त्वा आथर्वणवाक्यमाह - ब्रह्मैवेदमिति । यत्पुरस्तात्पूर्वदिग्वस्तुजातमिदमब्रह्मैवाविदुषां भाति तदमृतं ब्रह्मैव वस्तु इत्यर्थः । आदिपदेन 'सत्यं ज्ञानम्' इत्यादिवाक्यानि गृह्यन्ते ।

Ṭīkā: **yat purastāt pūrvadigvastujātaṃ idam abrahmaiva aviduṣāṃ bhāti tad amṛtaṃ brahmaiva vastu**

Explanation:

- **Aviduṣām (For the Ignorant):** The object seen in the East (**purastāt**) appears as **abrahmaiva** (distinctly non-Brahman).
- **Viduṣām (For the Wise):** That same "immortal" object is known to be **brahmaiva** (Brahman alone).

Refutation of Opposing Views (Pūrvapakṣa)

The text systematically addresses objections claiming **Brahman** is not the primary subject of the Vedas or is secondary to ritual action.

1. Objection: Brahman is Subordinate to Action

नन्वस्तु ब्रह्मणस्तात्पर्यविषयत्वम् , वेदान्तानां कार्यमेवार्थः किं न स्यादिति तत्राह - न चेति । वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्ये निश्चीयमाने कार्यार्थत्वं न युक्तं 'यत्परः शब्दः स शब्दार्थः' इति न्यायादित्यर्थः ।

न च तद्गतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमाने अर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता, श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात् ।

Ṭīkā: **nanu eva astu brahmaṇastātparyaviṣayatvam , vedāntānāṃ kāryamevārthaḥ kiṃ na syāt**

Pūrvapakṣa: Even if Vedanta statements have their purport in **Brahman**, why can they not be considered part of an action/ritual (**kāryam eva arthaḥ**)?

Bhāṣya Refutation: naca tadgatānāṃ padānāṃ brahma svarūpaviṣaye niścite samanvaye avagamyamāne arthāntara kalpanā yuktā śrutahāni aśrutakalpanā prasaṅgāt.

Explanation:

- If the words of the Vedanta specifically determine the nature of **Brahman** (**brahma-svarūpa-viṣaya**), it is improper to imagine a different meaning (action).
- The nature of **Brahman** has already been ascertained through the consensus (**Samanvaya**) and the indicatory marks (**Tātparya Liṅga**) of the four Vedas. When the nature of **Brahman**—which is Indivisible (**Akhaṇḍa**) and Attributeless (**Nirviśeṣa**)—is clearly understood through these words, it is not appropriate to imagine a different meaning (**Arthāntara**).
- Doing so would incur the fault of **śruta-hāni** (abandoning what is directly heard/stated) and **aśruta-kalpanā** (imagining what is not stated).
- Combining **Brahman** (Truth) and **Jagat** (World/Action) as equal realities creates **vākya-bheda** (split in sentence/purport). The **Mahā-tātparya** is Non-duality; the non-reality of the world is only an intermediate purport (**avāntara-tātparya**).

2. Objection: Vedanta as Eulogy (Arthavāda) and Connected to Action

यदुक्तमर्थवादन्यायेन वेदान्तानां कर्त्रादिस्तावकत्वमिति तत्राह - न च तेषामिति । तेषां कर्मशेषस्तावकत्वं न भाति किन्तु ज्ञानद्वारा कर्म तत्साधननाशकत्वमेव । तत्तत्र विद्याकाले कः कर्ता केन करणेन कं विषयं पश्येत् इति श्रुतेरित्यर्थः । अर्थवादानां तु स्वार्थे फलाभावात्स्तुतिलक्षणतेति भावः ।

Ṭīkā: **yad uktam arthavādanyāyena vedāntānāṃ kartrādistāvakatvam**

Pūrvapakṣa: Just as some Vedic texts praise the agent (**kartā**) or deity to encourage ritual, are Vedanta texts merely eulogies (**arthavāda**) for the agent?

Ṭīkā: **teṣāṃ karmaśeṣa stāvakatvaṃ na bhāti**.

Vedanta texts do not appear to be eulogies for the parts of karma. Instead of praising the agent, Vedanta destroys the triad of action (**kriyā**), agent (**kāraka**), and fruit (**phala**).

Ṭīkā: tatra vidyā-kāle kartā kena karaṇena kaṃ viṣayaṃ paśyet.

In the state of knowledge (**vidyā-kāle**), who is the agent? By what instrument and what object would he see? Since **Brahman** negates all these, it cannot be coordinated with action. Therefore, **Brahman** does not have the status of being subsidiary to injunctions (**Vidhi-śeṣatva**)

Conclusion: Arthavāda texts (praise) have no independent result (**phalābhāva**) and thus rely on a ritual injunction. Vedanta has an independent result (liberation), so it cannot be reduced to the same status as mere praise.

3. Objection: Brahman is Known by Other Means (Mānāntara-vedya) (Page 145)

यदुक्तं सिद्धत्वेन मानान्तरवेद्यं ब्रह्म न वेदार्थ इति तत्राह - न च परीति । 'तत्त्वमसि' इति शास्त्रमन्तरेणेति सम्बन्धः । धर्मो न वेदार्थः, साध्यत्वेन पाकवन्मानान्तरवेद्यत्वात् । यदि वेदं विना धर्मस्यानिर्णयान्न मानान्तरवेद्यता तदा ब्रह्मण्यपि तुल्यम् ।

न च परिनिष्ठितवस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः, 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. उ. ६ । ८ । ७) इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रमन्तरेणानवगम्यमानत्वात् ।

Ṭīkā: yaduktaṃ siddhatvena mānāntaravedyaṃ brahma na vedārthaḥ

Pūrvapakṣa: Brahman is an existing (**siddha**) entity. Therefore, it can be known by other means such as perception or inference (**mānāntara**). If it is known by other means, it is not the exclusive subject of the Vedas.

Bhāṣya Refutation: na pariniṣṭhita vastu svarūpatve pratyakṣādi viṣayatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ 'tattvamasi' iti brahmātma bhāvasya śāstramantareṇa anavagamyamānatvāt: Although **Brahman** is an established reality (**pariniṣṭhita vastu**), it is not an object of perception. The realization "I am Brahman" (**brahmātma-bhāva**) cannot be known without the scriptural (**śāstra**) statement **tattvamasi**

Logic (Anumāna):

- The Siddhanthin uses inference to argue: Even **Dharma** (religious duty) is not the exclusive subject of Veda. The opponent might say Dharma is known by tradition (Smṛti) and is strictly **sādhya** (to be accomplished).
- However, just as the specific nature of Dharma is not decided without Veda, **Brahman** is not decided without Veda.
- **Inference**: **dharmo na vedārthaḥ sādhyatvāt pākavat**. This is a counter-inference to show the flaw in the opponent's logic.

4. Objection: Uselessness (Niṣphalatva)

यच्चोक्तं निष्फलत्वाद्ब्रह्म न वेदार्थ इति तदनूद्य परिहरति - यत्त्वित्यादिना । रहितत्वाद्भिन्नत्वात् । ब्रह्मण इति शेषः ।

यत्तु हेयोपादेयरहितत्वादुपदेशानर्थक्यमिति, नैष दोषः; हेयोपादेयशून्यब्रह्मात्मतावगमादेव सर्वक्लेशप्रहाणात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धेः ।

Ṭīkā: niṣphalatvādbrahma na vedārtha

Pūrvapakṣa: Brahman is neither to be rejected (**heya**) nor acquired (**upādeya**). Therefore, instruction about it is fruitless/useless (**ānarthakyam**).

Bhāṣya Refutation: naiṣa doṣaḥ heyopādeya śūnya brahmātmatā avagamāt eva sarva kleśa prahāṇāt puruṣārtha siddheḥ: It is not a fault. The very knowledge of **Brahman**, which is devoid of rejection or acquisition, destroys all suffering (**kleśa**) and accomplishes the supreme human goal (**puruṣārtha**).

5. The Role of Upāsanā (Meditation) (Page 146-147)

यदप्युक्तम् - 'उपासनापरत्वं वेदान्तानाम्' इति तत्र किं प्राणपञ्चाग्न्यादिवाक्यानामुत सर्वेषामिति । तत्राद्यमङ्गीकरोति - देवतादीति । ज्येष्ठत्वादिगुणः फलं चादिशब्दार्थः । न द्वितीयः, विधिशून्यानां 'सत्यं ज्ञानम्' इत्यादीनां स्वार्थे फलवतामुपासनापरत्वकल्पनायोगात् । किञ्च तदर्थस्य ब्रह्मणस्तच्छेषत्वं ज्ञानात्प्रागूर्ध्वं वा । आद्ये, अध्यस्तगुणवतस्तस्य तच्छेषत्वेऽपि न द्वितीय इत्याह - न तु तथेति । प्राणादिदेवतावदित्यर्थः । 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' इत्येकत्वे ज्ञाते सति हेयोपादेयशून्यतया ब्रह्मात्मनः फलाभावात् , उपास्योपासकद्वैतज्ञानस्य कारणस्य नाशाच्च नोपासनाशेषत्वमित्याह - एकत्व इति । द्वैतज्ञानस्य संस्कारबलात्पुनरुदये विधानमिति नेत्याह - नहीति । दृढस्येति शेषः । भ्रान्तित्वानिश्चयो दार्ढ्यम् , संस्कारोत्थं तु भ्रान्तित्वेन निश्चितं न विधिनिमित्तम् । येनेति । उपासनायां कारणस्य सत्वेनेत्यर्थः ।

देवतादिप्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगतोपासनार्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः । न तु तथा ब्रह्मण उपासनाविधिशेषत्वं सम्भवति, एकत्वे हेयोपादेयशून्यतया क्रियाकारकादिद्वैतविज्ञानोपमर्दोपपत्तेः । न हि एकत्वविज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः सम्भवोऽस्ति येनोपासनाविधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्येत ।

Ṭīkā: **'upāsanāparatvaṃ vedāntānām' iti tatra kiṃ prāṇapañcāgnyādivākyānāmuta sarveṣāmiti**

Pūrvapakṣa: But aren't there many Vedanta texts regarding **Upāsanā** (e.g., Prāṇa, Pañcāgni)?

Siddhānta: Are you referring to specific texts like Prāṇa/Pañcāgni or all Vedanta texts?

Ṭīkā: tatrādyamaṅgīkaroti - devatādīti | jyeṣṭhatvādiguṇaḥ phalaṃ cādiśabdārthaḥ |

Siddhānta:

- We accept that texts regarding **Prāṇa** or **Pañcāgni** are for **upāsanā**.
- **Bhāṣya: devatā ādi pratipādanasya tu svavākyagata upāsanārtham na kaścit virodhaḥ**
- The description of deities or qualities (like supremacy of Prāṇa) in those specific sections is for the sake of meditation mentioned in those very sentences. This does not contradict the non-dual purport of the Vedanta sentences.

Ṭīkā: na dvitīyaḥ vidhi-śūnyānāṃ 'satyam jñānam' ityādīnāṃ svārthe phalavatām upāsanā-paratva-kalpanā-ayogāt

However, if the claim is that all Vedanta sentences are for **Upāsanā**, that is incorrect. Sentences like "**Satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma**" are devoid of injunctions (**Vidhi-śūnya**). They bear fruit in their own meaning (**Svārthe phalavatām**).

Elaboration: It is not appropriate to imagine a connection to **Upāsanā** for sentences that are capable of yielding fruit on their own. Sentences like **Arthavāda** (eulogies) may need to be connected to others because they cannot yield fruit independently. However, statements like "**Satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma**" yield fruit directly when connected with **Mahāvākyas** like "**Tattvamasi**" (realizing "That **Brahman** you are"). Therefore, there is no justification for imagining they are merely for **Upāsanā**.

The Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's Argument)

The opponent raises an objection regarding the sequence and dependency of Knowledge and Meditation.

The Context of Subordination (Śeṣatva): Previously, the discussion was about **Brahman** being a subsidiary to Ritual Action (**Karma-śeṣatvam**). Now, the discussion shifts to **Upāsanā-śeṣatvam** (Brahman being subsidiary to Meditation).

The Specific Question:

Ṭīkā: kiñca tadarthasya brahmaṇastaccheṣatvaṃ jñānātprāgūrdhvaṃ vā |

Meaning: Is the meditation on **Brahman** to be performed before (**prāk**) the knowledge arises, or after (**ūrdhvam**) the knowledge?

Connection to Manana and Nididhyāsana:

- The opponent argues that since texts mention **Manana** (reflection) and **Nididhyāsana** (contemplation) alongside hearing (**Śravaṇa**), these should be treated as **Upāsanā**.
- Therefore, they argue one must continue meditation even after gaining knowledge.

Definition of "Knowledge" in this Context

It should be clarified that "Knowledge" here does not mean mere intellectual understanding gained from introductory texts like Tattvabodha.

- **True Knowledge:** A firm conviction that "I am **Brahman**, the world is **Mithyā**."
- **Before this Stage: Manana**, **Nididhyāsana**, and necessary **Upāsanā** are required.
- **The Core Issue:** Does a realized person need to meditate?

The Nature of the Object of Meditation
Ṭīkā: ādye, adhyastaguṇavatastasya tat śeṣatve

The text distinguishes between **Brahman** as an object of meditation and **Brahman** as the non-dual Self.

- In the first alternative, we accept but if **Upāsanā** is to be performed, it requires a **Brahman** endowed with superimposed qualities (**adhyasta-guṇa**). Such a **Brahman** (with qualities) can be the content of meditation. However, Knowledge reveals **Brahman** without qualities. Therefore, the **Brahman** revealed by knowledge cannot be the subsidiary of a meditation injunction after knowledge has occurred.

Reconciliation of Deities in Vedanta Texts
The opponent might argue that Vedanta texts do mention deities and meditations.

Bhāṣya: devatā-pratipādanasya tu sva-vākyagata-upāsanārthatve'pi na kaścit virodhaḥ

There is no contradiction if texts mention deities (like Prāṇa) or specific meditations (e.g., **Pañcāgni-vidyā**, **Dahara-vidyā**). These mentions are for specific meditations found within their own respective sentences/sections (**sva-vākyagata**).

Conclusion: They are valid in their specific contexts but this does not prove that **Nirguṇa Brahma-jñāna** is subsidiary to meditation.

Why Knowledge Cannot Be Subsidiary to Meditation
This is the **Siddhānta** (conclusive) view explaining the impossibility of action/meditation after realization.

Bhāṣya: na tu tathā brahmaṇaḥ upāsanā-vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ saṃbhavati, ekatve-heyopādeya-śūnyatayā kriyā-kāraka-ādi-dvaita-vijñāna-upamardopapatteḥ

Key Reasoning:

- **Ekatva: Brahman** is One.
- **Heyopādeya-śūnyatayā: Brahman** is devoid of anything to be rejected (**heya**) or accepted (**upādeya**).
- **Upamardana:** This knowledge destroys (**mṛdnāti**) the dualistic understanding of Action (**Kriyā**), Doer/Instrument (**Kāraka**), and Result.
- **Implication:** Once the "Doer" (who is part of duality) is dissolved by knowledge, who remains to perform the meditation?

Reference to Naishkarmya Siddhi
Sureshvaracharya's Naishkarmya Siddhi (Chapter 1, Verse 67) may be a source for this line of argument.

सकृत् प्रवृत्त्या मृद्नाति क्रियाकारकरूपभृत् |
अज्ञानमागमज्ञानं साङ्गत्यं नास्त्यतोऽनयोः || नै.सि. १.६७ ||

sakṛt pravṛttyā mṛdnāti kriyākārakarūpabhṛt |
ajñānamāgamajñānaṃ sāṅgtyaṃ nāstyato'nayoḥ || nai.si. 1.67 ||

- **Meaning:** Knowledge, having arisen once (**sakṛt-pravṛttyā**), destroys the ignorance (**ajñāna**) which takes the form of action and the doer.
- **Logic:** Ignorance sustains the idea of "I am the doer." Knowledge destroys Ignorance. Therefore, Knowledge destroys the very foundation of action/meditation.

Ṭīkā: prāṇādi-devatāvat ityarthaḥ. "aham brahmāsmi" iti ekatva jñāte sati heyopādeya-śūnyatayā brahmātmanaḥ phalābhāvāt, upāsya-upāsaka-dvaita-jñānasya kāraṇasya nāśāt ca na upāsanā-śeṣatvam

- **Comparison:** Unlike the meditation on deities like Prāṇa (which assumes duality), **Brahma-jñāna** reveals Oneness.
- **Phalābhāvāt:** There is no other fruit to be gained; the Self is the limit.
- **Causal Destruction:** The cause of the duality between "The Worshipper" (**Upāsaka**) and "The Worshipped" (**Upāsya**) is **Ajñāna** (Ignorance).
- **Conclusion:** Since Knowledge destroys the cause (**Ajñāna**), the effect (Meditation) cannot continue.

The Argument of Lingering Impressions (Saṃskāra)
Ṭīkā: dvaitajñānasya saṃskārabalāt punarudaye vidhānamiti na iti āha

The Pūrvapakṣa returns with a practical objection regarding the persistence of duality.

The Objection:

- **Argument:** Even after Knowledge, the **Saṃskāra** (impressions) of duality are strong. One might still feel anger, hunger, or physical pain. Duality seems to rise again (**punarudaya**).
- **Proposal:** Therefore, scripture must enjoin **Upāsanā** (like repeating "Aham Brahmāsmi" or other rituals) to suppress these returning impressions.

Siddhānta: Upāsanā to Increase the Qualification (Practical Application):

- The text discusses a scenario where a student claims knowledge ("I have studied Tattvabodha, I am **Brahman**") but acts without discipline.
- Such students may refuse Vedic karma (having renounced) and worldly work (being monks), yet their minds are restless (vikṣipta).
- A teacher might assign them **Upāsanā** or service (Sewa) not because Knowledge needs it, but because the student's qualification (**Adhikāritva**) is immature. They lack **Vāsanākṣaya** (exhaustion of desires) and **Manonāśa** (dissolution of the mind).
- This prescription is due to the lack of firm knowledge, not a requirement for knowledge.

Siddhānta: The Impossibility of True Duality Returning
The Vedantin rejects the idea that a true Knower is bound by these impressions.

Bhāṣya: ekatva-vijñānena-unmathitasya dvaita-vijñānasya punaḥ saṃbhavaḥ na asti:
The knowledge of Oneness completely churns/uproots (**unmathita**) dualistic knowledge. Its re-emergence is impossible.

Ṭīkā: dṛḍhasyeti śeṣaḥ | bhrāntitvāniścayo dārḍhyam , saṃskārotthaṃ tu bhrāntitvena niścitaṃ na vidhinimittam |

The Concept of Dṛḍha (Firm):

- **Objection:** The opponent claims dualistic impressions are "firm" (**dṛḍha**).
- **Resolution:** For a Knower, even if duality appears (like a mirage), it is known to be false (**Mithyā**).

- **Explanation:** When the impression is determined to be an illusion (**bhrāntitva**), it cannot be the basis for a scriptural injunction (**vidhi**). You cannot command someone to interact with what they know to be a mirage.

Logical Analysis: Validity of Texts Without Action (Page 148)

वेदप्रामाण्यस्य व्यापकं क्रीयार्थकत्वमनुवदति - यद्यपीति । कर्मकाण्डेऽर्थवादादीनामित्यर्थः । तथा च व्यापकाभावाद्वेदान्तेषु व्याप्याभावानुमानमिति भावः । वेदान्ता न स्वार्थे मानम् , अक्रियार्थत्वात् 'सोऽरोदीत्' इत्यादिवदित्यनुमाने निष्फलार्थकत्वमुपाधिरित्याह - तथापीति ।

यद्यप्यन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम् , तथाप्यात्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वान्न तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम् ।

A logical argument is taken up regarding the validity of the Vedas.

Pūrvapakṣa Logic (Inference/Anumāna):

Ṭīkā: Vedāntā na svārthe mānam, akriyārthatvāt

Vedānta is not a valid means of knowledge (**mānam/pramāṇa**) regarding its own subject because it does not pertain to action (**akriyārthatvāt**). It lacks any verb denoting action.

Example: So'rodīt ("He wept"): This sentence is purely descriptive and prescribes no action; therefore, it has no independent validity.

- **Premise:** Vedic authority is always connected to Action (**Kriyā**).
- **Ṭīkā: vedaprāmāṇyasya vyāpakaṃ kriyārthakatvam**
- **The Inference:**
    - **Vyāpaka** (Pervader): Action-orientation (**Kriyārthakatvam**).
    - **Vyāpya** (Pervaded): Validity (**Prāmāṇyam**).
    - **Argument:** Wherever there is Validity, there is Action. Vedanta has no Action. Therefore, Vedanta has no Validity.
- Like the sentence so'rodīt ("He cried"). This is an **Arthavāda** (eulogy/condemnation) and has no independent validity because it prescribes no action.

Siddhānta's Refutation (The Upādhi):

- The Vedantin argues that the Inference is flawed due to an **Upādhi** (a limiting condition that invalidates the inference).
- **The Upādhi: Niṣphalārthakam** (Fruitlessness).
- **Explanation:**
    - Texts like so'rodīt are invalid not because they lack action, but because they lack fruit (**Phala**) on their own.
    - **Vedanta:** While it lacks action (**akriyārtha**), it possesses a definite Fruit (**Phala**), which is Liberation (**Mokṣa**).

- **Conclusion:** Because the inference is conditional (**sopādhika**), the reason (**hetu**) fails to prove the proposition (**sādhya**). Therefore, the lack of action does not invalidate Vedanta.

Logical Structure of the Refutation: To understand the flaw, one must define **Upādhi**:

Definition: Sādhya vyāpakatve sati sādhana avyāpakatvam

- It must be pervasive where the Sādhya (what is to be proved) exists.
- It must not be pervasive where the Sādhana/Hetu (the reason) exists.

Applying the Logic:

1. **Dṛṣṭānta (Example - Arthavāda):**
   - Here, there is **akriyārthatvam** (no action) and **svārthe aprāmāṇyam** (invalidity).
   - Here, the **Upādhi** (Fruitlessness) is present. Where there is invalidity, there is fruitlessness.
2. **Pakṣa (Subject - Vedānta):**
   - **Sādhana Avyāpakatva (Non-pervasion of the reason):**
     - Vedānta has **akriyārthatvam** (it is actionless).
     - However, Vedānta does not have **niṣphalārthakatvam** (fruitlessness).
     - Therefore, the condition (fruitlessness) is not present in the subject (Vedānta), even though the reason (actionlessness) is.
   - **Conclusion:** Just because Vedānta is actionless does not mean it is invalid. The invalidity in **Arthavāda** arises from fruitlessness, not merely from the lack of action.

Analogies from Nyāya Bodhinī

To clarify the logical structure, examples from the Nyāya Bodhinī are recalled.

- **Example 1 (Violence): kratvantarvartinī hiṃsā adharma janikā** (Violence within a sacrifice generates adharma).
  - Upādhi: **Niṣiddhatvam** (Being prohibited).
  - Explanation: Ordinary violence is prohibited (**na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni**), hence it generates adharma. However, ritual violence (e.g., **paśunā yajeta**) is enjoined (**vidhi**), so it is not prohibited. Therefore, the inference fails because the condition "prohibitedness" is absent in ritual violence.
- **Example 2 (Perception of Air): Vāyuḥ pratyakṣaḥ pratyakṣa-sparśāśrayatvāt** (Air is perceptible because it has touch).
  - Upādhi: **Udbhūta-rūpavattvam** (Possession of manifest color).
  - Explanation: For a substance to be visually perceptible, it needs color. Air lacks color, so the inference fails.
- **Example 3 (Destruction): Dhaṃso vināśī janyatvāt** (Destruction is perishable because it is created).
  - Upādhi: **Bhāvatvam** (Positive existence).

- Explanation: Only created positive entities are perishable. Destruction (**dhaṃsa**) is negative (**abhāva**) and endless.

The Fruitfulness of Self-Knowledge

अर्थवादानां निष्फलस्वार्थामानत्वेऽपीत्यर्थः । तद्विषयस्य तत्करणस्य । स्वार्थे ब्रह्मात्मनीति शेषः ।

The **Siddhānta** reinforces that Vedānta is not fruitless.

Bhāṣya: Tathāpi ātma-vijñānasya phala-paryantatvāt na tad-viṣayasya śāstrasya prāmāṇyaṃ śakyaṃ pratyākhyātum: Self-knowledge culminates in a specific result (liberation/mokṣa). Since the knowledge produces a result, one cannot refute the validity of the scripture regarding its subject (**tad-viṣayasya**).

Clarification on "Tad-viṣayasya":

- **Ṭīkā: arthavādānāṃ niṣphalasvārthāmānatve'pītyarthaḥ | tadviṣayasya tatkaraṇasya |** The commentary interprets "subject" here as **Tat-karaṇasya** (Its instrument). One cannot refute the validity of the Scripture, which is the instrument (**karaṇa**) for realizing Brahman.

Validity Does Not Depend on Action (Page 149)

सफलज्ञानकरणत्वेन वेदान्तानां स्वार्थे मानत्वसिद्धेर्न क्रियार्थकत्वं तद्व्यापकमिति भावः । ननु माभूद्वेदप्रामाण्यस्य व्यापकं क्रियार्थकत्वम् , व्याप्यं तु भविष्यति, तदभावाद्वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यं दुर्ज्ञानमिति, नेत्याह - न चेति ।

The discussion moves to the definition of validity itself.

Ṭīkā: Saphala-jñāna-karaṇatvena vedāntānāṃ svārthe mānatva-siddhe na kriyārthakatvaṃ tad-vyāpakam iti bhāvaḥ

Since Vedānta is proven to be a valid means of knowledge regarding its own subject by virtue of being the instrument for fruitful knowledge (**saphala-jñāna**), "pertaining to action" (**kriyārthakatva**) is not a necessary condition (**vyāpaka**) for validity.

The Opponent's Counter: Ṭīkā: nanu mā bhūt vedaprāmāṇyasya vyāpakaṃ kriyārthakatvam , vyāpyaṃ tu bhaviṣyati, tad abhāvāt vedāntānāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ durjñānam

The opponent suggests that perhaps "pertaining to action" is a pervaded factor (**vyāpya**)—meaning wherever there is validity, there must be action.

Siddhānta’s Rejection:

येन वेदप्रामाण्यं स्वस्यानुमानगम्यत्वेनान्यत्र क्वचिद्दृष्टं दृष्टान्तमपेक्षेत तदेव नास्तीत्यर्थः । चक्षुरादिवद्वेदस्य स्वतःप्रामाण्यज्ञानान्न तद्व्याप्तिलिङ्गाद्यपेक्षा । प्रामाण्यसंशये तु फलवदज्ञाताबाधितार्थतात्पर्यात्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो न क्रियार्थत्वेन । कूपे पतेदिति वाक्ये व्यभिचारादिति भावः ।

Ṭīkā: yena vedaprāmāṇyaṃ svasyānumānagamyatvenānyatra kvaciddṛṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭāntamapekṣeta tadeva nāstītyarthaḥ | cakṣurādivadvedasya svataḥprāmāṇyajñānānna tadvyāptiliṅgādyapekṣā | prāmāṇyasaṃśaye tu phalavadajñātābādhitārthatātparyātprāmāṇyaniścayo na kriyārthatvena | kūpe patediti vākye vyabhicārāditi bhāvaḥ |

The text asserts that scriptural validity is intrinsic, not inferred.

Siddhānta: Na ca anumāna-gamyaṃ śāstra-prāmāṇyam yena anyatra dṛṣṭaṃ nidarśanam apekṣyeta: Scriptural validity is not known through inference (**anumāna**). If it were, it would require an external example (**nidarśana/dṛṣṭānta**), leading to infinite regress or lack of parallel.

There is no other example where the self-validity of the Veda is seen through inference.

Analogy: Cakṣurādivat (Like the eyes, etc.). Just as the eye is self-valid in revealing color (e.g., "This cloth is yellow") without needing logical proof, the Veda is **svataḥ pramāṇa** (self-valid) in revealing its subject. This opposes the Logicians (Tārkikas) who believe in extrinsic validity (**parataḥ prāmāṇya**).

If validity depended strictly on action, then a sentence like **Kūpe patet** ("Fall into the well") would be valid because it commands an action. However, it is not valid because it leads to harm.

True Definition of Validity: Validity depends on:

- **Phalavat**: Fruitfulness
- **Ajñāta-jñāpakam**: Revealing the unknown
- **Abādhita-artha-tātparyam**: Purporting a subject that is not contradicted
- **Conclusion: Vidhi vākya** (injunctions) are valid because they meet these criteria, not just because they command action. Vedānta sentences also meet these criteria; thus, their validity is equal (**tulyam**).

Final Conclusion of First Varṇaka:

वर्णकार्थमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति । समन्वयादित्यर्थः । विधिवाक्यानामपि फलवदज्ञातार्थत्वेन प्रामाण्यं तत्तुल्यं वेदान्तानामपीति स्थितम् ।

तस्मात्सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वम् ॥

Bhāṣya: tasmātsiddhaṃ brahmaṇaḥ śāstrapramāṇakatvam ||

Ṭīkā: varṇakārthamupasaṃharati - tasmāditi | samanvayādityarthaḥ |

Therefore, it is established that Scripture is the valid means of knowledge for Brahman. This explains the word **Samanvayāt** in the sutra.

Ṭīkā: vidhi vākyānām api phalavat ajñāta arthatvena prāmāṇyam tat tulyam vedāntānām: Since Vedānta sentences fulfill the criteria of being fruitful, revealing the unknown, and being uncontradicted, their validity is equal (**tulyam**) to that of injunctions.

Introduction to the Second Varṇaka (Vṛttikāra Matam)

The text begins the second interpretation (**Varṇaka**) of the Sutra, addressing the views of the **Vṛttikāra** (Commentators like those influencing the Prābhākara school).

Refutation of the Previous Opponent (Nāstika/Atheist) (Page 150)

एवं पदानां सिद्धेऽर्थे व्युत्पत्तिमिच्छतां ब्रह्मनास्तिकानां मतम् , ब्रह्मणो मानान्तरायोग्यत्वात् , सफलत्वाच्च वेदान्तैकमेयत्वमित्युक्त्या निरस्तम् । सम्प्रति सर्वेषां पदानां कार्यान्वितार्थे शक्तिमिच्छतां विधिशेषत्वेन प्रत्यग्ब्रह्म वेदान्तैर्बोध्यते न स्वातन्त्र्येणेति वदतां वृत्तिकाराणां मतनिरासाय सूत्रस्य वर्णकान्तरमारभ्यते । तत्र वेदान्ताः किमुपासनाविधिशेषत्वेन ब्रह्म बोधयन्ति उत स्वातन्त्र्येणेति सिद्धे व्युत्पत्त्यभावभावाभ्यां संशये पूर्वपक्षमाह - अत्रापर इति ।

अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते — यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म, तथापि प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते ।

Before introducing the new opponent, the text briefly summarizes the defeat of the previous view regarding "Established Entities" (**Siddha-artha**).

Ṭīkā: evaṃ padānāṃ siddhe'rthe vyutpattimicchatāṃ brahmanāstikānāṃ matam , brahmaṇo mānāntarāyogyatvāt , saphalatvācca vedāntaikameyatvamityuktyā nirastam |

The Rejected View: Some argue that words do not have power (**vyutpatti**) in established facts (**siddha-artha**) unless connected to an action. Therefore, since Brahman is a "siddha" object (already existing) and not an action, they claim it cannot be the subject of valid scriptural knowledge.

The Resolution: This view is refuted because Brahman is:

- **Mānāntara-ayogyatvāt**: Not knowable by other means of knowledge (perception, inference, etc.).
- **Saphalatvāt**: The knowledge of Brahman yields a result (liberation).

Therefore, Vedānta is the unique means of knowing Brahman.

The New Opponent: The Vṛttikāra

The discussion now shifts to a new opponent, the **Vṛttikāra** (ancient commentators like Bhartṛprapañca or those influencing the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school).

The Vṛttikāra's Position:

- They accept the Veda but hold the theory of **Kāryānvita-śakti** (Words have power only when connected to a task/action).
- They argue that Vedānta does not reveal Brahman independently (**svātantryeṇa**).
- Instead, Vedānta reveals Brahman only as subservient (**śeṣa**) to an injunction for meditation (**Upāsanā-vidhi**).

Ṭīkā: samprati sarveṣāṃ padānāṃ kāryānvitārthe śaktimicchatāṃ vidhiśeṣatvena pratyagbrahma vedāntairbodhyate na svātantryeṇeti vadatāṃ vṛttikārāṇāṃ matanirāsāya sūtrasya varṇakāntaramārabhyate |

To refute the **Vṛttikāra** view—which claims that all words derive their power only through connection with a task (**kārya**)—this new section of the Sūtra is commenced.

The Central Doubt (Saṃśaya)

Question: Ṭīkā: Tatra vedāntāḥ kim upāsanā-vidhi-śeṣatvena brahma bodhayanti uta svātantryeṇa: Do Vedānta sentences teach Brahman merely as a detail required for an injunction of meditation, or do they teach Brahman independently?

Basis of Doubt: This stems from the debate on Vyutpatti (linguistic derivation/power).

- Does word power exist in Siddha-artha (established facts)?
- Or is it absent (meaning words only function in the context of action)?

The Pūrvapakṣa (Opponent's Argument)

ब्रह्मणो वेदान्तवेद्यत्वोक्तौ वृत्तिकाराः पूर्वपक्षयन्तीत्यर्थः । उपासनातो मुक्तिः पूर्वपक्षे, तत्त्वज्ञानादेवेति सिद्धान्ते फलम् । विधिर्नियोगः तस्य विषयः प्रतिपत्तिरुपासना । अस्याः को विषय इत्याकाङ्क्षायां सत्यादिवाक्यैर्विधिपरैरेव ब्रह्मसमर्प्यत इत्याह - प्रतिपत्तीति ।

The **Vṛttikāra** (acting as the Pūrvapakṣa) presents their case against the independent validity of Vedānta.

1. The Argument against Independent Knowledge

Bhāṣya: atrāpare pratyavatiṣṭhante — yadyapi śāstrapramāṇakaṃ brahma, tathāpi pratipattividhiviṣayatayaiva śāstreṇa brahma samarpyate |

Ṭīkā: brahmaṇo vedānta-vedyatva uktau vṛttikārāḥ pūrvapakṣyantī: Against the statement that Brahman is known by Vedānta, "others" (**apare** - referring to Vṛttikāra) stand in opposition (**pratyavatiṣṭhate**).

Ṭīkā: upāsanāto muktiḥ pūrvapakṣe, tattvajñānādeveti siddhānte phalam |

- The opponent believes liberation is achieved through **Upāsanā** (meditation/action), not merely by knowledge of the Reality (**Tattva-jñāna**).
- This is not just a textual debate but a practical one. The Siddhānta insists on **Tattva-jñānād-eva muktiḥ** (Liberation is by knowledge alone), rejecting the idea that one must perform meditation after knowledge to gain liberation.

2. Redefining Terms: Pratipatti as Upāsanā

The opponent interprets specific terms to suit the Action-oriented view.

Ṭīkā: vidhiḥ niyogaḥ tasya viṣayaḥ pratipattiḥ upāsanā

- **Vidhi:** Is the **Niyoga** (the command/injunction).
- **Pratipatti:** In this context, it implies **Upāsanā** (Meditation/Action), not just cognitive knowledge.
- The injunction commands meditation.
- The Role of Brahman in this View:
    - **Inquiry: Ṭīkā: Asyāḥ ko viṣaya iti ākāṅkṣāyām...** (What is the object of this meditation?)
    - **Answer: Ṭīkā: Satyādi vākyaiḥ vidhi-paraiḥ eva brahma samarpayate| vidhiviṣayapratipattiviṣayatayetyarthaḥ |**: Sentences like Satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma do not exist to reveal Brahman as an independent reality. They exist solely to supply the **object** (Brahma) required by the meditation injunction.

The Linguistic Theory (Logic of Language Learning) (Page 151)

विधिपराद्वाक्यात्तच्छेषलाभे दृष्टान्तमाह - यथेति । 'यूपे पशुं बध्नाति' 'आहवनीये जुहोति' 'इन्द्रं यजेत' इति विधिषु के यूपादय इत्याकाङ्क्षायां 'यूपं तक्षति, अष्टाश्रीकरोति' इति तक्षणादिसंस्कृतं दारु यूपः । 'अग्नीनादधीत' इत्याधानसंस्कृतोऽग्निराहवनीयः । 'वज्रहस्तः पुरन्दरः' इति विधिपरैरेव वाक्यैः समर्प्यन्ते तद्वद्ब्रह्मेत्यर्थः ।

The text briefly touches upon the Prābhākara/Vṛttikāra theory of language acquisition to support their view.

Analogy: A child learns language through commands like "Bring the pot" (**Ghaṭam ānaya**) or "Bring the water."

- The child understands "Pot" because it is connected to the action of "bringing."
- If someone says "The pot exists" (**Ghaṭo'sti**) or "The Himalayas exist," the child (in this theory) understands nothing because there is no action involved.
- **Conclusion:** Words have power only in **Kāryānvita** (Action-connected) meanings. Therefore, Brahman (a static entity) cannot be understood unless connected to the action of meditation.

To prove that Scriptural objects can be subservient to action, the opponent provides examples of "Alaukika" (Supernatural/Scriptural) entities.

1. Examples: Yūpa and Āhavanīya

Bhāṣya: yathā yūpāhavanīyādīni alaukikāni vidhi-śeṣatayā śāstreṇa samaspyante tadvat: Just as the **Yūpa** (sacrificial post) and **Āhavanīya** (consecrated fire) are supernatural entities known only through scripture, they are not revealed for their own sake. They are revealed only as accessories (**śeṣa**) to fulfill a ritual injunction.

2. Detailed Breakdown of the Analogy

Ṭīkā: 'yūpe paśuṃ badhnāti' 'āhavanīye juhoti' 'indraṃ yajeta' iti vidhiṣu ke yūpādaya ityākāṅkṣāyāṃ 'yūpaṃ takṣati, aṣṭāśrīkaroti' iti takṣaṇādisaṃskṛtaṃ dāru yūpaḥ |

Yūpa (Sacrificial Post):

- Scripture defines it: **Yūpam takṣati** (He carves the Yūpa), **Aṣṭāśriṃ karoti** (He makes it eight-cornered).
- **Yūpe paśuṃ badhnāti** (He ties the animal to the Yūpa).
- The definition of the Yūpa exists only so the ritual of tying the animal can happen.

Āhavanīya (Fire):

- **Āhavanīye juhoti** (He offers oblation in the Āhavanīya fire).
- The specific fire is defined only for the sake of the offering.

Vajrahasta Purandara (Indra):

- Deities are described (e.g., Indra with a thunderbolt) not to know the deity, but to visualize them during the sacrifice (**Indraṃ yajeta**).

3. Application to Brahman

Bhāṣya: Tathāpi pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayaiva śāstraṃ brahma samarpayate.

- Even if we accept that Scripture is the proof for Brahman, the opponent argues that Scripture reveals Brahman **only** as the object required for the injunction of meditation (**Pratipatti-vidhi-viṣaya**).
- Just as one asks "What is a Yūpa?" to perform the sacrifice, one asks "What is Brahman?" only to perform the meditation.

The Objection Regarding Vākya Bheda (Sentence Split) (Page 151)

विधिपरवाक्यस्यापि अन्यार्थबोधित्वे वाक्यभेदः स्यादिति शङ्कानिरासार्थमपिशब्दः । मानान्तराज्ञातान्यपि शेषतयोच्यन्ते न प्रधानत्वेनेति न वाक्यभेदः । प्रधानार्थभेदस्यैव वाक्यभेदकत्वादिति भावः ।

The text moves into a technical discussion regarding the defect of **Vākya Bheda** (split in the sentence). The **Siddhāntin** raises an objection to the **Pūrvapakṣa**'s claim that sentences pertaining to **Brahman** are merely supplementary to injunctions (**Vidhi**).

The Objection (Siddhānta Śaṅkā)

A scriptural sentence is intended to be enjoined with an action (**Vidhi**). If it is also interpreted to reveal a distinct entity (like **Brahman**), does this not result in a split in the sentence's purport?

Ṭīkā: vidhipara vākyasya api anyārtha bodhitve vākya bhedaḥ syāt

- **Explanation:** The objection is thus: "You (**Pūrvapaṣa**) say that a scriptural sentence is **Vidhi Para** (meant for injunction) and, you also say it connects to **Brahman** (a distinct entity). If a single sentence intended for a specific action also conveys a different meaning (**Anyārthabodhitve**), there will be **Vākya Bheda**."

- **The Dilemma:** A single sentence cannot have two independent primary purposes. If it tries to command an act and independently reveal an object, the sentence splits, rendering it invalid.

The Pūrvapakṣa's Resolution: Rejection of Vākya Bheda

The **Pūrvapakṣa** refutes this objection by clarifying the relationship between the injunction (**Vidhi**) and the object (**Brahman**). The key argument is based on the distinction of primary (**Pradhāna**) and subsidiary (**Śeṣa**).

1. The Argument of Subordination

Ṭīkā: mānāntara-ajñātāni api śeṣatayā ucyante na pradhānatvena iti na vākya bhedaḥ

- **Explanation:** The **Pūrvapakṣa** argues that **Vākya Bheda** only occurs if there are two primary loci. However, here **Brahman** is not the primary locus (**Pradhāna**).
    - Sentences related to **Brahman** are spoken as subsidiary (**Śeṣa**) to the injunction.
    - The injunction (**Vidhi**) remains the sole locus (**Pradhāna)**.
    - Therefore, since the secondary meaning subserviently supports the injunction, there is no split in the sentence.

2. The Analogy of Supernatural Objects (Alaukika)

The example of sentences with secondary loci is given by the **Pūrvapakṣa -** pertaining to Vedic ritual hence unworldly items - sacrificial post (**Yūpa**) and consecrated altar (**Āhavanīya**) - to illustrate the secondariness of the other locus in a sentence with seemingly two loci.

Context: Words like sacrificial post (**Yūpa**) are Alaukika (scriptural hence unwordly). They are not used in common worldly interactions.

The Process:

- A person hearing these terms has an expectancy (**Ākāṅkṣā**): "What is a **Yūpa**?" or "What is **Āhavanīya**?"
- The scripture provides a description. For the **Yūpa**: "Yūpaṃ takṣati aṣṭāśrīkaroti" ("One chisels the Yūpa; one makes it octagonal").
- **Key Point:** This description is not for the sake of knowing the **Yūpa** as an independent object. It is described so it can be connected to the ritual action: "Yūpe paśuṃ badhnāti" ("He ties the animal to the Yūpa").

Application to Brahman: Similarly, **Brahman** is "Alaukika" (not of the world). Scripture describes **Brahman** only so it can be connected to the **Vidhi** (injunction) of meditation. Just as the **Yūpa** is for the sacrifice, **Brahman** is for the **Upāsanā**.

The Epistemological Clarification: Mānāntara Ajñāta

A deeper philosophical point is raised regarding objects not known by other means of knowledge (**Mānāntara**).

Ṭīkā: mānāntara-ajñātāni api śeṣatayā ucyante

- **Mānāntara Ajñāta** refers to objects that cannot be known through perception or inference (e.g., **Indra**, **Āhavanīya Agni**, or **Brahman**).
- Just because the meaning of these objects are unknown by other means (due to being revealed only by scripture), they do not automatically become the main purport (**Pradhāna**) of the scripture.
- They are revealed solely to function as subsidiaries (**Śeṣa**) to the injunction. They fulfill their purpose by serving the **Vidhi**.

Definition of Vākya Bheda (The Rule)

The text provides a precise definition of when **Vākya Bheda** actually occurs to show why it does not apply here.

Ṭīkā: pradhānārtha bhedasya eva vākya bhedakatvāt

- **Vākya Bheda** is caused by a difference in primary meanings (**Pradhānārtha Bheda**) only.
- **Explanation:**
    - If a text has two primary purposes—(1) It establishes an action (**Vidhi**) as **Pradhāna**, AND (2) It establishes an established object (**Siddha Vastu**) as **Pradhāna**—then there is a split.
    - However, if one is primary (**Pradhāna**) and the other is its Subsidiary (**Aṅga**), there is no split.
- Since the **Pūrvapakṣa** claims **Brahman** is merely a subsidiary of the injunction to meditate, they claim to escape the defect of **Vākya Bheda**.

The Siddhānta's Objection: Ṣaḍvidha Liṅga

ननूक्तषड्विधलिङ्गैस्तात्पर्यविषयस्य ब्रह्मणः कुतो विधिशेषत्वमिति शङ्कते - कुत इति ।

कुत एतत् ? प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य ।

The text introduces a specific objection raised by the **Siddhānta** (Vedantin) against the **Pūrvapakṣa**'s claim that **Brahman** is merely subsidiary to an injunction.

Siddhāntin's Argument: the import of the scriptures is determined by the six indicators of meaning **Ṣaḍvidha Liṅga**.

Siddhānta Question

Ṭīkā: nanu ukta ṣaḍvidhaliṅgaiḥ tātparyaviṣayasya brahmaṇaḥ kuto vidhiśeṣatvam iti śaṅkate

- Since **Brahman** is ascertained as the primary subject matter through the **Ṣaḍvidha Liṅga**, how can it be considered subsidiary to an injunction (**Vidhi Śeṣa**)? On the strength of the meaning indicators, **Brahman** establishes itself as the independent subject.
- **Nature of the Objection:** This is a doubt raised by the **Siddhāntin** because it is **Siddhānta** that utilizes the **Ṣaḍvidha Liṅga** to determine purport. The **Pūrvapakṣa** does not rely on these marks.

The Pūrvapakṣa's Refutation: Reliance on Vṛddha Vyavahāra

वृद्धव्यवहारेण हि शास्त्रतात्पर्यनिश्चयः । वृद्धव्यवहारे च श्रोतुः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती उद्दिश्यापूर्वप्रयोगो दृश्यते ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** rejects the six indicators, instead choosing to establish the meaning of words and scripture through the behavior of elderly seniors (**Vṛddha Vyavahāra**).

The Basis of Word Meaning: The **Pūrvapakṣa** argues that the determination of scriptural purport is not through the six indicators but through the observation of usage in daily life, specifically how words connect to actions.

Ṭīkā: vṛddha vyavahāreṇa hi śāstra tātparya niścayaḥ

- The determination of the purport of the **Śāstra** is indeed through **Vṛddha Vyavahāra**.
- **Vṛddha Vyavahāra** means the actions (**Vyavahāra**) of elderly seniors. It is the process by which meaning is comprehended by observation of those who know better..

Ṭīkā: vṛddhavyavahāre ca śrotuḥ pravṛttinivṛttī uddiśya āptaprayogo dṛśyate

- In the behavior of elders, the usage of words by a trustworthy person (**Āpta**) is seen with the objective of either engaging in said behaviour of (**Pravṛtti**) or deciding to not engage in said behaviour (**Nivṛtti**).
- There is a variant reading in some editions of the **Ṭīkā**. Instead of **āpta**, the word **apūrva** is found.
    - **apūrva prayogo dṛśyate**: Here, **Apūrva** refers to a unique action referred to in the Injunction (**Vidhi**).
    - Whether the reading is **āpta** or **apūrva**, the implication is that the behaviour governs the listener's action.

Mechanism of Action: How does the listener act or desist? It happens solely through the verbal behavior (**Vāk Vyavahāra**) of the elderly.

Application to Scripture: The Purpose of Veda

अतः शास्त्रस्यापि ते एव प्रयोजने । ते च कार्यज्ञानजन्ये इति कार्यपरत्वं शास्त्रस्य । ततः कार्यशेषत्वं ब्रह्मण इत्याह - प्रवृत्तीति ।

Based on the logic of **Vṛddha Vyavahāra**, the **Pūrvapakṣa** defines the purpose of the Scriptures.

Ṭīkā: ataḥ śāstrasyāpi te eva prayojane: Therefore, the **Śāstra** also has those two purposes. **Te (Dual Case):** Refers to **Pravṛtti** (Engagement) and **Nivṛtti** (Cessation).

Ṭīkā: te ca kārya jñāna janye iti kārya paratvaṃ śāstrasya: Pravṛtti and **Nivṛtti** are born from the knowledge of what is to be done (**Kārya Jñāna Janya**). The sentence generates knowledge of the task {e.g., "Ghaṭam ānaya" - "Bring the pot" - This verbal action acts as the generator (**Janaka**), and the action (**Pravṛtti**) is the generated result (**Janya**).

Conclusion: Therefore, the **Śāstra** is **Kārya Para**—it is entirely devoted to Action. Its sole purposeand intent is to prompt or prevent action.

Ṭīkā: tataḥ kārya śeṣatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ ityāha

- Consequently, **Brahman** is a subsidiary to action (**Kārya Śeṣa**).
- Even though **Brahman** is the subject, it must serve the action—whether that action is a mental act (**Mānasa Karma**) or worship (**Upāsanā**).

The Authority of Niyoga (Injunction) (Page 152)

शास्त्रस्य नियोगपरत्वे वृद्धसम्मतिमाह - तथाहीत्यादिना । क्रिया, कार्यम् , नियोगो, विधिः धर्मोऽपूर्वमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । को वेदार्थ इत्याकाङ्क्षायां शाबरभाष्यकृतोक्तम् - दृष्टो हीति । तस्य वेदस्य । कार्यं वेदार्थ इत्यत्र चोदनासूत्रस्थं भाष्यमाह - चोदनेति । क्रियाया नियोगस्य ज्ञानद्वारा प्रवर्तकं वाक्यं चोदनेत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः । शबरस्वामिसम्मतिमुक्त्वा जैमिनिसम्मतिमाह - तस्य ज्ञानमिति । तस्य धर्मस्य ज्ञापकमपौरुषेयविधिवाक्यमुपदेशः । तस्य धर्मेणाव्यतिरेकादित्यर्थः ।

तथा हि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविद आहुः — ‘दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनं नाम’ इति; ‘चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्’ ‘तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः’ (जै. सू. १ । १ । ५),

The **Pūrvapakṣa** establishes that the scripture is authoritative only because it commands an action. This is rooted in the consensus of the **Vṛddha** (Elders/Ancient Sages).

Pūrvapakṣa Explanation of Niyoga

- **Niyoga**: The scripture connects the individual to a specific method or action. This binding force or command is **Niyoga**.
- **Niyojya**: The person who is commanded (the aspirant).
    - Example: A person desiring heaven (**Svarga-kāma**) is the **Niyojya** for rituals.
    - Application: Similarly, a person desiring liberation (**Mokṣa-kāma**) is the **Niyojya** for the injunctions of the Upaniṣads.
- **Niyoga Viṣaya**: The content of the command (what is to be done).

The Distinction: The difference between a ritualist and a Vedantin, according to the **Pūrvapakṣa**, is merely the object of desire. One is **Svarga-kāma** (desiring heaven), the other is **Mokṣa-kāma** (desiring liberation). Both require a **Vidhi** (injunction) to achieve their goals.

Synonyms for Scriptural Duty

To clarify the terminology used in Mīmāṃsā, the **Ṭīkā** provides a list of synonyms that all point toward the "Action" aspect of the Veda.

Ṭīkā: kriyā kāryam niyogo vidhiḥ dharmo apūrvam iti anarthāntaram

Anarthāntaram: Derived from **na anyo arthaḥ** (no other meaning). It implies that these words are synonyms or carry the same import in this context.

- **The Synonyms:**
  - **Kriyā** (Action)
  - **Kāryam** (That which is to be done)
  - **Niyogaḥ** (Injunction/Command - preferred by the Prābhākara sc0.hool)
  - **Vidhiḥ** (Rule/Command)
  - **Dharmaḥ** (Duty/Religious Merit)
  - **Apūrvam** (The unseen potency generated by the act)
- **Usage:** While the meanings overlap, specific terms are used depending on the context.
  - **Vidhi/Dharma:** Used when referring to the scriptural sentence (e.g., Vidhi-liṅ or Loṭ lakāra).
  - **Dharma/Apūrvam:** Used when referring to the result generated by the action.
  - **Kriyā:** Used because the sentence is active in nature.

Testimony of the Elders (Vṛddha Sammati)

Ṭīkā: ko vedārtha ityākāṅkṣāyāṃ śābarabhāṣyakṛtoktam - dṛṣṭo hīti | tasya vedasya |

The **Pūrvapakṣa** cites the two highest authorities of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā: **Maharṣi Jaimini** and **Śabara Svāmin** (the Bhāṣyakāra of Jaimini Sūtras).

1. Evidence from Śabara Svāmin

Ṭīkā: kāryaṃ vedārtha ityatra codanāsūtrasthaṃ bhāṣyaṃ: Pūrvapakṣa (citing **Śābara Bhāṣya)**

Bhāṣya: dṛṣṭo hi tasyārthaḥ karmāvabodhanam: "Indeed, the seen purpose of That (the Veda) is the enlightenment regarding Action (**Karma**)." **Tasya** refers to **Vedasya** (of the Veda). The purpose of the Veda is solely to teach action.

Bhāṣya: codanā iti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam: Codanā (Vedic Injunction) is the statement that incites/prompts one towards action (**Kriyā**).

Ṭīkā:
kriyāyāḥ niyogasya jñāna dvārā pravartakaṃ vākyam codanā: Codanā is a sentence that prompts activity. It works through the knowledge of the **Niyoga** (command). First, one understands the command (knowledge), and then one acts (**Pravṛtti**).

The Vedantic Counter-Perspective (Note): Vedantins argue that Śabara Svāmin's statement applies only to the **Karma Kāṇḍa** (ritual section). When Mīmāṃsakas say "The Veda teaches action," they are not considering the distinct nature of the **Upaniṣads** (Jñāna Kāṇḍa). However, the **Pūrvapakṣa** insists this rule applies to the entire Veda, including Vedanta.

2. Evidence from Jaimini Maharṣi

The **Pūrvapakṣa** cites the **Jaimini Sūtra** (1.1.5) to define the authority of the Veda regarding **Dharma**.

औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः तस्य ज्ञानम् उपदेशः अव्यतिरेकः च अर्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्य अनपेक्षत्वात् इति |

autpattikastu śabdasyārthena saṃbandhaḥ tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ avyatirekaḥ ca arthe'nupalabdhe tatpramāṇaṃ bādarāyaṇasya anapekṣatvāt iti |

Autpattikaḥ: Means **Apauruṣeya** (eternal/non-human). The relationship between the Vedic word and its meaning is eternal.

Tasya Jñānam: **Ṭīkā: dharmasya jñānam jñāpakam apauruṣeya vidhi vākyam:** It means the Veda is the valid means of knowledge (**Jñāpaka** / **Pramāṇa**) for **Dharma**.

Upadeśaḥ: Instruction.

Avyatirekāt (from the full sūtra mentioned in commentary): undisputable (अव्यभिचारि)

Ṭīkā: tasya dharmeṇāvyatirekāt: The Veda is authoritative regarding objects not available to perception (**Pratyakṣādi anupalabdhe**). It is **Avyatireka** (Unfailing/Non-contradictable). Unlike sentences like "The sacrificial post is the sun" (which is metaphoric), injunctions are strictly valid.

Even **Bādarāyaṇa** (Veda Vyāsa), the author of the Brahma Sūtras, agrees that the Vedic sentence is the valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**) regarding **Dharma**.

Self-Validity (Svataḥ Pramāṇa): The Veda is valid in itself. It does not require another proof. If one asks, "How do I know this ritual leads to heaven?", the answer is "Because the Veda says so." Seeking proof for the proof leads to the defect of infinite regress (**Anavasthā dośaḥ**).

The Linguistic Argument: Power of Words (Śakti) (Page 153)

पदानां कार्यान्वितार्थे शक्तिरित्यत्र सूत्रं पठति - तद्भूतानामिति । तत्तत्र वेदे भूतानां सिद्धार्थनिष्ठानां पदानां क्रियार्थेन कार्यवाचिना लिङादिपदेन समाम्नायः सहोच्चारणं कर्तव्यम् । पदार्थज्ञानस्य वाक्यार्थरूपकार्यधीनिमित्तत्वादित्यर्थः । कार्यान्वितार्थे शक्तानि पदानि कार्यवाचिपदेन सह पदार्थस्मृतिद्वारा कार्यमेव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीति भावः । फलितमाह - अत इति । यतो वृद्धा एवमाहुः, अतो विधिनिषेधवाक्यमेव शास्त्रम् । अर्थवादादिकं तु तच्छेषतयोपक्षीणम् । तेन कर्मशास्त्रेण सामान्यं शास्त्रत्वम् । तस्माद्वेदान्तानां कार्यपरत्वेनैव अर्थवत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः ।

‘तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः’ (जै. सू. १ । १ । २५) ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्’ (जै. सू. १ । २ । १) इति च । अतः पुरुषं क्वचिद्विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत्कुतश्चिद्विषयविशेषान्निवर्तयच्चार्थवच्छास्त्रम् । तत्सामान्याद्वेदान्तानामपि तथैवार्थवत्त्वं स्यात् ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** argues that words possess meaning only when related to an action. This is the **Kāryānvita Śakti-vāda** (Theory that word-power is grasped in relation to action).

Sūtra Reference (Jaimini 1.1.25): tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt

- **Tadbhūtānāṃ**: Refers to **Siddha-vastu** (Established/Existing things like "Curd," "Pot," or "Brahman").
- **Kriyārthena Samāmnāyaḥ**: These words are mentioned in the Veda only for the purpose of action (**Kriyā**).
    - Example: **Dadhi** (Curd) is a **Siddha Vastu**. Its mention is useless unless paired with an action: Dadhnā juhoti ("He sacrifices with curd"). (Note: juhoti is not लट् लकार, it is लेट् लकार in the meaning of विधिलिङ्)
- **Arthasya Tannimittatvāt**: The meaning is grasped because it is the cause of the action.

Process of Learning (Linguistic Psychology)

Ṭīkā: padārtha jñānasya vākyārtha rūpa kāryadhī nimittatvāt

1. **Childhood Learning:** A child watches an Elder (**Uttama Vṛddha**) command a Middle Elder (**Madhyama Vṛddha**): "Bring the cow" (Gām ānaya).
2. **Observation:** The Middle Elder acts.
3. **Deduction:** The child deduces that the word Gām (Cow) relates to the object and the action of bringing.
4. **Conclusion:** Words (**Padārtha**) are remembered and understood only when they are connected to a command or action (**Kārya-vāci**).
5. **Application to Vedanta:** When the Veda says "Brahman," it must be connected to an action (like "Meditate on Brahman"). Pure knowledge of an existing entity is linguistically impossible to convey as a scriptural purport.

Purva-Pakṣa (Opponent's) View on the Purpose and Validity of Śāstra

The fundamental purpose of any scripture (**Śāstra**) is its "meaningfulness" (**Arthavat**), which is defined by its ability to influence human behavior.

Definition of Śāstra:
Bhāṣya: **ataḥ puruṣaṃ kvacit viṣaya viśeṣe pravartayat kutaścit viṣaya viśeṣān nivartayat ca arthavat śāstram:** A scripture is meaningful only if it either impels a person toward a specific subject (Pravṛtti) or restrains them from another (Nivṛtti). If it does not lead to action (injunction) or avoidance (prohibition), it lacks purpose.

Subordination of Non-Action Texts:

- Everything else in the Vedas that does not directly command an action is considered "remainder" (**Śeṣa**).
- These texts (like **Upaniṣads** or **Vedānta**) find their utility only by being auxiliary to an action or a meditative practice (**Upāsanā-Vidhi-Śeṣa**).

The opponent argues that Vedānta vakyas (like **Aham Brahmāsmi** or **Tat Tvam Asi**) have no independent authority because they describe an existing entity (**Siddha-Vastu**) rather than a task to be performed.

Subservience of Mahāvākyas: The opponent views the great sentences (**Mahāvākyas**) as being "given a place" within the Vedic structure only as long as they serve the purpose of ritual or meditation.

Comparison to Ritual: Just as ritual texts are meaningful through action, the opponent suggests that Vedānta is meaningful only through its connection to the performer (the Self) of the action.

Perspectives from the Commentaries (Ṭīkā)

The commentary reinforces that the definition of scripture is strictly tied to Injunctions (**Vidhi**) and Prohibitions (**Niṣedha**).

- **The Authority of Elders**:
  Ṭīkā: **yato vṛddhā evamāhuḥ, ato vidhiniṣedhavākyameva śāstram |** Because the elders/learned ones say so, only sentences containing commands or prohibitions are truly **Śāstra**.
- **Exhaustion in Injunctions**:
  Ṭīkā: **arthavādādikaṃ tu taccheṣatayopakṣīṇam |** Explanatory passages (**Arthavāda**) or Mantras are "exhausted" (Upakṣīṇam) by being auxiliary to the main injunction (**Vidhi**). Their only value is in supporting the primary command.
- **Conclusion of the Opponent's Logic**:
  Ṭīkā: tena karmaśāstreṇa sāmānyaṃ śāstratvam | tasmādvedāntānāṃ kāryaparatvenaiva arthavatvaṃ syādityarthaḥ | Therefore, the status of being a scripture (**Śāstratvam**) is common to the ritualistic sections. The **Vedānta** (Vedanā) is meaningful only whenit is associated with an action (Kārya-Paratva).

Mananam: Role of Practice, Purification, and Teaching

Swamiji touches upon how different individuals require different paths based on their mental clarity.

- **Karma-Yoga and Upāsanā**: For those whose intellect is not yet pure (Aśuddha), performing actions (**Karma-Yoga**) or specific meditations (**Upāsanā**) is essential.
- **Diversity in Learning**:
    - Sometimes, if a student does not grasp the knowledge from one teacher, they are sent to another.
    - Changing the text (e.g., moving from one Upaniṣad to **Pañcadaśī**) might help if the previous one didn't resonate, although the ultimate subject matter (**Brahma-Ātmā**) remains consistent.
- **Action as a Foundation**: Service (Sevā) and action are emphasized when the capacity for direct listening (**Śravaṇa**) or understanding is hindered by mental impurities.

The Psychological Barrier to Pure Knowledge

Swamiji elaborates on why the **Pūrvapakṣa** (and many practitioners) struggle with the Vedantic view.

The "Doing" Bias: The intellect is conditioned to ask, "What must I do?"

- When Vedanta says, "You are Brahman, you are already free," the unprepared mind cannot grasp it.
- Reaction: "If I am Brahman, why am I hungry? I must have to do something (meditate/chant) to become Brahman."

Vedanta's Response:

- Hunger belongs to the **Prāṇamaya Kośa**, not the **Ātman**.
- The problem is not a lack of action, but a lack of **Viveka** (Discrimination) and **Śravaṇa** (Proper hearing/understanding).
- Adding action to Ignorance does not remove Ignorance. Only Knowledge removes Ignorance.

Prārabdha vs. Jñāna:

- External circumstances (e.g., a realized master sitting on a chair vs. a disciple on the floor) are dictated by **Prārabdha Karma** (destiny), not by the level of Knowledge.
- The **Pūrvapakṣa** falsely equates the "result" of liberation with the "result" of an action (like going to heaven).

Summary of the Pūrvapakṣa Position in this section: Since words only have power when associated with action, and since the highest authorities (Jaimini/Śabara) declare Veda to be for **Karma**, the **Vedanta** texts must be interpreted as **Arthavāda** (glorification) supporting the **Vidhi** (injunction) of **Upāsanā**.

The Conceptual Difference regarding Phala (Result)

Bhāṣya: taccheṣatayā cānyadupayuktam | tatsāmānyādvedāntānāmapi tathaivārthavattvaṃ syāt |

The text highlights a fundamental divergence in understanding the result of spiritual practice between the **Pūrvapakṣa** and the **Siddhānta**.

The Pūrvapakṣa Mindset

- **Intellectual Habit:** There is a deep-seated understanding that by doing something repeatedly, knowledge or the result will be attained.
- **Equivalence:** They believe that **Upāsanā** (meditation/action) yields the exact same result as **Jñāna** (knowledge).
- **View on Liberation:** While Vedanta says **Jñāna** leads to **Ajñāna Nivṛtti** (removal of ignorance), the **Pūrvapakṣa** asserts that **Upāsanā** leads to **Ajñāna Nivṛtti**. For them, **Mukti** is achieved through **Upāsanā**.

The Vedantic Stance

- **Vedanta** asserts that the removal of ignorance (**Ajñāna Nivṛtti**) is the result itself, attained only through Knowledge.
- The **Pūrvapakṣa**, however, insists that any result attained must come through "doing" of **Upāsanā**.

The Siddhānta's Counter: Lack of Enjoined Elements

ननु वेदान्तेषु नियोज्यस्य विधेयस्य चादर्शनात्कथं कार्यधीरिति । तत्राह - सति चेति ।

सति च विधिपरत्वे यथा स्वर्गादिकामस्याग्निहोत्रादिसाधनं विधीयते, एवममृतत्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयत इति युक्तम् ।

The **Siddhānta** raises a logical objection: Vedānta is devoid of the necessary components of an injunction—a person to be commanded (**Niyojya**) and an act to be performed (**Vidheya**).

Ṭīkā: nanu vedānteṣu niyojyasya vidheyasya ca adarśanāt kathaṃ kāryadhīriti: If neither the person to be enjoined nor the act to be performed is seen in the Vedānta, how can a cognition of "work" or "duty" arise?

Bhāṣya: **sati ca vidhiparatve yathā svargādikāmasyāgnihotrādisādhanaṃ vidhīyate, evamamṛtatvakāmasya brahmajñānaṃ vidhīyata iti yuktam |**

Parallelism with Karma Kāṇḍa: To this objection, **Pūrvapakṣa** replies**:** Just as one desiring heaven (**Svarga-kāma**) is enjoined to perform the **Agnihotra** sacrifice, one desiring immortality (**Amṛtatva-kāma**) should be enjoined to perform "Brahman-knowledge" as a mental act. **Brahman** is merely the object provided for the act of meditation.

Distinction Between the Two Mimamsas (Page 154)

ननु धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासासूत्रकाराभ्यामिह काण्डद्वयेऽर्थभेद उक्तः, एककार्यार्थत्वे शास्त्रभेदानुपपत्तेः । तत्र काण्डद्वये जिज्ञास्यभेदे सति फलवैलक्षण्यं वाच्यम् । तथा च न मुक्तिफलाय ज्ञानस्य विधेयता, मुक्तेर्विधेयक्रियाजन्यत्वे कर्मफलादविशेषप्रसङ्गादविशेषे जिज्ञास्यभेदासिद्धेः । अतः कर्मफलविलक्षणत्वान्नित्यसिद्धमुक्तेस्तद्व्यञ्जकज्ञानविधिरयुक्त इत्याशङ्कते - नन्विहेति ।

नन्विह जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यमुक्तम् — कर्मकाण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः, इह तु भूतं नित्यनिर्वृत्तं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमिति; तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलादनुष्ठानापेक्षाद्विलक्षणं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं भवितुमर्हति ।

Ṭīkā: dharmabrahmajijñāsāsūtrakārābhyāmiha kāṇḍadvaye'rthabheda uktaḥ, ekakāryārthatve śāstrabhedānupapatteḥ | tatra kāṇḍadvaye jijñāsyabhede sati phalavailakṣaṇyaṃ vācyam |

The **Siddhānta** highlights that if the subject of both parts of the Veda (Action and Knowledge) were the same, there would be no need for two separate sets of sūtras by two different sages.

- **Two Sages: Maharṣi Jaimini** (Dharma) and **Maharṣi Bādarāyaṇa** (Brahman).
- **Two Subjects: Dharma** is **Bhavya** (yet to be accomplished/future-oriented). **Brahman** is **Bhūta** (already existent/ever-established).

Ṭīkā: tathā ca na muktiphalāya jñānasya vidheyatā, muktervidheyakriyājanyatve karmaphalādaviśeṣaprasaṅgādaviśeṣe jijñāsyabhedāsiddheḥ |

The Problem with Produced Liberation: If liberation (**Mukti**) were a result of a commanded action (**Vidheya-kriyā-janyatva**), it would be no different from the results of karma (**Karma-phala**). This leads to the defect of impermanence (**Anityatva**), as anything created by action must eventually perish.

Brahman-Knowledge as a "Revealer" (Vyañjaka)

The **Siddhānta** clarifies that Brahman is **Nitya-siddha** (eternally established). Knowledge does not "create" Brahman; it reveals it by removing ignorance.

Ṭīkā: ataḥ karmaphala vailakṣaṇyatvāt nitya siddha muktau tad vyañjaka jñānavidhiḥ ayuktaḥ: Therefore, because it is different from the result of karma, an injunction for knowledge as a producer of eternally established liberation is improper.

Key Insight on Vṛtti: The **Brahmākāra Vṛtti** (mental modification of the form of Brahman) is necessary not to create Brahman, but to negate the false identity of being a "doer" (**Kartā**) or "enjoyer" (**Bhoktā**). This is compared to the removal of a "snake" illusion to reveal the "rope."

The Nature of Liberation and the Necessity of Vidhi (Page 155)

मुक्तेः कर्मफलाद्वैलक्षण्यमसिद्धमिति तदर्थं ज्ञानं विधेयम् । न च तर्हि सफलं कार्यमेव वेदान्तेष्वपि जिज्ञास्यमिति तद्भेदासिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् , इष्टत्वात् । न च ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञास्यत्वसूत्रविरोधः, ज्ञानविधिशेषत्वेन सूत्रकृता ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनादिति परिहरति - नेति ।

नार्हत्येवं भवितुम् , कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात् ।

The **Pūrvapakṣa** argues that liberation (**Mukti**) is not inherently different from the results of ritual actions (**Karmaphala**). If **Mukti** is a result to be achieved, then the knowledge leading to it must be commanded by an injunction.

Ṭīkā: mukteḥ karmaphalād vailakṣaṇyaṃ asiddhaṃ iti tadarthaṃ jñānaṃ vidheyaṃ: The objector claims that the distinction between liberation and ritual results is unproven (**Asiddha**). Therefore, for the sake of **Mukti**, knowledge must be "enjoined" (**Videyaṃ**). If Vedānta only provides information without a task, it becomes useless because, in their view, inquiry in Vedānta must also lead to a "task" (**Kārya**) that yields a result.

Reconciliation with the Brahma Sūtras

A potential conflict arises: If **Brahman** is merely a secondary element to a command of worship (**Upāsanā-vidhi**), does this contradict the Sūtra's claim that **Brahman** is the primary object of inquiry?

Ṭīkā: na ca brahmaṇo jijñāsyatvasūtravirodhaḥ, jñānavidhiśeṣatvena sūtrakṛtā brahmapratipādanāt: The objector suggests there is no contradiction because the author of the Sūtras (**Sūtrakāra**) presents **Brahman** as a subordinate element (**Śeṣa**) to

the injunction of knowledge or meditation. Thus, **Brahman** is revealed only so that one may perform the act of meditation upon it.

Rebutting Injunction-like Phrases in Upanisads (Page 156)

ब्रह्मणो विधिप्रयुक्तत्वं स्फुटयति - आत्मा वा इति । 'ब्रह्म वेद' इत्यत्र ब्रह्मभावकामो ब्रह्मवेदनं कुर्यादिति विधिः परिणम्यत इति द्रष्टव्यम् । लोकं ज्ञानस्वरूपम् । वेदान्तानेवार्थतो दर्शयति - नित्य इति । ननु किं विधिफलमिति तदाह - तदुपासनादिति । प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मोपासनात् 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' इति शास्त्रोक्तो मोक्षः स्वर्गवल्लोकाप्रसिद्धः फलमित्यर्थः ।

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । ५) 'य आत्मापहतपाप्मा ... सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' (छा. उ. ८ । ७ । १) 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' (बृ. उ. १ । ४ । ७) 'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत' (बृ. उ. १ । ४ । १५) 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मु. उ. ३ । २ । ९) इत्यादिषु विधानेषु सत्सु, 'कोऽसावात्मा ?' 'किं तद्ब्रह्म ?' इत्याकाङ्क्षायां तत्स्वरूपसमर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः — नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतो नित्यतृप्तो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावो विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म इत्येवमादयः । तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टो मोक्षः फलं भविष्यति ।

Ṭīkā: brahmaṇo vidhiprayuktatvaṃ sphuṭayati

The **Pūrvapakṣa** cites several quotations from **śruti** that appear to be commands, such as "The Self should be seen" (**Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ**). They argue that even the statement "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman" is an injunction.

Ṭīkā: "brahma veda" iti atra brahma bhāva kāmo brahma vedanaṃ kuryāt iti vidhiḥ pariṇamyate iti draṣṭavyam: In the phrase "He knows Brahman," it should be seen that it transforms into an injunction: "One desiring the state of Brahman should perform the act of knowing."

Scriptural Examples Cited:

- **Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ (bṛ. u. 2 | 4 | 5)** (The Self, indeed, should be seen).
- **ya ātmāpahatapāpmā … So'nveṣṭavyaḥ** (That is to be sought).
- **Sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ (chā. u. 8 | 7 | 1)** (That should be inquired into).
- **Ātmetyeva upāsīta (bṛ. u. 1 | 4 | 7)** (One should worship It as the Self).
- **ātmānameva lokamupāsīta (bṛ. u. 1 | 4 | 15)**
- **brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati (mu. u. 3 | 2 | 9)**

Logic of the Objector: When one asks, "What is that Self/Brahman?", Vedānta provides the description (**Nitya, Śuddha, Buddha, Mukta**), but only to fulfill the requirement of the command "Worship!"

The **Siddhānta** maintains that these are not literal commands to "do" something but are intended to turn the seeker's attention inward, toward the already-existent Self.

Bhāṣya: tadupāsanācca śāstradṛṣṭo'dṛṣṭo mokṣaḥ phalaṃ bhaviṣyati |

Pūrvapakṣa View: Liberation is an **Adṛṣṭa** (unseen/future) result, similar to **Svarga** (heaven). It is achieved after death through the merit of lifelong worship.

Siddhāntin View: The result of Vedāntic knowledge is **Dṛṣṭa** (directly perceptible here and now). It is the immediate removal of fear and suffering, similar to how knowing a "snake" is actually a "rope" provides instant relief.

The "Rope-Snake" Analogy and its Purpose (Page 156)

ब्रह्मणः कर्तव्योपासनाविषयकविधिशेषत्वानङ्गीकारे बाधकमाह - कर्तव्येति । विध्यसम्बद्धसिद्धबोधे प्रवृत्त्यादिफलाभावाद्वेदान्तानां वैफल्यं स्यादित्यर्थः । नन्विति शङ्का स्पष्टार्था । दृष्टान्तवैषम्येण परिहरति - स्यादिति । एतदर्थवत्वमेवंचेत्स्यादित्यर्थः । एवं शब्दार्थमाह - यदिति ।

कर्तव्यविध्यननुप्रवेशे तु वस्तुमात्रकथने हानोपादानासम्भवात् 'सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती' 'राजासौ गच्छति' इत्यादिवाक्यवद्वेदान्तवाक्यानामानर्थक्यमेव स्यात् । ननु वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि 'रज्जुरियम् , नायं सर्पः' इत्यादौ भ्रान्तिजनितभीतिनिवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम् । तथेहाप्यसंसार्यात्मवस्तुकथनेन संसारित्वभ्रान्तिनिवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं स्यात् । स्यादेतदेवम् , यदि रज्जुस्वरूपश्रवणमात्रेणेव सर्पभ्रान्तिः, संसारित्वभ्रान्तिर्ब्रह्मस्वरूपश्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तेत; न तु निवर्तते ।

The **Siddhānta** explains that a mere statement of fact (**Vastu-mātra-kathana**) is valid and purposeful if it removes suffering.

Bhāṣya: nanu vastumātrakathane api 'rajjuriyam , nāyaṃ sarpaḥ' ityādau bhrāntijanitabhītinivartanena arthavattvaṃ dṛṣṭam: Even in a mere statement of fact, like "This is a rope, not a snake," purposefulness is seen through the removal of fear born of delusion.

Pūrvapakṣa Challenge: The opponent argues that unlike the rope-snake example, people hear "You are Brahman" for years and often continue to suffer from grief and delusion. They suggest that mere hearing is insufficient, and thus, an injunction for a "task" or "meditation" is required to fix the person's condition.

Analysis of 'Spaṣṭārtha': The word **Spaṣṭārtha** is used to indicate that the doubt (**Śaṅkā**) raised is for the sake of clarity.
Ṭīkā: nanviti śaṅkā spaṣṭārthā

Interpretation of 'Syād etadevam': The **Ṭīkā** clarifies the phrase **Syād etadevam** (It might be so) as:
Ṭīkā: etad arthavatvam evaṃ cetsyādityarthaḥ | This means: "If it were the case (that hearing alone removes delusion), then Vedānta would indeed be purposeful in itself." However, the opponent argues it is not so.

The **Pūrvapakṣin** argues that if liberation came solely from hearing (**Śravaṇa**), there would be no need for the subsequent injunctions for reflection (**Manana**) and meditation (**Nididhyāsana**).

किञ्च यदि ज्ञानादेव मुक्तिस्तदा श्रवणजन्यज्ञानानन्तरं मननादिविधिर्न स्यात् , तद्विधेश्च कार्यसाध्या मुक्तिरित्याह - श्रोतव्य इति ।

श्रुतब्राह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं सुखदुःखादिसंसारिधर्मदर्शनात् । 'श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । ५) इति च श्रवणोत्तरकालयोर्मननिदिध्यासनयोर्विधिदर्शनात् ।

Ṭīkā: kiñca yadi jñānādeva muktistadā śravaṇajanyajñānānantaraṃ mananādividhirna syāt , tadvidheśca kāryasādhyā muktiḥ: The opponent believes liberation is Kārya-sādhya (attainable through action). They view Manana and Nididhyāsana as mental acts (Upāsanā) similar to worshiping a deity.

Bhāṣya: śrutabrahmaṇo'pi yathāpūrvaṃ sukhaduḥkhādisaṃsāridharmadarśanāt | They observe that even one who has heard of Brahman (**Śruta-brahmaṇaḥ**) continues to experience pleasure and pain.

The opponent argues that the commands "should be heard, should be reflected upon, should be meditated upon" (**Śrotavyaḥ, Mantavyaḥ, Nididhyāsitavyaḥ**) prove that Liberation is a product of action (**Kārya-sādhya**).

Bhāṣya: 'śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ' (bṛ. u. 2 | 4 | 5) iti ca śravaṇa uttarakālayoḥ manananididhyāsanayoḥ vidhidarśanāt | They view Manana and Nididhyāsana as Upāsanā (meditative acts) directed by Vedic command, rather than spontaneous knowledge.

शब्दानां कार्यान्वितशक्तेः, प्रवृत्त्यादिफलस्यैव शास्त्रत्वात् , सिद्धे फलाभावात् , मननादिविधेश्च कार्यपरा वेदान्ता इति पूर्वपक्षमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति ।

तस्मात्प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति ॥

The **Pūrvapakṣin** holds a specific linguistic theory: words only have the power to convey meaning when associated with an action (**Kārya-anvita-śakti**).

Ṭīkā: śabdānāṃ kāryānvitaśakteḥ, pravṛttyādiphalasyaiva śāstratvāt , siddhe phalābhāvāt , mananādividheśca kāryaparā vedāntā

Since purely descriptive words (**Siddha-vastu**) do not prompt action, they believe the Vedas cannot primarily aim at describing Brahman without a corresponding injunction.

The Siddhānta: Refutation and the Autonomy of Knowledge (Page 158)

वेदान्ता न विधिपराः स्वार्थे फलवत्वे सति नियोज्यविधुरत्वात् , नायं सर्प इति वाक्यवत् । 'सोऽरोदीत्' 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति वाक्ययोर्निरासाय हेतौ विशेषणद्वयमिति सिद्धान्तयति - अत्रेति ।

अत्राभिधीयते -

The **Siddhāntin** rejects the idea that Vedānta is subservient to injunctions.

The Nature of the Prohibited Snake: When one says "This is a rope, not a snake" (**Rajjuriyaṃ nāyaṃ sarpaḥ**), the second part (**nāyaṃ sarpaḥ**) is critical for removing the false

identity. Knowledge of the rope alone terminates the delusion. Similarly, knowledge of Brahman terminates the delusion of being a **saṃsārī** (worldly being).

Logical Inference (Anumāna) for Vedānta: The **Siddhāntin** provides a logical framework to prove Vedānta is not action-oriented.
Ṭīkā: vedāntā na vidhiparāḥ svārthe phalavatve sati niyojyavidhuratvāt , nāyaṃ sarpa iti vākyavat |

- **Pakṣa (Subject): Vedānta**.
- **Sādhya (What is to be proven): Avidhiparatva:** Absence of being action-oriented
- **Hetu (Reason): Svārthe phalavat**: It yields results in its own meaning (knowledge itself is the result) **Niyojya-vidhuratva:** while being devoid of a person to act
- **Example:** The statement **Rajjuriyam nāyam sarpaḥ** ("This is a rope, not a snake").

It is important to emphasize that simply saying "This is not a snake" (**Nāyam sarpaḥ**) is insufficient for valid knowledge (**Pramā**).

- **The Limitation of Negation:** If you only say "It is not a snake," the mind might jump to another delusion—thinking it is a stick (**Daṇḍa**) or a crack in the ground (**Bhū-chidra**). You merely move from one delusion to another.
- **The Necessity of Positive Assertion:** True knowledge (**Pramā**) arises only when the underlying reality is revealed: **Rajjuriyam** ("This is a rope").
- **Application to Consciousness:** In the **Māṇḍūkya** context, if one only denies being the waker (**Jāgrat-abhimānī**), they may still cling to being the dreamer or the sleeper. Total negation of all false identities, coupled with the revelation of the Truth, alone constitutes **Pramā**.

Dissecting the Two-Fold Reason (Hetu)

Ṭīkā: ‘so'rodīt’ ‘svargakāmo yajeta’ iti vākyayornirāsāya hetau viśeṣaṇadvayamiti siddhāntayati

The reason for **Vedānta** not being **Vidhi-para** has two parts to exclude specific categories of Vedic sentences:

1. **Excluding Arthavāda (Explanatory/Eulogistic remarks):**
    - **Arthavāda** sentences (like "**So’rodīt**") are not **Svārthe phalavat** (they don't have a fruitful meaning of their own; they only support a command).
    - By adding the qualification **Svārthe phalavat**, we distinguish **Vedānta** from mere **Arthavāda**.
2. **Excluding Ritual Commands (Karma-kāṇḍa):**
    - Sentences like **Svargakāmo yajeta** ("One desiring heaven should perform sacrifice") are **Svārthe phalavat** (they have a clear result), but they are not **Niyojya-vidhura**. They depend on a person being commanded (**Niyojya**) to act.
    - **Vedānta** is **Niyojya-vidhura** because it simply reveals what is already there; it doesn't command you to "do" something to create the Self.

The Refutation of the Opponent (Pūrvapakṣa)

यदुक्तं मोक्षकामस्य नियोज्यस्य ज्ञानं विधेयमिति, तन्नेत्याह - नेति । मोक्षो न विधिजन्यः, कर्मफलविलक्षणत्वात् , आत्मवदित्यर्थः । उक्तहेतुज्ञानाय कर्मतत्फले प्रपञ्चयति - शारीरमित्यादिना वर्णितं संसाररूपमनुवदति इत्यन्तेन ।

— न; कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यात् । शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं धर्माख्यम् , यद्विषया जिज्ञासा 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' (जै. सू. १ । १ । १) इति सूत्रिता । अधर्मोऽपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणत्वाज्जिज्ञास्यः परिहाराय ।

The **Pūrvapakṣin** (opponent) argues that knowledge is a mental act and therefore should be commanded for one desiring liberation (**Mokṣa-kāma**).

Bhāṣya: Na: No. The commentator provides a single-word refutation, which is elaborated upon in the **Ṭīkā**.

Ṭīkā: yaduktaṃ mokṣakāmasya niyojyasya jñānaṃ vidheyam iti tan na: That which was said—that knowledge is to be enjoined for the seeker of liberation as the person commanded—that is not correct.

The Argument for Mokṣa's Unique Nature

Mokṣa cannot be the result of a command (**Vidhi**) because it is fundamentally different from the result of action.

Ṭīkā: mokṣo na vidhijanyaḥ, karmaphalavilakṣaṇatvāt , ātmavadityarthaḥ: Liberation is not produced by injunctions, because it is distinct from the results of karma, just like the Ātman.

Logical Framework:

- **Subject (Pakṣa): Mokṣa**.
- **Sādhya (To be proven): Vidhi-janyatva-abhāva:** Absence of being produced by injunction.
- **Reason (Hetu): Karma-phala-vilakṣaṇatvāt:** Because it is distinct from the results of action.
- **Example (Dṛṣṭānta): Ātman**.

The Divergence of Karma and Brahman-Knowledge (Page 158)

अथ वेदाध्ययनानन्तरम् , अतो - वेदस्य फलवदर्थपरत्वात् , धर्मनिर्णयाय कर्मवाक्यविचारः कर्तव्य इति सूत्रार्थः । न केवलं धर्माख्यं कर्म किन्तु अधर्मोऽपीत्याह - अधर्मोऽपीति । निषेधवाक्यप्रमाणत्वादित्यर्थः । कर्मोक्त्वा फलमाह - तयोरिति । **अधर्मोऽपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणत्वाज्जिज्ञास्यः परिहाराय । तयोश्चोदनालक्षणयोरर्थानर्थयोर्धर्माधर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे शरीरवाङ्मनोभिरेवोपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे ।**

The notes highlight that if **Mokṣa** were a result of **Karma** (action/injunction), it would inevitably be:

- **Āpya** (Attainable/Reachable)
- **Utpādya** (Producible/Created)
- **Saṃskārya** (Purifiable/Refinable)
- **Vikārya** (Modifiable/Transformable)

If **Mokṣa** fell into any of these categories, it would be **Anitya** (temporary/perishable). The **Mīmāṃsakas** might accept a temporary heaven, but the **Vedāntin** points to the **Śruti** (Scripture) to prove **Mokṣa** is eternal and not a product of work: **na karmaṇā na prajayā dhanena tyāgenaike amṛtatvamānaśuḥ** (Neither by action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone, some attained immortality.)

Conclusion: Since the **Ātman** is not produced by any action, and **Mokṣa** is nothing other than the **Ātman** (the Self), **Vedānta** serves only to remove ignorance, not to enjoin action.

The **Bhāṣya** establishes a clear distinction between the results of these two paths to ensure that the seeker does not mistakenly view liberation as a product of work.

Bhāṣya: karma-brahmavidyā-phalayoḥ vailakṣaṇyāt: There is distinctness/heterogeneity between the result of karma and the result of Brahman-knowledge.

The Nature of Karma
Action is categorized into three types based on the instrument of performance:

- **Śārīram** (Physical/Bodily)
- **Vācikam** (Vocal/Speech-based)
- **Mānasam** (Mental)

Bhāṣya: śārīraṃ vācikaṃ mānasaṃ ca karma śruti-smṛti-siddhaṃ dharmākhyam: Actions performed at body, speech, and mind level is established by Śruti and Smṛti, is called Dharma.

Important Distinction: Brahma-jñāna (Knowledge of Brahman) is not a mental action (**Mānasa-karma**). While meditation or worship (**Upāsanā**) is a mental act, true Knowledge is generated by valid means of proof (**Pramāṇa**) and is not subject to the will of the individual.

The Scope of Inquiry: Dharma and Adharma

The inquiry into **Dharma** (as initiated in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtras) inherently includes the inquiry into **Adharma** (to avoid it)

Ṭīkā: atha vedādhyayanānantaram , ato - vedasya phalavadarthaparatvāt , dharmanirṇayāya karmavākyavicāraḥ kartavya iti sūtrārthaḥ | adharmo'pi hiṃsādiḥ pratiṣedhacodanālakṣaṇatvājjijñāsyaḥ parihārāya | niṣedhavākyapramāṇatvādityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: yad-viṣayā jijñāsā 'athāto dharmajijñāsā' (jai. sū. 1 | 1 | 1) iti sūtritā| adharmo'pi hiṃsādiḥ pratiṣedhacodanālakṣaṇatvājjijñāsyaḥ parihārāya | : The inquiry whose subject is summarized in the sutra: "Now therefore the inquiry into Dharma."

- **Atha (अथ):** Implies "after the study of the Vedas" (**Vedādhyayana-ānantaryam**).
- **Atas (अतः):** Because the Veda has a purposeful and fruitful meaning (**Phalavat-artha-paratvāt**).
- **Adharma Inquiry:** Even though the Sūtra mentions **Dharma**, **Adharma** (demerit) is also investigated.
    - **Reason: Adharma** is characterized by prohibited actions like violence (**Hiṃsādi**). One must know it to avoid it (**Parihārāya**).
    - **Authority:** The Veda is a valid authority (**Pramāṇa**) for prohibitions (**Niṣedha-vākya**) just as it is for injunctions.

The Scale of Worldly Experience: Samsāra

The result of **Dharma** and **Adharma** is the experience of pleasure (**Sukha**) and pain (**Duḥkha**) respectively. This experience is universal, spanning from the highest deity to the lowest life form.

Bhāṣya: tayoḥ codanā-lakṣaṇayoḥ arthānarthayoḥ dharmādharmayoḥ phale pratyakṣe sukha-duḥkhe: The results of Dharma and Adharma—defined by Vedic injunctions—are the directly perceived experiences of pleasure and pain.

Bhāṣya: śarīra-vāṅmanobhiḥ eva upabhujyamāne viṣaya-indriya-saṃyogajanye brahmādiṣu sthāvarānteṣu prasiddhe |

1. The Mechanism of Experience
Pleasure and pain are experienced through body, speech, and mind (**Śarīra-vāṅ-manobhireva upabhujyamāne**). They are born from the contact of senses with objects (**viṣaya-indriya-saṃyogajanye**).

2. The Hierarchy of Beings (Brahmādyā-sthāvarānteṣu)
The variety of experiences is seen in the "Gradation of Happiness" (**Sukha-tāratamya**):

- **Brahmā (The Creator):** Even the highest being is subject to subtle defects like fear (**Bhaya**) and lack of delight (**arati**) if knowledge of the Self is absent.
- **Humans:** Experience varying degrees of pleasure and pain based on their specific **Prārabdha** (past karma).
- **Sthāvara (Immobile beings/Plants):** Trees and plants also experience pleasure and pain. This is a "yoni" (birth) predominantly meant for suffering (e.g., enduring heat, cold, or being cut). However, even they can experience "Sukha" through the association or touch of a **Mahātmā** (Great Soul).

The Absolute Distinctness of Mokṣa (Page 159)

मोक्षस्तु अतीन्द्रियो विशोकः शरीराद्यभोग्यो विषयाद्यजन्योऽनात्मवित्स्वप्रसिद्ध इति वैलक्षण्यज्ञानाय प्रत्यक्षादीनि विशेषणानि । सामान्येन कर्मफलमुक्त्वा धर्मफलं पृथक्प्रपञ्चयति - मनुष्यत्वादीति । 'स एको मानुष आनन्दः' ततः शतगुणो गन्धर्वादीनामिति श्रुतेरनुभवानुसारित्वमनुशब्दार्थः । ततश्च । सुखतारतम्यादित्यर्थः । मोक्षस्तु निरतिशयः, तत्साधनं च तत्वज्ञानमेकरूपमिति वैलक्षण्यम् । किं च साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्न एकरूप एव मोक्षविद्याधिकारी, कर्मणि तु नानाविध इति वैलक्षण्यमाह - धर्मेति ।

मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यमनुश्रूयते । ततश्च तद्धेतोर्धर्मस्यापि तारतम्यं गम्यते । धर्मतारतम्यादधिकारितारतम्यम् ।

To distinguish Liberation from the fluctuating experiences of the world, the **Ṭīkā** provides specific attributes for **Mokṣa**.

Ṭīkā: mokṣastu atīndriyo viśokaḥ śarīrādyabhogyo viṣayādyajanyo'nātmavit-svaprasiddha iti vailakṣaṇyajñānāya pratyakṣādīni viśeṣaṇāni: Mokṣa, however, is beyond the senses, free from grief, not enjoyable by the body-senses, not produced by objects, and is unknown to those who do not know the Self; this is stated to show its distinctness.

Comparison Table: Worldly Result vs. Mokṣa

Feature	Worldly Result (Karma-phala)	Liberation (Mokṣa)
Origin	Produced by contact with objects	Not produced by objects (**Ajanya**)
Perception	Perceived by senses/mind	Beyond the senses (**Atīndriya**)
Nature	Gradated (**Tāratamya**)	Uniform/Absolute
Duration	Perishable/Temporary	Eternal (**Nitya**)
Experience	Bodily/Vocal/Mental	Devoid of body-identification

Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra distinguishes between the results of **karma** and **brahma-vidyā**.

- **Result of Karma:** Results in **svarga** (heaven) and other experiences determined by **dharma** and **adharma**. These results are inherently graded and varied (**tārtamya**).
- **Result of Brahma-vidyā:** Results in **mokṣa** (liberation), which is uniform and constant.

The Hierarchy of Bliss

Ṭīkā: sāmānyena karmaphalamuktvā dharmaphalaṃ pṛthakprapañcayati - manuṣyatvādīti | 'sa eko mānuṣa ānandaḥ' tataḥ śataguṇo gandharvādīnāmiti śruteranubhavānusāritvamanuśabdārthaḥ |

Having spoken of the results of Karma, now the results of dharma are spoken of. The gradation in the results of action is established by both scripture (**śruti**) and direct experience (**anubhava**).

- The **śruti** states: from the bliss of a human to that of **brahmā**, there is a hundredfold increase at each level.
- **Logic:** Since there is a gradation in the result (**sukha**), there must be a corresponding gradation in the cause (**dharma**).

The understanding the hierarchy helps one realize:

1. **Responsibility:** If there is suffering or a specific station in life, it is due to our own **Dharma** and **Adharma**.
2. **Transience:** Worldly success even as great as a King (**Rājā Raghu**) or **Indra** is still within the realm of anxiety and limitation.
3. **The Goal:** The purpose of the **Bhāṣya** is to expand the intellect beyond local concerns ("the frog in the well") to realize the vast journey the soul has taken through countless births, eventually seeking the only constant: **Mokṣa**.

Dharma as the Cause of Happiness

Happiness is not accidental; it is the direct result of **dharma**.

Bhāṣya: manuṣyatvādārabhya brahmānteṣu dehavatsu sukhatāratamyamanuśrūyate | tataśca taddhetordharmasyāpi tāratamyaṃ gamyate

The gradation in happiness implies a gradation in its cause, which is **dharma**. **dharma** is the extraordinary cause (**asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa**) of **sukha**. If someone is happy, it is not merely due to wealth or social circle, but due to their **dharma**. Conversely, **duḥkha** is the result of **adharma**. Even if an unrighteous person seems to flourish, their eventual downfall or hidden suffering is certain.

Ṭīkā: mokṣastu niratiśayaḥ, tatsādhanaṃ ca tatvajñānamekarūpamiti vailakṣaṇyam |

Unlike the graded results of **karma**, **mokṣa** is **niratiśaya**—beyond all degrees or superiority.

- **Uniform Means:** While **dharma** is of many types, the means to **mokṣa** is only one: **tattva-jñāna** (Knowledge of Reality).
- **Uniform Agency:** The **adhikārī** for **brahma-vidyā** is one who is **sādhana-catuṣṭaya-saṃpanna** (endowed with the fourfold qualifications).
- **Nature of Result: mokṣa** is **nitya-prāpta** (eternally attained), whereas the results of **karma** are **mārga-prāpyam** (to be reached through a path).

Gradation in Qualifications (adhikāri-tārtamya)

धर्मेति । गम्यते न केवलं किं तु प्रसिद्धं चेत्यर्थः । अर्थित्वं फलकामित्वम् । सामर्थ्यं लौकिकं पुत्रादि । आदिपदाद्विद्वत्त्वं शास्त्रानिन्दितत्वं च । किं च कर्मफलं मार्गप्राप्यम् , मोक्षस्तु नित्याप्त इति भेदमाह - तथेति ।

धर्मतारतम्यादधिकारितारतम्यम् । प्रसिद्धं चार्थित्वसामर्थ्यादिकृतमधिकारितारतम्यम् । तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषादुत्तरेण पथा गमनम् , केवलैरिष्टापूर्तदत्तसाधनैर्धूमादिक्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथा गमनम् , तत्रापि सुखतारतम्यम् , तत्साधनतारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् 'यावत्सम्पातमुषित्वा' (छा. उ. ५ । १० । ५) इत्यस्माद्गम्यते ।

The hierarchy of **dharma** depends on the hierarchy of the performer (**adhikārī**). A superior **adhikārī** performs superior **dharma**, leading to a superior result.

Ṭīkā: gamyate na kevalaṃ kiṃ tu prasiddhaṃ cetyarthaḥ | arthitvaṃ phalakāmitvam | sāmarthyaṃ laukikaṃ putrādi | ādipadādvidvattvaṃ śāstrāninditatvaṃ ca |

Factors Defining an adhikārī:

1. **arthitva** (Desire/Aspiration): The person must desire a specific result (e.g., **svargārthī**, **putrārthī**, **vidyārthī**).
2. **sāmarthya** (Capacity): The physical, financial, and situational ability to perform a ritual. For instance, the **rājasūya-yajña** requires specific resources and the presence of qualified **ṛtvik** (priests) which may not be available to everyone.
3. **vidvattvam** (Knowledge): The performer must be learned in the **veda** to gain the full intended result.
4. **śāstra-aparyudastatvam** (Scriptural Permission): The person must not be prohibited by scripture from performing that specific act (e.g., certain rituals are reserved for specific **varṇa**).

Paths of Transition: uttara and dakṣiṇa (Page 161)

उपासनायां चित्तस्थैर्यप्रकर्षादर्चिरादिमार्गेण ब्रह्मलोकगमनं 'तेऽर्चिषम्' (छां. उ. ४.१५.५) इत्यादिना श्रूयत इत्यर्थः ।
'अग्निहोत्रं तपः सत्यं वेदानां चानुपालनम् । आतिथ्यं वैश्वदेवं च इष्टमित्यभिधीयते ॥
वापीकूपतडागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामः पूर्तमित्यभिधीयते ॥
शरणागतसन्त्राणं भूतानां चाप्यहिंसनम् । बहिर्वेदि च यद्दानं दत्तमित्यभिधीयते ॥' तत्रापि ।

Ritualists and practitioners of meditation follow different paths after death:

1. **uttara-mārga** (Northern Path): Those who perform **upāsanā** (devout meditation) and possess **citta-sthairya** (mental steadiness) go via the path of light (**arci-mārga**) to **brahmaloka**. The more profound the meditation, the more distinct the reflection of the deity in the mind, leading to higher results.
2. **dakṣiṇa-mārga** (Southern Path): Those who perform only **iṣṭa**, **pūrta**, and **datta** reach the **pitṛ-loka** (lunar realm).

Categories of Pious Acts:

- **iṣṭa: agnihotra**, penance (**tapas**), truth (**satya**), and Vedic study.
- **pūrta:** Public welfare works like building wells (**vāpī**), tanks (**taḍāga**), hospitals, and schools.
- **datta:** Protecting those who seek refuge (**śaraṇāgata-saṃtrāṇam**), non-violence (**ahiṃsā**), and charity outside the sacrificial context.

Bhāṣya: yāvatsampātamuṣitvā' (chā. u. 5 | 10 | 5)

Explanation: In the **dakṣiṇa-mārga**, one stays in the higher realms only as long as the merit (**saṃpāta** or **karma**) lasts. Once the balance is exhausted, they must return to the human world.

Gradation in Lower Realms (adhogati) (Page 161)

चन्द्रलोकेऽपीत्यर्थः । सम्पतति गच्छति अस्माल्लोकादमुं लोकमनेनेति सम्पातः कर्म । यावत्कर्म भोक्तव्यं तावत्स्थित्वा पुनरायान्तीत्यर्थः । मनुष्यत्वादूर्ध्वङ्गतेषु सुखस्य तारतम्यमुक्त्वा अधोगतेषु तदाह - तथेति । इदानीं दुःखतद्धेतुतदनुष्ठायिनां तारतम्यं वदन्धर्मफलं प्रपञ्चयति - तथोर्ध्वमिति । द्विविधं कर्मफलं मोक्षस्य तद्वैवलक्षण्यज्ञानाय प्रपञ्चितमुपसंहरति - एवमिति । अस्मिताकामक्रोधभयान्यादिशब्दार्थः । 'ते तं भुक्त्वा स्वर्गलोकं विशालम्' इत्याद्या स्मृतिः । काष्ठोपचयाज्ज्वालोपचयदर्शनात् , फलतारतम्येन साधनतारतम्यानुमानं न्यायः । श्रुतिमाह - तथाचेति ।

तथा मनुष्यादिषु स्थावरान्तेषु सुखलवश्चोदनालक्षणधर्मसाध्य एवेति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः । तथोर्ध्वगतेष्वधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःखतारतम्यदर्शनात्तद्धेतोरधर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणस्य तदनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं गम्यते । एवमविद्यादिदोषवतां धर्माधर्मतारतम्यनिमित्तं शरीरोपादानपूर्वकं सुखदुःखतारतम्यमनित्यं संसाररूपं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम् ।

Gradation is not limited to humans and gods; it exists in the lower realms as well.

- In animals, trees (**sthāvara**), and hellish beings (**nāraka**), there is a preponderance of suffering.
- However, even the "drop of happiness" (**sukha-lava**) experienced by a tree or an animal is the result of a small portion of **dharma**.
- All forms of existence, from the highest heavens to the lowest hells, are part of **saṃsāra**, which is characterized by **tāratamya** (gradation) and **anityatvam** (impermanence).

This way the **ṭīkā** explains that the entire world is bound together by a three-fold gradation (**tāratamya**). This structure is the hallmark of the realm of **dharma**.

1. **Sukha-tāratamya**: Gradation in the experience of happiness.
2. **Dharmādharma-tāratamya**: Gradation in merit and demerit, which acts as the cause for happiness/sorrow.
3. **Adhikāritva-tāratamya**: Gradation in the qualifications of those performing actions.

This gradation proves that any result achieved through **dharma** is limited, varied, and temporary. **brahman**, being **vilakṣaṇa** (distinct) from **dharma**, does not fall into this category.

The State of Embodiment vs. Bodilessness (Page 162)

मोक्षो न कर्मफलम् , कर्मफलविरुद्धातीन्द्रियत्वविशोकत्वशरीराद्यभोग्यत्वादिधर्मवत्वात् , व्यतिरेकेण स्वर्गादिवदिति न्यायानुग्राह्यां श्रुतिमाह - अशरीरमिति । वावेत्यवधारणे । तत्त्वतो विदेहं सन्तमात्मानं वैषयिके सुखदुःखे नैव स्पृशत इत्यर्थः ।

तथा च श्रुतिः 'न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति' इति यथावर्णितं संसाररूपमनुवदति । 'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' (छा. उ. ८ । १२ । १) इति प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधाच्चोदनालक्षणधर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाख्यस्याशरीरत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यत इति गम्यते ।

Logical Inference of Mokṣa as Non-Action

The **ṭīkā** provides a formal logical inference (**anumāna**) to prove that **mokṣa** is not a result of action (**karmaphala**).

Ṭīkā: mokṣo na karmaphalaṃ karmaphala-viruddha-atīndriyatva-viśokatva-śarīrādi-abhogyatvādi-dharmavattvāt l vyatirekeṇa svargādivat l

- **Proposition: mokṣa** is not a result of action.
- **Reason:** Because it possesses attributes contrary to the results of action.
- **Attributes of Mokṣa:** It is **atīndriya** (beyond the senses), **viśoka** (without sorrow), and **śarīrādi-abhogya** (not enjoyable through the body).
- **Contrast (Vyatireka):** Unlike heaven (**svarga)**, which is a **karmaphala**, is perceived through the senses, and involves subtle gradations of sorrow or transience.

The core of the argument rests on a crucial passage from the **chāndogya upaniṣad** (8.12.1), which defines the relationship between the body and the experience of pleasure and pain.

Bhāṣya: na ha vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayoḥ apahatirasti (chā. u. 8 | 12 | 1)

As long as a person identifies the Self with the body (**saśarīra**)—whether it is the gross, subtle, or causal body—there is no possibility of destroying the experience of **priya** (pleasure) and **apriya** (pain). To be "embodied" is to be subject to the dualities of the world.

Bhāṣya: aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ

When the Self is known to be **aśarīra** (bodiless/incorporeal), pleasure and pain can no longer touch it.

Aham-pada (The word "I"): * The **vācyārtha** (literal meaning) of "I" is the individual with adjuncts (**upādhi**), who experiences pleasure and pain. This is indicated by the word **saśarīra.**

The **lakṣyārtha** (implied meaning) of "I" is the **śuddha-chaitanya** (pure consciousness), which is the **aśarīra** state where no suffering exists.

Ṭīkā: tattvato videhaṃ santaṃ ātmānaṃ vaiṣayike sukha-duḥkhe naiva spṛśata ityarthaḥ: Essentially, the sense-object-born pleasures and pains do not touch the Self which is fundamentally and truly **videha** (without a body). This bodilessness is not a state to be achieved after death, but a realization to be had even while alive.

The Essential Nature of the Self (Page 163)

मोक्षश्चेदुपासनारूपधर्मफलम् , तदेव प्रियमस्तीति तन्निषेधायोग इत्याह - धर्मकार्यत्वे हीति । ननु प्रियं नाम वैषयिकं सुखं तन्निषिध्यते, मोक्षस्तु धर्मफलमेव, कर्मणां विचित्रदानसामर्थ्यादिति शङ्कते - अशरीरत्वमेवेति । आत्मनो देहासङ्गित्वमशरीरत्वम् , तस्यानादित्वान्न कर्मसाध्यतेत्याह - नेति । अशरीरं स्थूलदेहशून्यम् , देहेष्वनेकेषु अनित्येषु एकं नित्यमवस्थितम् , महान्तं व्यापिनम् । आपेक्षिकमहत्त्वं वारयति - विभुमिति । तमात्मानं ज्ञात्वा धीरः सन् शोकोपलक्षितं संसारं नानुभवतीत्यर्थः । सूक्ष्मदेहाभावे श्रुतिमाह - अप्राण इति । प्राणमनसोः क्रियाज्ञानशक्त्योर्निषेधात् , तदधीनानां कर्मज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां निषेधो हि यतः, अतः शुद्ध इत्यर्थः । देहद्वयाभावे श्रुतिः 'असङ्गो हि' इति । निर्देहात्मस्वरूपमोक्षस्यानादिभावत्वे सिद्धे फलितमाह - अत एवेति ।

धर्मकार्यत्वे हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्येत । अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेत् , न । तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वात् — 'अशरीरꣳ शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् । महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति' (क. उ. १ । २ । २२), 'अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः' (मु. उ. २ । १ । २), 'असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः' (बृ. उ. ४ । ३ । १५) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । अत एवानुष्ठेयकर्मफलविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यमशरीरत्वं नित्यमिति सिद्धम् ।

The Nature of Pleasure and the Objection of the Pūrvapakṣa

Ṭīkā: mokṣaścedupāsanārūpadharmaphalam , tadeva priyamastīti tanniședhāyoga ityāha - dharmakāryatve hīti | nanu priyaṃ nāma vaiṣayikaṃ sukhaṃ tannișidhyate, mokṣastu dharmaphalameva, karmaṇāṃ vicitradānasāmarthyāditi śaṅkate

The discussion begins by defining the nature of pleasure and pain in the context of worldly experience versus liberation. A doubt is raised regarding whether **Mokṣa** is a result of ritualistic or moral actions (**Dharma**).

Definition of Priyam and Apriyam

- **Priyam**: Defined as **Vaiśayika-sukham**, or the happiness derived from sensory objects.
- **Apriyam**: By extension, this refers to **Vaiśayika-duḥkha**, or the pain resulting from sensory contact.
- The **Śruti** (scripture) negates both of these in the state of liberation.

The Objection (Śaṅkā)

The opponent (**Pūrvapakṣa**) argues that **Mokṣa** must be a result of **Dharma**. They reason that just as **Karma** (action) has the capacity to produce diverse results—such as **Svarga** (heaven), progeny, rain, or cattle—it could also potentially produce **Mokṣa**.

Bhāṣya: aśarīratvameva dharmakāryamiti cet

The opponent suggests that even **Aśarīratvam** (the state of being bodiless) could be considered a "product" or "effect" of **Dharma**. If it were a product of **Dharma**, it would be subject to **Tāratamya** (gradations/variations in degree), just like any other result of action.

The Essential Nature of Aśarīratvam (Bodilessness)

The **Siddhāntin** (proponent of the established view) counters the idea that liberation is an effect to be produced.

Bhāṣya: na | tasya svābhāvikatvāt

Aśarīratvam is not a result of action because it is **Svābhāvikam**—the natural, inherent state of the **Ātman** (Self).

- **Ajanya**: That which is "natural" is not "produced" (**Ajanya**). Anything that is a product (**Kārya**) is generated and, therefore, temporary.
- **Svarūpataḥ**: We are inherently bodiless in our true essence. The perception of being "embodied" (**Saśarīra**) is a result of **Bhrānti** (delusion) and **Ajñāna** (ignorance).

The Pitfall of Satyatva-buddhi

While living in the world, a certain level of body-consciousness is necessary for daily transactions (eating, sleeping, etc.). However, the danger lies in **Satyatva-buddhi**—the firm belief that the body is the ultimate reality.

- If one maintains a **Mithyā-buddhi** (realization of the body's illusory nature), then **Paramārtha** (Supreme Truth) remains intact.
- If one grants absolute reality to the body, the pursuit of the Supreme Truth is lost, as all thoughts become centered only on the preservation and comfort of the **Saśarīra** (embodied) state.

Defining the "Bodiless" State

The **ṭīkā** delves into the technical definition of what it means to be without a body.

Ṭīkā: ātmano dehāsaṅgitvamaśarīratvam , tasyānāditvānna karmasādhyatā

Aśarīratvam is defined as **Deha-asaṅgitvam**, which means being unattached to or disconnected from the body.

- **The Three Bodies**: In the absence of a specific qualification, "body" refers to all three levels: the **Sthūla** (gross), **Sūkṣma** (subtle), and **Kāraṇa** (causal) bodies. To be truly **Aśarīra** is to be free from all three.
- **The Nature of Connection**: The **Ātman** is described as **Asaṅgī** (eternally unattached). Therefore, "bodilessness" is not a new state to be achieved, but the realization of an existing reality.

The Argument of Anāditva

- **Anādi**: The **Aśarīratvam** of the **Ātman** is beginningless. It did not start at a certain point in time.

- **Na Karma-sādhyatā**: Because it is beginningless and natural, it cannot be "attained" or "accomplished" through **Karma**. Action can only produce something that was previously non-existent; it cannot "produce" one's own eternal nature.

The Self is not "made" bodiless by action; it is naturally bodiless (**svābhāvika-aśarīratva**).

The primary focus is understanding the **Ātman** as **Aśarīram** (bodiless). While this is mentioned in the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad**, the **Bhāṣyakāra** (Shankara) provides a more profound elaboration to strengthen the seeker's conviction.

Bhāṣya: **‘aśarīraṃ śarīreṣvanavastheṣvavasthitam | mahāntaṃ vibhumātmānaṃ matvā dhīro na śocati’ (ka. u. 1 | 2 | 22)**

Ṭīkā: aśarīraṃ sthūladehaśūnyam , deheṣvanekeṣu anityeṣu ekaṃ nityamavasthitam , mahāntaṃ vyāpinam | āpekṣikamahattvaṃ vārayati - vibhumiti | tamātmānaṃ jñātvā dhīraḥ san śokopalakṣitaṃ saṃsāraṃ nānubhavatītyarthaḥ |

- **Aśarīram**: This refers to the true nature of "I." It is the absence of the gross body (**Sthūla Deha Śūnyam**).
- **Anavastheṣu**: Bodies are by nature unstable and transient. They have no real status or permanence.
- **Avasthitam**: Amidst these transient bodies, the **Ātman** remains established and unchanging.
- **Ekam Nityam**: Among the many (**Anekeṣu**) and the impermanent (**Anityeṣu**), the Self is the One and the Eternal.

The greatness of the Self is not "relative greatness" (**Āpekṣika Mahattvam**) but absolute all-pervasiveness (**Vyāpinam**).

Key Concepts:

- **The One in Many**: The Self is not limited to three bodies; it is the one Self in all fields of existence. This aligns with the Gītā: **Kṣetrajñam cāpi mām viddhi** — "Know Me as the Knower of the Field in all fields."
- **Matvā (Knowing)**: In this context, Matvā means knowing (**Jñātvā**) — to know or realize.
- **The Dhīra (The Wise)**: Only the **Dhīra** (one endowed with the **Sādhana Catuṣṭaya**) does not grieve. The **Adhīra** (the ignorant) continues to suffer because he lacks this realization.
- **Qualification (Adhikāra)**: Scripture (**Veda**) provides valid knowledge (**Pramā**) only to the qualified seeker (**Adhikārī**). For one who lacks innate wisdom (**Prajñā**), the scriptures alone cannot act.

Negation of Prāṇa and Manas

The Self is further described as being beyond the instruments of the subtle body. To establish the purity of the Self, the subtle elements—**Prāṇa** (vital breath) and **Manas** (mind)—must be negated.

Bhāṣya: 'aprāṇo hyamanāḥ śubhraḥ' (mu. u. 2 | 1 | 2) 'asaṅgo hyayaṃ puruṣaḥ' (bṛ. u. 4 | 3 | 15)

Ṭīkā: sūkṣmadehābhāve śrutimāha - aprāṇa iti | prāṇamanasoḥ kriyājñānaśaktyornisedhāt , tadadhīnānāṃ karmajñānendriyāṇāṃ niṣedho hi yataḥ, ataḥ śuddha ityarthaḥ | dehadvayābhāve śrutiḥ 'asaṅgo hi' iti |

Explanation: The Self is without **prāṇa** (vital force) and without **manas** (mind); it is **śubhra** (pure).

Explanation: By negating **prāṇa** and **manas**, the **ṭīkā** negates **kriyā-śakti** (power of action) and **jñāna-śakti** (power of knowledge/cognition) respectively from the Self. Since the Self is free from these, it is also free from the **karmendriya** (organs of action) and **jñānendriya** (organs of perception) which are subordinate to them.

Negation (Niṣedha): The Self is described as **Aprāṇaḥ** (without breath) and **Amanāḥ** (without mind). This is a **Prasakta-pratiṣedha**—negating something that is falsely perceived to be real.

The Purpose of the Instruction

The teaching "You are **Aprāṇa** and **Amana**" is for the **Jīva** who identifies with the breath and mind.

- If one already knew they were the Self, the instruction would be redundant (like telling a man "You are a man").
- The scriptures exist to remove the misconception of being the "body-mind complex" in the ignorant (**Ajñānī**).

Practical Realization and Niṣṭhā

Intellectual study is insufficient if the mind remains turbulent. The goal of Vedantic study is **Bodha-niṣṭhā** (steadfastness in knowledge).

- **Instability of Wisdom**: Just as a strong wind sweeps away a boat on the water (**Nāvamivāmbhasi**), sensory distractions or emotional reactions sweep away the **Prajñā** (wisdom) of one whose mind is not steady.
- **The Goal of Study**: The purpose is not to show off knowledge to others or carry a "paper of credentials," but to become established in Brahman.
- **Utility of External Aids**: Institutions, food, clothing, and maintaining the body are necessary only until the realization is firm. Once **Bodha-niṣṭhā** is achieved, these external dependencies fall away.

Liberation as the Bodiless State (Aśarīratvam)

Liberation (**Mokṣa**) is defined as the natural, bodiless state of the Self, which is distinct from the results of any action.

Bhāṣya: **ata eva anuṣṭheya-karmaphala-vilakṣaṇaṃ mokṣākhyam aśarīratvaṃ nityamiti siddham |**

Therefore, it is established that the bodiless state is called **mokṣa;** eternal and entirely distinct from the results of any performable actions or rituals.

- **Mokṣa** is not a result of ritualistic actions (**Karma-phala**). Actions produce limited, temporary results, whereas **Mokṣa** is **Nitya** (eternal).
- **Definition of Mokṣa**: It is **Aśarīratvam**—bodilessness.

Ṭīkā: **nirdeha ātmasvarūpamokṣasya anādibhāvatve siddhe phalitamāha**

The Two Types of Eternity (Nityatva)

The text introduces a distinction to clarify the nature of **Mokṣa**:

1. **Pariṇāmi-nitya**: Changing eternity (something that remains through changes).
2. **Apariṇāmi-nitya** (or **Kūṭastha-nitya**): Unchanging eternity.

Mokṣa is the latter—it is beginningless (**Anādi**), a positive state (**Bhāva-rūpa**), and the very nature of the Self.

Practical Conclusion for the Seeker

- **Asaṅga (Unattached):** The Self is **asaṅgo hyayaṃ puruṣaḥ** (this person/Self is unattached). Identification with the body is a result of **bhrānti** (delusion) or **ajñāna** (ignorance).
- **Mokṣa as Nitya: mokṣa** is **nitya** (eternal),not a result to be produced (**asādhya**). It is **apariṇāmi-nitya** (unchangingly eternal), unlike the world which is **pariṇāmi-nitya** (eternally changing).
- **Purpose of Study:** The purpose of studying **vedānta** and the **bhāṣya** is to become **niṣṭha** (firmly established) in this knowledge. One must not study merely for information or for others, but for the removal of one's own sense of embodiment and suffering.

The Nature of Mokṣa as Aśarīratva (Page 163)

The central theme is whether the nature of **Mokṣa** is "bodilessness" (**Aśarīratva**) and whether this emancipation is natural or attained through effort.

Bhāṣya: iti priyāpriyasparśanapratiṣedhāccodanā-lakṣaṇadharmakāryatvaṃ mokṣākhyasya aśarīratvasya pratiṣidhyata iti gamyate |

The **Bhāṣya** explains that because there is a negation of the touch of pleasure and pain (**Priyāpriya-sparśana**) in liberation, **Mokṣa** cannot be the result of **Dharma** (virtuous deeds)

defined by Vedic injunctions (**Codanā**). If **Mokṣa** were a product of **Dharma**, it would necessarily involve the experience of pleasure and pain, which is the hallmark of the "embodied" state.

Key Points:

- **Aśarīratva** (Bodilessness) is the definition of **Mokṣa**.
- **The Incompatibility of Action:** If **Mokṣa** were a result of action (**Dharmakārya**), the negation of pleasure and pain would be impossible.
- **The Nature of the Self:** The Self, by its very nature, is not touched by **Sukhadukha** (happiness and sorrow).

Aśarīratva as a Natural State (Svābhāvika)

A doubt is raised: Is this bodilessness a result of some virtuous deeds? The teacher clarifies that it is the inherent nature of the Self.

Bhāṣya: aśarīratvameva dharmakāryamiti cet , na | tasya svābhāvikatvāt

If one argues that bodilessness itself is a result of **Dharma**, it is refuted because **Aśarīratva** is **Svābhāvika** (natural/innate). Here, "natural" does not mean "illusory" (**āvidyaka**), but rather refers to the **Svarūpa** (essential nature) of the Self.

Śruti Support for Aśarīratva:

1. **Aśarīraṃ śarīreṣu anavastheṣu avasthitaṃ mahāntaṃ vibhumātmānaṃ matvā dhīro na śocati** (The wise one does not grieve, knowing the great all-pervading Self to be bodiless among bodies, and as permanent amidst the impermanent).
2. **Aprāṇo hyamanāḥ śubhraḥ** (He is without breath, without mind, pure) — This **Muṇḍaka Śruti** negates the **Sūkṣma Śarīra** (subtle body), proving that **Aśarīratva** means the absence of both gross and subtle bodies.
3. **Asaṅgo hyayaṃ puruṣaḥ** (This Puruṣa is unattached).

Ṭīkā: nirdehātmasvarūpamokṣasyānādibhāvatve siddhe phalitamāH

The **Ṭīkā** emphasizes that **Mokṣa** is simply the Self-existent without a body (**Nirdeha**). It is **Anādi** (beginningless) and **Bhāva-rūpa** (a positive reality, not a mere absence).

Two Types of Eternity (Nityatva) (Page 164-165)

नित्यत्वेऽपि परिणामितया धर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षस्येत्याशङ्क्य नित्यं द्वेधा विभजते - तत्र किञ्चिदिति । नित्यवस्तुमध्य इत्यर्थः । परिणामि च तन्नित्यं चेति परिणामिनित्यम् । आत्मा तु कूटस्थनित्य इति न कर्मसाध्य इत्याह - इदं त्विति । परिणामिनो नित्यत्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञाकल्पितं मिथ्यैव । कूटस्थस्य तु नाशकाभावान्नित्यत्वं पारमार्थिकम् । कूटस्थत्वसिध्यर्थं परिस्पन्दाभावमाह - व्योमवदिति । परिणामाभावमाह - सर्वविक्रियारहितमिति । फलानपेक्षित्वान्न फलार्थापि क्रियेत्याह - नित्यतृप्तमिति । तृप्तिरनपेक्षत्वम् , विशोकं सुखं वा । निरवयवत्वान्न क्रिया । तस्य भानार्थमपि न क्रिया, स्वयञ्ज्योतिष्ट्वात् । अतः कूटस्थत्वान्न कर्मसाध्यो मोक्ष इत्युक्तम् । कर्मतत्कार्यासङ्गित्वाच्च तथेत्याह - यत्रेति । कालानवच्छिन्नत्वाच्चेत्याह - कालेति । कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तत इति योग्यतया सम्बन्धनीयम् । धर्माद्यनवच्छेदे मानमाह - अन्यत्रेति । अन्यदित्यर्थः । कृतात्कार्यात् , अकृताच्च कारणात् , भूताद्भव्याच्च, चकाराद्वर्तमानाच्च अन्यद्यत्पश्यसि तद्वदेत्यर्थः ।

तत्र किञ्चित्परिणामिनित्यं यस्मिन्विक्रियमाणेऽपि तदेवेदमिति बुद्धिर्न विहन्यते; यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्ववादिनाम् , यथा च साङ्ख्यानां गुणाः । इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम् , यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते । तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम् — 'अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात् । अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च' (क. उ. १ । २ । १४) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

The **Bhāṣya** and **Ṭīkā** distinguish between two types of "eternal" things to clarify why **Mokṣa** is not a product of action.

Ṭīkā: nityatve'pi pariṇāmitayā dharmakāryatvaṃ mokṣasyetyāśaṅkya nityaṃ dvedhā vibhajate - tatra kiñciditi | nityavastumadhya ityarthaḥ | pariṇāmi ca tannityaṃ ceti pariṇāminityam | ātmā tu kūṭasthanitya iti na karmasādhya ityāha - idaṃ tviti |

Bhāṣya: idaṃ tu pāramārthikaṃ kūṭasthanityaṃ vyomavatsarvavyāpi sarvavikriyārahitaṃ nityatṛptaṃ niravayavaṃ svayaṃjyotiḥsvabhāvam

Ṭīkā notes that **Pariṇāmi Nityatva** is imagined due to pratyabhijñā but is actually **Mithyā** (illusory/conditional), whereas **Kūṭastha Nitya** is **Pāramārthika** (absolute) because there is no cause for its destruction.

Type of Eternity	Definition	Examples
Pariṇāmi Nitya (Changing Eternal)	That which changes but retains the identity "That alone is this" (Tadevedam).	The world (Jagat) for Mīmāṃsakas, or Guṇas for Sāṅkhya.
Kūṭastha Nitya (Unchanging Eternal)	That which is absolutely changeless, partless, and beyond all modification.	Brahman / Mokṣa.

Essential Attributes of Brahman

Ṭīkā: pariṇāmābhāvamāha - sarvavikriyārahitamiti | phalānapekṣitvānna phalārthāpi kriyetyāha - nityatṛptamiti | tṛptiranapekṣatvam , viśokaṃ sukhaṃ vā | niravayavatvānna kriyā | tasya bhānārthamapi na kriyā, svayañjyotiṣṭvāt | ataḥ kūṭasthatvānna karmasādhyo mokṣa ityuktam | karmatatkāryāsaṅgitvācca tathetyāha - yatreti | kālānavacchinnatvāccetyāha - kāleti | kālatrayaṃ ca nopāvartata iti yogyatayā sambandhanīyam | dharmādyanavacchede mānamāha - anyatreti | anyadityarthaḥ | kṛtātkāryāt , akṛtācca kāraṇāt , bhūtādbhavyācca, cakārādvartamānācca anyadyatpaśyasi tadvadetyarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: tadetadaśarīratvaṃ mokṣākhyam — 'anyatra dharmādanyatrādharmādanyatrāsmātkṛtākṛtāt | anyatra bhūtācca bhavyācca' (ka. u. 1 | 2 | 14) ityādiśrutibhyaḥ |

Brahman is described as:

- **Pāramārthika**: Absolutely real. The Self is the only non-negatable reality, persisting through all states of consciousness (waking, dreaming, deep sleep).
- **Kūṭastha Nitya**: Changeless eternal. Like the anvil that remains still while being struck, the Self is the changeless witness of all mental and physical changes.
- **Vyomavat Sarvavyāpi** : All-pervading like space.
- **Sarva-vikriyā-rahita**: Free from all six modifications (birth, existence, growth, transformation, decay and death.).
- **Nitya-tṛpta**: Eternally content. Happiness for the Self is not a "gain" or a "result." Because it is inherently full (Purna), it lacks nothing and requires no external objects for fulfillment.
- **Svayaṃ-jyoti**: Self-luminous. The Self is self-evident. It requires no external light, no sensory perception, and no specific mental act (Kriya) to "shine." It is the Awareness that allows the mind itself to function.

The Transcendence of Action (Karma) and Time

Since **Mokṣa** is **Kūṭastha**, it cannot be achieved through **Karma**. Action only produces results that are non-eternal or involve modification.

Bhāṣya: yatra dharmādharmau saha kāryeṇa kālatrayaṃ ca nopāvartete |

In the Self (**Brahman**), neither **Dharma** (righteous deeds) nor **Adharma** (unrighteous deeds), along with their effects (happiness and sorrow), can enter. Furthermore, the three periods of time (**Kālatraya**) — past, present, and future — do not touch it.

Śruti: ‘anyatra dharmādanyatrādharmādanyatrāsmātkṛtākṛtāt | anyatra bhūtācca bhavyācca’ (ka. u. 1 | 2 | 14)

That which is other than **Dharma**, other than **Adharma**, other than cause and effect, and other than the past and future.

Mananam: Using the Pūrvapakṣa's View for Reflection

Thinking back on what is being discussed, an objection was raised by the opponent: If knowledge of the Self (**Atmajñāna**) immediately results in **Mokṣa**, why do we see "knowers" still experiencing hunger, thirst, or suffering?

The Opponent's Logic:

- Hearing "**Tat Tvam Asi**" (That Thou Art) alone should instantly remove the delusion of being a worldly being (**Saṃsāritva**).
- However, since we see people who have heard the scriptures still suffering, knowledge alone isn't enough. One must perform **Upāsanā** (meditation) or **Karma** to get results.

The Siddhāntin's Response:

1. **Locus of Suffering:** Suffering and hunger belong to the **Anātman** (non-Self/body/mind), not the **Atman**(which is bodiless).
2. **The Error of Perception:** The observer sees the **Jñānī** (knower) as with body (**Saśarīra**), but the **Jñānī** knows themselves to be bodiless (**Aśarīra**).
3. **Sādhana-catuṣṭaya:** If a seeker does not feel liberated after hearing the truth, it is due to a lack of mental purity or **Viveka** and **Vairāgya**. It is not a fault of the **Vedānta** philosophy.
4. **Nididhyāsana:** This is not a ritualistic action but the continuous flow of the thought "I am Brahman" to remove contrary habits of thought (**Viparīta Bhāvanā**).

If the Self is already free and action is irrelevant to its nature, the seeker's remaining task is the systematic removal of habitual, erroneous thoughts.

The Misconception	The Vedantic Truth
"I must perform actions or 'do' something to become the Self."	The Self is Nitya-siddha (ever-established). You cannot "become" what you already are. Action only creates temporary results.
"I still feel hunger and pain, so I am not yet liberated."	Hunger and pain are properties of the Anatman (non-self/body). The "failure" to feel free is a lack of Viveka (discrimination). The body is hungry; I am the witness.
"Vedanta has failed because the student still suffers."	The fault lies in the student's Viparita-bhavana (contrary thoughts), not the Knowledge. Liberation is the internal shift from "I am this body" to "I am the bodiless witness."

Nididhyasanam is not a ritual, but the process of making the Knowledge firm by removing Viparita-bhavana—the deeply ingrained belief that one is a limited, hungry, or time-bound entity.

Seeker's Checklist for Reflection

Use these shifts in perspective to align with the Paramarthika reality:

• **Shift from Virtuous Deeds to Nature**: I recognize that my freedom is not a reward for good deeds, but my inherent, bodiless nature (**Svābhavikam**).

• **Shift from Doing to Knowing**: I understand that because I am partless (**Niravayavam**), I cannot be the "doer" of any action (Kriya); I am the Knower.

• **Shift from Discontentment to Fulfillment**: When the mind suggests a need, I recall: "I am **Nitya-tripta**—eternally satisfied."

• **Shift from Body/Mind to Witness**: When the body experiences hunger or the mind experiences grief, I practice Viveka: "These are properties of the Anatman; I am the **Asharīra** (bodiless) witness."

• **Shift from Time to Eternity**: I cease worrying about the past or future, recognizing I am **Anyatra BhutAt ca BhavyAt**—beyond time.

The Essential Identity of Mokṣa and Brahman (Page 166-167)

ननु उक्ताः श्रुतयो ब्रह्मणः कूटस्थासङ्गित्वं वदन्तु, मोक्षस्य नियोगफलत्वं किं न स्यादिति, तत्राह - अत इति । तत्कैवल्यं ब्रह्मैव । कर्मफलविलक्षणत्वादित्यर्थः । ब्रह्माभेदान्मोक्षस्य कूटस्थत्वं धर्माद्यसङ्गित्वं चेति भावः । यद्वा यज्जिज्ञास्यं तद्ब्रह्म अतः पृथग्जिज्ञास्यत्वाद्धर्माद्यस्पृष्टमित्यर्थः । अतः शब्दाभावपाठेऽप्ययमेवार्थः । ब्रह्मणो विधिस्पर्शे शास्त्रपृथक्त्वं न स्यात् , कार्यविलक्षणानधिगतविषयलाभात् । नहि ब्रह्मात्मैक्यं भेदप्रमाणे जाग्रति विधिपरवाक्याल्लब्धुं शक्यम् । न वा तद्विना विधेरनुपपत्तिः । योषिदग्न्यैक्योपास्तिविधिदर्शनादिति भावः ।

Ṭīkā: nanu uktāḥ śrutayo brahmaṇaḥ kūṭasthāsaṅgitvaṃ vadantu, mokṣasya niyogaphalatvaṃ kiṃ na syāt

The opponent (**Pūrvapakṣa**) argues that, granted that the **śruti** (scriptures) declare Brahman to be **kuṭastha** (unchanging, immutable) and **asaṅgi** (unattached, relationless). But why should **Mokṣa** not be the result of a **niyoga** (injunction/command), just like other Vedic results?

The **Siddhāntin** responds saying that the primary thesis is that **Mokṣa** (liberation) is not something produced from action but is identical to **Brahman**. Because **Brahman** is **Kūṭastha** (unchangeable/eternal), **Mokṣa** must also be **Kūṭastha**.

Ṭīkā: tatkaivalyaṃ brahmaiva | karmaphalavilakṣaṇatvādityarthaḥ | brahmābhedānmokṣasya kūṭasthatvaṃ dharmādyasaṅgitvaṃ ceti bhāvaḥ |

Definition of Mokṣa: It is defined as **Brahmābheda** (non-different from **Brahman**). Therefore, "attaining" **Mokṣa** is synonymous with "attaining" **Brahman**.

The Nature of Attainment: This is not the attainment of something unreached (**Aprāptasya Prāpti**), but rather the **Prāptasya Prāpti** (attainment of that which is already attained).

Role of Knowledge: Knowledge (**Jñāna**) serves only to remove the ignorance that masks this already-attained state. If someone claims to have **Brahma-jñāna** but does not feel liberated, they haven't actually understood the truth. True knowledge is the realization that you are the **Caitanya** (consciousness) and the **Adhiṣṭhāna** (substratum) of the world, while the **Pañca-kośa** (five sheaths) are **Mithyā** (illusory).

Distinction Between Brahma-jijñāsā and Dharma-jijñāsā

The discussion emphasizes why the inquiry into **Brahman** requires a separate **Śāstra** (scripture) from the inquiry into **Dharma**.

Ṭīkā: yad jijñāsyaṃ tad brahma ataḥ pṛthak jijñāsyatvāt dharmādi aspṛṣṭamityarthaḥ |

Dharmādi-aspṛṣṭam: Brahman is untouched by **Dharma** (righteous deeds) or its ritualistic results.

Logical Inference for Separation:

- **Assertion: Brahman** is untouched by **Dharma**.
- **Reason:** Because it is a separate object of inquiry (**Pṛthak jijñāsyatvāt**).
- **Vyatireka (Negative) Example:** Heaven (**Svarga**) is an effect of **Dharma**; therefore, it is not an object of a separate metaphysical inquiry like **Brahman**.

Refutation of Vidhi-śeṣatva (Subordination to Injunctions)

The **Pūrvapakṣa** (opponent) argues that **Brahma-jñāna** is just a means to perform a certain meditation or action. This is firmly rejected.

Ṭīkā: brahmaṇo vidhisparśe śāstraprṛthaktvaṃ na syāt , kāryavilakṣaṇānadhigataviṣayalābhāt | nahi brahmātmaikyaṃ bhedapramāṇe jāgrati vidhiparavākyāllabdhuṃ śakyam | na vā tadvinā vidheranupapattiḥ | yoṣidagnyaikyopāstividhidarśanāditi bhāvaḥ |

Scriptural Necessity: If **Brahman** were merely a part of **Dharma** (ritual action), it would have been explained in **Dharma jijñāsā**. The fact that a separate inquiry is started proves **Brahman** is **Kārya-vilakṣaṇa** (distinct from any effect or action) and **Anadhigata** (previously unknown).

- **Incompatibility with Action:** If **Brahman** were subject to an injunction (**Vidhi-sparśa**), the distinctness of the **Brahma Sūtra** would be lost.

- **The Problem of Bheda (Duality):** An injunction requires a distinction between the commander, the action, and the result. However, the identity of **Brahman** and **Ātman** cannot be established through **Vidhi-paravākya** (injunctive sentences) because they are based on **Bheda** (difference).
- **The Yoṣit-Agni Analogy:** In the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad** (**Pañcāgni Vidyā**), a woman is meditated upon as fire (**Yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ**). Here, the identity between a woman and fire is artificial and for the sake of the meditation process (**upasānā vidhi**). **Brahman**-**Ātman** identity is not like this; it is a literal, factual reality, not a meditative overlay.

The Perishability of Action-based Mokṣa (Page 167-168)

अथवा मोक्षस्य नियोगासाध्यत्वे फलितं सूत्रार्थमाह - अत इति । यदत्र जिज्ञास्यं ब्रह्म तत्स्वतन्त्रमेव वेदान्तैरुपदिश्यते । समन्वयादित्यर्थः । विपक्षे दण्डं पातयति - तद्यदीति । तत्रैवं सतीति । मोक्षे साध्यत्वेनानित्ये सतीत्यर्थः । अत इति । मुक्तेर्नियोगासाध्यत्वेन नियोज्यालाभात् । कर्तव्यनियोगाभावादित्यर्थः ।

अतस्तद्ब्रह्म, यस्येयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता । तद्यदि कर्तव्यशेषत्वेनोपदिश्येत, तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यश्चेन्मोक्षोऽभ्युपगम्येत, अनित्य एव स्यात् । तत्रैवं सति यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेष्वनित्येषु कश्चिदतिशयो मोक्ष इति प्रसज्येत । नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैर्मोक्षवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते । अतो न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः ।

Ṭīkā: athavā mokṣasya niyogāsādhyatve phalitaṃ sūtrārthamāha

Bhāṣya: atastadbrahma, yasyeyaṃ jijñāsā prastutā | tadyadi kartavyaśeṣatvenopadiśyeta, tena ca kartavyena sādhyaścenmokṣo'bhyupagamyeta, anitya eva syāt | tatraivaṃ sati yathoktakarmaphaleṣveva tāratamyāvasthiteṣvanityeṣu kaścidatiśayo mokṣa iti prasajyeta |

If **Mokṣa** were a result of action (**Niyoga-sādhya**), it would be **Anitya** (temporary).

- **The Gradation of Fruits:** All actions have results that vary in degree (**Tāratamya**), such as being born as an animal, a human, or a **Gandharva**. If **Mokṣa** were a fruit of action, it would just be another temporary state in this hierarchy.
- **Vairāgya (Dispassion):** The understanding that even Heaven has a "queue" and involves jealousy (seeing those with more merit) leads to dispassion. **Mokṣa** must be eternal, which is only possible if it is **Siddha** (already accomplished) and not **Sādhya** (to be accomplished).

Samanvaya is **samyak (akhaṇḍārthaviṣayaka) anvaya (tātparya vishayatvam) :** Complete or Correct purport with "Indivisible Meaning" as the subject.

Knowledge as a Direct Fruit (Dṛṣṭa-phala) (Page 168-169)

प्रदीपात्तमोनिवृत्तिवज्ज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तिरूपमोक्षस्य दृष्टफलत्वाच्च न नियोगसाध्यत्वमित्याह - अपिचेति । यो ब्रह्माहमिति वेद स ब्रह्मैव भवति । परं कारणमवरं कार्यं तद्रूपे तदधिष्ठाने तस्मिन्दृष्टे सति अस्य द्रष्टुरनारब्धफलानि कर्माणि नश्यन्ति । ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपमानन्दं विद्वान्निर्भयो भवति, द्वितीयाभावात् । अभयं ब्रह्म प्राप्तोऽसि, अज्ञानहानात्तज्जीवाख्यं ब्रह्म गुरूपदेशादात्मानमेव अहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यवेत् विदितवत् । तस्माद्भेदनात्तद्ब्रह्म पूर्णमभवत् । परिच्छेदभ्रान्तिहानादेकत्वम् , अहं ब्रह्म इत्यनुभवतस्तत्रानुभवकाले मोहशोकौ न स्त इति श्रुतीनामर्थः ।

अपि च 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मु. उ. ३ । २ । ९), 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे' (मु. उ. २ । २ । ९), 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्न बिभेति कुतश्चन' (तै. उ. २ । ९ । १), 'अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि' (बृ. उ. ४ । २ । ४,) 'तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति, तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्' (वाजसनेयि ब्रह्मण. उ. १ । ४ । १०), 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः' (ई. उ. ७) इत्येवमाद्याः श्रुतयो ब्रह्मविद्यानन्तरमेव मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति ।

Unlike ritual results which are **Adṛṣṭa** (unseen/future), the fruit of **Brahma-jñāna** is immediate and visible in this life.

Bhāṣya: ato na kartavyaśeṣatvena brahmopadeśo yuktaḥ |

Ṭīkā: pradīpāttamonivṛttivajjñānādajñānanivṛttirūpamokṣasya dṛṣṭaphalatvācca na niyogasādhyatvamityāha

- **Analogy of Light:** Just as a lamp immediately removes darkness (**Pradīpāt tamo nivṛttivat**), knowledge immediately removes ignorance.
- **Upalakṣaṇa (Signifier):** Known-ness (**Jñātatva**) is merely an **Upalakṣaṇa** on the **Ātman**.
    - Analogy: "The house with the crow." Whether the crow stays or flies away, the house remains unchanged. Similarly, whether the **Ātman** is "known" or "unknown," the **Ātman** itself remains the same.
- **Spiritual Contentment:** This is evidenced by the **Gītā**; one who is **Ātma-tṛpta** (satisfied in the self) has no further duty (**Kārya**) to perform.

Scriptural Quotations for Immediate Liberation

The following quotes are used to prove that knowledge results in immediate abidance, not in something in the future.

Quote	Significance
'brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati' (mu. u. 3 | 2 | 9)	The knower of Brahman is indeed Brahman). This is not a future state (bhavishyati) but a present reality realized through knowledge.
'kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmindṛṣṭe parāvare' (mu. u. 2 | 2 | 9)	When the Self is seen, the "knots of the heart" (ignorance/attachments) are broken and all past karmas are destroyed
'ānandaṃ brahmaṇo vidvānna bibheti kutaścana' (tai. u. 2 | 9 | 1)	The knower of bliss as Brahman has no fear, as there is no "other."
'abhayaṃ vai janaka prāpto'si' (bṛ. u. 4 | 2 | 4,)	Knowledge leads to the end of the delusion of limitation (**Paricchedа bhranti hana**), allowing one to abide in total fulfillment

‘tadātmānamevāvedahaṃ brahmāsmīti, tasmāttatsarvamabhavat’ (vājasaneyi brahmaṇa. u. 1 | 4 | 10),	By knowing the Self as "**Aham Brahmāsmi**" (I am Brahman), the individual becomes everything (Sarva-rūpa). This is the answer to the fundamental question in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad: "By knowing what did Brahman become all?" The answer is that by knowing Itself, It became all. The state of **Sarvātma-bhāva** (the state of being the self of all) is not a future result but the very nature of **Brahma-jñāna**.
‘tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvamanupaśyataḥ’ (ī. u. 7)	In the "Time of Knowledge" (Vidyā-kāla), which refers to the period immediately following the attainment of knowledge (**Vidyā-prāpti-anantaram**), there is no delusion or sorrow. **The Significance of 'Anu':** The term **Anupaśyataḥ** contains the prefix **Anu**, which signifies **Śāstra-ācārya-upadeśa-paścāt** (following the instructions of the scriptures and the Teacher). One who "sees" or knows the unity of the Self after receiving these instructions cannot be touched by grief.

Denial of an Interval (Madhyakāryāntaram)

तासां तात्पर्यमाह - ब्रह्मेति । विद्यातत्फलयोर्मध्य इत्यर्थः । मोक्षस्य विधिफलत्वे स्वर्गादिवत्कालान्तरभावित्वं स्यात् , तथा च श्रुतिबाध इति भावः । इतश्च मोक्षो वैधो नेत्याह - तथेति ।

A central argument is that there is no action or "work" required between gaining knowledge and attaining liberation.

Bhāṣya: iti evamādyāḥ śrutayo brahmavidyānantaram eva mokṣam darśayantyo madhye kāryāntaram vārayanti

Explanation: These Śrutis demonstrate that liberation occurs immediately after **Brahmavidyā**. They exclude any intermediate action (**Madhyakāryāntaram**). This refutes the opponent’s view that after knowledge, one must perform a specific meditation (Upāsanā) or maintain a certain feeling to reach Mokṣa.

The Logic of Immediate Fruit:

Tīkā: Mokṣasya vidhiphalatve svargādivat kālāntarabhāvitvam syāt

Explanation: If liberation were the result of a ritualistic injunction (**Vidhi-phala**), it would be attained at a later time (**Kālāntara-bhāvi**), much like heaven (**Svarga**). However, the Śrutis

declare that liberation is immediate. To suggest an interval would result in **Śruti-bādha** (contradicting the scriptures).

The Realization of Sage Vāmadeva

तथा 'तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च' (बृ. उ. १ । ४ । १०) इति ब्रह्मदर्शनसर्वात्मभावयोर्मध्ये कर्तव्यान्तरवारणायोदाहार्यम् —

Tīkā: itaśca mokṣo vaidho netyāha - tatheti |

The example of Rishi **Vāmadeva** is used to illustrate the simultaneity of knowledge and the state of being everything.

Bhāṣya: Taddhaitatpaśyanṛṣirvāmadevaḥ pratipede aham manurbhavam sūryaśca (bṛ. u. 1 | 4 | 10)

Explanation: While seeing (realizing) the Truth, Sage **Vāmadeva** understood: "I was **Manu**, and I am the **Sūrya** (Sun)." This illustrates that **Brahma-darśana** (Vision of Brahman) and **Sarvātma-bhāva** (Being the Self of all) have no gap between them.

If one has not attained the feeling of being the Self of all, the knowledge is considered incomplete. True knowledge implies realizing "I am the eater, I am the food, and I am the enjoyer" from a relative perspective, while remaining **Nirguṇa** (without attributes) from the absolute perspective.

Conclusion on Liberation (Vaidho na)

Explanation: For this reason, liberation is not **Vaidha** (enjoined by a command or generated by a ritual/method). It is not a product of an action (**Vidhi-janya**). It is the inherent nature of the Self, revealed the moment ignorance is destroyed.

The Simultaneity of Vision and Attainment (Page 169-170)

तद्ब्रह्मैतत्प्रत्यगस्मीति पश्यन् तस्माज्ज्ञानात् वामदेवो मुनीन्द्रः शुद्धं ब्रह्म प्रतिपेदे ह तत्र ज्ञाने तिष्ठन् दृष्टवानात्ममन्त्रान् स्वस्य सर्वात्मत्वप्रकाशकान् 'अहं मनुः' इत्यादीन्ददर्शेत्यर्थः । यद्यपि स्थितिर्गानक्रियाया लक्षणम् , ब्रह्मदर्शनं तु ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिक्रियाया हेतुरिति वैषम्यमस्ति तथापि 'लक्षणहेत्वोः क्रियायाः' इति सूत्रेण क्रियां प्रति लक्षणहेत्वोरर्थयोर्वर्तमानाद्धातोः परस्य लटः शतृशानचावादेशौ भवत इति विहितशतृप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात्तिष्ठन्गायति इत्युक्ते तत्कर्तृकं कार्यान्तरं मध्ये न भातीत्येतावता पश्यन् प्रतिपेदे इत्यस्य दृष्टान्तमाह - यथेति ।

यथा 'तिष्ठन्गायति' इति तिष्ठतिगायत्योर्मध्ये तत्कर्तृकं कार्यान्तरं नास्तीति गम्यते ।

The core of the discussion revolves around two words: **Paśyan** (seeing/realizing) and **Pratipade** (attained/reached). The grammatical structure indicates that there is no time interval (**Kālāntara**) or intermediate action (**Kāryāntara**) between these two states.

Ṭīkā:tadbrahmaitatpratyagasmīti paśyan tasmājjñānāt vāmadevo munīndraḥ śuddhaṃ brahma pratipede

Explanation: Realizing "I am that Brahman which is the innermost Self (**Pratyak**)," the great sage **Vāmadeva**, through that very knowledge, attained the Pure Brahman (**Śuddha-brahma**), which refers to **Nirguṇa-brahma**.

The Vision of Ātma-Mantras:

Ṭīkā: tatra jñāne tiṣṭhan dṛṣṭavānātmamantrān svasya sarvātmatvaprakāśakān ‘ahaṃ manuḥ’ ityādīndadarśetyarthaḥ |

Explanation: While established in that knowledge, **Vāmadeva** "saw" the **Ātma-mantras**—mantras that reveal one's own nature as the Self of all (**Sarvātmatva**). He realized, "I was **Manu**, and I am the Sun." Whether these mantras pre-existed in the **Vedas** or were revealed through him, he became the "Seer" (**Mantradraṣṭā**) of his own universal identity.

Grammatical Analysis: The Śatṛ Suffix

Ṭīkā: yadyapi sthitirgānakriyāyā lakṣaṇam , brahmadarśanaṃ tu brahmapratipattikriyāyā heturiti vaiṣamyamasti tathāpi ‘lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ’ iti sūtreṇa kriyāṃ prati lakṣaṇahetvorarthayorvartamānāddhātoḥ parasya laṭaḥ śatṛśānacāvādeśau bhavata iti vihitaśatṛpratyayasāmarthyāttiṣṭhangāyati ityukte tatkartṛkaṃ kāryāntaraṃ madhye na bhātītyetāvatā paśyan pratipede ityasya dṛṣṭāntamāha

To prove that knowledge and liberation are simultaneous, the text employs an analogy from everyday language and Sanskrit grammar.

Bhāṣya: yathā tiṣṭhan gāyati iti tiṣṭhatigāyatyoḥ madhye tatkartṛkaṃ kāryāntaraṃ nāsti gamyate

Explanation: Just as in the phrase "**Tiṣṭhan gāyati**" (He sings while standing), where the acts of standing (**Tiṣṭhati**) and singing (**Gāyati**) happen together without any other action by the performer in between, the same applies here. The word **Paśyan** (realizing) replaces **Tiṣṭhan**, and **Pratipade** (attained) replaces **Gāyati**.

The Rule of Panini:

The **Ṭīkā** references the Sūtra: **lakṣaṇa-hetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ** (Pāṇini 3.2.126). This rule states that the **Śatṛ** and **Śānac** suffixes are used when an action serves as a "mark" (**Lakṣaṇa**) or a "cause" (**Hetu**) for another action.

- **Lakṣaṇa (Indicator): śayānā bhuñjate yavanāḥ** (The **Yavanas** eat while reclining). The act of reclining characterizes their eating.
- **Hetu (Cause):** adhīyāno vasati (He stays for the sake of studying). The study is the reason for the stay.

Although there is a slight technical difference—standing is a mark of singing, while seeing Brahman is the cause of attaining Brahman—the grammatical rule covers both. Therefore, the use of the **Śatṛ** participle in **Paśyan** confirms that there is no gap in time.

The Litmus Test for Knowledge

The philosophical conclusion is that if liberation (the cessation of sorrow and delusion) has not occurred, then true knowledge has not yet dawned.

Key Insight on Knowledge and Delay:

- The purpose of citing these grammatical rules and the example of **Vāmadeva** is to assert that there is absolutely no delay between **Jñāna** (knowledge) and **Mokṣa** (liberation).
- If someone claims to have "studied a lot" or "attained knowledge" but still experiences a sense of limitation (**Paricchinna-bhāva**), sorrow, or delusion, their understanding has not yet matured.

Important Note: One cannot have **Brahma-jñāna** and still be bound by the laws of karma or ritualistic requirements (**Karma**). The moment the "vision" (**Paśyan**) occurs, the "attainment" (**Pratipade**) is complete.

Knowledge as a Revealer, Not an Injunction (Page 170-171)

किं च ज्ञानादज्ञाननिवृत्तिः श्रूयते । ज्ञानस्य विधेयत्वे कर्मत्वादविद्यानिवर्तकत्वं न युक्तम् , अतो बोधका एव वेदान्ता न विधायका इत्याह - **त्वं हीति ।**

'त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकमविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि' (प्र. उ. ६ । ८), 'श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति; सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि, तं मा भगवाञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु' (छा. उ. ७ । १ । ३) 'तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनत्कुमारः' (छा. उ. ७ । २६ । २) इति चैवमाद्याः श्रुतयो मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रमेवात्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति ।

The text establishes that the purpose of the **Vedas** regarding **Brahma-vidyā** is to provide information and realization, not to command an action.

Ṭīkā: jñānāt ajñāna-nivṛttiḥ śrūyate | jñānasya vidheyatve karmatvāt avidyā-nivartakatvaṃ na yuktam ato bodhakā eva vedāntā na vidhāyakā

Explanation: If knowledge were a commanded action (**Vidhi**), it would become an object of work (**Karma**). However, **Karma** is not inherently opposed to ignorance (**Avidyā**). Therefore, knowledge cannot be a "commanded act" if it is to successfully remove ignorance. The **Vedānta** serves as a **Bodhaka** (informer/revealer) and not a **Vidhāyaka** (enjoiner).

The Praśna Upaniṣad: Crossing the Ocean of Ignorance

The dialogue between the six Rishis (such as **Bharadvāja**) and Sage **Pippalāda** is cited to show the nature of the Guru-disciple relationship and the power of knowledge.

Bhāṣya: ‘tvaṃ hi naḥ pitā yo'smākamavidyāyāḥ paraṃ pāraṃ tārayasi’ (pra. u. 6 | 8)

Explanation: The disciples address the Guru as their "Father" because he leads them across the "other shore" of ignorance. These Rishis were already **Saguṇa-brahmavids** (knowers of Brahman with attributes) but sought the **Nirguṇa** (attributeless) truth.

The Analogy of Light: Just as a cloud obscures the sun, ignorance obscures the Self. Knowledge acts like a wind that removes the cloud; it does not need to "create" the light of the Sun (**Ātman**), as the Sun is self-luminous.

Key Definitions (Ṭīkā):

- **Maho-dadhi:** The vast ocean of ignorance (**Avidyā**).
- **Para:** The state of **Punarāvṛtti-śūnyam** (freedom from the cycle of rebirth).
- **Pāra:** Refers to **Brahman**.
- **Plava:** The "boat" or "raft" of knowledge (**Vidyā-plava**) used to cross the ocean of sorrow.

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad: Nārada and Sanatkumāra (Page 170-171)

भारद्वाजादयः षड्ऋषयः पिप्पलादं गुरुं पादयोः प्रणम्य ऊचिरे - त्वं खल्वस्माकं पिता । यस्त्वमविद्यामहोदधेः परं पुनरावृत्तिशून्यं पारं ब्रह्म विद्याप्लवेनास्मांस्तारयसि प्रापयसि । ज्ञानेनाज्ञानं नाशयसीति यावत् । प्रश्नवाक्यमुक्त्वा छान्दोग्यमाह - श्रुतमिति ।

‘श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति; सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि, तं मा भगवाञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु’ (छा. उ. ७ । १ । ३) ‘तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनत्कुमारः’ (छा. उ. ७ । २६ । २) इति चैवमाद्याः श्रुतयो मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रमेवात्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति ।

The interaction between **Nārada** and **Sanatkumāra** highlights the difference between theoretical hearing (**Śravana**) and actual realization.

Bhāṣya: ‘śrutaṃ hyeva me bhagavaddṛśebhyastarati śokamātmaviditi; so'haṃ bhagavaḥ śocāmi, taṃ mā bhagavāñchokasya pāraṃ tārayatu’ (chā. u. 7 | 1 | 3)

Explanation: Nārada admits to **Sanatkumāra** that despite his vast learning, he is still grieving. He says, "I have heard from greats like you that a knower of the Self crosses sorrow, yet I am in sorrow." He requests the Guru to take him to the "other shore" of grief (**Śoka-sāgara**).

Logical Implication (Arthāpatti):

- The text explains that the statement "The knower of the Self crosses sorrow" proves the **Mithyātva** (illusory nature) of the world. If the world (sorrow/samsara) were real, knowledge could not destroy it. Since knowledge destroys it, the world must be an appearance.

Grammatical Note (Bhagavaḥ):

- The term **Bhagavaḥ** is a specific Vedic/Chāndogya vocative form derived through Pāṇinian rules (referencing matuvaso ru sambuddhau chandasi 8.3.1)

Reaching the "Other Shore" (Upakrama and Upasaṃhāra)

अत्र ‘तारयतु’ इत्यन्तमुपक्रमस्थम्, शेषमुपसंहारस्थमिति भेदः ।

The text distinguishes between the beginning and end of the teaching in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

Ṭīkā: atra tārayatu ityantam upakramasthaṃ, śeṣam upasaṃhārastham iti bhedaḥ

- **Explanation:** The request "Take me across" is the **Upakrama** (commencement). The final realization is the **Upasaṃhāra** (conclusion).
- **Final State: Sanatkumāra** shows **Nārada** the truth of **Brahman** after **Nārada's** impurities (**Kaṣāya**) were burnt away through **Tapas** (austerity).

Breaking the Knot of Ignorance

आत्मविच्छोकं तरतीति भगवत्तुल्येभ्यो मया श्रुतमेव हि न दृष्टम् , सोऽहमज्ञत्वात् हे भगवः, शोचामि, तं शोचन्तं मां भगवानेव ज्ञानप्लवेन शोकसागरस्य परं पारं प्रापयत्विति नारदेनोक्तः सनत्कुमारस्तस्मै तपसा दग्धकिल्बिषाय नारदाय तमसः शोकनिदानाज्ञानस्य ज्ञानेन निवृत्तिरूपं पारं ब्रह्म दर्शितवानित्यर्थः । ‘एतद्यो वेदसोऽविद्याग्रन्थिं विकिरति’ इति वाक्यमादिशब्दार्थः ।

Ṭīkā: ātmavicchokaṃ taratīti bhagavattulyebhyo mayā śrutameva hi na dṛṣṭam , so'hamajñatvāt he bhagavaḥ, śocāmi, taṃ śocantaṃ māṃ bhagavāneva jñānaplavena śokasāgarasya paraṃ pāraṃ prāpayatviti nāradenoktaḥ sanatkumārastasmai tapasā dagdhakilbiṣāya nāradāya tamasaḥ śokanidānājñānasya jñānena nivṛttirūpaṃ pāraṃ brahma darśitavānityarthaḥ | ‘etadyo vedaso'vidyāgranthiṃ vikirati’ iti vākyamādiśabdārthaḥ |

Finally, a reference to the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad is provided to show the immediate effect of knowledge. One who knows the **Ātman** hidden in the "cave" of the heart (**Guhā**) unties/breaks the knot of ignorance (**Avidyā-granthi**).

The teachers again and again remind us by emphasizing the importance of studying the **Prasthānatrayī** (Upanishads, Brahma Sutras, and Gita) through the traditional **Sampradāya** (lineage).

- **Analysis of "Śokanidānājñānasya" (Ṭīkā):**
    - **Analysis:** This is a compound where **Śokasya nidānam** (the root of sorrow) is the **Ajñānam** (ignorance). It is a **Karmadhāraya** compound where the "root cause" is identified with "ignorance."
- **Traditional Study:** Even if one has not heard directly from a physical Guru, studying the **Śaṅkara-bhāṣya** and **Ṭīkā** ensures one remains within the **Sampradāya**, as they are not projecting their own subjective meanings onto the text.

The text further establishes that liberation is achieved solely through the realization of Truth (**Tattva-pramā**), not through ritualistic actions (**Karma**).

The Destruction of the Ignorance-Knot

The **Muṇḍakopaniṣad** (2.1.10) serves as the scriptural foundation: **‘etadyo veda so'vidyāgranthiṃ vikirati’**

When an individual recognizes the **Caitanya** (**Consciousness**) available in the intellect as their true "I" (**Aham**), the **Avidyā-granthi** (**knot of ignorance**) is destroyed. This destruction leads to the cessation of **Śoka** (**grief**) and **Moha** (**delusion**).

Bhāṣya:iti caivamādyāḥ śrutayo mokṣapratibandhanivṛttimātramevātmajñānasya phalaṃ darśayanti |
Explanation: The scriptures demonstrate that the fruit of **Ātmajñāna** is simply the removal of the obstacles to liberation (**Mokṣa-pratibandha-nivṛtti**). Since the **Ātman** is eternally attained (**Satata-prāpta**) and of the nature of bliss, it is only due to the "obstruction" of ignorance that one perceives oneself as limited, happy, or unhappy.

The Nyāya Sūtra to Support the Argument (Page 172)

तत्राक्षपादगौतममुनिसंमतिमाह - तथा चेति ।

तथा च आचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपबृंहितं सूत्रम् — ‘दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः’ (न्या. सू. १ । १ । २) इति ।

To support the Vedantic view that knowledge removes ignorance, the **Bhāṣya** references **Akṣapāda Gautama Muni**, the founder of the **Nyāya** school.

The Chain of Bondage

Gautama’s fundamental **Sūtra** (1.1.2) outlines the sequence of liberation:

Nyāya Sūtra: ‘दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः’ (न्या. सू. १ । १ । २)

Bhāṣya: ‘duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānāmuttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyādapavargaḥ’ (nyā. sū. 1 | 1 | 2)

This **Sūtra** describes five factors where the removal of the subsequent leads to the removal of the preceding, eventually leading to **Apavarga** (**Liberation**).

Level	Factor	Description
1	**Mithyājñāna**	False knowledge (superimposing Ātman on Anātman and vice-versa).
2	**Doṣa**	Defects (Attraction/Rāga, Aversion/Dveṣa, and Delusion/Moha).
3	**Pravṛtti**	Activity (Religious merit/Dharma and demerit/Adharma).
4	**Janma**	Rebirth (Caused by the accumulation of Karma).
5	**Duḥkha**	Suffering (The result of embodied existence).

The Mechanics of Removal

गौरोऽहमिति मिथ्याज्ञानस्यापाये रागद्वेषमोहादिदोषाणां नाशः, दोषापायाद्धर्माधर्मस्वरूपप्रवृत्तेरपायः, प्रवृत्यपायात्पुनर्देहप्राप्तिरूपजन्मापायः, एवं पाठक्रमेणोत्तरोत्तरस्य हेतुनाशान्नाशे सति तस्य प्रवृत्तिरूपहेतोरनन्तरस्य कार्यस्य जन्मनोऽपायाद्दुःखध्वंसरूपोऽपवर्गो भवतीत्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: gauro'hamiti mithyājñānasya apāye rāga-dveṣa-mohādidoṣāṇāṃ nāśaḥ

When **Mithyājñāna** (such as the delusion "**Gauro'ham**" or "I am fair/white") is removed through **Samyag-jñāna** (**Right Knowledge**), the defects of **Rāga** and **Dveṣa** are destroyed. Without these defects, there is no further **Pravṛtti** (tendency toward ritualistic or worldly action). Without action, there is no further **Janma** (**Birth**), and consequently, **Duḥkha** (**Suffering**) ceases.

Brahmātmaikatva-vijñāna vs. Upāsanā (Page 172-173)

ननु पूर्वसूत्रे 'तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः' इत्युक्ते सतीतरपदार्थभिन्नात्मतत्त्वज्ञानं कथं मोक्षं साधयतीत्याकाङ्क्षायां मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिद्वारेणेति वक्तुमिदं सूत्रं प्रवृत्तम् । तथा च भिन्नात्मज्ञानान्मुक्तिं वदत्सूत्रं सम्मतं चेत्परमतानुज्ञा स्यादित्यत आह - मिथ्येति । तत्त्वज्ञानान्मुक्तिरित्यंशे सम्मतिरुक्ता भेदज्ञानं तु 'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति' इति श्रुत्या भ्रान्तित्वात् 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' इति श्रुत्या अनर्थहेतुत्वाच्च न मुक्तिहेतुरिति भावः । ननु ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानमपि भेदज्ञानवन्न प्रमा, सम्पदादिरूपत्वेन भ्रान्तित्वादित्यत आह - न चेदमित्यादिना ।

मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानाद्भवति ।

A critical distinction is made between **Brahmātmaikatva-vijñāna** (**Knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman**) and various meditative exercises. The opponent suggests that this knowledge is just another form of meditation, which the text refutes by defining four distinct types of **Upāsanā**.

I. Sampad Upāsanā (Meditation by Superimposition)

अल्पालम्बनतिरस्कारेणोत्कृष्टवस्त्वभेदध्यानं सम्पत् , यथा मनःस्ववृत्त्यानन्त्यादनन्तम् , तत उत्कृष्टा विश्वेदेवा अप्यनन्ता इत्यनन्तत्वसाम्यात् विश्वेदेवा एव मन इति सम्पत्तयानन्तफलप्राप्तिर्भवति तथा चेतनत्वसाम्याज्जीवे ब्रह्माभेदः सम्पदिति न चेत्यर्थः ।

न चेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं सम्पद्रूपम् — यथा 'अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता विश्वेदेवा अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति' (बृ. उ. ३ । १ । ९) इति ।

This involves taking an inferior support (**Alpa-ālambana**) and meditating upon it as a superior object based on some commonality.

Ṭīkā: alpālambana-tiraskāreṇa utkṛṣṭa-vastu-abheda-dhyānaṃ sampad

- **Example:** Meditating on the **Manas** (**Mind**) as the **Viśvedevas**.
- **Logic:** Both the mind and the **Viśvedevas** are "infinite" (**Ananta**). By disregarding the limited nature of the mind and focusing on the infinity of the deity, one attains "infinite worlds."
- **Vedantic Refutation: Brahmātmaikatva** is not a **Sampad**. It is not "treating" the **Jīva** as **Brahman** based on the commonality of **Cetana** (**Consciousness**); it is the realization of their absolute identity.

II. Adhyāsa / Pratīka Upāsanā (Symbolic Meditation)

आलम्बनस्य प्राधान्येन ध्यानं प्रतीकोपास्तिरध्यासः । यथा ब्रह्मदृष्ट्या मनस आदित्यस्य वा । तथा अहं ब्रह्मेति ज्ञानमध्यासो नेत्याह - न चेति । आदेश उपदेशः ।

न चाध्यासरूपम् — यथा 'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत' (छा. उ. ३ । १८ । १) 'आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः' (छा. उ. ३ । १९ । १) इति च मनआदित्यादिषु ब्रह्मदृष्ट्यध्यासः ।

In this form, the support (**Ālambana**) remains primary, but one superimposes the vision of the Supreme upon it.

Bhāṣya: na ca adhyāsa-rūpam yathā 'mano brahmeti upāsīta', 'ādityo brahmeti ādeśaḥ'

- **Example:** "Meditate on the Mind as **Brahman**" or "The Sun is **Brahman**."
- **Logic:** Here, the Mind or Sun is the **Pratīka** (**Symbol**). Just as one sees **Viṣṇu** in a **Śāligrāma** stone, the stone remains the focus of the ritual (washing, offering flowers), but the thought is of the Divine.
- **Vedantic Refutation:** Self-knowledge is not an "overlap" or a "superimposition" (**Adhyāsa**) of **Brahman**-hood onto the self; it is the removal of the false notion that the self was ever separate.

III. Saṃvarga Upāsanā (Meditation on Functional Unity) (Page 175)

क्रियाविशेषो विशिष्टक्रिया तथा योगो निमित्तं यस्य ध्यानस्य तत्तथा । यथा प्रलयकाले वायुरग्न्यादीन्संवृणोति संहरतीति संवर्गः, स्वापकाले प्राणो वागादीन्संहरतीति संहारक्रियायोगात्संवर्ग इति ध्यानं छान्दोग्ये विहितम् , तथा वृद्धिक्रियायोगाज्जीवो ब्रह्मेति ज्ञानमिति नेत्याह - नापीति ।

नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोगनिमित्तम् 'वायुर्वाव संवर्गः' (छा. उ. ४ । ३ । १) 'प्राणो वाव संवर्गः' (छा. उ. ४ । ३ । ३) इतिवत् ।

Meditation based on a specific ritualistic or cosmic function (**Viśiṣṭa-kriyā-yoga**).

Bhāṣya: nāpi viśiṣṭa-kriyā-yoga-nimittaṃ 'vāyurvāva saṃvargaḥ' 'prāṇo vāva saṃvarga' itivat

- **Example: Vāyu** (**Air**) is called **Saṃvarga** because it absorbs fire, water, etc., during dissolution. Similarly, **Prāṇa** is **Saṃvarga** because it absorbs the senses during sleep.
- **Logic:** The meditation is based on the "act of absorbing" (**Saṃhāra-kriyā**).
- **Vedantic Refutation:** The realization "I am **Brahman**" is not based on an action or a function like "growth" (**Vṛddhi**).

IV. Karmāṅga-saṃskāra (Refinement of Ritual Action)

यथा 'पत्न्यवेक्षितमाज्यं भवति' इति उपांशुयाजाद्यङ्गस्याज्यस्य संस्कारकमवेक्षणं विहितं तथा कर्मणि कर्तृत्वेनाङ्गस्यात्मनः संस्कारार्थं ब्रह्मज्ञानं नेत्याह - नाप्याज्येति ।

नाप्याज्यावेक्षणादिकर्मवत्कर्माङ्गसंस्काररूपम् । This is when knowledge is used merely to purify a factor of a ritual.

Ṭīkā: yathā patnī-avekṣitam ājyaṃ bhavati

- **Example:** In a sacrifice, the wife looks at the **Ājya** (**Clarified Butter**) to sanctify it. This "looking" (**Avekṣaṇa**) is a refinement (**Saṃskāra**) that makes the butter fit for the ritual.
- **Logic:** The opponent argues that **Brahmajñāna** is just a "refinement" of the performer (**Kartā**) to make them better at performing **Karma**.
- **Vedantic Refutation:** This is rejected because **Brahmajñāna** destroys the very notion of being a "performer" (**Kartṛtva**).

The Reality of Non-Duality (Page 176)

प्रतिज्ञाचतुष्टये हेतुमाह - सम्पदादीति ।

सम्पदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने, 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा. उ. ६ । ८ । ७) 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' (बृ. उ. १ । ४ । १०) 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' (बृ. उ. २ । ५ । १९) इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तुप्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत ।

The text concludes that any knowledge involving "difference" (**Bheda-jñāna**) is actually a cause of worldly existence (**Anartha-hetu**), not liberation.

One who sees "manifoldness" or "many-ness" here goes from death to death. Liberation only arises from **Brahmātma-ekatva-vijñāna**—the direct realization of the oneness of the individual self and the Supreme Self. While Vedānta agrees with Nyāya that knowledge destroys ignorance, it clarifies that only the knowledge of Non-duality can truly terminate the cycle of birth and death.

The Four Prohibitions and the Integrity of Mahāvākyas

उपक्रमादिलिङ्गैर्ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तुनि प्रमितिहेतुर्यः समानाधिकरणवाक्यानां पदनिष्ठः समन्वयस्तात्पर्यं निश्चितं तत्पीड्येत ।

The **Ṭīkā** identifies four specific "propositions" (**pratijñā**) regarding what **brahma-jñāna** is not.

Ṭīkā: **pratijñācatuṣṭaye hetumāha**

The four-fold proposition is stated: The knowledge of the oneness of **Brahman** and **Atman** is not in the form of **saṃpad** (symbolic identification), not **adhyāsa** (superimposition), not **saṃvarga** (absorption), and not **karmāṅga** (an accessory to action).

Bhāṣya: **sampadādirūpe hi brahmātmaikatvavijñāne'bhyupagamyamāne, 'tattvamasi' (chā. u. 6 | 8 | 7) 'ahaṃ brahmāsmi' (bṛ. u. 1 | 4 | 10) 'ayamātmā brahma' (bṛ. u. 2 | 5 | 19) ityevamādīnāṃ vākyānāṃ brahmātmaikatvavastupratipādanaparaḥ padasamanvayaḥ pīḍyeta |**

If **brahmātmaikatva-vijñāna** were accepted as a form of **saṃpad** (meditative identification), then the coordination of terms (**pada-samanvaya**) in **mahāvākya**s like "**tattvamasi**" (That Thou Art), "**ahaṃ brahmāsmi**" (I am **Brahman**), and "**ayamātmā brahma**" (This **Atman** is **Brahman**) would be ruined or damaged. In other words, it would negate the meaning of **mahāvākya**s.

Ṭīkā: **upakramādiliṅgairbrahmātmaikatvavastuni pramitiheturyaḥ samānādhikaraṇavākyānāṃ padaniṣṭhaḥ samanvayastātparyaṃ niścitaṃ tatpīḍyeta |**

• **Samanvaya (Coordination)**: If we treat these statements as mere symbolic meditations (like thinking of the mind as infinite), the primary purpose of the Vedas—to reveal the actual identity of the self and **Brahman**—would fail. The term **samanvaya** refers to the "ascertainment of the intended meaning" (**tātparya-niścitam**).

• **Grammatical Relation**: These sentences function through **sāmānādhikaraṇya** (grammatical coordination/apposition). In sentences like **tattvamasi**, the words **tat** (That) and **tvam** (Thou) share the same substratum. This is not a relationship of attribute-substantive (like "blue lotus"), but one of identity through **lakṣaṇā** (implication/indication).

The Fruit of Knowledge: Destruction of the Ego-Knot (Page 177)

किं च एकत्वज्ञानादाज्ञानिकहृदयस्यान्तःकरणस्य यो रागादिग्रन्थिश्चिन्मनस्तादात्म्यरूपाहङ्कारग्रन्थिर्वा नश्यतीत्यज्ञाननिवृत्तिफलवाक्यबाधः स्यात् , सम्पदादिज्ञानस्याप्रमात्वेनाज्ञानानिवर्तकत्वात् ।

'भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः' (मु. उ. २ । २ । ९) इति चैवमादीन्यविद्यानिवृत्तिफलश्रवणान्युपरुध्येरन् । 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मु. उ. ३ । २ । ९) इति चैवमादीनि तद्भावापत्तिवचनानि सम्पदादिरूपत्वे न सामञ्जस्येनोपपद्येरन् । तस्मान्न सम्पदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम् ।

True knowledge is distinguished from meditative identification by its immediate results—the removal of ignorance.

Ṭīkā: **kiṃ ca ekatvajñānādājñānikahṛdayasyāntaḥkaraṇasya yo rāgādigranthiścinmanastādātmyarūpāhaṅkāragranthirvā naśyatītyajñānanivṛttiphalavākyabādhaḥ syāt , sampadādijñānasyāpramātvenājñānānivartakatvāt |**

From the knowledge of oneness, the "knots of the heart" (the internal organ/mind) of the ignorant—consisting of attachment (**rāga**) and aversion (**dveṣa**)—are destroyed. This knot is the **ahaṃkāra-granthi** (ego-knot), which is the identification (**tādātmya**) between consciousness (**cit**) and the mind (**manas**).

Bhāṣya: **'bhidyate hṛdayagranthiśchidyante sarvasaṃśayāḥ' (mu. u. 2 | 2 | 9) iti ca evam ādīni avidyā-nivṛtti-phala-śravaṇāni uparudhyeran**

If knowledge were just **saṃpada**, then scriptural statements regarding the fruit of the cessation of ignorance would be contradicted/blocked.

Hṛdaya-granthi: The term "heart" refers to the **antaḥkaraṇa** (internal organ). The "knot" is the mutual identification of the **Atman** (Self) and **anātman** (not-Self). Knowing the **Atman** as the **anātman** is the ego.

Pramā vs. Saṃpad: **Saṃpad** (symbolic meditation) is not **pramā** (valid knowledge). Since it is not **pramā**, it lacks the power (**sāmarthya**) to actually destroy ignorance (**ajñāna**).

The Impossibility of "Becoming" Brahman via Effort

किञ्च जीवस्य ब्रह्मत्वसम्पदा कथं तद्भावः । पूर्वरूपे स्थिते नष्टे वान्यस्यान्यात्मतायोगात् । तस्मान्न सम्पदादिरूपमित्यर्थः ।

A crucial philosophical point is raised: can a **jīva** (individual soul) become **Brahman** through symbolic thought?

Ṭīkā: **kiñca jīvasya brahmatvasampadā kathaṃ tadbhāvaḥ | pūrvarūpe sthite naṣṭe vānyasyānyātmatāyogāt |**

Through a symbolic identification (**saṃpada**) of the **jīva** as **Brahman**, how can the state of being **Brahman** (**brahma-bhāva**) actually occur? It is impossible for something to attain a different nature while either retaining its original form or after being destroyed.

Key Elaborations:

• **The Pot Analogy**: A clay pot cannot become gold by simply meditating "I am a gold pot." If it retains the nature of clay, it isn't gold. If the clay is destroyed, the "pot" is gone, so who became gold?.

• **The Jīva's Dilemma**: If the **jīva** maintains its limited nature (**jīvatva**—feeling like a doer and enjoyer) while meditating on **Brahman**, it never actually becomes **Brahman**. If it drops its **jīvatva**, then the "individual" who was supposed to become **Brahman** no longer exists to experience that state.

Ṭīkā: **tasmānna sampadādirūpamityarthaḥ |**

Conclusion: Thus, **brahmātmaikatva-vijñāna** is not **saṃpadrūpa**.

Knowledge is Vastutantra (Object-Dependent), Not Puruṣatantra (Effort-Dependent) (Page 178)

सम्पदादिरूपत्वाभावे फलितमाह - अत इति । प्रमात्वान्न कृतिसाध्या । किं तर्हि नित्यैव ? न, प्रमाणसाध्येत्यर्थः । उक्तरीत्या सिद्धब्रह्मरूपमोक्षस्य कार्यसाध्यत्वं तज्ज्ञानस्य नियोगविषयत्वं च कल्पयितुमशक्यं कृत्यसाध्यत्वादित्याह - एवंभूतस्येति ।

अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवद्वस्तुतन्त्रैव । एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणस्तज्ज्ञानस्य च न कयाचिद्युक्त्या शक्यः कार्यानुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुम् ।

The core distinction between ritual action and knowledge is explained here.

"He who knows **Brahman** becomes **Brahman**." Therefore, **brahma-vidyā** is not dependent on human activity/effort (**puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantra**).

Ṭīkā: **pramātvānna kṛtisādhyā । kiṃ tarhi? nityaiva | na, pramāṇasādhyetyarthaḥ |**

Because it is **pramā** (valid knowledge), it is not accomplished through effort (**kṛti-sādhya**); rather, it is accomplished through the means of knowledge (**pramāṇa-sādhya**).

Bhāṣya: **pratyakṣa ādi pramāṇa-viṣaya-vastujñānavad vastutantra eva |**

Like the knowledge of an object through perception (**pratyakṣa**) and other **pramāṇa**s, this knowledge is dependent on the object itself (**vastu-tantra**).

Puruṣa-tantra (Human-dependent): Actions are **puruṣa-tantra**. You can choose to do them, not do them, or do them differently (e.g., choosing where to sit in a lecture, or choosing your mode of transport). These choices do not produce knowledge.

Vastu-tantra (Object-dependent): Knowledge depends on the reality of the object and the efficiency of the **pramāṇa**. No amount of "action" or "circus" will produce knowledge if the essential requirements for the **vṛtti** (mental modification) are not met.

Role of Effort: Effort is required for the means (like reaching the place of study), but the actual dawn of knowledge is strictly **vastu-tantra**.

Brahman is Beyond Injunctions and Worship (Page 178-179)

ननु ब्रह्म कार्याङ्गम् , कारकत्वात्पत्न्यवेक्षणकर्मकारकाज्यवदिति चेत् , किं ज्ञाने ब्रह्मणः कर्मकारकत्वमुतोपासनायाम् । नाद्य इत्याह - **न चेति** । शाब्दज्ञानं विदिक्रियाशब्दार्थः - विदितं कार्यमविदितं कारणं तस्मादधि अन्यदित्यर्थः । येनात्मना इदं सर्वं दृश्यं लोको जानाति तं केन करणेन जानीयात् । तस्मादविषय आत्मेत्यर्थः ।

न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः — ‘अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि’ (के. उ. १ । ४) इति विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधात् , ‘येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्’ (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । १४) इति च ।

The opponent raises an objection:

Ṭīkā: nanu brahma kāryāṅgam , kārakatvāt patni avekṣaṇa karmakāraka ājyavad iti

Objection: Brahman is an accessory (aṅga) of ritual action (kārya). That is, Brahman is not independent mokṣa-svarūpa, but merely part of a Vedic ritual structure. Because Brahman functions as a **kāraka** (instrumental factor in action). Like the wife glancing the **Ājya (clarified butter)** in a ritual.

To this the **Siddhāntin** asks**:**

Ṭīkā: **kiṃ jñāne brahmaṇaḥ karmakārakatvamutopāsanāyām | nādya ityāha**

In which context is Brahman considered a kāraka? Two possibilities:

1. In **jñāna**?
2. In **upāsanā**?

The opponent must clarify:

- Is Brahman an instrumental factor in knowledge?
- Or is Brahman an instrumental factor in meditation?

The text now refutes the idea that it cannot be in the first case (not in knowledge).

Bhāṣya: na ca vidikriyākarmatvena kāryānupraveśo brahmaṇaḥ — ‘anyadeva tadviditādatho aviditādadhi’ (ke. u. 1 | 4) iti vidikriyākarmatvapratiṣedhāt

Ṭīkā: **śābdajñānaṃ vidikriyāśabdārthaḥ - viditaṃ kāryamaviditaṃ kāraṇaṃ tasmādadhi anyadityarthaḥ |**

Brahman does not enter into action as an object of a prescribed act (**vidhi-kriyā**). Scriptural texts state it is "different from the known (**vidita**) and above the unknown (**avidita**)," thereby negating its status as an object of prescribed knowledge-action.

Śābda-jñāna (verbal knowledge) has as its object the meaning of words. That which is known is an effect (kārya), and that which is unknown is a cause (kāraṇa); therefore, ‘other than that’ is the intended meaning.

Bhāṣya: **‘yenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijānāti taṃ kena vijānīyāt’ (bṛ. u. 2 | 4 | 14)**

Ṭīkā: **yenātmanā idaṃ sarvaṃ dṛśyaṃ loko jānāti taṃ kena karaṇena jānīyāt | tasmādaviṣaya ātmetyarthaḥ |**

"By whom all this is known, how can one know that Knower?" By that very Self through which this entire perceptible world is known — by what instrument could one know That? Therefore, the Self is not an object (of knowledge).

Brahma and the Mind (Manas) (Page 179)

न द्वितीय इत्याह - तथेति । 'यन्मनसा न मनुते' इति श्रुत्या लोको मनसा यद्ब्रह्म न जानातीत्यविषयत्वमुक्त्वा तदेवावेद्यं ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि तत्तूपाधिविशिष्टं देवतादिकमित्युपासते जना नेदं ब्रह्मेत्यर्थः ।

तथोपास्तिक्रियाकर्मत्वप्रतिषेधोऽपि भवति — 'यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते' इत्यविषयत्वं ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य, 'तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि, नेदं यदिदमुपासते' (के. उ. १ । ५) इति ।

Siddhāntin now refutes the idea that (**Nirguṇa**) Brahman can be an object of **upāsanā.** The text now clarifies the relationship between the mind and the Absolute.

Ṭīkā: 'yanmanasā na manute' iti śrutyā loko manasā yad brahma na jānāti iti aviṣayatvamuktvā tadevāvedyaṃ brahma tvaṃ viddhi

Non-Objectivity of Mind: According to the **Śruti**, **Brahma** is not something the mind can think of. It is not a subject/object of mental modifications (**mano-vṛtti**).

The Status of Worshiped Deities

Ṭīkā: **tattu upādhi viśiṣṭaṃ devatādikaṃ iti upāsate janā na idaṃ brahma ityarthaH**

Bhāṣya: tathopāstikriyākarmatvapratiṣedho'pi bhavati — 'yadvācānabhyuditaṃ yena vāgabhyudyate' ityaviṣayatvaṃ brahmaṇa upanyasya, 'tadeva brahma tvaṃ viddhi, nedaṃ yadidamupāsate' (ke. u. 1 | 5) iti |

People worship various deities characterized by limiting adjuncts (**upādhi-viśiṣṭa**). However, anything that can be pointed to as "this" (**idam**) is not the primary, unconditioned **Brahma**. The true **Brahma** is the non-objectifiable (**avedya**).

The Objection (Pūrvapakṣa): The Dilemma of Śāstra-yonitva

ब्रह्मणः शाब्दबोधाविषयत्वे प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति शङ्कते - अविषयत्व इति ।

अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् ,

If **Brahma** is entirely beyond the scope of words and cognition, a logical contradiction arises regarding its definition as being known through Scripture.

Bhāṣya: aviṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ śāstrayonitvānupapattiriti cet

The Argument: If **Brahma** is not an object (**aviṣaya**), then the definition of **Brahma** as **Śāstra-yonitva** (having Scripture as its source of knowledge) becomes untenable.

The Contradiction: Previously, it was stated that **Brahma** is **Śāstra-pramāṇakam** (proven by Scripture) because it is the intended meaning (**tātparya-viṣaya**) of the **Vedānta**. If it is not an object of knowledge, the prior "promise" or proposition (**pratijñā**) is violated.

The Resolution (Siddhānta): Vṛtti-Vyāpti vs. Phala-Vyāpti

The resolution lies in a technical distinction regarding how knowledge functions in the context of the Self-luminous Absolute.

वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिकृताविद्यानिवृत्तिफलशालितया शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं वृत्तिविषयत्वे अपि स्वप्रकाशब्रह्मणो वृत्त्यभिव्यक्तस्फुरण अविषयत्वात् अप्रमेयत्वम् इति परिहरति ।

Ṭīkā: vedāntajanyavṛttikṛta avidyānivṛttiphalaśālitayā śāstrapramāṇakatvam vṛttiviṣayatve api svaprakāśa brahmaṇo vṛttyabhivyaktasphuraṇa aviṣayatvāt aprameyatvam iti pariharati

Key Concepts of the Resolution:

- **Vedānta-janya-vṛtti:** Listening to the **Mahāvākyas** of **Vedānta** generates a specific mental modification known as the **Brahmākāra-vṛtti** (the modification in the form of **Brahma**).
- **Avidyā-nivṛtti:** The sole "fruit" (**phala**) of this **vṛtti** is the destruction of ignorance (**avidyā**).
- **Double Pervasion (Vyāpti):**
    1. **Vṛtti-Vyāpti:** The mind reaches out and "envelopes" the object. This happens in the case of **Brahma** because the **vṛtti** is necessary to remove the veil of ignorance.
    2. **Phala-Vyāpti:** In ordinary objects (like a pot), the reflected consciousness (**cidābhāsa**) in the **vṛtti** illuminates the object. This does not happen with **Brahma**.

Why Phala-Vyāpti is Absent in Brahma:

Brahma is self-luminous (**svaprakāśa**). It does not require a secondary light (reflected consciousness) to be revealed.

- **Analogy of the Lamp and the Sun:** Bringing a lamp to see the sun is redundant. The lamp's light (reflected consciousness) performs no function in revealing the sun (the Self).
- **The Role of Vṛtti:** The **Brahmākāra-vṛtti** is only required to destroy the ignorance that hides the already-shining **Brahma**. Once the "cover" is removed, **Brahma** shines by itself.

Comparison: Knowing a Pot (Ghaṭa) vs. Knowing Brahma

Feature	Ordinary Object (Pot)	Brahma
Vṛtti-Vyāpti	Present (Mind forms **ghaṭākāra-vṛtti**)	Present (Mind forms **brahmākāra-vṛtti**)
Phala-Vyāpti	Present (**Cidābhāsa** illuminates the pot)	**Absent (No "extra" light needed)**
Nature	Inert (**Jaḍa**)	Self-luminous (**Svaprakāśa**)
Requirement	Needs **vṛtti** and **cidābhāsa**	Needs **vṛtti** only for **avidyā-nivṛtti**

The Nature of Scripture: Removal of Superimposed Duality (Page 180)

परत्वात्फलत्वादित्यर्थः । निवृत्तिरूपब्रह्मतात्पर्यादिति वार्थः । उक्तं विवृणोति - नहीति । चिद्विषयत्वमिदन्त्वम् । अविषयता अनिदन्तया । अदृश्यत्वे श्रुतिमाह - तथा चेति । यस्य ब्रह्मामतं चैतन्यविषय इति निश्चयस्तेन सम्यगवगतम् । यस्य त्वज्ञस्य ब्रह्म चैतन्यविषय इति मतं स न वेद । उक्तमेव दार्ढ्यार्थमनुवदति - अविज्ञातमिति । अविषयतया ब्रह्म विजानतामविज्ञातमदृश्यमिति पक्षः । अज्ञानां तु ब्रह्म विज्ञातं दृश्यमिति पक्ष इत्यर्थः । दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं चाक्षुषमनोवृत्तेः साक्षिणम् , अनया दृश्यया दृष्ट्या न पश्येर्विज्ञातेर्बुद्धिवृत्तेर्निश्चयरूपायाः साक्षिणं तथा न विषयीकुर्यादित्याह - नेति ।

न; अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । न हि शास्त्रमिदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयत् अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति । तथा च शास्त्रम् — 'यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः । अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्' (के. उ. २ । ३) 'न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः' (बृ. उ. ३ । ४ । २) 'न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः' (बृ. उ. ३ । ४ । २) इति चैवमादि ।

The primary function of the **Śāstra** (Scripture) is not to "show" **Brahman** as a new object, but to negate the imagined differences born of ignorance.

Bhāṣya: na | avidyā kalpita bheda nivṛtti paratvāt śāstrasya

Ṭīkā: paratvātphalatvādityarthaḥ | nivṛttirūpabrahmatātparyāditi vārthaḥ |

Explanation: The Scripture is **nivṛtti-para**—it is focused on the cessation of the differences imagined through **avidyā** (ignorance). The term **parattva** (being "intent upon" or "purport") is interpreted in two ways by the **Ṭīkā**:

1. **Phalattvāt:** The ultimate "fruit" or result of Scripture is the removal of duality.
2. **Tātparyāt:** The intended meaning (**tātparya**) of Scripture is **Brahman**, which is itself of the nature of the cessation of all differences (**nivṛtti-rūpa-brahman**).

Brahman as "Non-This" (Anidantayā)

The text clarifies that **Brahman** cannot be pointed to as an external object.

Bhāṣya: nahi śāstram idantayā viṣaya bhūtam brahma pratipipādayiṣati

Explanation: Scripture does not establish **Brahman** as "This" (**idantayā**). If it were presented as "this," it would become a limited, objective entity (**viṣaya-bhūta**).

Ṭīkā: cidviṣayatvamidantvam | aviṣayatā anidantayā |

Bhāṣya: kiṃ tarhi ? pratyagātmatvena aviṣayatayā pratipādayat avidyākalpitaṃ vedya-veditṛ-vedanādibhedam apanayati |

Explanation: Scripture reveals **Brahman** as the **pratyag-ātman** (the Inner Self) and as an **aviṣaya** (non-object). By doing so, it removes (**apanayati**) the ignorance-imagined distinctions of the knower, the known, and the knowledge. Once this triad disappears, the realization "**ātmā idaṃ sarvam**" (The Self is all this) dawns.

The "differences" (**bheda**) being negated are the fundamental categories of worldly experience:

- **Vettṛ** (The Knower / **pramātā**)
- **Vedana** (The act of Knowing / **pramāṇa**)
- **Vedya** (The Known / **prameya**)

Scriptural Testimony: The Kena Upaniṣad

The non-objective nature of **Brahman** is supported by the **Kena Upaniṣad**, which highlights that those who think they "know" it as an object are actually in ignorance.

Ṭīkā: adṛśyatve śrutimāha - tathā ceti | yasya brahmāmataṃ caitanyaviṣaya iti niścayastena samyagavagatam | yasya tvajñasya brahma caitanyaviṣaya iti mataṃ sa na veda |

Bhāṣya: ‘yasyāmataṃ tasya mataṃ mataṃ yasya na veda saḥ | avijñātaṃ vijānatāṃ vijñātamavijānatām’ (ke. u. 2 | 3)

Explanation:

- **Perspective of the Wise:** One for whom **Brahman** is **amatam** (not an object of mental determination) is the one who truly knows. They realize **Brahman** is the subject, not the object.
- **Perspective of the Ignorant:** One who believes "I have known **Brahman** (as an object)" remains in ignorance (**na veda saḥ**).
- **The Paradox: Brahman** is **avijñātam** (unknown) to the **vijānatām** (the wise, who know it isn't an object) and **vijñātam** (claimed to be known) by the **avijānatām** (the ignorant).

Note on "Miracles": Practitioners who have not gained knowledge through traditional lineage (**asampradāya-vid**) often seek "miracles," "lights," or "visions" during meditation. If one sees a light and thinks, "Now my knowledge is firm," they have merely found another object (**idantayā**). True knowledge is the firm conviction that **Brahman** is the ever-present Witness, never a "seen" object.

The Witness is Beyond the Senses: Bṛhadāraṇyaka Quotes

Bhāṣya: na dṛṣṭerdraṣṭāraṃ paśyeḥ na śruteḥ śrotāraṃ śṛṇuyāḥ na mater mantāraṃ manvīthā na vijñāter vijñātāraṃ vijānīyāḥ (bṛ. u. 3 | 4 | 2)

Explanation:

- **Na dṛṣṭerdraṣṭāraṃ paśyeḥ:** You cannot see the seer of seeing. The **sākṣī** (witness) who enables the eyes to see cannot be seen by the eyes.
- **Na vijñāter vijñātāraṃ vijānīyāḥ:** You cannot know the knower of knowledge. The intellect's mental modifications (**vṛtti**) cannot turn back to "grasp" the witness that illumines them.

The Eternity of Liberation (Mokṣa) (Page 181)

नन्वविद्यादिनिवर्तकत्वेन शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्येऽपि निवृत्तेरागन्तुकत्वान्मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यादिति नेत्याह - अत इति । तत्त्वज्ञानादित्यर्थः । ध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वादात्मरूपत्वाच्च नानित्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः । उत्पत्तिविकाराप्तिसंस्काररूपं चतुर्विधमेव क्रियाफलं तद्भिन्नत्वान्मोक्षस्य नोपासनासाध्यत्वमित्याह - यस्य तु इत्यादिना तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा इत्यन्तेन । तथा उत्पाद्यत्ववत्विकार्यत्वे चापेक्षत इति युक्तमित्यन्वयः । दूषयति - तयोरिति । स्थितस्यावस्थान्तरं विकारः ।

अतोऽविद्याकल्पितसंसारित्वनिवर्तनेन नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपसमर्पणान्न मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वदोषः । यस्य तूत्पाद्यो मोक्षः, तस्य मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षत इति युक्तम् । तथा विकार्यत्वे च । तयोः पक्षयोर्मोक्षस्य ध्रुवमनित्यत्वम् ।

A significant objection is raised: If **Mokṣa** is the result of Scripture removing ignorance, does it not become an "event" with a beginning? If it has a beginning (**āgantukatva**), must it not also have an end?

Ṭīkā: avidyādi nivartakatvena śāstrasya prāmāṇye'pi nivṛtteḥ āgantukatvāt mokṣasya anityatvaṃ syāt

Bhāṣya: avidyā kalpita saṃsāritva nivartanena nitya mukta ātma svarūpa samarpaṇāt na mokṣasya anityatva doṣaḥ

Explanation:

1. **Not a New Production: Mokṣa** does not "create" a new state. It simply removes the imagined state of being a **saṃsārī** (transmigrator).
2. **Recognition:** It is the "handing over" or realization of the **nitya-mukta-ātma-svarūpa** (the eternally liberated nature of the Self). You were always free; you only stop imagining you are bound.
3. **Eternal Negation:** In **Vedānta**, the destruction (**dhvaṃsa**) of ignorance is considered eternal. Once ignorance is destroyed by the **brahmākāra-vṛtti**, it never returns. Because the "result" is the eternal Self itself, there is no defect of impermanence (**anityatva-doṣa**).

The Four Types of Action-Results (Kriyā-phala)

Ṭīkā: utpatti-vikāra-āpti-saṃskāra rūpaṃ caturvidhameva kriyāphalaṃ tadbhinnatvāt mokṣasya na upāsanā sādhyatvam ityāha

In the context of Vedic inquiry, any result achieved through action (**kriyā**) or worship (**upāsanā**) falls into one of four categories. These are known as the four **vikāras** (modifications/results):

1. **Utpatti** (Production/Origination): Creating something that did not exist before (e.g., making a pot from clay).
2. **Vikāra** (Modification/Transformation): Changing the state of an existing thing (e.g., turning milk into curd).
3. **Āpti** (Attainment/Reach): Reaching a destination or state (e.g., traveling to a village).
4. **Saṃskāra** (Refinement/Purification): Polishing or cleaning an object to improve its quality (e.g., cleaning a mirror).

Mokṣa is distinct from all four. Since it is not a result of action, it is not **upāsanā-sādhyatvam** (attainable through worship).

1. Mokṣa is Not an "Effect" (Utpādya)

If liberation were something produced, it would be dependent on human effort, which contradicts its eternal nature.

Bhāṣya: **yasya tu utpādyaḥ mokṣaḥ tasya mānasaṃ vācikaṃ kāyikaṃ vā kāryam apekṣata iti yuktam**

Explanation: If one holds the view that **Mokṣa** is "produced" (**utpādya**), then it would necessarily require mental (**mānasa**), vocal (**vācika**), or physical (**kāyika**) actions. However, in the **Siddhānta** (established conclusion), **Mokṣa** is not produced; it is **Nitya** (eternal).

The **Brahmākāra-vṛtti** (the mental modification in the form of **Brahma**) occurs in time, but the resulting knowledge is: "I am **Nitya-mukta**" (eternally free). Liberation is the recognition of an already existing fact, not the creation of a new state.

The Flaw of Impermanence (Anityatva)

If **Mokṣa** were considered either produced (**utpādya**) or a modification (**vikārya**), it would suffer from the defect of being temporary.

Bhāṣya: tayoḥ pakṣayoḥ mokṣasya dhruvam anityatvam

Explanation: In both cases—whether **Mokṣa** is a product or a transformation—it would be "certainly impermanent" (**dhruvam anityatvam**). Whatever has a beginning in time must inevitably have an end. If you "gain" liberation through action, you can also "lose" it when the merit of that action is exhausted.

2. Mokṣa is Not Modification (Vikārya)

The commentary provides a precise definition of what constitutes a "modification."

Ṭīkā: **sthitasya avasthāntaraṃ vikāraḥ**

Explanation: Vikāra is defined as the transition of an existing entity from its current state to another state (**avasthāntaram**). Since **Brahma** is changeless and without parts, it cannot undergo an "other state." Therefore, **Mokṣa**—which is the realization of one's nature as **Brahma**—cannot be a modification.

The Necessity of Study (Adhyayana)

A doubt arises: If **Mokṣa** is already eternal and nitya, why bother with study and contemplation?

- **The Purpose of Effort:** Effort is required to remove the deep-rooted ignorance (**avidyā**) that makes the eternal **Mokṣa** seem "lost."
- **Stability of Knowledge:** One must study until they are firmly established in the knowledge (**jñāna-niṣṭhā**). Without this, a person might intellectually claim "**Mokṣa** is eternal," but at the slightest worldly disturbance (**vikṣepa**), their equanimity vanishes.
- **Brahmākāra-vṛtti:** The goal of study is to maintain the **Brahmākāra-vṛtti** until the identification with the body and ego is completely dissolved. Without this practice, "Brahma-knowledge" remains mere lip service and disappears in the face of practical life challenges.

3. Mokṣa is Not Attainment (Āpya) (Page 182)

नन्वनित्यत्वनिरासाय क्रियया स्थितस्यैव ब्रह्मणो ग्रामवदाप्तिरस्तु, नेत्याह - न चेति । ब्रह्म जीवाभिन्नं न वा । उभयथाप्याप्तत्वान्न क्रियापेक्षेत्याह - स्वात्मेत्यादिना ।

न च आप्यत्वेनापि कार्यापेक्षा, स्वात्मस्वरूपत्वे सत्यनाप्यत्वात्; स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वं , सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्तस्वरूपत्वात्सर्वेण ब्रह्मण आकाशस्येव ।

An opponent suggests that **mokṣa** could be an attainment of **Brahman** through action, similar to reaching a destination.

The Objection

Ṭīkā: **nanu anityatva nirāsāya kriyayā sthitasya eva brahmaṇo grāmavatāptiḥ astu**

An opponent argues that to avoid the defect of impermanence (**anityatva**), we should view the attainment of **Brahman** (which is already in existence) through action, just as one reaches a village (**grāma**). The village exists before the traveler arrives, so the "attainment" doesn't make the village impermanent.

The Siddhānta (Conclusion)

Bhāṣya: **na ca āpyatvenāpi kāryāpekṣā svātmasvarūpatve sati anāpyatvāt; svarūpa vyatiriktatve api brahmaṇo na āpyatvam , sarvagatatvena nitya āptasvarūpatvāt sarveṇa brahmaṇaH ākāśasya iva |**

Even if **brahman** is considered "attainable," it does not require action (**kārya**). Since **Brahman** is the very nature of one's own self (**svātma-svarūpatvāt**), it is already attained and cannot be one "to be attained" (**anāpyatvāt**).

The school of thought provides two logic paths:

1. **Non-difference**: If the **jīva** (individual soul) is non-different from **Brahman**, **Brahman** is already the Self. You cannot "attain" what you already are.
2. **Difference (Pervasiveness)**: Even if one argues they are different, **Brahman** is **sarvagata** (all-pervasive) like space (**ākāśa**). Being omnipresent, it is eternally "attained" by everyone.

4. Mokṣa is Not Purification (Saṃskārya)

The Analogy of Rituals

यथा व्रीहीणां संस्कार्यत्वेन प्रोक्षणापेक्षा तथा मोक्षस्य नेत्याह - नापीत्यादिना । गुणाधानं व्रीहिषु प्रोक्षणादिना, क्षालनादिना वस्त्रादौ मलापनयः ।

नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः, येन व्यापारमपेक्षेत । संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्यात् , दोषापनयनेन वा । न तावद्गुणाधानेन सम्भवति, अनाधेयातिशयब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य । नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।

Ṭīkā: **yathā vrīhīṇāṃ saṃskāryatvena prokṣaṇāpekṣā tathā mokṣasya**

Just as rice grains (**vrīhi**) require the ritual of sprinkling water (**prokṣaṇa**) for their refinement (**saṃskāra**) in a sacrifice, perhaps **mokṣa** requires a similar refining action.

Defining saṃskāra

Bhāṣya: saṃskāro hi nāma saṃskāryasya guṇādhānena vā syāt , doṣāpanayanena vā |

Refinement consists of two possibilities:

- **guṇādhāna**: Adding a new quality or excellence to the object.
- **doṣāpanayana**: Removing a defect or impurity from the object.

Refutation for Brahman

Bhāṣya: na tāvadguṇādhānena sambhavati, anādheya-atiśayabrahmasvarūpatvāt mokṣasya | nāpi doṣa-apanayanena, nityaśuddhabrahmasvarūpatvāt mokṣasya |

- **Against Adding Qualities**: Refinement by adding a quality is impossible because the nature of **brahman** (which is **mokṣa**) is **anādheya-atiśaya**. This means no excellence (**atiśaya**) can be added to it; it is already full and complete.
- **Against Removing Defects**: **Bhāṣya**: Refinement by removing defects is impossible because **mokṣa** is the nature of the eternally pure (**nitya-śuddha**) **brahman**. There are no defects to remove.

The Mirror Analogy and Impurity (Page 183)

शङ्कते - स्वात्मधर्म इति । ब्रह्मात्मस्वरूप एव मोक्षोऽनाद्यविद्यामलावृत उपासनया मले नष्टेऽभिव्यज्यत इत्यत्र दृष्टान्तः - यथेति ।

स्वात्मधर्म एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रिययाऽऽत्मनि संस्क्रियमाणेऽभिव्यज्यते — यथा आदर्शे निघर्षणक्रियया संस्क्रियमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्म इति चेत् , न; क्रियाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेरात्मनः ।

An opponent attempts to save the **saṃskāra** argument by using the example of a mirror.

The Mirror Objection

Ṭīkā: **brahmātmasvarūpa eva mokṣo'nādyavidyāmalāvṛta upāsanayā male naṣṭe'bhivyajyata**

Mokṣa is indeed the nature of the Self, but it is covered by the "stain" of beginningless ignorance (**anādi-avidyā-mala**). Through action/worship (**upāsanā**), the stain is destroyed and **mokṣa** is revealed, just as a mirror reflects light clearly only after it is cleaned (**ādarśa-nigharṣaṇa-kriyā**).

The Logic Trap: Is the Stain Real?

संस्कारो मलनाशः । किमात्मनि मलः सत्यः कल्पितो वा । द्वितीये ज्ञानादेव तन्नाशो न क्रियया । आद्ये क्रिया किमात्मनिष्ठा अन्यनिष्ठा वा ।

यदाश्रया हि क्रिया, तमविकुर्वती नैवात्मानं लभते । यद्यात्मा क्रियया विक्रियेत, अनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत ।'अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते'(भ. गी. २ । २५) इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन् । तच्चानिष्टम् । तस्मान्न स्वाश्रया क्रिया आत्मनः सम्भवति ।

Ṭīkā: saṃskāro malanāśaḥ | kimātmani malaḥ satyaḥ kalpito vā | dvitīye jñānādeva tannāśo na kriyayā | ādye kriyā kimātmaniṣṭhā anyaniṣṭhā vā |

The **siddhāntī** (proponent) asks: Is this impurity (**mala**) real (**satya**) or imagined (**kalpita**)?

- If **Imagined**: It is destroyed by knowledge (**jñāna**), not action (**kriyā**).
- If **Real**: Does the action occur in the Self (**ātmani**) or somewhere else?

However, if it is considered "real" (**Vāstavika**), the question arises: where does the purifying action take place?

- Does action reside within the Self (**Ātmaniṣṭhā**), or does it reside elsewhere (**Anya-niṣṭhā**)?
- If one does not engage in this systematic inquiry (**Vicāra**), they remain trapped in delusions (**Bhrānti**), performing actions without understanding their efficacy or the lack thereof.
- **Vicāra** is a disciplined scriptural method which requires analyzing successive positions (**Pakṣa**) to reach the truth.

Why Purifying Action Cannot Abide in the Self

नाद्य इत्याह - न, क्रियेति । अनुपपत्तिं स्फुटयति - यदिति । क्रिया हि स्वाश्रये संयोगादिविकारमकुर्वती न जायत इत्यर्थः । तच्च वाक्यबाधनम् ।

Ṭīkā: nādya ityāha - na, kriyeti | anupapattiṃ sphuṭayati - yaditi | kriyā hi svāśraye saṃyogādivikāramakurvatī na jāyata ityarthaḥ | tacca vākyabādhanam |

The Self cannot be the locus of action because such a position is logically untenable. The following points elaborate on this impossibility:

Action Modifies its Substratum

Bhāṣya: yadāśrayā hi kriyā, tamavikurvatī naivātmānaṃ labhate |

Action cannot exist without modifying its substrate (**āśraya**). If action were to occur in the Self, it would necessarily produce a modification (**vikāra**). Action cannot establish its own existence without producing a modification (**Vikāra**) in the substratum in which it resides. Here, "**ātmānam**" refers to the action's own nature (**svātmānam**); meaning, action is not even defined as "action" unless it changes its locus.

Bhāṣya: yadyātmā kriyayā vikriyeta, anityatvamātmanaḥ prasajyeta |

If the Self were to be modified by action, the Self would become impermanent (**anitya**).

Bhāṣya: 'avikāryo'yamucyate'(bha. gī. 2 | 25) iti caivamādīni vākyāni bādhyeran | taccāniṣṭam | tasmānna svāśrayā kriyā ātmanaḥ sambhavati |

This contradicts the scripture (**śruti**) which states the Self is changeless (**avikārya**). If the Self were subject to change, scriptural statements (**Śruti** and **Smṛti**) that define the Self as changeless (**Avikārya**) would be invalidated (**Bādhita**). Logic that contradicts **Śruti** is considered flawed.

- **Example:** Any action, such as speaking, involves the expenditure of energy and causes exhaustion in the gross (**Sthūla**) and subtle (**Sūkṣma**) bodies. If the Self were the actor, it would also suffer exhaustion and decay.

Why Purifying Action Cannot Abide in the Non-Self (Page 184)

न द्वितीय इत्याह - अन्येति । अविषयत्वात् । क्रियाश्रयद्रव्यासंयोगित्वादिति यावत् । दर्पणं तु सावयवं क्रियाश्रयेष्टकाचूर्णादिद्रव्यसंयोगित्वात्संस्क्रियत इति भावः ।

अन्याश्रयायास्तु क्रियाया अविषयत्वान्न तयाऽऽत्मा संस्क्रियते ।

If action resides in something other than the Self, it cannot purify the Self.

Bhāṣya: anyāśrayāyāḥ tu kriyāyā aviṣayatvāt na tayā ātmā saṃskriyate

An action residing in another locus cannot refine or sanctify (**Saṃskāra**) the Self because the Self is not the object (**Aviṣaya**) of that action.

1. Lack of Connection (Asaṃyoga)

Ṭīkā: aviṣayatvāt | kriyāśraya-dravya asaṃyogitvāt iti yāvat |

Action resides in a substance (**Dravya**). Since the Self has no contact (**Asaṃyoga**) with the substance that acts as the locus of action, it remains unaffected.

2. The Mirror Analogy

Ṭīkā: darpaṇaṃ tu sāvayavaṃ kriyā āśraya iṣṭakā-cūrṇādidravyasaṃyogitvāt saṃskriyate

The example of a mirror (**Darpaṇa**) is often used to show purification. However, a mirror is composed of parts (**Sāvayava**) and can be physically joined with cleaning agents like brick powder (**Iṣṭakā-cūrṇa**). The Self is partless and cannot be "cleaned" in this manner.

Body vs. Self: The Illusion of Purification

अन्यक्रिययान्यो न संस्क्रियत इत्यत्र व्यभिचारं शङ्कते - नन्विति । आत्मनो मूलाविद्याप्रतिबिम्बितत्वेन गृहीतस्य नरोऽहमिति भ्रान्त्या देहतादात्म्यमापन्नस्य क्रियाश्रयत्वभ्रान्त्या संस्कार्यत्वभ्रमान्न व्यभिचार इत्याह - नेति ।

ननु देहाश्रयया स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतधारणादिना क्रियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो दृष्टः, न; देहादिसंहतस्यैवाविद्यागृहीतस्यात्मनः संस्क्रियमाणत्वात् ।

The opponent (**Pūrvapakṣī**), likely a **Mīmāṃsaka**, argues that we visibly see the "embodied one" (**Dehī**) being purified by actions like bathing.

Bhashya: nanu dehāśrayayā snāna-ācamana-yajñopavīta dhāraṇādinā kriyayā dehī saṃskriyamāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ

An objection: Actions like bathing (**snāna**), sipping water (**ācamana**), and wearing the sacred thread (**yajñopavīta**) are actions of the body (**Deha**), they are seen to purify the "embodied one" (**dehī**).

The Counter-Argument: Delusion of Identity

Ṭīkā: ātmano mūlā-avidyā-pratibimbitatvena-gṛhītasya naro'ham iti bhrāntyā deha-tādātmyamāpannasya kriyāśrayatva-bhrāntyā saṃskāryatva-bhramāt na vyabhicāraḥ

The **siddhāntī** clarifies that these purifications belong to the body-complex, not the Self. The Self, reflected in primal ignorance (**Mūlā-avidyā**), identifies as a human ("I am a man"). Due to this identification, when the body is cleaned, the individual falsely perceives, "I am purified." This is a perceived refinement (**Saṃskāra**), not a factual one.

- The Self identifies with the body due to **avidyā** (ignorance).
- When the body is cleaned, the individual falsely thinks, "I am pure."
- This is a **bhrānti** (delusion) caused by **deha-tādātmya** (identification with the body).

Bhāṣya: dehādi-saṃhatasya-eva-avidyā-gṛhītasya ātmanaḥ saṃskriyamāṇatvāt

Only the Self that is "grasped by ignorance" and identifies with the aggregate of the body and senses (**Dehādi-saṃghāta**) appears to be purified. In reality, actions like bathing are **Pratyakṣa** (perceptually) inherent only in the body (**Deha-samavāyitva**).

The **Siddhāntin** (Vedāntin) clarifies that there is no logical fallacy (**Vyabhicāra**) here. The apparent refinement of the Self is due to **Avidyā**.

प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नानाचमनादेर्देहसमायित्वम् ।

Bhāṣya: pratyakṣaṃ hi snāna ācamanādeḥ dehasamavāyitvam |

Explanation: It is a matter of direct perception that actions like bathing and sipping water reside in the body via **Samavāya-sambandha** (inherence). Since these are actions (**Kriyā**), they must reside in a substance (**Dravya**), which in this case is the body.

तया देहाश्रयया तत्संहत एव कश्चिदविद्ययाऽऽत्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रियत इति युक्तम् ।

Bhāṣya: tayā dehāśrayayā tatsaṃhata eva kaścit avidyayātmatvena parigṛhītaḥ saṃskriyata iti yuktam |

Explanation: The **Cidābhāsa** (reflection of consciousness) identifies with the body-mind complex. Due to **Avidyā**, one takes the body to be the Self (**Ātmatva-parigraha**). When the body—the locus of the action—is purified, the individual falsely feels, "I have been purified." There is no instance where the impurity is in one place and the purification occurs in another without this false identification.

The Analogy of Medical Treatment (Page 185)

कश्चिदिति । अनिश्चितब्रह्मस्वरूप इत्यर्थः । यत्रात्मनि विषये आरोग्यबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तस्य देहसंहतस्यैवारोग्यफलमित्यन्वयः ।

यथा देहाश्रयचिकित्सानिमित्तेन धातुसाम्येन तत्संहतस्य तदभिमानिन आरोग्यफलम् , ‘अहमरोगः’ इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते — एवं स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतधारणादिकया ‘अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः’ इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, स संस्क्रियते । स च देहेन संहत एव ।

The text uses the example of health to illustrate how bodily changes are superimposed on the "I."

Ṭīkā: aniścitabrahmasvarūpa ityarthaḥ | yatrātmani viṣaye ārogyabuddhirutpadyate tasya dehasaṃhatasyaivārogyaphalamityanvayaḥ |

Explanation: This refers to one who has not yet realized their true nature as **Brahman**. Such a person identifies with the **Saṃghāta** (aggregate of body/senses).

Bhāṣya: yathā dehāśrayacikitsānimittena dhātusāmyena tatsaṃhatasya tadabhimānina ārogyaphalam , ‘ahamarogaḥ’ iti yatra buddhirutpadyate

Explanation: When medicine is taken to balance the **Dhātus** (the three humors: **Vāta**, **Pitta**, and **Kapha**), the result is **Dhātu-sāmya** (equilibrium). Although the chemical/biological change happens in the body, the person says, "I am healthy" (**Aham arogaḥ**). The "I" (**Aham**) here refers to the **Cidābhāsa** due to **Tādātmya** (identification) with the body.

Citing the Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra-saṃgraha, Swamiji mentions three primary obstacles (**Vighna**) or desires (**Eṣaṇā**) that prevent one from cutting the knot of body-identification:

1. **Kāñcana** (Wealth/Gold/Finance).
2. **Kāminī** (Lust/Sensual attraction).
3. **Rasanendriya** (The organ of taste/gluttony).

Without **Vairāgya** (dispassion) toward these, no amount of study of **Vedānta** will yield results, as the body-identity (**Deha-bhāva**) will remain intact.

The Performer and the Reaper of Fruits

ननु देहाभिन्नस्य कथं संस्कारः, तस्यामुष्मिकफलभोक्तृत्वायोगादित्यत आह - तेनेति । देहसंहतेनैवान्तःकरणप्रतिबिम्बात्मना कर्ताहमिति भासमानेन प्रत्ययाः कामादयो मनस्तादात्म्यादस्य सन्तीति प्रत्ययिना क्रियाफलं भुज्यत इत्यर्थः । मनोविशिष्टस्यामुष्मिकभोक्तुः संस्कारो युक्त इति भावः ।

तेनैव ह्यहंकर्त्रा अहंप्रत्ययविषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रिया निर्वर्त्यन्ते ।

Ṭīkā: dehābhinnasya kathaṃ saṃskāraḥ, tasya āmuṣmikaphalabhoktṛtva ayogāt ityata

Explanation: A logical challenge is raised regarding the continuity of results in the afterlife (**Āmuṣmika-phala**) if the doer is seemingly identical to the perishable body.

Bhāṣya: tena eva hi ahaṃkartrā ahaṃpratyayaviṣayeṇa pratyayinā sarvāḥ kriyā nirvartyante |

Explanation: All actions are performed by the **Ahaṅkartṛ** (the ego-sense) which is the object of the "I-notion" (**Ahaṃ-pratyaya**). Since the individual identifies very strongly with the body-mind complex (**Saṃghāta**), he attributes the action to himself ("I did this") and consequently, accrues the fruit of that action.

Ṭīkā: dehasaṃhatena eva antaḥkaraṇapratibimbātmanā kartāhamiti bhāsamānena pratyayāḥ kāmādayo manaḥ tādātmyādasya santi iti pratyayinā kriyāphalaṃ bhujyate ityarthaH |

Explanation: The "I" is the reflection of consciousness in the **Antaḥkaraṇa** (internal organ). Desires like **Kāma** (lust/desire) belong to the mind, but due to **Tādātmya**, the individual feels "I desire." Therefore, the one who has the "I-notion" towards the action is the one who experiences the fruit (**Phala**). The **Sākṣī** (Witness) does not experience the fruit.

Scriptural Evidence

The Metaphor of the Two Birds (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣadad) (Page 186)

विशिष्टस्य भोक्तृत्वं न केवलस्य साक्षिण इत्यत्र मानमाह - तयोरिति । प्रमातृसाक्षिणोर्मध्ये सत्त्वसंसर्गमात्रेण कल्पितकर्तृत्वादिमान् प्रमाता पिप्पलं कर्मफलं भुङ्क्ते, स एव शोधितत्वेनान्यः साक्षितया प्रकाशत इत्यर्थः

तत्फलं च स एवाश्नाति, 'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति' (मु. उ. ३ । १ । १) इति मन्त्रवर्णात् —

The ultimate authority in distinguishing the **Sākṣī** (witness) from the **Bhoktā** (enjoyer) is **Śruti** (revelation). The **Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad** presents the imagery of two birds:

Bhāṣya: 'tayoranyaḥ pippalaṃ svādvattyanaśnannanyo'bhicākaśīti' (mu. u. 3 | 1 | 1)

Pippalaṃ svādu atti: The bird eating the fruit represents the **Bhoktā**, the **Kṣetra** (field), or the **Pramātā** (knower) who is **Sopādhika** (associated with attributes). In the light of the **Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad**, this "eating bird" represents the three empirical states: Waking, Dream, and Deep Sleep.

Anaśnan anyaḥ: The bird that looks on without eating is the **Sākṣī**, the **Kṣetrajña** (knower of the field) who is **Nirupādhika** (without attributes). This witness represents the **Turīya**, the "Fourth," which remains a detached observer of the other three states. By independent contemplation, one sees that the **Pramātā** undergoes experiences, while the **Sākṣī**—as **Turīya**—remains the untouched, self-luminous reality.

In the context of the **Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad**, the **Viśva**, **Taijasa**, and **Prājña** states are all associated with the "eating" (experiencing) bird because they involve identification with various levels of ignorance. The **Turīya** (the Fourth) is the true **Anaśnan** (the non-eater/witness).

Who is Bhoktā? (Kaṭhopaniṣad)

आत्मा देहः । देहादियुक्तं प्रमात्रात्मानमित्यर्थः ।

‘आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः’ (क. उ. १ । ३ । ४) इति च ।

Ṭīkā: ātmā dehaḥ | dehādiyuktaṃ pramātrātmānamityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: ‘ātmendriyamanoyuktaṃ bhoktetyāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ’ (ka. u. 1 | 3 | 4) iti ca |

This mantra from **Kaṭhopaniṣad** is cited to explain how the empirical enjoyer (**bhoktā / jīva)** arises through superimposition (**adhyāsa**). “The wise (**manīṣiṇaḥ**) declare that the enjoyer (**bhoktā**) is that which is endowed with / united with (**yuktaṃ**) the body (**ātman** = deha here), the senses (indriya), and the mind (manas).”

The Nature of the Sākṣī (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad) (Page 186-187)

एवं सोपाधिकस्य चिद्धातोर्मिथ्यासंस्कार्यत्वमुक्त्वा निरुपाधिकस्यासंस्कार्यत्वे मानमाह - एक इति । सर्वभूतेष्वद्वितीय एको देवः स्वप्रकाशः । तथापि मायावृतत्वान्न प्रकाशत इत्याह - गूढ इति । ननु जीवेनासम्बन्धाद्भिन्नत्वाद्वा देवस्याभानं न तु मायागूहनादिति, नेत्याह - सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मेति । देवस्य विभुत्वात्सर्वप्राणिप्रत्यक्त्वाच्चावरणादेवाभानमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्त्वे कर्तृत्वं स्यादिति चेन्न, कर्माध्यक्षः क्रियासाक्षीत्यर्थः । तर्हि साक्ष्यमस्तीति द्वैतापत्तिः । न सर्वभूतानामधिष्ठानं भूत्वा साक्षी भवति । साक्ष्यमधिष्ठाने साक्षिणि कल्पितमिति भावः । साक्षिशब्दार्थमाह - चेता केवल इति । बोद्धृत्वे सति अकर्ता साक्षीति लोकप्रसिद्धम् । चकारो दोषाभावसमुच्चयार्थः । निर्गुणत्वान्निर्दोषत्वाच्च गुणो दोषनाशो वा संस्कारो नेत्यर्थः ।

तथा ‘एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा । कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च’ (श्वे. उ. ६ । ११) इति,

Ṭīkā: evaṃ sopādhikasya ciddhātoḥ mithyāsaṃskāryatvam uktvā nirupādhikasya asaṃskāryatve mānamāha

Having first established that conditioned consciousness (**sopaadhika cid-vastu / cid-dhātuḥ)** has apparent / illusory impressionability (**mithyā-saṃskāryatva)**, i.e., it appears to receive saṃskāra (impressions/purification) only due to superimposition

The text now provides **pramāṇa** (valid means of knowledge / evidence) for the fact that unconditioned consciousness (**nirupādhika cid-vastu**) is not impressionable (**asaṃskārya / asaṃskāryatva**), i.e., it remains untouched by any **saṃskāra** whatsoever.

Ṭīkā: sarvabhūteṣvadvitīya eko devaḥ svaprakāśaḥ | tathāpi māyāvṛtatvānna prakāśata ityāha - gūḍha iti | nanu jīvenāsambandhādbhinnatvādvā devasyābhānaṃ na tu māyāgūhanāditi, netyāha - sarvavyāpī sarvabhūtāntarātmeti | devasya vibhutvātsarvaprāṇipratyaktvāccāvaraṇādevābhānamityarthaḥ | pratyaktve kartṛtvaṃ syāditi cenna, karmādhyakṣaḥ kriyāsākṣītyarthaḥ | tarhi sākṣyamastīti dvaitāpattiḥ | na sarvabhūtānāmadhiṣṭhānaṃ bhūtvā sākṣī bhavati | sākṣyamadhiṣṭhāne sākṣiṇi kalpitamiti bhāvaḥ | sākṣiśabdārthamāha - cetā kevala iti | boddhṛtve sati akartā sākṣīti lokaprasiddham | cakāro doṣābhāvasamuccayārthaḥ | nirguṇatvānnirdoṣatvācca | guṇo doṣanāśo vā saṃskāro netyarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: tathā ‘eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ sarvavyāpī sarvabhūtāntarātmā | karmādhyakṣaḥ sarvabhūtādhivāsaḥ sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca’ (śve. u. 6 | 11) iti,

The **Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad** defines the **Ātman** as:

- **Eko Devaḥ**: The non-dual, self-luminous light (from the root div, to shine).
- **Sarvabhūteṣu Gūḍhaḥ**: Hidden in all beings, veiled by the **Māyā-yavanikā** (curtain of illusion).
- **Karmādhyakṣaḥ**: The presiding witness of all actions, who oversees without participating.
- **Sākṣī:** Defined as **Boddhṛtve sati akartā** (One who is conscious/aware but is a non-doer). This is known as"Witness" in common parlance—one who knows what happened but did not participate.
- **Cetā:** Pure Consciousness.
- **Kevalaḥ:** One, without a second.
- **Nirguṇaḥ**: Free from the three **Guṇas** and all **Doṣas** (defects).

The **Sākṣī** is defined as "**Cetā kevala**" (pure consciousness/witness). Just as a worldly witness in a dispute between two parties (such as **Caitra** and **Maitra**) must be **vilakṣaṇa** (distinct and different) from the disputants to be valid, the **Sākṣī** must be distinct from the **Pramātā**. Realizing this requires **Padārtha-śodhana**—the refinement of the meanings of "Thou" (**Tvam**) and "That" (**Tat**). By stripping away incidental **Upādhis** (attributes), one realizes the **Lakṣyārtha** (implied meaning) of the **Mahāvākyas**, shifting from the "I" that requires purification to the "I" that is the eternally pure, non-dual Witness.

The Scope of the Witness: The **Sākṣī** is the observer of the interactions between the senses (**Indriya**), the internal organ (**Antaḥkaraṇa**), and the external objects (**Viṣaya**). It observes the transaction or activity of the subtle body (**Sūkṣma Śarīra**) and external world while remaining distinct from them.

The Logic of the Definition: To define the **Sākṣī** accurately, two characteristics are essential: **Boddhṛtva** (Consciousness) and **Akartṛtva** (Non-doership).

- **Avoiding Over-extension (Ativyāpti) to the Subtle Body:** If we only defined the Witness as "Conscious" (**Bodha**), the definition would wrongly apply to the subtle body, which possesses consciousness but is a "doer" (**Kartā**).
- **Avoiding Over-extension to Objects:** If we only defined the Witness as a "Non-doer" (**Akartā**), it would wrongly apply to inert objects (**Viṣaya**), which do not act but also lack consciousness.
- **Conclusion:** The **Sākṣī** must be defined as that which is simultaneously **Conscious** and a **Non-doer**.

Negation of the Three Bodies (Śarīra-traya-niṣedha - Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad)

‘स’ इत्युपक्रमाच्छुक्रादिशब्दाः पुंस्त्वेन वाच्याः । स एव आत्मा परि सर्वमगात् व्याप्तः, शुक्रो दीप्तिमान् , अकायो लिङ्गशून्यः, अव्रणोऽक्षतः, अस्नाविरः शिराविधुरः अनश्वर इति वा । आभ्यां पदाभ्यां स्थूलदेहशून्यत्वमुक्तम् । शुद्धो रागादिमलशून्यः । अपापविद्धः पुण्यपापाभ्यामसंस्पृष्ट इत्यर्थः । अत इति ।

‘स पर्यगाच्छुक्रमकायमव्रणमस्नाविरं शुद्धमपापविद्धम्’ (ई. उ. ८) इति च, एतौ मन्त्रावनाधेयातिशयतां नित्यशुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः ।

Ṭīkā: ‘sa’ ityupakramācchukrādiśabdāḥ puṃstvena vācyāḥ | sa eva ātmā pari sarvamagāt vyāptaḥ, śukro dīptimān , akāyo liṅgaśūnyaḥ, avraṇo'kṣataḥ, asnāviraḥ śirāvidhuraḥ anaśvara iti vā | ābhyāṃ padābhyāṃ sthūladehaśūnyatvamuktam | śuddho rāgādimalaśūnyaḥ | apāpaviddhaḥ puṇyapāpābhyāmasaṃspṛṣṭa ityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: ‘sa paryagāt śukram akāyam avraṇam asnāviraṃ śuddham apāpaviddham’ (ī. u. 8) iti, ca —

The **Bhāṣya** transitions to the **Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad** (Verse 8) negating the **Śarīra-traya** (the three bodies) to reveal the **Asaṃskārya** (unpurifiable) nature of the Self. In this mantra, the Upaniṣad provides a systematic negation of all superimposed attributes:

The **Ṭīkā** notes that while these terms appear in the neuter gender in the mantra, they refer to the masculine **Atman** and should be understood accordingly (**Puman-vācyā**).

Analysis of the Attributes:

- **Paryagāt:** The All-pervading One who pervades everything.
- **Śukram:** Radiant or Self-luminous (**Dīptimān**).
- **Akāyam:** Without a body; specifically, the negation of the **Subtle Body** (**Sūkṣma Śarīra**).
- **Avraṇam & Asnāviram: Avraṇam** means "without wounds/scars" (**Akṣata**). **Asnāviram** means "without sinews/nerves" (**Snāyu-rahita**). These terms collectively negate the **Gross Body** (**Sthūla Śarīra**). The Self is **Anasvara** (Imperishable). When experiencing bodily pain (like a headache), one should contemplate on **Asnāviram** to realize the Self is untouched by physical ailments.
- **Śuddham:** Negation of the **Causal Body** (**Kāraṇa Śarīra**). In the **Bhāṣya (īśa)**, it means free from the "impurity of ignorance" (**Avidyā-mala-rahita**).
- **Apāpaviddham:** Untouched by merit (**Puṇya**) and demerit (**Pāpa**).

Bhāṣya: **etau mantrāu anādheya-atiśayatāṃ nityaśuddhatāṃ ca brahmaṇo darśayataḥ |**

This indicates that Brahman is **Anādheya-atiśaya** (one to whom no excellence can be added) and **Nitya-śuddha** (eternally pure).

Mokṣa and the Fourfold Limitation of Action (Kriyā-phala)

उत्पत्त्याप्तिविकारसंस्कारेभ्योऽन्यत्पञ्चमं क्रियाफलं नास्ति, यन्मोक्षस्य क्रियासाध्यत्वे द्वारं भवेदित्यर्थः । ननु मोक्षस्यासाध्यत्वे शास्त्रारम्भो वृथा । न । ज्ञानार्थत्वादित्याह - तस्मादिति । द्वाराभावादित्यर्थः ।

ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः । तस्मान्न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः । अतोऽन्यन्मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेशद्वारं न शक्यं केनचिद्दर्शयितुम् । तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते ।

A major theme is that **Mokṣa** (Liberation) is not a product of any action (**Kriyā**). It is **Brahmabhāva**—the state of being Brahman.

The Four Gates of Action (Kriyā-phala):

Action can only produce four types of results. Since **Mokṣa** fits none of these, it cannot be "attained" through action:

1. **Utpatti** (Production)
2. **Āpti** (Attainment/Reach)
3. **Vikṛti** (Modification)
4. **Saṃskṛti**(Refinement/Purification)

Ṭīkā: utpatti vikāra saṃskārebhyaḥ anyat pañcamaṃ kriyāphalaṃ nāsti yanmokṣasya kriyāsādhyatve dvāraṃ bhavet

Mokṣa, as **Brahma-bhāva** (being Brahman), falls into none of these. Since there is no fifth type of fruit, there is no "doorway" for action to enter the realm of **Mokṣa**. The Self is already pure; it does not need refinement (**Saṃskāra**).

Bhāṣya: tasmāt jñānamekaṃ muktvā kriyāyā gandhamātrasya api anupraveśa iha nopapadyate |

The **Bhāṣya** emphasizes this exclusion with the phrase: "**kriyāyā gandha mātrasya anupraveśa iha nopapadyate**" (not even a scent of action enters). This is illustrated by the analogy of the "onion and garlic". Just as a person who strictly avoids these foods will not even tolerate their smell coming from a neighbor's kitchen, the realm of Knowledge permits no "scent" or "odor" of action.

Ṭīkā: nanu mokṣasya asādhyatve śāstra ārambho vṛthā | na | jñānārthatvādityāha - tasmāditi | dvārābhāvādityarthaḥ |

If the opponent argues that this renders the scriptures useless, the scholar responds that the purpose of scripture is **Jñāna** for the sake of **Avidyā-nivṛtti** (removal of ignorance). Knowledge does not create liberation; it removes the veil of ignorance obscuring the already-present truth.

Epistemological Analysis: Jñāna vs. Mānasī Kriyā (Meditation) (Page 188)

व्याघातं शङ्कते - नन्विति । तथा च मोक्षे क्रियानुप्रवेशो नास्तीति व्याहतमिति भावः । मानसमपि ज्ञानं न विधियोग्या क्रिया, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् , कृत्यसाध्यत्वाच्चेत्याह - नेति ।

ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया? न; वैलक्षण्यात् ।

Bhāṣya: nanu jñānaṃ nāma mānasī kriyā ? | na | vailakṣaṇyāt |

A common fallacy of the **Purvapakṣin** is taken up now which is to conflate Knowledge with "mental action" (**Upāsanā**). The distinction lies in **Vastu-tantra** (dependence on the object) versus **Puruṣa-tantra** (dependence on the person).

Ṭīkā: mānasamapi jñānaṃ na vidhiyogyā kriyā, vastutantratvāt , kṛti asādhyatvāt ca

The Nature of Knowledge:

Jñāna (Knowledge) is defined by four markers:

1. **Mānasam** (Mental in locus, occurring in the **Antaḥkaraṇa**).
2. **Na Vidhi-yogyā** (Not subject to injunctions/commands).
3. **Vastu-tantra** (Dependent on the reality of the object).
4. **Kṛti-asādhya** (Not achievable by mere will or effort).

The Nature of Action/Meditation (Kriyā/Upāsanā) (Page 189)

वैलक्षण्यं प्रपञ्चयति - क्रिया हीति । यत्र विषये तदनपेक्षयैव या चोद्यते तत्र सा हि क्रियेति योजना । विषयवस्त्वनपेक्षा, कृतिसाध्या च क्रियेत्यत्र दृष्टान्तमाह - यथेति । गृहीतमध्वर्युणेति शेषः । वषट्करिष्यन्होता, सन्ध्यां देवतामिति चैवमादिवाक्येषु यथा यादृशी ध्यानक्रिया वस्त्वनपेक्षा पुन्तन्त्रा च चोद्यते तादृशी क्रियेत्यर्थः ।

क्रिया हि नाम सा, यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुषचित्तव्यापाराधीना च, यथा — 'यस्यै देवतायै हविर्गृहीतं स्यात्तां मनसा ध्यायेद्वषट्करिष्यन्'(ऐ०ब्रा० ३-१-८) इति, 'सन्ध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्' (ऐ. ब्रा. ३ । ८ । १) इति चैवमादिषु ।

In contrast, meditation is defined as:

Bhāṣya: kriyā hi nāma sā, yatra vastusvarūpanirapekṣaiva codyate, puruṣacittavyāpārādhīnā ca, yathā — 'yasyai devatāyai havirgṛhītaṃ syāttāṃ manasā dhyāyedvaṣaṭkariṣyan'(ai०brā० 3-1-8) iti, 'sandhyāṃ manasā dhyāyet' (ai. brā. 3 | 8 | 1) iti caivamādiṣu |

Puruṣa-tantra: Dependent on the person's choice (one can meditate, not meditate, or meditate differently).

An example (**Dṛṣṭānta**) is given from Yajurveda: For whichever deity the oblation is taken by the Yajur veda priest (**adhvaryu**), the Rig veda priest (**hotā**) should meditate on it mentally, uttering the word **vaṣaṭ**. This is injunction (**vidhi**) with (**manasā dhyāyet**) mental meditation—an action (**kriyā)**, (**vastu-anapekṣā)** independent of the object's actual characteristics, therefore (**puruṣa-tantra)** human-dependent.

Vastu-svarūpa-nirapekṣa: Independent of the actual nature of the object (e.g., visualizing a stone as a Deity).

Consider the meditation on Lord Shiva. A seeker may visualize Shiva as Karpura-gauram (white as camphor), with a crescent moon and serpents, while focusing on a physical stone

Lingam. The stone is not camphor-white, nor does it have serpents; the mind superimposes these attributes based on scriptural injunction (**Vidhi**). This is **Puruṣa-tantra**, an effort-driven mental act. Knowledge, however, would be the realization of the stone as it truly is, independent of any superimposed visualization.

Logical Refutation and the Role of Upādhi

ध्यानमपि मानसत्वाज्ज्ञानवन्न क्रियेत्यत आह - ध्यानमित्यादिना । तथापि क्रियैवेति शेषः । कृत्यसाध्यत्वमुपाधिरिति भावः ।

ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसम् , तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम् , पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात् ।

The opponent attempts an inference (**Anumāna**): "Meditation is not an action because it is mental, just like knowledge."

Opponent's Inference:

- **Pakṣa** (Subject): Meditation (**Dhyānam**).
- **Sādhya** (That which is to be proved): Non-action (**Akriyātvam**).
- **Hetu** (Reason): Being mental (**Mānasatvam**).
- **Dṛṣṭānta** (Example): Knowledge (**Jñānam**).

The Refutation (Identifying the Upādhi): The **Siddhāntin** exposes the fallacy by introducing an **Upādhi** (limiting condition). An **Upādhi** is technically defined as **Sādhya-vyāpakatve sati sādhana-avyāpakatvam**—that which pervades the **Sādhya** but does not pervade the **Hetu(sādhana)**.

In this debate:

- The **Sādhya** is the "absence of action."
- The **Hetu** is "being mental."
- The **Upādhi** is **Kṛti-asādhyatvam** (unattainability through effort).

Upādhi Analysis:

1. **Sādhya-vyāpakatvam**: In **Dṛṣṭānta (Jñānam),** there is **Sādhya (Akriyātvam)** and there is **Upādhi (Kṛti-asādhyatvam).** In other words, in Knowledge, there is an absence of action, and there is an absence of effort-based attainment.
2. **Sādhana-avyāpakatvam**: In **Pakṣa,** there is **Sādhana or Hetu (**being mental) and there is absence of **Upādhi (Kṛti-asādhyatvam).** In other words, Dhyānam is a mental action and effort-driven.

Since characteristics of **Upādhi** are satisfied, this is a valid **Upādhi**; and hence the inference fails.

The opponent's reason ("it is mental") is **Sopādhika** (vitiated by a hidden condition). It fails to prove that meditation is not an action because meditation, despite being mental, is "done" through effort. The opponent often clings to this fallacy due to the fact meditation is

psychologically "easier" than the rigorous inquiry into the Upaniṣadic truth. However, the scholars insist that meditation is an "act" that prepares the mind, but Knowledge is an "understanding" that alone results in the finality of **Mokṣa**.

The Ontological Distinction Between Jñāna and Dhyāna (Page 190)

ध्यानक्रियामुक्त्वा ततो वैलक्षण्यं ज्ञानस्य स्फुटयति - ज्ञानं त्विति । अतः प्रमात्वान्न चोदनातन्त्रं न विधेर्विषयः । पुरुषः कृतिद्वारा तन्त्रं हेतुर्यस्य तत्पुरुषतन्त्रम् , तस्माद्वस्त्वव्यभिचारादपुन्तन्त्रत्वाच्च ध्यानाज्ज्ञानस्य महान्भेद इत्यर्थः । भेदमेव दृष्टान्तान्तरेणाह - यथा चेति । अभेदासत्त्वेऽपि विधितो ध्यानं कर्तुं शक्यम् , न ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ।

ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम् । अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम् । केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्; न चोदनातन्त्रम् , नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् । तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम् ।

The fundamental difference lies in what it depends on. Knowledge is dependent on the thing itself, on reality; meditation is dependent on human (mental) action.

Ṭīkā: ataḥ pramātvāt na codanātantraṃ na vidherviṣayaḥ | puruṣaḥ kṛtidvārā tantraṃ heturyasya tatpuruṣatantram , tasmāt vastu avyabhicārāt apuntantratvācca dhyānāt jñānasya mahānbheda ityarthaḥ

Bhāṣya: jñānaṃ tu pramāṇajanyam | pramāṇaṃ ca yathābhūtavastuviṣayam | ato jñānaṃ kartum akartum anyathā vā kartumaśakyam |

Unlike an action, knowledge is not left to the will of an individual but a result of the use of a valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**). Vedāntic epistemology characterizes true knowledge as **Yathābhūta-vastu-viṣayam** — that which reveals the object exactly as it is, without distortion or subjective imposition.

Jñānam (Knowledge): It is **Vastu-tantra** (dependent on the object). If one sees a pillar, one must know it as a pillar. One cannot "choose" to know it as a tree assuming the **Pramāṇa** (eyesight) is functioning correctly. As the **Bhāṣya** confirms, knowledge is impossible to perform, not-perform, or alter by human will.

The "impossibility of choice" in knowledge is its greatest ontological strength. It ensures that **Brahma-jñānam** remains an objective understanding of reality rather than a subjective mental construction. If liberation were a product of the subject's will (**Puruṣa-tantra**), it would be as transient and fallible as any other human action.

Dhyānam (Meditation): It is often defined as **Atasmin tad-buddhiḥ**—thinking of something as that which it is not (superimposition e.g., meditating on a stone as Viṣṇu). This is a mental act performed because a scriptural injunction commands it.

Subjective vs. Objective Dependence

The text explores the concept of **Tantra** (dependence/causality).

Feature	Jñāna (Knowledge)	Dhyāna/Kriyā (Action)
Dependence	**Vastu-tantra (Object-dependent)**	**Puruṣa-tantra (Subject-dependent)**
Flexibility	Cannot be done, not done, or done otherwise.	Can be done, not done, or changed.
Source	**Pramāṇa (Evidence/Means)**	**Codanā (Injunction/Command)**

That which has the effort of the person (**Puruṣa-kṛti**) as its governing cause (**Hetu**) is called **Puruṣa-tantra**.

The Illustrative Contrast: Pañcāgni Vidyā

यथा च 'पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः' (छा. उ. ५ । ७ । १) 'योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः' (छा. उ. ५ । ८ । १) इत्यत्र योषित्पुरुषयोरग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति । केवलचोदनाजन्यत्वात् क्रियैव सा पुरुषतन्त्रा च । या तु प्रसिद्धेऽग्नावग्निबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा; नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा ।

Bhāṣya: yathā ca 'puruṣo vāva gautamāgniḥ' (chā. u. 5 | 7 | 1) 'yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ' (chā. u. 5 | 8 | 1) ityatra yoṣitpuruṣayoḥ agnibuddhiḥ mānasī bhavati | kevalacodanājanyatvāt kriyaiva sā puruṣatantrā ca | yā tu prasiddhe'gnāvagnibuddhiḥ, na sā codanātantrā; nāpi puruṣatantrā |

To show how meditation can still be "action" rather than "knowledge," the example of the **Pañcāgni Vidyā** (Five Fires meditation) from the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad** is used.

In passages like "Man is fire, O Gautama" and "Woman is fire," the idea of fire in the man or woman is a mental process (**Mānasī-buddhi**).

- **The Distinction:** Thinking of a woman as fire is **Atasmin tad-buddhi** (superimposing a trait where it doesn't exist). This is a meditation triggered by **Codanā** (scriptural command). However, seeing fire as fire is **Jñāna**, because it is **Yathābhūta** (as it is).
- **Nididhyāsana vs. Upāsanā:**
    - **Upāsanā** (Meditation): Symbolic, like seeing **Viṣṇu** in a **Śālagrāma**. This is sublated by other **Pramāṇas** (the stone isn't literally a divine entity).
    - **Nididhyāsana**: Reflection after **Śravaṇa** (listening) to remove contrary notions (**Viparīta-bhāvanā**). Unlike symbolic meditation, the thought "I am Brahman" is not a sublatable fiction; it is the ultimate reality.

Mananam: Subtle Clarification on Nididhyāsanam

A subtle confusion often arises regarding **Nididhyāsana** (profound contemplation). If meditation is subject-dependent, is the contemplation on "**Aham Brahmāsmi**" a mere mental act? The Vedāntin draws a sharp line of distinction here.

While **Upāsanā** like visualizing a **Śālagrāma** as **Viṣṇu** are valid impositions (**Atasmin tad-buddhi**), **Nididhyāsana** is directed toward a **Vāstavikatā** (factual reality) already revealed by the **Upaniṣads** through **Śravaṇa**. It is not the creation of a new reality but the removal of **Viparīta-bhāvanā**—contrary mental habits and tendencies such as grief (**Śoka**), fear (**Bhaya**), and delusion (**Moha**). Unlike the **Pañcāgni Vidyā**, the knowledge of the Self is not "subsequently negated" by other means of knowledge; it remains an absolute fact.

The Problem of Verbal Testimony (Śābda-bodha)

ननु प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य विषयजन्यतया तत्तन्त्रत्वेऽपि शाब्दबोधस्य तदभावाद्विधेयक्रियात्वमिति नेत्याह - एवं सर्वेति । शब्दानुमानाद्यर्थेष्वपि ज्ञानमविधेयक्रियात्वेन ज्ञातव्यम् । तत्रापि मानादेव ज्ञानस्य प्राप्तेर्विध्ययोगादित्यर्थः । तत्रैवं सति । लोके ज्ञानस्याविधेयत्वे सतीत्यर्थः । यथाभूतत्वमबाधितत्वम् ।

किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानमेवैतत्; न क्रिया । एवं सर्वप्रमाणविषयवस्तुषु वेदितव्यम् । तत्रैवं सति यथाभूतब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम् ।

Ṭīkā: pratyakṣajñānasya viṣayajanyatayā tat tantratve'pi śābdabodhasya tat abhāvāt vidheyakriyātvam

An objection is raised: While perception (**Pratyakṣa**) might be object-dependent, isn't knowledge from words (**Śābda-bodha**) dependent on an injunction to listen? The opponent argues that all Vedic texts must impel action (**Vidhi**), suggesting that even verbal understanding (**Śābda-bodha**) requires a command to be purposeful.

Ṭīkā: śabda anumānādi artheṣu api jñānam avidheyakriyātvena jñātavyam | tatrāpi mānādeva jñānasya prāpteḥ vidhi ayogāt ityarthaḥ |

The Vedāntin refutes this by asserting that verbal knowledge from a valid Pramāṇa is as objective and direct as perception (**Pratyakṣa**).

Knowledge derived from verbal testimony, inference, etc., should be understood as non-enjoinable (**Avidheya**) action. Even in **Śābda-bodha**, if the words are heard and the meaning is clear, knowledge arises automatically. It does not wait for a command to "know." The **Pramāṇa** itself is sufficient for the result.

Deconstructing Injunctions (Vidhi) in the Upaniṣads (Page 191-192)

ननु 'आत्मानं पश्येत्' 'ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि' 'आत्मा द्रष्टव्यः' इति विज्ञाने लिङ्लोट्तव्यप्रत्यया विधायकाः श्रूयन्ते, अतो ज्ञानं विधेयमित्यत आह - तद्विषय इति । तस्मिन् ज्ञानरूपविषये विधयः पुरुषं प्रवर्तयितुमशक्ता भवन्ति । अनियोज्यं कृत्यसाध्यं

नियोज्यशून्यं वा ज्ञानं तद्विषयकत्वादित्यर्थः । ममायं नियोग इति बोद्धा नियोज्यो विषयश्च विधेर्नास्तीति भावः । तर्हि ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म विधीयताम् , नेत्याह - अहेयेति । वस्तुस्वरूपो विषयस्तत्त्वात् । ब्रह्मणो निरतिशयस्यासाध्यत्वान्न विधेयत्वमित्यर्थः । उदासीनवस्तुविषयकत्वाच्च ज्ञानं न विधेयम् , प्रवृत्त्यादिफलाभावादित्यर्थः ।

तद्विषये लिङादयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्कुण्ठीभवन्ति उपलादिषु प्रयुक्तक्षुरतैक्ष्ण्यादिवत् , अहेयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् ।

Ṭīkā: nanu ‘ātmānaṃ paśyet’ ‘brahma tvaṃ viddhi’ ‘ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ’ iti vijñāne liṅloṭtavyapratyayā vidhāyakāḥ śrūyante, ato jñānaṃ vidheyamityata āha

The opponent points out that Upaniṣads use command-style words (Imperatives/Optatives like **Paśyet**, **Draṣṭavyaḥ**).

Bhāṣya: tadviṣaye liṅādayaḥ śrūyamāṇā api aniyojyaviṣayatvāt kuṇṭhībhavanti upalādiṣu prayuktakṣurataikṣṇyādivat , aheya anupādeyavastuviṣayatvāt |

Even though imperative suffixes (**Liṅ**, **Lot**, **Tavya**) are used for knowing the Self, they become blunt (**Kuṇṭhī-bhavanti**) because the Self is not an object that can be "enjoined." It is like trying to use a razor to carve a stone (**Upala**); the razor loses its edge, but the stone remains unaffected.

The Reason: Brahman is **Aniyojya-viṣaya**—a subject that cannot be enjoined in action. As the substrate of the knower, the Self cannot be treated as an "object" or a "result" to be produced. Injunctions apply to things that are **Heya** (to be discarded) or **Upādeya** (to be acquired). Since Brahman is the very Self of the seeker, it can neither be grasped nor thrown away.

Ṭīkā: tasmin jñānarūpaviṣaye vidhayaḥ puruṣaṃ pravartayitumaśaktā bhavanti | aniyojyaṃ kṛtyasādhyaṃ niyojyaśūnyaṃ vā jñānaṃ tadviṣayakatvādityarthaḥ | mamāyaṃ niyoga iti boddhā niyojyo viṣayaśca vidhernāstīti bhāvaḥ |

Knowledge is beyond all injunction because its object is the Self alone, and no separate “doer” or “result” remains. Hence the three adjectives — **aniyojyam**, **kṛtyasādhyam**, **niyojya-śūnyam** — are not three different things; they are three ways of saying the same thing.

1. **aniyojyaṃ** – Not something that can be enjoined or directed towards a person (niyojya). – Knowledge (jñānam) cannot be commanded by the statements of the Vedas.
2. **kṛtyasādhyam** – Not producible by any action or effort (kṛti = human effort; asādhya = cannot be accomplished). Brahman-Ātman knowledge is not a result that can be “made” by doing something.
3. **niyojyaśūnyaṃ vā** – Or, devoid of any niyojya phala (a result of engagement in action).

When a person hears a Vedic injunction (e.g., “svargakāmo yajeta”), he immediately thinks: “This command is for me!” – He becomes the **niyojya** (the one being enjoined). – The result (svarga, putra, etc.) becomes the **viṣaya** (object) of the injunction.

But in the case of Ātma-jñāna there is **no such boddhā** (no such perceiver who feels “this is addressed to me”). Therefore, neither the person to be enjoined nor the object of injunction exists for this vidhi.

Ṭīkā: vastusvarūpo viṣayastattvāt | brahmaṇo niratiśayasyāsādhyatvānna vidheyatvamityarthaḥ | udāsīnavastuviṣayakatvācca jñānaṃ na vidheyam , pravṛtyādiphalābhāvādityarthaḥ |

Knowledge of Brahman can never be the object of any Vedic command because its object is the infinite, self-established, actionless Reality itself. Following reasons are given to conclude the arguments:

1. Because the object (**viṣaya**) is of the very nature (**svarūpa**) of the vastu (the real thing itself).” – **Brahman-Ātman** is not a separate object to be known; the knower, the knowledge, and the known are identical. There is no gap between them for any injunction to operate.
2. Because Brahman is **niratiśaya** (unsurpassable, infinite, perfect, without any higher state), it is **asādhya** (not something that can be accomplished or produced); therefore it has no **vidheyatva** (enjoinability) — this is the meaning. Whatever is already complete and infinite cannot be “achieved” by any action. You cannot enjoin someone to “produce” what is already their own svarūpa.
3. And because the knowledge has for its object an **udāsīna-vastu** (a completely neutral/indifferent object that is beyond all transaction), **jñāna** itself is not **vidheya** (enjoinable).” – **Udāsīna** here means “utterly indifferent” — neither to be accepted nor rejected, neither desirable
4. Because there is complete absence of any result (**phala**) in the form of any engagement/action(**pravṛtti**) or withdrawal (**nivṛtti**) etc. — this is the meaning. All vedic injunctions (**vidhi**) operate only where there is a result to be gained by doing or not-doing something. In the knowledge of Brahman there is neither **pravṛtti-phala** nor **nivṛtti-phala**; hence no scope for **vidhi** at all.

The Purpose of "Shadow Commands" (Page 192)

विधिपदानां गतिं पृच्छति - किमर्थानीति । विधिच्छायानि प्रसिद्धयागादिविधितुल्यानीत्यर्थः । विधिप्रत्ययैरात्मज्ञानं परमपुरुषार्थसाधनमिति स्तूयते । स्तुत्या आत्यन्तिकेष्टहेतुत्वभ्रान्त्या या विषयेषु प्रवृत्तिरात्मश्रवणादिप्रतिबन्धिका तन्निवृत्तिफलानि विधिपदानीत्याह - स्वाभाविकेति ।

किमर्थानि तर्हि ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः’ (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । ५) इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि ? स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषयविमुखीकरणार्थानीति ब्रूमः ।

The Concept of Vidhi-chāyā (Shadow Injunctions): The phrases like "The Self should be seen" (**Ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ**) are not actual commands (**Vidhi**). They are just a semblance of injunctions.

Ṭīkā: vidhicchāyāni prasiddhayāgādividhitulyānītyarthaḥ | vidhipratyayairātmajñānaṃ paramapuruṣārthasādhanamiti stūyate | stutyā ātyantikeṣṭahetutvabhrāntyā yā viṣayeṣu pravṛttirātmaśravaṇādipratibandhikā tannivṛttiphalāni vidhipadānītyāha

They are "shadow injunctions" because they resemble well-known ritualistic commands (like those for sacrifices), but they do not function the same way.

If they aren't real commands, why are they there?

1. **Stuti (Praise):** To glorify the knowledge of the Self as the means to the supreme goal.
2. **Vimukhī-karaṇa (Turning Away):** To wean humans from their natural, habitual tendency (**Svābhāvika-pravṛtti**) to look outward at sense objects.
3. **Removal of Obstacles:** By saying "Look at the Self," the scripture effectively tells you to "Stop looking at the non-Self." It turns the seeker inward.

Bhāṣya: svābhāvikapravṛttiviṣayavimukhīkaraṇārthānīti brūmaḥ |

We say that these (shadow commands) are meant to turn the individual away from the objects of natural inclination.

The **Pūrva-pakṣa** (opponent) argues that sentences like "The Self should be seen" (**Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ**) are injunctions because they contain suffixes denoting duty (**Tavyat-pratyaya**), similar to ritual commands in **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā**.

The Siddhānta Response: Vidhi-chāyā

The response clarifies that these are not actual injunctions but "shadows of injunctions" (**Vidhi-chāyāni vākyāni**). Their purpose is not to impel to action but to turn the seeker away from the natural tendency toward the non-Self (**Anātman**).

Bhāṣya: **svābhāvikapravṛttiviṣayavimukhīkaraṇārthānīti brūmaḥ |**

Explanation: These statements serve to turn the individual away from the objects of natural inclination. "Natural inclination" does not just mean physical action; it specifically refers to contemplating the non-Self (**Anātma-cintanam**). Any thought directed toward the non-Self—whether for ten minutes or a whole day—acts as an obstacle to hearing the truth of the Self (**Ātma-śravaṇam**).

The Human Condition and the Pursuit of the Ultimate Goal (Page 193)

विवृणोति - यो हीत्यादिना । तत्र विषयेषु । सङ्घातस्य या प्रवृत्तिः तद्गोचराच्छब्दादेरित्यर्थः । स्रोतश्चित्तवृत्तिप्रवाहः ।प्रवर्तयन्ति ज्ञानसाधनश्रवणादाविति शेषः । श्रवणस्वरूपमाह - तस्येति । अन्वेषणं ज्ञानम् । यदिदं जगत्तत्सर्वमात्मैवेत्यनात्मबाधेनात्मा बोध्यते ।

यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः ‘इष्टं मे भूयादनिष्टं मा भूत्’ इति, न च तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तमात्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थवाञ्छिनं स्वाभाविककार्यकरणसङ्घातप्रवृत्तिगोचराद्विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ इत्यादीनि; तस्यात्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्याहेयमनुपादेयं चात्मतत्त्वमुपदिश्यते — ‘इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । ६) ‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत् ... केन कं विजानीयात्’ (बृ. उ. ४ । ५ । १५) ‘विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्’ (बृ. उ. २ । ४ । १४) ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म’ (बृ. उ. २ । ५ । १९) इत्यादिभिः । यदप्यकर्तव्यप्रधानमात्मज्ञानं हानायोपादानाय वा न भवतीति, तत्तथैवेत्यभ्युपगम्यते ।

Bhāṣya: yo hi bahirmukhaḥ pravartate puruṣaḥ ‘iṣṭaṃ me bhūyādaniṣṭaṃ mā bhūt’ iti, na ca tatrātyantikaṃ puruṣārthaṃ labhate

The human mind is naturally extroverted, seeking the "desirable" and avoiding the "undesirable" within the realm of duality.

Explanation: An extroverted person acts with the motive: "Let me gain what is pleasant and avoid what is unpleasant." This pursuit is always centered on the non-Self. However, such a person never attains the **Ātyantika-puruṣārtha** (the ultimate goal of human life), which is **Mokṣa** (liberation). They remain entangled in removing one non-Self and bringing in another.

Turning the Mind’s Attention Inward

To help the seeker who desires the ultimate goal, the scriptures use language that looks like a command to redirect the mind's flow.

Bhāṣya: tam ātyantikapuruṣārthavāñchinaṃ svābhāvikakāryakaraṇasaṅghātapravṛttigocarāt vimukhīkṛtya pratyagātmasrotastayā pravartayanti ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ’ ityādīni

Ṭīkā: tatra viṣayeṣu | saṅghātasya yā pravṛttiḥ tadgocarāt śabdāderityarthaḥ | srotaścittavṛttipravāhaḥ | pravartayanti jñānasādhanaśravaṇādāviti śeṣaḥ |

- **Redirecting the Flow**: The scriptures turn the seeker away from the objects of the "body-mind-complex" (**Kārya-karaṇa-saṅghāta**) and toward the inner Self (**Pratyagātman**).
- **Authority of Veda**: For these "shadow injunctions" to work, the seeker must view the **Veda** as the ultimate authority (**Parama-pramāṇa**). For those who prioritize their own whims (**Manmānī**) over Vedic wisdom (**Buddhimānī**), these sentences remain ineffective.
- **Cleaning the Mental "Impurities"**: The process involves removing the mental impurities (or **Kaṣāya**) that surface when one sits in silence.

The **Atman** cannot be rejected because it is the **Sākṣī** (Witness)—the very subject who would perform the act of rejection. Nor can it be acquired, for it is the seeker's own nature. The **Ṭīkā** defines **śravaṇa-svarūpam** not as an act, but as the recognition of this non-dual nature.

Bhāṣya: **tasya ātma-anveṣaṇāya pravṛttasya aheyamanupādeyaṃ ca ātmatattvam upadiśyate**

A crucial definition is provided regarding the nature of the Self in the context of knowledge.

- **Heya** (Discardable): Something different from oneself that can be given up (e.g., the physical body is "given up" in the dream state; the mind is "given up" in deep sleep). Avidyā is negated at the time of knowledge.

- **Upādeya** (Acquirable): Something different from oneself that can be gained or accepted.
- **Aheyam-Anupādeyam**: The Self is neither discardable (because the one who discards is the Self) nor acquirable (because it is already oneself).

This definition refutes the idea that **Ātma-jñāna** (Self-knowledge) requires a subsequent action or **Upāsanā** (meditation). Since there is nothing to add (**Guṇādhāna**) to or remove (**Doṣāpanaya**) from the Self, ritualistic commands find no place here.

Bhāṣya: 'idaṃ sarvaṃ yadayamātmā' (bṛ. u. 2 | 4 | 6)

The essence of the Self is taught through the declaration: "All these are what this Self is." This statement serves to negate the independent existence of the world apart from the **Ātman**.

Explanation: Whatever this world is perceived to be, it is in its entirety nothing but the **Ātman**. The instructional thrust here is **Anātmā-bādha**—the sublation or negation of the non-Self. By negating the "otherness" of the world, the knowledge of the Self is revealed. It is not that the "all" exists and is then called the Self; rather, the "all" is found to be non-existent as something separate from the Self.

A significant doubt is raised by the **Pūrva-pakṣī** (opponent): "What must one do after gaining this knowledge? Should there not be some **Upāsanā** or **Karma** to solidify it?" The following **Śruti** provides the answer.

Bhāṣya: 'yatra tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūttatkena kaṃ paśyet ... kena kaṃ vijānīyāt' (bṛ. u. 4 | 5 | 15) 'vijñātāramare kena vijānīyāt' (bṛ. u. 2 | 4 | 14)

Explanation: This (**yatra**) refers to the time of realization (**Vidyā-kāla**). When, for the knower, everything has become the Self alone, then through what instrument should one see what? Through what should one know whom?

- **No Scope for Action**: For an action like **Upāsanā** to occur, there must be a distinction between the "meditator," the "object of meditation," and the "act of meditation."
- **Absence of Duality**: Once knowledge dawns, this triad (**Tripuṭī**) dissolves. There is no "space" or "vacancy" (**Avakāśa**) left for any further means or efforts.

The realization that the Self is already **Brahma** makes any future effort toward "becoming" **Brahma** redundant.

Bhāṣya: 'ayamātmā brahma' (bṛ. u. 2 | 5 | 19)

Explanation: "This Self is **Brahma**." If **Brahma**-hood were a state to be achieved in the future through some activity, then an injunction for effort would be logical. However, since the Self is already **Brahma**, the statement is purely informative of an existing reality.

Bhāṣya: yadapi akartavyapradhānam ātmajñānaṃ hānāya upādānāya vā na bhavatīti, tattathā eva iti abhyupagamyate |

Explanation: Self-knowledge is **Akartavya-pradhānam**—it is such that "non-action is the principal." Here, **Pradhānam** is defined as **Tantram**. This implies that knowledge is not **Karma-tantra** (governed by the laws of action/will) but **Vastu-tantra** (governed by the reality of the object). Because the **Ātman** is ever-present and unchanging, there is nothing to "give up" (**Hāna**) and nothing to "acquire" (**Upādāna**). One simply "recognizes" what is.

The **Pūrva-pakṣa** (ritualist/opponent) struggles with this concept because their entire worldview is built on the logic of effort: "If I don't do something, I won't get anything."

- **The Ritualistic Logic**: Just as one performs a sacrifice to reach **Svarga** (heaven), the ritualist thinks one must do something to “gain” the **Ātman**.
- **The Vedantic Shift**: In **Uttara-mīmāṃsā** (**Vedānta**), the process is the opposite of worldly acquisition. It is a path of **Sannyāsa** (renunciation)—not of the world, but of the false identification with the non-Self. It involves "leaving" the habits of the ego (**Ahaṃkāra**) rather than "doing" something new.

The "Flaw" as an Ornament

The **Pūrva-pakṣa** (opponent) argues that if knowledge of **Brahman** leads to the cessation of all actions, then such knowledge is a defect or a "fault" (**Doṣa**), as it renders the person useless to the Vedic system of injunctions. To this, the **Bhāṣyakāra** (Śaṅkara) offers a celebrated and witty rebuttal.

अलङ्कारो ह्ययमस्माकम् — यद्ब्रह्मात्मावगतौ सत्यां सर्वकर्तव्यताहानिः कृतकृत्यता चेति ।

Bhāṣya: alaṅkāro hi ayam asmākam — yad brahmātma-avagatau satyāṃ sarvakartavyatāhāniḥ kṛtakṛtyatā ceti |

The **Bhāṣyakāra** declares that what the opponent calls a "defect" is actually the **Vedāntin’s** "ornament" (**Alaṅkāra**) or jewel (**Bhūṣaṇa**). The ultimate goal of all human endeavor is to reach a state where nothing more needs to be achieved. Therefore, the loss of duty is the highest achievement, not a failure.

Defining the Two Pillars of Liberation

The "Ornament" consists of two distinct but related results associated with the realization of **Brahman** (**Brahmātmāvagati**):

1. Sarva-kartavyatā-hāni (Loss of All Duties)

- **Definition**: The word **Sarvāsām kartavyānām hāniḥ** implies the complete disappearance of the "sense of duty."
- **Elaboration**: For one who has realized they are **Brahman**, there is no longer a command that can apply to them.
    - Example: If a **Jñānī** (knower of **Brahman**) comes to know that someone speaks ill of them and is asked, "Now what will you do about this?", the **Jñānī** essentially

has no compulsion to react or respond. They remain established in the Self because the "doer" who would react has been sublated by knowledge.

- **Pre-requisite**: This state of sitting in the "station of knowledge" is only possible for those who have performed intense **Citta-śuddhi** (purification of the mind). It is not a mere intellectual jump but a transition into **Jñāna-niṣṭhā** (steadfastness in knowledge).

2. Kṛtakṛtyatā (Absolute Fulfillment)

- **Definition**: The state of having done all that was to be done.
- **Elaboration**: Often, "not doing anything" is associated with restlessness (**Atṛpti**) or boredom. However, the **Jñānī's** "non-action" is characterized by total satisfaction.
    - There is no internal "jumping" or anxiety of "What should I do now?"
    - One is **Kṛta-kṛtya**—completely satisfied and content, requiring nothing from the world to feel complete.

While the realization of **Brahman** is the ultimate goal, the text clarifies that the "loss of duty" might not feel absolute the very second one hears the truth. It is through continued abidance that one becomes a **Jñāna-niṣṭha** (one established in knowledge).

The Practicality of Silence: To stay in a state where no worldly provocation triggers a sense of duty requires a mind that has been thoroughly scrubbed of mental impurities (**Kaṣāya**).

Refutation of the Opponent: The opponent's mindset is stuck in "doing" (**Pravṛtti**). They cannot conceive of a high state that is "non-doing." The **Siddhānta** clarifies that **Mokṣa** (liberation) is not the result of an action, but the cessation of the need for action.

The Metaphor of the Ascetic in the Forest of Duality (Page 194)

अद्वितीयादृश्यात्मबोधे विधिस्तपस्वी द्वैतवनोपजीवनः क्व स्थास्यतीति भावः ।

The commentary employs a beautiful, almost poetic sentence to describe the relationship between vedic injunctions and realization.

Ṭīkā: advitīya adṛśya ātmabodhe vidhiḥ tapasvī dvaitavanopajīvanaḥ kva sthāsyatīti bhāvaḥ |

- **Advitīya** (**Non-dual**): The **Ātman** is one without a second.
- **Adṛśya** (**Non-perceivable**): The Self never becomes a "seen" object (**Dṛśya**). It is the eternal seer.
- **Vidhi-Tapasvī** (**The Ascetic named Injunction**): Here, scriptural command (**Vidhi**) is personified as an ascetic.
- **Dvaita-Vana-Upajīvana** (**Subsisting on the Forest of Duality**): This "ascetic" (the command) earns its livelihood and finds its existence only within the "forest of duality" where there is a distinction between the commander, the commanded, and the action.

Explanation: Just as an ascetic who has spent his entire life in a specific forest cannot survive or find a place in a completely different terrain, the personified **Vidhi** (Injunction) exists only so

long as duality is perceived. In the **Ātma-bodha** (Knowledge of the Self), which is **Advitīya** and **Adṛśya**, there is no "other" to command and no "action" to perform. Thus the rhetoric, where would the "ascetic of injunction" reside (**Kva sthāsyati**) in non-dual realization.

The Conditioning of the Opponent (Pūrva-pakṣa)

The **Pūrva-pakṣa** (opponent) is described as being conditioned by the "Forest of Duality" (**Dvaita-vana**). Their entire psychological and spiritual structure (**Saṃskāra**) is built on the necessity of performing an action to achieve a result. They cannot conceive of a reality where "doing" is not the primary factor.

- **Abhaya Pratiṣṭhā**: The scriptures describe the Self as being established in fearlessness (**Abhaya**). Fear only exists where there is a "second" (duality).
- **Incompatibility**: Because the opponent's mind is tuned to the frequency of "doing," they insist on finding a **Vidhi** even in **Vedānta**. However, once one enters **Advaita**, the very basis of their logic dissolves.

Mananam: Analogies of Qualitative Difference

The difference between a casual seeker and a dedicated **Vedāntin** is explained through two powerful analogies regarding perception and lifestyle.

1. The Analogy of Study (Adhyayana)

- **The Casual View**: A person might listen to a **Satsaṅga** for one hour and claim, "I am also studying."
- **The Immersion View**: In a traditional setting like Kailāś, **Adhyayana** means being immersed from morning to night in **Vyākaraṇa** (Grammar), **Nyāya** (Logic), and **Vedānta**.
- **Conclusion**: Both use the word "study," but the qualitative depth is so different that the casual listener cannot truly understand what the dedicated student is doing until they enter that same level of commitment.

2. The Analogy of the Ganges and the Himalayas

- **The Worldly Perception**: Someone living in a city might say, "The Ganges is near me; it's just a 30-minute drive by car."
- **The Himalayan Perception**: A resident of the Himalayas lives with the Ganges and the mountains. They can step out and be at the river at any moment.
- **The Contrast in Peace**: Similarly, a worldly person claims to have "peace" because it is quiet until 8:00 AM. But the **Vedāntin's** peace is the absolute silence of the forest and the Self, which is undisturbed by the "drums of the world."

The **Atman** cannot be rejected because it is the **Sākṣī** (Witness)—the very subject who would perform the act of rejection. Nor can it be acquired, for it is the seeker's own nature. The **Ṭīkā** defines **śravaṇa-svarūpam** not as an act, but as the recognition of this non-dual nature.

Scriptural Proofs for the Cessation of Action

आत्मज्ञानिनः कर्तव्याभावे मानमाह - तथा चेति । अयं स्वयंपरमानन्दः परमात्माहमस्मि इति यदि कश्चित्पुरुष आत्मानं जानीयात्तदा किं फलमिच्छन् , कस्य वा भोक्तुः प्रीतये, शरीरं तप्यमानमनुसञ्ज्वरेत्तप्येत । भोक्तृभोग्यद्वैताभावात्कृतकृत्य आत्मविदित्यभिप्रायः । ज्ञानदौर्लभ्यार्थश्चेच्छब्दः । एतद्ह्यतमं तत्त्वम् ।

तथा च श्रुतिः — 'आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः । किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्' (बृ. उ. ४ । ४ । १२) इति, 'एतद्बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान्स्यात्कृतकृत्यश्च भारत' (भ. गी. १५ । २०) इति च स्मृतिः ।

Ṭīkā: ātmajñāninaḥ kartavyābhāve mānamāha

A knower of the Self (**Ātma-jñānī**) is characterized by the total absence of a sense of "duty." To substantiate this, the **Bhāṣya** and **Ṭīkā** refer to a famous verse from the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad** (4.4.12), which has also been extensively analyzed by **Vidyāraṇya Svāmī** in the **Pañcadaśī**.

Bhāṣya: 'ātmānaṃ cedvijānīyādayamasmīti pūruṣaḥ | kimicchankasya kāmāya śarīramanusaṃjvaret' (bṛ. u. 4 | 4 | 12)

Ṭīkā: ayaṃ svayaṃ paramānandaḥ paramātmāhamasmi iti yadi kaścitpuruṣa ātmānaṃ jānīyāttadā kiṃ phalamicchan , kasya vā bhoktuḥ prītaye, śarīraṃ tapyamānamanusañjvarettapyeta | bhoktṛbhogyadvaitābhāvātkṛtakṛtya ātmavidityabhiprāyaḥ |

This verse describes the state of a person (**Pūruṣaḥ**) who has realized the Self.

- **Ayam**: Refers to the "Self-effulgent" (**Svayaṃ-prakāśa**) or **Svayaṃ-prabhananda** (ever-shining) Supreme Reality.
- **Aham Asmi**: The realization "I am this Brahman."
- **Kim Icchan / Kasya Kāmāya**: Desiring what result? Or for the sake of which enjoyer?
    - Since **Brahman** is the ultimate gain, no other fruit (**Phala**) remains to be desired.
    - Since the "enjoyer" (the ego) is dissolved into the **Abhoktā** (non-enjoyer) **Brahman**, there is no one left to fulfill desires.
- **Śarīram anusañjvaret**: Why would such a knower suffer or "burn" along with the ailments of the body? The suffering mentioned (**Anusañjvaret**) refers to the heat or pain associated with the gross(**Sthūla)**, subtle (**Sūkṣma)**, and causal (**Kāraṇa)** bodies. **Brahman** does not have hands, feet, or a causal body. To know **Brahman** is to realize, "I am not these bodies." Suffering only exists when there is a false identification (**Tādātmya**) with the body. For the knower, the world is **Mithyā** (unreal), and the Self is **Abhoktā** (non-enjoyer); thus, there is no one left to be "pained" by bodily ailments like disease or broken limbs.

- **Knowledge is not Automatic**: Many believe that once knowledge happens, everything will drop away on its own. The text corrects this: one must practice "letting go" (**Tyāga**) and renunciation to reach the state where knowledge can dawn.
- **The Necessity of Sattva-guṇa**:
  Sattva must be increased through practice. Knowledge does not simply "arrive" and then increase **Sattva**. Rather, one must cultivate **Sattva** first; only then does knowledge enter the mind.
- **Internal Purification**: Simply changing clothes, names, or locations is insufficient. One must abandon defects (**Dur-guṇa**) and mental impurities (**Kaṣāya**). As long as these are not removed, one will not find even a "scent" of true knowledge.

Ṭīkā: **Jñāna-daurlabhyārthaḥ cet-śabdaḥ**: The use of the word **Cet** ("if") in the **Śruti** highlights that this knowledge is **Guhyatamam** (extremely secret and rare). It is not something achieved by everyone easily.

To further support the idea of Kṛta-kṛtyatā (total fulfillment), the text cites the Bhagavad Gītā (15.20).

Bhāṣya: 'etadbuddhvā buddhimānsyātkṛtakṛtyaśca bhārata' (bha. gī. 15 | 20) iti ca smṛtiḥ

Ṭīkā: etadguhyatamaṃ tattvam |

Etad Buddhvā: Having known this "most secret" (**Gūhyatamam**) truth of **Brahman**.

Buddhimān: One becomes truly wise.

Kṛta-kṛtya: One has fulfilled all that was ever to be done.

Synthesis: While the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka** quote focuses on the **Sarva-kartavyatā-hāni** (cessation of all duties), the **Gītā** focuses on the positive aspect of **Kṛta-kṛtyatā** (absolute satisfaction).

Conclusion of the Refutation of the Vṛttikāra

वृत्तिकारमतनिरासमुपसंहरति - तस्मादिति ।

तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम् ॥

The section concludes by dismissing the **Vṛttikāra** view (which claims knowledge needs to be paired with **Upāsanā**).

Ṭīkā: vṛttikāramatanirāsamupasaṃharati

Bhāṣya: tasmānna pratipattividhiviṣayatayā brahmaṇaḥ samarpaṇam ||

Explanation: Therefore, Brahman is not presented as an object of an injunction for meditation/knowledge (**Pratipatti-vidhi**).

The Prābhākara View (Mīmāṃsā) (Page 195)

प्राभाकरोक्तमुपन्यस्यति - यदपि केचिदिति । कर्तात्मा लोकसिद्धत्वान्न वेदान्तार्थः । तदन्यद्ब्रह्म नास्त्येव, वेदस्य कार्यपरत्वेन मानाभावादित्यर्थः । मानाभावेऽसिद्ध इत्याह - तन्नेति ।

यदपि केचिदाहुः — प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधितच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवलवस्तुवादी वेदभागो नास्तीति, तन्न । औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात् ।

The text then introduces the stance of the **Prābhākara** school of **Mīmāṃsā**, who claim that the entire **Veda** is only concerned with action (**Pravṛtti**) or prohibition (**Nivṛtti**).

Ṭīkā: prābhākaroktam upanyasyati

Bhāṣya: yadapi kecid-āhuḥ — ‘pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vidhi-tat-śeṣa-vyatirekeṇa kevala-vastu-vādī vedabhāgo nāsti’ iti

Key Points of the Prābhākara Argument:

The **Prābhākara** school (a branch of **Pūrva-mīmāṃsā**) posits that the entirety of the **Veda** is directed toward action (**kārya**). They argue that no portion of the **Veda** merely describes an existing entity (**siddha-vastu**) without being supplementary to a mandatory injunction.

- **Pravṛtti-Nivṛtti-Vidhi**: All Vedic sentences are either an injunction to perform an action (**Pravṛtti**) or an injunction to avoid an action (**Nivṛtti**).
- **Tat-Śeṣa**: Any sentence that does not look like a command is simply a "supplement" (**Śeṣa**) to a command.
- **Kevala-Vastu-Vādī**: There is no "purely object-descriptive" (**Vastu-vādī**) portion of the **Veda**. In their view, the **Veda** does not exist to tell us "what is," but only "what to do."
- **Reinterpretation of Mahāvākyas**: Under this logic, great sentences like **Aham Brahmāsmi** (I am Brahman) or **Ayam Ātmā Brahma** cannot stand alone. They must be linked to some ritual or mental activity.

This sets the stage for the final **Siddhānta** argument that proves the **Veda** can indeed reveal a reality that is not a "subservient" to action.

The Self as a Doer (Kartā)

The **Prābhākara** school argues that the **Ātman** (Self) is already known through common experience as the agent of action, making the **Vedānta**'s claim of revealing a "new" **Brahman** redundant.

Ṭīkā: kartātmā lokasiddhatvānna vedāntārthaḥ | tadanyadbrahma nāstyeva, vedasya kāryaparatvena mānābhāvādityarthaḥ |

Explanation: Since the self is perceived by everyone as a "doer" (**Kartā**) in the world (**Loka-siddha**), it does not require the **Veda** to reveal it. Therefore, the Self is not the unique subject matter of **Vedānta**.

The **Prābhākara** school concludes that there is no **Brahman** other than this performing, individual soul. They deny the existence of a non-dual, non-acting Supreme Reality.

The ritualists argue that the **Veda** lacks the capacity to serve as a means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**) for an inactive reality like **Brahman**.

- **Kārya-paratva**: The **Veda** is essentially "action-oriented." Its purpose is to impel a person toward a result.
- **Mānābhāva**: Because the **Veda**'s function is limited to action, there is a "lack of evidence/authority" (**Mānābhāva**) for a **Brahman** that is not a part of an action.
- **Logical Constraint**: If a statement is not "action-oriented" (**Kārya-para**), the ritualists believe it cannot be considered a valid means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**).

Refuting the Lack of Evidence

A common objection raised by opponents is that there is no valid means of knowledge (**pramāṇa**) to establish a non-dual, actionless **Brahman**. This is addressed in the commentary.

Ṭīkā: mānābhāve'siddha ityāha

The assertion that there is a "lack of evidence" (**mānābhāva**) for **Brahman** is itself **asiddha** (unproven or fallacious). The **Vedāntic** position maintains that the **Upaniṣads** provide direct evidence for the Self, which is not subservient to any ritual or action.

The Linguistic Theory of Prābhākara

Prābhākara's theory of how words acquire meaning (**śakti-graha**) is central to their argument that all language is action-oriented.

A. Divine Will and Symbolic Relation

- **Signification (Saṅketa):** The relationship between a word and its meaning is established by **Īśvara-saṅkalpa** (Divine Will). It is the divine intent that "this specific word should denote this specific object."
- **Universal to Particular:** The resolution of the Supreme Being (**samaṣṭi-paramātmā**) manifests in individual forms to facilitate language learning.

B. The Process of Language Acquisition (Vṛddha-vyavahāra)

To illustrate how a child (**bālaka**) learns language, **Prābhākara** uses the example of the "Interactions of Elders":

1. **Uttama-vṛddha (The Senior Elder):** Gives a command.
2. **Madhyama-vṛddha (The Intermediate Elder):** Hears the command and performs the action.
3. **Bālaka (The Child/Observer):** Observes the interaction to understand word meanings.

The Learning Mechanism: When the senior elder says, "**ghaṭam ānaya**" (Bring the pot), and the intermediate elder fetches the pot, the child observes the action. Through the repetition of commands like "**jalam ānaya**" (Bring water) or "**gām ānaya**" (Bring the cow), the child uses the method of **anvaya-vyatireka** (agreement and difference) to isolate the meaning of individual words like "**ghaṭa**" (pot) and "**ānaya**" (bring).

The Doctrine of Kārya-paratva

The core of the **Prābhākara** argument is that language is only meaningful when it relates to a "task" (**kārya**).

- **Failure of Existential Statements:** If someone simply says, "**gauḥ asti**" (The cow exists) or "**ghaṭo asti**" (The pot exists), the child/learner gains no clear motivation or functional understanding.
- **Action as the Pivot:** Therefore, they conclude that words only have the power to denote things in the context of an action. If the **Veda** is to be authoritative, it must be **kārya-para** (action-oriented).
- **The Dilemma:** Under this logic, either **Brahman** is secondary to an action (like meditation), or **Brahman** does not exist as a Vedic reality at all.

The Vedāntic Rebuttal (Siddhānta)

अज्ञातस्य फलस्वरूपस्यात्मन उपनिषदेकवेद्यस्याकार्यशेषत्वात्कृत्स्नवेदस्य कार्यपरत्वमसिद्धम् ।

औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात् ।

The **Vedāntin** rejects the **Prābhākara** restriction on Vedic meaning.

Bhāṣya: aupaniṣadasya puruṣasyānanyaśeṣatvāt

Explanation: The **Puruṣa** (Supreme Self/Brahman) described in the **Upaniṣads** is **ananya-śeṣa**. This means:

- **Brahman** is not a "supplement" or "accessory" (**śeṣa**) to anything else.
- It is the final, independent truth.
- The **Veda** is capable of revealing an already existing reality (**siddha-vastu**) without requiring it to be linked to a physical or ritual action.

Ṭīkā: tan-na

This brief refutation (**tan-na**—"It is not so") signifies that the **Prābhākara** theory of language acquisition is too narrow and cannot be used to dismiss the self-evident authority of the **Upaniṣads** in revealing the independent reality of **Brahman**.

The Nature of the Self (Ātman) as the Fruit

The discussion begins by defining the **Ātman** (Self) not as a component of a ritual, but as the ultimate "fruit" or result that is currently unknown to the individual.

Ṭīkā: ajñātasya phalasvarūpasya ātmana upaniṣad ekavedyasya akāryaśeṣatvāt kṛtsnavedasya kāryaparatvam asiddham |

Explanation: The **Ātman** is described as **ajñāta** (unknown) and **phala-svarūpa** (the nature of the final result/fruit). The **Vedāntin** argues that since this **Ātman** is known exclusively through the **Upaniṣads**, it cannot be reduced to a mere accessory of action.

The **Prābhākara** school insists that the entire **Veda** (**kṛtsna-veda**) is **kārya-para** (aimed at action). They claim that even the **Upaniṣads** must somehow fit into this framework.

The opponent argues that if one does not accept the **Upaniṣads** as being subsidiary to action (**akārya-śeṣatvāt**), it would break the rule that the entire **Veda** is action-oriented. However, the **Vedāntin** counters this by stating that the **Ātman** is realized as an entity that is already "there," requiring no further action to create it.

The Logic of Language Acquisition (Vyutpatti)

न च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिलिङ्गाभ्यां श्रोतुस्तद्धेतुं कार्यबोधमनुमाय वक्तृवाक्यस्य कार्यपरत्वं निश्चित्य वाक्यस्थपदानां कार्यान्विते शक्तिग्रहान्न सिद्धस्यापदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वमिति वाच्यम् , पुत्रस्ते जात इति वाक्यश्रोतुः पितुर्हर्षलिङ्गेनेष्टं पुत्रजन्मानुमाय पुत्रादिपदानां सिद्धे सङ्गतिग्रहात् , कार्यान्वितापेक्षयान्वितार्थे शक्तिरित्यङ्गीकारे लाघवात् , सिद्धस्यापि वाक्यार्थत्वादित्यलम् ।

The core of the **Prābhākara** argument lies in how a child (**bālaka**) learns the meaning of words. They argue that words only have "power" (**śakti**) when they are linked to a task.

Ṭīkā: na ca pravṛttinivṛttiliṅgābhyāṃ śrotustaddhetuṃ kāryabodhamanumāya vaktṛvākyasya kāryaparatvaṃ niścitya vākyasthapadānāṃ kāryānvite śaktigrahānna siddhasyāpadārthasya vākyārthatvamiti vācyam

Detailed Breakdown of the Inference:

1. **Pravṛtti-nivṛtti-liṅga:** The child observes the "signs" (**liṅga**) of inclination (**pravṛtti**) or withdrawal (**nivṛtti**) in the elder listening (**Madhyama-vṛddha)**.
2. **Anumāna (Inference):** The child infers that the words spoken by the speaker(**Uttama-vṛddha)** caused a specific "knowledge of a task" (**kārya-bodha**) in the listener.
3. **Kāryānvita-śakti-graha:** The child concludes that words have the power to denote things only as they are related to an action (**kāryānvita**).
4. **The Conclusion against Brahman:** Since **Brahman** is an established, static reality (**siddha-vastu**) and not an action, it cannot be the "meaning of a sentence" (**vākyārtha**).

Brahman as Apadārtha (The Non-Referent)

An interesting technical point is raised: **Brahman** is described as **apadārtha**.

- **Definition:** In this context, **apadārtha** does not mean "non-existent." It means that **Brahman** is not the literal, conventional meaning (**vācyārtha**) of any specific word because it is beyond verbal definition.
- **Parallels:** Similar to how **Sureśvarayācārya** uses the term **avākyārtha**, it implies that the ultimate reality cannot be captured by the standard relationship between words and their meanings if those meanings must be action-linked.

The Vedāntic Refutation: The "Birth of a Son" Example

The **Vedāntin** shatters the **Prābhākara** theory by providing a real-world example where language conveys an "established fact" (**siddha-vastu**) without any command to act.

Ṭīkā: putraste jāta iti vākyaśrotuḥ piturharṣaliṅgeneṣṭaṃ putrajanmānumāya putrādipadānāṃ siddhe saṅgatigrahāt

The Argument:

- **The Scenario:** Someone tells a father, "**putraste jātaḥ**" (A son is born to you).
- **The Observation:** The child/observer sees the father's face light up with joy (**harṣa-liṅga**).
- **The Inference:** The child understands that the joy was caused by the news of an existing fact (the birth of a son), not by a command to do something.
- **Lāghava (Parsimony):** It is simpler and more logical to accept that words can signify "already existing entities" (**siddha-saṅgati-graha**) directly.

Final Conclusion: By establishing that language can convey facts (**siddha-vastu**) like the birth of a son, the **Vedāntin** proves that the **Upaniṣads** can validly reveal the **ajñāta** (unknown) **Brahman** without needing it to be part of a ritual or action (**akārya-śeṣatva**). This refutes the **Prābhākara** claim of **kārya-paratva** (universal action-orientation) of the **Vedas**.

The ṭīkā examine the philosophical refutation of the **Prābhākara** view, which asserts that words only have meaning when associated with an action (**Kāryānvita-śakti**). Instead, the text establishes that sentences can convey meaning about already existing, accomplished facts (**Siddha-vastu**).

The Core Conflict: Kārya vs. Siddha

The primary debate centers on how words acquire their "power" or meaning (**Śakti**).

- **The Opponent's View (Pūrvapakṣa):** All words must be linked to a command or an action (**Kārya**) to be meaningful.
- **The Established View (Siddhānta):** Words can denote an entity that is already "accomplished" or "existent" (**Siddha**), such as Brahman, without requiring an injunction to act.

The Illustration of Caitra and the Newborn Son

To prove that knowledge can be derived from a statement of fact alone, the example of **Caitra** is provided.

- **Context: Caitra** works in a distant village while his family remains elsewhere. His wife was pregnant at the time of his departure.
- **The News:** A messenger arrives to inform him of the birth of his son.
- **The Evidence (Pramāṇa):** The messenger brings a cloth marked with the saffron-tinted footprints (**Kuṅkumāñcita Pāda-cihna**) of the newborn. This serves as physical proof to validate the verbal statement.

The Mechanism of Word-Meaning Acquisition (Vyutpatti)

The text explains how a third party, who does not yet know the meaning of the words, learns the language through observation:

1. The messenger says: पुत्रस्ते जातः (**Putraste jātaḥ**—"A son is born to you").
2. The father (**Caitra**) hears this and experiences immediate joy (**Harṣa**).
3. The third party observes this joy. Since joy is a visible "sign" (**Liṅga**), the observer infers that the sentence conveyed something desirable and existent.

Grasping the Relation in the Accomplished (Siddha)

The observer realizes that the word "**Putra**" (son) refers to the infant, not to an action. This proves that words have a relationship (**Saṅgati**) with established objects.

The relationship (power) of words like "**Putra**" is grasped in an already accomplished or existing entity (**Siddha**).

- **Conclusion on Action:** In this scenario, there is no "work" or "action" (**Karma**) to be performed. The knowledge is complete simply by grasping the meaning of the words. Therefore, word-power is not inherently "action-bound" (**Kāryānvita-śakti**).

Logical Simplicity: Anvitārtha vs. Kāryānvita

Ṭīkā: kāryānvitāpekṣayānvitārthe śaktirityaṅgīkāre lāghavāt , siddhasyāpi vākyārthatvādityalam |

The text argues that the **Siddhānta** position is logically superior because it follows the principle of **Lāghava** (economy or simplicity).

Kāryānvita-śakti: Meaning is related to an action.
Logic: Complex; requires an extra layer of "command."

Anvitārtha-śakti: Meaning is simply a related sense.
Logic: Simple (**Lāghava**); accounts for both facts and actions.

Accepting that the power of words lies in their related meaning (**Anvitārtha**) is logically simpler than insisting they must be related specifically to an action.

The Contrast of Emotions

To further prove that facts alone convey meaning, the text offers a counter-example of bad news:

- **Good News:** "A son is born" (**Putraste jātaḥ**) ====> Result: Joy.
- **Bad News:** "Your daughter is pregnant" (**Kanyā te garbhiṇī**) ====> Result: Sorrow. In both cases, no action is commanded, yet the meaning is perfectly understood, and the emotional impact is immediate.

Final Conclusion on Vedāntic Statements

The purpose of this entire discussion is to validate that **Brahma-Sūtra** can discuss Brahman (an existing reality) without needing to provide a "method" or "ritual" for achieving it.

It is established that even an accomplished entity (**Siddha**) can be the valid meaning of a sentence; let this suffice (no further expansion is needed).

Final Point: By refuting the **Prābhākara** insistence on action, the way is cleared to accept that the Great Sayings (**Mahāvākyas**) of the Upaniṣads provide direct knowledge of the **Siddha-Brahman**.

The Independence of the Upanishadic Person (Aupaniṣad-puruṣa)

The discussion begins by defining the unique status of **Brahman** in the context of the **Upaniṣads**.

Definition of Ananya-śeṣa

The term **Ananya-śeṣa** is crucial for understanding the **Siddhānta** (established view). It signifies that **Brahman** is not a "subsidiary" or "supplement" to anything else.

- **Aupaniṣad-puruṣa**: This refers directly to **Brahman**, the Supreme Being revealed in the **Upaniṣads**.
- **The Meaning of Śeṣa**: In ritualistic contexts, a **Śeṣa** is something that serves another (like a ritual act serving a result).
- **The Argument**: The opponent might try to make **Brahman** a **Śeṣa** (subordinate) to **Karma** (action) or **Upāsanā** (meditation). The **Siddhānta** rejects this, stating **Brahman** is **Ananya-śeṣa**—it does not exist for the sake of performing a ritual or a meditation; it is the ultimate, independent reality.

The Five-Fold Challenge To Pūrvapakṣa (Page 196)

किञ्च ब्रह्मणो नास्तित्वादेव कृत्स्नवेदस्य कार्यपरत्वम् , उत वेदान्तेषु तस्याभानात् , अथवा कार्यशेषत्वात् , किं वा लोकसिद्धत्वात् , आहोस्वित् मानान्तरविरोधात् ?

The **Ṭīkā** introduces a structured challenge to the idea that the entire **Veda** is only associated with a ritual or an action. The opponent proposes a formal proposition (**Pratijñā**) for which the proponent proposes five distinct reasons (**Hetus**) and subsequently refutes them.

Ṭīkā: kiñca brahmaṇo nāstitvādeva kṛtsnavedasya kāryaparatvam, uta vedānteṣu tasyābhānāt , athavā kāryaśeṣatvāt , kiṃ vā lokasiddhatvād, āhosvit mānāntaravirodhāt ?

The Proposition (Pratijñā)
kṛtsna-vedasya kārya-paratvam: The entire **Veda** is dedicated to action/work (**Kārya**).

The Five Reasons (Hetu)
The proponent presents five possible reasons as to why the opponent proposes that the **Veda** cannot be about a non-active entity like **Brahman**:

#	The Reason (Hetu)	Hetu (Sanskrit)	Explanation
1	Non-existence	**Brahmaṇo nāstitvāt**	Brahman simply does not exist.
2	Absence in Vedānta	**Vedānteṣu tasya abhānāt**	Even in the Upaniṣads (Vedānta), Brahman is not truly perceived or revealed.
3	Subordination to Action	**Kārya śeṣatvāt**	Brahman is merely a secondary part of an action/ritual (Kārya).
4	Worldly Redundancy	**Loka siddhatvāt**	If Brahman exists, it is already known through common worldly experience, making the Veda redundant.
5	Contradiction	**Mānāntara virodhāt**	The concept of Brahman contradicts other established means of knowledge (Pramāṇas).

Summary of the Opponent's Logic (As Described by the Siddhāntin)

The opponent's goal is to prove that the **Veda** cannot be a valid source of knowledge for an accomplished reality (**Siddha-vastu**) like **Brahman**. By their proposition the **Pūrvapakṣa** attempts to force the conclusion that the only valid use of Vedic text is to command an action (**Kārya**).

- If **Brahman** doesn't exist (1) or isn't in the text (2), the **Veda** must be about something else (action).
- If **Brahman** is just a tool for ritual (3), then the ritual remains the primary focus.

- If we already know **Brahman** through our senses (4) or if it contradicts other means of knowledge (5), the **Veda** fails as an independent source of knowledge unless it is interpreted as a command to act.

Siddhāntin now takes up the systematic refutation of the first three possible reasons (out of five) regarding **Brahman** and reveals the extraordinary intellectual caliber of the commentators (**Ṭīkākāra**) who uncover these depths.

Refutation of the First Three Reasons Simultaneously

तत्राद्यं पक्षत्रयं निराचष्टे - योऽसाविति । अनन्यशेषत्वार्थम् 'असंसारी' इत्यादि विशेषणम् । नास्तित्वाभावे हेतुं वेदान्तमानसिद्धत्वमुक्त्वा हेत्वन्तरमात्मत्वमाह - स एष इति । इतिरिदमर्थे । 'इदं न इदं न इति' सर्वदृश्यनिषेधेन य आत्मा उपदिष्टः स एष इत्यर्थः ।

योऽसावुपनिषत्स्वेवाधिगतः पुरुषोऽसंसारी ब्रह्मस्वरूपः उत्पाद्यादिचतुर्विधद्रव्यविलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्थोऽनन्यशेषः, नासौ नास्ति नाधिगम्यत इति वा शक्यं वदितुम् । 'स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा' (बृ. उ. ३ । ९ । २६) इत्यात्मशब्दात् आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात् , य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात् ।

The **Siddhāntin** does not always address the reasons one by one. In this instance, the **Bhāṣya** provides a single, potent sentence that dismantles the first three challenges.

Ṭīkā: tatrādyaṃ pakṣatrayaṃ nirācaṣṭe

In this context, the first three positions/objections are refuted together.

The Decisive Statement

The following sentence from the **Bhāṣya** is identified by commentators as the refutation of the first three doubts (that **Brahman** does not exist, that it is not found in **Vedānta**, and that it is subordinate to action):

Bhāṣya: yo'sau upaniṣatsu adhigataḥ puruṣo'saṃsārī brahmasvarūpaḥ utpādyādicaturvidhadravyavilakṣaṇaḥ svaprakaraṇastho'nanyaśeṣaḥ

That **Puruṣa** (Supreme Being) who is known/attained through the **Upaniṣads**, who is non-transmigratory (**Asaṃsārī**), is **Brahman** and it is not subordinate to any action or meditation.

Analysis of the Refutation

- **Refuting Non-existence (Nāstitva) and Absence in Vedānta:** By using the word **adhigataḥ** (known/attained), the **Bhāṣya** affirms that **Brahman** is an existing reality and is indeed the subject matter revealed by the **Upaniṣads**.
- **Refuting Subordination to Action (Kārya-śeṣatva):** By describing **Brahman** as **Asaṃsārī** (beyond the cycle of birth and death/ever-free), it is established that **Brahman** cannot be a mere "tool" or "supplement" for ritualistic acts. A being that is eternally free and non-acting cannot be the subsidiary of a command to act.

The Definition of Brahman

The **Bhāṣya** identifies **Brahman** as:

- **Aupaniṣad-puruṣa**: The entity known exclusively through the **Upaniṣads**.
- **Asaṃsārī**: Non-transmigratory. This specifically refutes the idea of **Brahman** being a "tool" for ritual. If **Brahman** were linked to actions/results (like the four types of results: **Utpādya** - producible, **Saṃskārya** - purifiable, **Vikārya** - transformable, or **Āpya** - attainable), It would be part of the cycle of **Saṃsāra**.
- **Ananya-śeṣa**: Not a subsidiary of anything else.

Refuting Non-existence via Ātmatva (Self-hood)

For the argument that **Brahman** does not exist (**Nāstitva**) the **Siddhānta** counters by equating **Brahman** with the **Ātman** (the Self).

- **Logic**: One cannot deny the existence of **Brahman** because **Brahman** is the very Self of the one who is denying it.
- **pratyākhyātum aśakyatvāt**: The impossibility of rejection. To deny the Self is a contradiction, as the "denier" must exist to perform the denial.

Bhāṣya: nāsau nāsti nādhigamyata iti vā śakyaṃ vaditum |

It cannot be said that **Brahman** does not exist or cannot be known, because It is the Self.

Analogy: You cannot cut the very branch you are sitting on. Similarly, you cannot use consciousness (which is **Brahman**) to negate the existence of consciousness.

The Methodology of Neti-neti (Not this, Not this)

The text explores how the **Upaniṣads** reveal **Brahman** through the process of elimination of the "Seen" (**Dṛśya**).

Ṭīkā: nāstitva abhāve hetuṃ vedāntamānasiddhatvam uktvā hetu antaram ātmatvam āha | itiridamarthe | idaṃ na idaṃ na iti sarvadṛśyaniṣedhena ya ātmā upadiṣṭaḥ sa eṣa ityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: ‘sa eṣa neti netyātmā’ (bṛ. u. 3 | 9 | 26) ityātmaśabdāt ātmanaśca pratyākhyātumaśakyatvāt , ya eva nirākartā tasyaivātmatvāt |

Analysis of Sa eṣa neti netyātmā

- **Iti**: In the phrase **Neti-neti** (**Na-iti**), the word **Iti** stands for **Idam** (this/object).
- **Mechanism**: By saying "Not this, Not this," the **Upaniṣad** negates everything that can be perceived as an object (**Idam**).
- **The Remainder**: After negating the body, mind, and even the ego (**Ahaṃkāra**) as "objects" (**Idam**), what remains is the witness—the **Ātman**, which is **Brahman**.

The word '**Iti**' refers to 'this' (objects). By negating all that is perceivable (**Sarva-dṛśya**), the Self is taught (**Upadiṣṭaḥ**).

Correlation with Upadeśasāhasrī

Swamiji refers to the first verse of the second chapter of **Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's Upadeśasāhasrī** to reinforce the impossibility of negating the Self.

प्रतिषेद्धुमशक्यत्वान्नेतिनेतीति शेषितम् ।
इदं नाहमिदं नाहमित्यद्धा प्रतिपद्यते ॥ २.१ ॥

pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvānnetinetīti śeṣitam |
idaṃ nāhamidaṃ nāhamityaddhā pratipadyate || 2.1 ||

- **Idam na aham**: "I am not this [object]."
- **The Un-negatable**: You can negate the ego-sense because it is perceived as an object, but you cannot negate the "negator" or the final witness.

Because it is impossible to negate [the Self], one realizes "I am not this [object]" and reaches the final ground of the Self.

Mananam: The Genius of the Commentators (Ṭīkākāra)

The text reflects on the extraordinary cognitive and spiritual capacity of the great sages who wrote the commentaries.

- **Inferential Brilliance:** The commentators do not have a secondary guide; they look only at the **Bhāṣya**. From a single sentence like **"Yo'sau upaniṣatsu..."**, they are able to intuit exactly which five objections are being raised and how the text systematically answers them.
- **The Difficulty of the Task:** Writing a **Ṭīkā** is not a common human endeavor. It requires a high degree of **Sattva** (purity/clarity of mind). Swamiji notes that if an ordinary person were to attempt to write a commentary on the **Brahma-Sūtra**, the sheer complexity would be overwhelming.
- **Divine and Guru Grace:** The ability to "digest" and then elaborate upon these texts is seen as a result of **Bhagavat-prasāda** (God's Grace) and **Guru-prasāda** (the Guru's Grace).

Mention of Ānandagiri Ji

Ānandagiri ji is highlighted as a pre-eminent **Adhikārī Puruṣa** (qualified person).

- He has written extensive and profound commentaries on almost all major **Bhāṣyas**, including the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad**, which is known for its extreme difficulty.
- **Pre-destined Purpose:** Such individuals are seen as being prepared by the Divine from the very beginning of their lives. They are placed in specific environments and situations to be ready for the monumental task of preserving and explaining these philosophical systems.

The Merit of Study: Simply having the opportunity to study these works is considered a great **Puṇya** (spiritual merit).

The Goal: For a student, the objective is to "digest" (**Pacāle**) these teachings—to move beyond mere reading and truly assimilate the logic and the reality of **Brahman** presented by the **Bhāṣyakāra** and **Ṭīkākāra**.

Refuting the Fourth Reason: Is Brahman Known to the World? (Page 197)

चतुर्थं शङ्कते - नन्वात्माहमिति । आत्मनोऽहङ्कारादिसाक्षित्वेनाहंधीविषयत्वस्य निरस्तत्वान्न लोकसिद्धतेत्याह - नेति । यं तीर्थकारा अपि न जानन्ति तस्यालौकिकत्वं किमु वाच्यमित्याह - नहीति । समस्तारतम्यवर्जितः । तत्तन्मते आत्मानधिगतिद्योतकानि विशेषणानि ।

नन्वात्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वादुपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायत इत्यनुपपन्नम् । न, तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात् । न ह्यहंप्रत्ययविषयकर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषो विधिकाण्डे तर्कसमये वा केनचिदधिगतः सर्वस्यात्मा ।

The text now focuses on the refutation of the **fourth reason** (**Loka-siddhatva**) and describes the unique nature of **Brahman** as the Witness (**Sākṣī**) who is unknown to ordinary logic and ritualistic science.

If the Self is known through the "I-thought" (**Ahaṃ-pratyaya**), then it is a matter of common experience (**Loka-siddha**) and the **Upaniṣads** would be redundant.

The Opponent's Challenge

Bhāṣya: nanu ātmā ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣayatvāt upaniṣatsueva vijñāyate iti anupapannam

Explanation: If the Self is the object of the "I-notion" (which everyone has), then saying it is known only through the **Upaniṣads** is illogical.

The Siddhānta's Distinction

The text explains that while the **Ahaṃ-vṛtti** (the thought "I") seems to reveal the Self, it does so in a limited or distorted way. In the **Adhyāsa-bhāṣya**, the **Bhāṣyakāra** mentions two ways the Self appears in the "I-notion":

1. **As the Substratum (Adhiṣṭhāna)**: Just as a rope is the substratum for the superimposed snake, the Pure Consciousness is the substratum for the "I-thought."
2. **As the Reflected Consciousness (Cidābhāsa)**: The "I-thought" is inert (**Jaḍa**) but appears conscious because it reflects the light of the Self.

The Self as the Witness (Sākṣī)

The refutation hinges on the fact that the **true** Self is not the "I" who acts or experiences, but the Witness of that "I."

Bhāṣya: na, tatsākṣitvena pratyuktatvāt |

No, [the objection is] refuted because [the Self is known] as the **Witness** of that [I-notion].

Ṭīkā: ātmano'haṅkārādisākṣitvenāhandhīviṣayatvasya nirastatvānna lokasiddhatetyāha

Since the Self is the Witness of the ego (**Ahaṅkāra**), and the rejection of its being an object of the "I-notion" has been established, it is not "known to the world" (**Loka-siddha**).

- **Key Insight**: Ordinary objects like a pot (**Ghaṭa**) or cloth (**Paṭa**) are objects of knowledge. The Self is the **Witness** (**Sākṣī**) of knowledge itself. Therefore, the "world" knows the ego, but not the Witness.

The Uniqueness of the Upanishadic Person

The text emphasizes that this "Witness" is so subtle that even great scholars and founders of various systems (**Tīrthakāra**) fail to grasp it.

Ignorance of the Tīrthakāras

Ṭīkā: yaṃ tīrthakārā api na jānanti tasyālaukikatvaṃ kimu vācyamityāha

What need is there to speak of its extra-worldly nature (**Alaukikatva**) when even the great founders of philosophical schools (**Tīrthakāras** like **Jaimini**, **Kaṇāda**, **Kapila**, **Gautama**) do not know It?

Attributes of the Witness

The Witness is described as:

- **Vyatirekeṇa**: Distinct from the "I-notion" and the doer (**Kartā**).
- **Sarvabhūtasthaḥ Samaḥ**: Residing equally in all beings. There is no "more" or "less" of the Self in different people.
- **Ekaḥ:** The one and only
- **Kūṭastha-nitya**: Immutable and eternal.

Bhāṣya: na hi ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣaya-kartṛ-vyatirekeṇa tatsākṣī sarvabhūtasthaḥ sama ekaḥ kūṭasthanityaḥ puruṣo vidhikāṇḍe tarkasamaye vā kenacidadhigataḥ sarvasyātmā |

This Witness, distinct from the ego (the doer who has the "I-thought as the object) , who is one, equal in all beings, and immutably eternal... has not been understood by any [other system].

Exclusion from Other Sciences

The text clarifies that **Brahman** cannot be reached through ritual or mere logic:

- **Vidhi-kāṇḍe**: Not in the section of injunctions (Karma-kāṇḍa).
- **Tarka-samayevā**: Not through the systems of logic (**Tarka-śāstra** or **Nyāya**).
- **Sarvasya ātmā**: Because It is the Self of everyone, It cannot be negated (**Pratyākhyātum aśakyaḥ**).

- **Vidhi-śeṣatva**: It cannot be made a subsidiary to any ritualistic command.

Ṭīkā: samastāratamyavarjitaḥ | tattanmate ātmānadhigatidyotakāni viśeṣaṇāni |

The term **samaḥ** (equal/even) signifies the absence of **tāratamya** (gradation or hierarchy). There is no sense of "more" or "less" in the **Atman**.

निर्दोषं हि समं ब्रह्म तस्माद्ब्रह्मणि ते स्थिताः।
nirdoṣaṃ hi samaṃ brahma tasmādbrahmaṇi te sthitāḥ|

Quoting the **Bhagavad Gītā** (5.19), it is established that **Brahman** is flawless and equal; those whose minds are established in this equality are established in **Brahman**.

Purpose of the Attributes of Atman

The various descriptors used for the **Atman**—**samaḥ** (equal), **ekaḥ** (one), **kūṭastha-nityaḥ** (unchangeably eternal)—are not mere adjectives; they are intentional exclusions of non-Vedantic views through which **Atma** is “unattainable” (**anadhigata**)

- **Exclusion of Mīmāṃsā:** In the **Mīmāṃsā** view, souls are many and varied (e.g., the soul of a deity is superior to the soul of a lower being). The word **samaḥ** refutes this gradation.
- **Exclusion of Jainism:** Jainism posits that the soul's size varies with the body. **Samatva** (equality/uniformity) denies this **tāratamya**.
- **Exclusion of Plurality:** By saying **ekaḥ** (one), all schools that posit multiple souls are refuted.
- **Exclusion of Changeability:** Other schools view the soul as **vikārī** (subject to change/modification through joy or sorrow). The term **kūṭastha** (immovable/rock-seated) refutes this, establishing that the **Atman** is **apariṇāmī** (non-transforming).

These attributes indicate that the **Atman** cannot be apprehended by the methods of these other systems.

Refutation of the Fifth Reason: Conflict with Other Means of Knowledge (Mānāntara-virodha) (Page 199)

पञ्चमं निरस्यति - अत इति । केनचिद्वादिना प्रमाणेन युक्त्या वेत्यर्थः । अगम्यत्वान्न मानान्तरविरोध इति भावः । साक्षी कर्माङ्गम् , चेतनत्वात् , कर्तृवदिति, तत्राह - विधीति । अज्ञातसाक्षिणोऽनुपयोगाज्ज्ञातस्य व्याघातकत्वान्न कर्मशेषत्वमित्यर्थः । साक्षिणः सर्वशेषित्वादहेयानुपादेयत्वाच्च न कर्मशेषत्वमित्याह - आत्मत्वादिति । अनित्यत्वेनात्मनो हेयत्वमाशङ्क्याह - सर्वं हीति । परिणामित्वेन हेयतां निराचष्टे - विक्रियेति । उपादेयत्वं निराचष्टे - अत एवेति । निर्विकारित्वादित्यर्थः । उपादेयत्वं हि साध्यस्य न त्वात्मनः । नित्यसिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः । परप्राप्त्यर्थमात्मा हेय इत्यत आह - तस्मात् , पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चिदिति । काष्ठा सर्वस्यावधिः । एवमात्मनोऽनन्यशेषत्वात् , अबाध्यत्वात् , अपूर्वत्वात् , वेदान्तेषु स्फुटभानाच्च वेदान्तैकवेद्यत्वमुक्तम् । तत्र श्रुतिमाह - तं त्वेति । तं सकारणसूत्रस्याधिष्ठानं पुरुषं पूर्णं हे शाकल्य, त्वा त्वां पृच्छामीत्यर्थः । अत इति । उक्तलिङ्गैः श्रुत्या च वेदान्तानामात्मवस्तुपरत्वनिश्चयादित्यर्थः ।

अतः स न केनचित्प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यः, विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुम्; आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषाम् — न हेयो नाप्युपादेयः । सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति । पुरुषो हि विनाशहेत्वभावादविनाशी । विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः । अत एव नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः; तस्मात् 'पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः' (क. उ. १ । ३ । ११) 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' (बृ. उ. ३ । ९ । २६) इति चौपनिषदत्वविशेषणं पुरुषस्योपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाश्यमानत्वे उपपद्यते । अतो भूतवस्तुपरो वेदभागो नास्तीति वचनं साहसमात्रम् ॥

The **Pūrvapakṣa** argues that if the Veda does not focus on action (**kārya**), it will conflict with other means of knowledge (**pramāṇas**).

Ṭīkā: pañcamaṃ nirasyati - ata iti | kenacidvādinā pramāṇena yuktyā vetyarthaḥ | agamyatvānna mānāntaravirodha iti bhāvaḥ |

The **Siddhāntin** responds that conflict is impossible because the **Atman** is inaccessible (**agamya)** to other **pramāṇas** like perception (**pratyakṣa**) or inference (**anumāna**).

- **Non-Overlapping Domains:** Conflict or agreement occurs only when two means of knowledge share the same object. If two people speak entirely different languages, they can neither agree nor argue.
- **Levels of Reality: Advaita Vedānta** posits three levels of reality. The **Atman** is **Pāramārthika** (absolute truth).
    - Other schools recognize only two levels; for them, the soul is **Vyāvahārika** (empirical).
    - Because the Upanishadic **Atman** is not an object of the senses or logic, worldly arguments about it being "happy" or "miserable" do not apply to its true nature.

Refutation of the Prābhākara Inference

A specific argument from the **Prābhākara** school is introduced. They attempt to prove that the **Sākṣī** (Witness) is actually an accessory to ritual action (**karmāṅga**).

Note on Prābhākara View

In the **Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā**, the **first varṇaka** discussed the nature of the Self—whether the Self is merely a **subsidiary to ritual action (karma-śeṣa)** through injunctions related to ritual duties.

The **second varṇaka** dealt with the idea that the Self might be a **subsidiary to meditation (upāsanā)** through injunctions prescribing contemplative practices.

Thus, both positions have already been addressed and resolved. So the question arises: **Why is the Prābhākara view being raised again?**

The reason is that the **Prābhākara school** held a particularly influential and strong opposing view. During the time of **Bhagavān Ādi Śaṅkarācārya**, this view was a powerful **pūrvapakṣa** (opponent). Because of its prominence, **Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāra** considers it necessary to address it separately and more explicitly.

Ṭīkā: sākṣī karmāṅgam , cetanatvāt , kartṛvat

Pūrvapakṣa Inference:

- **Pakṣa** (Subject): The **Sākṣī** (or **Puruṣa**).
- **Sādhya** (Probandum): Is an accessory to action (**karmāṅgam**).
- **Hetu** (Reason): Because it is conscious (**cetanatvāt**).
- **Dṛṣṭānta** (Example): Like the agent (**kartṛvat**), such as a potter.

Ṭīkā: ajñātasākṣiṇaḥ anupayogāt jñātasya vyāghātakatvāt na karmaśeṣatvam ityarthaḥ |

The Refutation: If the **Sākṣī** is unknown, it is useless for ritual. If it is known, it destroys the very basis of ritual.

1. **ajñāta** (Unknown): If one doesn't know they are the Witness, their life continues in misery/ignorance as before; the concept has no utility for them.
2. **jñāta** (Known): If the **Sākṣī** is truly known, it reveals the non-dual nature of reality and destroys **dvaita** (duality). Since ritual action requires the distinction of "performer," "action," and "result," the knowledge of the **Sākṣī** makes the performance of karma impossible.

सर्वेषाणां शेषाणां शेषी इति सर्वशेषी। (sarveṣāṇāṃ śeṣāṇām śeṣī iti sarvaśeṣī|)

The **Atman** is the **Sarva-śeṣī**—the ultimate residue or the end-goal of everything else. Everything else exists for it; it does not exist as a "subservient part" (**śeṣa**) of anything else.

The Nature of Atman: Neither Acceptable nor Rejectable

Ṭīkā: sākṣiṇaḥ sarvaśeṣitvādaheyānupādeyatvācca na karmaśeṣatvamityāha - ātmatvāditi | anityatvenātmano heyatvamāśaṅkyāha - sarvaṃ hīti | pariṇāmitvena heyatāṃ nirācaṣṭe - vikriyeti | upādeyatvaṃ nirācaṣṭe - ata eveti | nirvikāritvādityarthaḥ | upādeyatvaṃ hi sādhyasya na tvātmanaḥ | nityasiddhatvādityarthaḥ |

The **Atman** is described as **aheya-anupādeya** (that which cannot be discarded and cannot be acquired).

Bhāṣya: ataḥ sa na kenacitpratyākhyātuṃ śakyaḥ, vidhiśeṣatvaṃ vā netum; ātmatvādeva ca sarveṣām — na heyo nāpyupādeyaḥ | sarvaṃ hi vinaśyadvikārajātaṃ puruṣāntaṃ vinaśyati | puruṣo hi vināśahetvabhāvādavināśī | vikriyāhetvabhāvācca kūṭasthanityaḥ | ata eva nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvaḥ

Because it is the very Self of everyone, one cannot "give it up" (as you cannot give up yourself) nor "attain it" (as you already are it).

Attributes of the Atman:

- **Nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāvaḥ**: Eternally pure, conscious, and free.
- **Kūṭastha-nitya**: Unchangeably eternal, unlike "changing eternals" (**pariṇāmī-nitya**).
- **Nirvikāritvāt**: Due to being changeless, it is neither a cause nor an effect.

The Role of Sādhana (Practice): Knowledge of being "Eternally Pure" is blocked by the ego in the five sheaths (**pañca-kośa**).

- **Rāga-dveṣa** (attachment and aversion) exist only while the "I" is centered in the sheaths.
- When these are thinned, the "I" in the sheaths becomes **śithila** (loose/weak). Only then can **Vedānta** reveal the true nature.
- One who remains steady in the face of the dualities of pleasure and pain (**Dhīra**) is fit for immortality (**Amṛtatva**).

The Upanishadic Puruṣa

Ṭīkā: paraprāptyarthamātmā heya ityata āha - tasmāt , puruṣānna paraṃ kiñciditi | kāṣṭhā sarvasyāvadhiḥ | evamātmano'nanyaśeṣatvāt , abādhyatvāt , apūrvatvāt , vedānteṣu sphuṭabhānācca vedāntaikavedyatvamuktam | tatra śrutimāha - taṃ tveti | taṃ sakāraṇasūtrasyādhiṣṭhānaṃ puruṣaṃ pūrṇaṃ he śākalya, tvā tvāṃ pṛcchāmītyarthaḥ | ata iti | uktaliṅgaiḥ śrutyā ca vedāntānāmātmavastuparatvaniścayādityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: tasmāt ‘puruṣānna paraṃ kiñcitsā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ’ (ka. u. 1 | 3 | 11) ‘taṃ tvaupaniṣadaṃ puruṣaṃ pṛcchāmi’ (bṛ. u. 3 | 9 | 26) iti caupaniṣadatvaviśeṣaṇaṃ puruṣasyopaniṣatsu prādhānyena prakāśyamānatve upapadyate |

The argument that one must "discard" the individual self (**jīvātman**) to "gain" the Supreme Self (**Paramātman**) is refuted. They are not two distinct entities where one is replaced by the other.

Quoting the **Kaṭhopaniṣad (1.3.11))**, it is stated that there is nothing beyond the **Puruṣa**; it is the ultimate goal (**Kāṣṭhā**) and the supreme path.

The quote from the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (3.9.26)** emphasizes that the **Puruṣa** is known exclusively through the Upanishads (**aupaniṣadam**).

The **Puruṣa** is the substratum (**adhiṣṭhāna**) of everything, including the **hiraṇyagarbha** (the cosmic thread/intellect). It is "Full" (**pūrṇam**). It is called **aupaniṣadam** because it is primarily revealed by the Upanishads, whereas other means like inference provide only a secondary or vague understanding.

Reinterpreting the Mīmāṃsā Position: Reconciliation with Śabara-bhāṣya (Page 199-200)

पूर्वोक्तमनुवदति - यदपीति । वेदस्य नैरर्थक्ये शङ्किते तस्यार्थवत्तापरमिदं भाष्यम् - दृष्टो हीति । तत्र 'फलवदर्थावबोधनम्' इति वक्तव्ये धर्मविचारप्रक्रमात् 'कर्मावबोधनम्' इत्युक्तं नैतावता वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मपरत्वनिरासः । अत एव 'अनुपलब्धेऽर्थे तत्प्रमाणम्' इति सूत्रकारो धर्मस्य फलवदज्ञातत्वेनैव वेदार्थतां दर्शयति । तच्चावशिष्टं ब्रह्मण इति न वृद्धवाक्यैर्विरोध इत्याह - तद्धर्मेति ।

यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदामनुक्रमणम् — 'दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्' इत्येवमादि, तत् धर्मजिज्ञासाविषयत्वाद्विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्राभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Ṭīkā: vedasya nairarthakye śaṅkite tasyārthavattāparamidaṃ bhāṣyam

The **Pūrvapakṣa** often cites **Śabara Svāmī** (the great Mīmāṃsā commentator) to claim the Veda only teaches action.

Bhāṣya: yadapi śāstratātparyavidāmanukramaṇam — 'dṛṣṭo hi tasyārthaḥ karmāvabodhanam' ityevamādi

Śabara Svāmī stated: "The seen purpose of the Veda is the understanding of action." The **Siddhāntin** clarifies that this was said in the specific context of **Dharma-jijñāsā** (the inquiry into duty/ritual), not as a universal rule excluding **Brahman**.

Ṭīkā: tatra 'phalavadarthāvabodhanam' iti vaktavye dharmavicāraprakramāt 'karmāvabodhanam' ityuktaṃ naitāvatā vedāntānāṃ brahmaparatvanirāsaḥ |

A more accurate, comprehensive statement would be: "The purpose of the Veda is the revelation of **phalavat-artha** (fruitful goals)."

- If the goal is heaven, the Veda teaches **Karma**.
- If the goal is the cessation of sorrow (**mokṣa**), the Veda teaches **Brahma-vidyā**.

The **Mīmāṃsā** focus on **Karma** was for the purpose of ritual inquiry and was not intended to negate the **Upaniṣadic** revelation of the **Atman**.

- **Mīmāṃsā Interpretation:** Traditionally, this implies that the "seen" or "evident" purpose of the **Veda** is to provide the knowledge of action (**karmāvabodhanam**).
- **The Vedāntic Amendment: Vedānta** suggests a subtle yet profound modification to this definition to make it universally applicable to both **Dharma** (action) and **Brahman** (existence).
- **Definition of "Phalavat-arthāvabodhanam":** Instead of saying the Veda is for "knowledge of action," it should be defined as "knowledge of a fruitful/purposeful entity" (**phalavat artha**).
- **Significance:** * In **Dharma-jijñāsā** (inquiry into duty), the "fruitful entity" is the ritual leading to heaven.

- In **Brahma-jijñāsā** (inquiry into Brahman), the "fruitful entity" is **Brahman** itself, which leads to liberation.
- By using this broader definition, the claim that **Vedānta** is centered on **Brahman** (**brahma-paratva**) cannot be refuted or dismissed.

Validation through the Jaimini Sūtra

The text invokes **Maharṣi Jaimini**, the author of the **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras**, to show that the criteria for Vedic authority are equally met by **Brahma-vidyā**.

Ṭīkā: ata eva ‘anupalabdhe'rthe tatpramāṇam’ iti sūtrakāro dharmasya phalavadajñātatvenaiva vedārthatāṃ darśayati |

The Jaimini Sūtra (1.1.5): औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः तस्य ज्ञानम् उपदेशः अव्यतिरेकः च अर्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्य अनपेक्षत्वात् इति |

autpattikastu śabdasyārthena saṃbandhaḥ tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ avyatirekaḥ ca arthe'nupalabdhe tatpramāṇaṃ bādarāyaṇasya anapekṣatvāt iti |

Analysis of the Sūtra Criteria:

1. **Autpattikaḥ Sambandhaḥ:** The relationship between the word and its meaning is eternal and innate.
2. **Anupalabdhe Arthe:** The **Veda** is a valid authority (**pramāṇa**) specifically for matters that are **unobtainable** through other means (like perception or inference).
3. **Avyatirekaḥ:** The knowledge provided must be uncontradicted (**abādhita**).
4. **Bādarāyaṇasya-anapekṣatvāt:** Interestingly, the sūtra mentions **Bādarāyaṇa** (the author of the **Brahma Sūtras**), indicating that even the teacher of **Vedānta** accepts the self-validity of the **Veda** in the matters related to **Dharma**.

Important Point: The **Ṭīkā** emphasizes that if a subject is **Phalavat** (fruitful) and **Ajñāta** (previously unknown), it constitutes the legitimate scope of the **Veda**. Since **Brahman** is both fruitful (leads to **Mokṣa**) and unknown (not accessible via the senses), the **Veda** is perfectly valid in teaching it.

Harmony with the Traditional Masters (Vṛddha)

The **ṭīkā** addresses whether this **Vedāntic** view contradicts the "ancients" or "knowers of the essence of scriptures" (**vṛddha** or **śāstra-tātparya-vid**).

Ṭīkā: taccāvaśiṣṭaṃ brahmaṇa iti na vṛddhavākyairvirodha iti

- **No Conflict:** There is no contradiction with the great teachers like **Śabara Svāmī**.
- **Contextualization:** Their statements regarding "action" should be understood as being strictly within the context of **Dharma-jijñāsā**.
- **Scope:**
  - **Karmakāṇḍa:** Focuses on Injunctions (**Vidhi**) and Prohibitions (**Pratiṣedha**).

- **Jñānakāṇḍa:** Focuses on the nature of reality (**Vastu-svarūpa**).

The Nature of Injunctions and Prohibitions

निषेधशास्त्रस्यापि निवृत्तिकार्यपरत्वमस्ति, तत्सूत्रभाष्यवाक्यजातं कर्मकाण्डस्य कार्यपरत्वाभिप्रायमित्यर्थः । वस्तुतस्तु लिङर्थे कर्मकाण्डस्य तात्पर्यम् , लिङर्थश्च, लोके प्रवर्तकज्ञानगोचरत्वेन कॢप्तं यागादिक्रियागतमिष्टसाधनत्वमेव न क्रियातोऽतिरिक्तं कार्यं तस्य कूर्मलोमवदप्रसिद्धत्वादिति तस्यापि पराभिमतकार्यविलक्षणे सिद्धे दधिसोमादौ प्रामाण्यं किमुत ज्ञानकाण्डस्येति मन्तव्यम् ।

The text clarifies that even within the **Karmakāṇḍa**, "action" isn't just about doing something; it also includes "refraining."

Ṭīkā: niṣedhaśāstrasya api nivṛttikāryaparatvam asti, tatsūtrabhāṣyavākyajātaṃ karmakāṇḍasya kāryaparatva abhiprāyam ityarthaḥ |

- **Vidhi (Injunctions):** These are **Pravṛtti-kārya-para**—oriented toward prompting action.
- **Niṣedha (Prohibitions):** These are **Nivṛtti-kārya-para**—oriented toward the "action of cessation" or refraining.
- **Conclusion on Karmakāṇḍa:** The entire corpus of sūtras and commentaries in the ritual section intends to establish the **Kārya-paratva** (action-oriented nature) of the Vedas in that specific domain. However, this does not limit the **Veda** from describing the **Siddha-vastu** (established reality of **Brahman**) in the **Upaniṣads**.

The Meaning of Injunctions and the Critique of Niyoga

The discussion begins by identifying the core intent of the **Karmakāṇḍa**. The primary focus is on **liṅga-artha**, which refers to the meaning of the optative suffix (the "should" or "must" in a Vedic command).

Ṭīkā: vastutastu liṅarthe karmakāṇḍasya tātparyam , liṅarthaśca, loke pravartakajñānagocaratvena kḷptaṃ yāgādikriyāgatamiṣṭasādhanatvameva

- **Liṅg (Injunction):** In common parlance (**loke**), the meaning of an injunction is recognized as the object of knowledge that prompts a person to act (**pravartaka-jñāna-gocaratva**).
- **Iṣṭa-sādhanatvam:** The performance of rituals like **yāga** (sacrifice) is undertaken because they are understood to be the means to a desired end (**iṣṭa-sādhanatva**).
- **The Condition for Action:** For a person to be inclined toward an action (**pravṛtti**), two conditions must be met:
    - The action must be a means to a desired result (**iṣṭa-sādhanatva**).
    - The action must not lead to a greater undesired result (**balavad-aniṣṭa-ananubandhitvam**).
    - **Example**: Even if milk is desired, if it is known to be mixed with poison, a person will not drink it because of the "stronger undesired result."

The Rejection of Prābhākara's "Niyoga"

The **Prābhākara** school of **Mīmāṃsā** argues that the Vedic injunction produces a unique supersensible force or mandate called **niyoga** (also termed **kārya**), which is distinct from the action itself.

Ṭīkā: na kriyāto'tiriktaṃ kāryaṃ tasya kūrmalomavat aprasiddhatvāt iti

- **Refutation:** There is no "mandate" (**niyoga**) that exists over and above the action (**kriyā**) itself. This concept is exclusive to the **Prābhākara** philosophy and is not supported by the Vedas.
- **The Analogy of the Tortoise:** Just as "hair on a tortoise" (**kūrma-loma**) is non-existent and unproven, the concept of **niyoga** is unproven and nonexistent in reality.

Validity of Existing Objects (Siddha-vastu)

The core argument shift focuses on whether the Veda is only valid for actions (**kārya**) or if it is also valid for existing entities (**siddha-vastu**).

Ṭīkā: tasyāpi parābhimatakāryavilakṣaṇe siddhe prāmāṇyaṃ kimuta jñānakāṇḍasyeti mantavyam |

- **The Mīmāṃsaka's Contradiction:** Even those who prioritize action accept the validity of Vedic words describing accessories like **dadhī** (curd) and **soma**. These are **siddha** (already existing) objects, not actions to be produced.
- **Logical Extension to Brahman:** If the Veda is an authority (**pramāṇa**) for existing things like curd and **soma**, why should it not be an authority for the **Jñānakāṇḍa**, which describes the ultimate existing entity—**Brahman**?

Logical Inference for Vedāntic Validity

किं च वेदान्ताः सिद्धवस्तुपराः, फलवद्भूतशब्दत्वात् , दध्यादिशब्दवदित्याह - अपि चेति ।

अपि च 'आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्' इत्येतदेकान्तेनाभ्युपगच्छतां भूतोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः ।

A formal inference is provided to prove that Vedānta texts are authoritative regarding existing entities.

Ṭīkā: kiṃ ca vedāntāḥ siddhavastuparāḥ, phalavadbhūtaśabdatvāt , dadhyādiśabdavat

Component	Description
Pakṣa (Subject)	Vedānta texts (Vedāntāḥ)
Sādhya (Probandum)	Referring to an established entity (Siddha-vastu-parāḥ)
Hetu (Reason)	Being words describing an existing entity that yield a result (Phalavat-bhūta-śabdatvāt)
Dṛṣṭānta (Example)	Words like "curd" (dadhyādi-śabdavat)

Elaboration of the Reason:

- **Phalavat:** The knowledge of **Brahman** leads to a result—the cessation of sorrow (**śoka-nivṛtti**) and the attainment of liberation (**mokṣa**).
- **Bhūta-śabdatvāt:** These words refer to something that "is" (**bhūta/siddha**), not something that "must be done" (**bhāvya/sādhya**).

Rebuttal of the "Action-Only" Maxim (Page 201-204)

The **Mīmāṃsā** school cites the sūtra: The Veda's purpose is action; therefore, what does not refer to action is meaningless.

Bhāṣya: api ca 'āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt ānarthakyam atadarthānām' iti etad ekāntena abhyupagacchatāṃ bhūtopadeśa-ānarthakyaprasaṅgaḥ |

- **The Consequence:** If one strictly follows the view that only action-oriented words are meaningful, then all Vedic descriptions of existing substances (**siddha-vastu**) like **soma** and **dadhi** would become "meaningless" (**anarthaka**).

किमक्रियार्थकशब्दानामानर्थक्यमभिधेयाभावः, फलाभावो वा । आद्य आह - आम्नायस्येति । इति न्यायेन एतदभिधेयराहित्यं नियमेनाङ्गीकुर्वतां 'सोमेन यजेत' 'दध्ना जुहोति' इत्यादि वाक्येषु दधिसोमादिशब्दानामर्थशून्यत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः । ननु केनोक्तमभिधेयराहित्यमित्याशङ्क्याह - प्रवृत्तीति । कार्यातिरेकेण भव्यार्थत्वेन कार्यशेषत्वेन दध्यादिशब्दो भूतं वक्ति चेत् , तर्हि सत्यादिशब्दः कूटस्थं न वक्तीत्यत्र को हेतुः, किं कूटस्थस्याक्रियत्वादुताक्रियाशेषत्वाद्वेति प्रश्नः ।

प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधि(तच्छेष)व्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेद्वस्तूपदिशति भव्यार्थत्वेन, कूटस्थनित्यं भूतं नोपदिशतीति को हेतुः ।

Ṭīkā: kimakriyārthakaśabdānām ānarthakyam abhidheyābhāvaḥ, phalābhāvo vā |

Abhidheya vs. Phala: The **Siddhanti** asks: is the "meaninglessness" due to a lack of referent like for non-existent things (**abhidheya-abhāva**) or a lack of result (**phala-abhāva**)?

1. **"Meaninglessness" Due to Abhidheya-Abhāva**

   Ṭīkā: iti nyāyena etadabhidheyarāhityaṃ niyamenāṅgīkurvatāṃ 'somena yajeta' 'dadhnā juhoti' ityādi vākyeṣu dadhisomādiśabdānāmarthaśūnyatvaṃ syādityarthaḥ |

   Abhidhāna = word; **Abhidheya** = referent/subject. Sentences like sacrifice with **soma**(**somena yajeta**) or **dadhnā juhoti** become void of meaning (**artha-śūnya**) if **dadhi-soma** has no referent.

   Ṭīkā: nanu kena uktam abhidheyarāhityam
   Siddhāntin asks the opponent what is the basis for the absence of a referent?

   Bhāṣya: pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vidhivyatirekeṇa bhūtaṃ cet vastūpadiśati bhavyārthatvena, kūṭasthanityaṃ bhūtaṃ nopadiśatīti ko hetuḥ |

The opponent argues that existing things like curd are only mentioned because they serve an action (**kriyā-śeṣa**). However, **Brahman** does not serve any action.

Siddhāntin Argument: If the Veda can point to existing things that are accessories to rituals, what logic prevents it from pointing to the **Kūṭastha-nitya** (unchangingly eternal) **Brahman**?

Ṭīkā: kāryātirekeṇa bhavyārthatvena kāryaśeṣatvena dadhyādiśabdo bhūtaṃ vakti cet , tarhi satyādiśabdaḥ kūṭasthaṃ na vaktītyatra ko hetuḥ, kiṃ kūṭasthasyākriyatvādutākriyāśeṣatvādveti praśnaḥ |

Siddhāntin: Brahman is **akārya** (not an effect/not to be done) and **akriyā-śeṣa** (not an accessory to action). The **Siddhāntin** (proponent) argues that a word's power (**śakti**) lies in denoting a meaningful object (**anvitārtha**), not necessarily an action-linked object. Why **satyādi-śabda** (words like "satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma" – truth, knowledge, infinite Brahman) not teach kūṭastha (unchanging Brahman)? Would it be because **kūṭastha** is non-action or not an auxiliary to action?

ननु दध्यादेः कार्यान्वयित्वेन कार्यत्वादुपदेशः, न कूटस्थस्य अकार्यत्वात् इत्याद्यमाशङ्ख्य निरस्यति - नहीति |

न हि भूतमुपदिश्यमानं क्रिया भवति ।

1. **Kūṭastha Is Akriya (Non-Action)**

   Ṭīkā: nanu dadhyādeḥ kāryānvayitvena kāryatvādupadeśaḥ, na kūṭasthasyākāryatvādityādyamāśaṅkya nirasyati

   Bhāṣya: na hi bhūtamupadiśyamānaṃ kriyā bhavati |

   Pūrva-pakṣa (opponent): **Dadhyādi** connects (anvita) to **kārya** (action, e.g., **dadhnā juhoti** – offers with curd; **somena yajeta** – sacrifices with soma), gaining **kāryatva-upadeśa** (teaching as action-related).

   Siddhāntin (conclusion): Brahman is **akārya-rūpa** (non-action form), so no connection. The established thing, when taught, does not become action. **Dadhi-soma** remain **bhūta/siddha**; their action-link is separate.

   Ṭīkā: dadhyādeḥ kāryatve kāryaśeṣatvahāniḥ | ato bhūtasya kāryādbhinnasya dadhyādeḥ śabdārthatvaṃ labdhamiti bhāvaḥ |

   If curd etc. are identical with action, auxiliary status is lost; thus, the established is distinct from action, and the meaning of words like curd is obtained as distinct. **Veda** teaches **vilakṣaṇa** (distinct) things from **karma**, like **dadhi** (distinct from action); similarly, **Brahman** is distinct and teachable.

2. **Kūṭastha Is AKāryaśeṣaparaḥ (Not Auxiliary to Action)**

द्वितीयं शङ्कते - अक्रियात्वेऽपीति । क्रियार्थः कार्यशेषपरः । कूटस्थस्य त्वकार्यशेषत्वान्नोपदेश इति भावः ।

अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वात्क्रियार्थ एव भूतोपदेश इति चेत् , नैष दोषः ।

Bhāṣya: akriyātve'pi bhūtasya kriyāsādhanatvāt kriyārtha eva bhūtopadeśa iti cet

Doubt: Brahman is **akriyātva** (non-action), but **bhūta-vastu** (established thing) is taught as **kriyārtha** (for action) if it's a **sādhana** (means) to **kriyā**, like dadhi-soma.

Ṭīkā: kriyārthaḥ kāryaśeṣaparaḥ | kūṭasthasya tvakāryaśeṣatvānnopadeśa iti bhāvaḥ |

Siddhānta: No **doṣa** (fault). Action-oriented means auxiliary to action; dadhi-soma are **kārya-śeṣa-para** (auxiliary-oriented), but **kūṭastha** is **akārya-śeṣa** (not auxiliary).

भूतस्य कार्यशेषत्वं शब्दार्थत्वाय फलाय वा, नाद्य इत्याह - नैष दोष इति । दध्यादेः कार्यशेषत्वे सत्यपि शब्देन वस्तुमात्रमेवोपदिष्टं न कार्यान्वयी शब्दार्थः । अन्वितार्थमात्रे शब्दानां शक्तिग्रहणादित्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: bhūtasya kāryaśeṣatvaṃ śabdārthatvāya phalāya vā

Siddhāntin asks the opponent a counter question: The established entity (**bhūta**) becomes an auxiliary part (**śeṣa**) of an action either to fulfill the literal meaning of a word (**śabdārthatvāya**) or for the sake of a result (**phalāya**)?

<u>Option 1: Established Entity Auxiliary of An Action</u>
Ṭīkā: dadhyādeḥ kāryaśeṣatve satyapi śabdena vastumātramevopadiṣṭaṃ na kāryānvayī śabdārthaḥ | anvitārthamātre śabdānāṃ śaktirityarthaḥ |

No initial fault; even as auxiliary, curd etc. are taught as mere things by words, not as action-connected meanings; the power of words is grasped in connected meanings alone. Word teaches mere **vastu** (thing), e.g., "dadhi exists" – **bodha** (cognition) happens. Connecting to action (**dadhnā juhoti)** is optional/separate. For Brahman: Cognition alone suffices; no need for action-link.

<u>Option 2: Established Entity Exists For A Result</u>

द्वितीयमङ्गीकरोति - क्रियार्थत्वं त्विति । तस्य भूतविशेषस्य दध्यादेः क्रियाशेषत्वं फलमुद्दिश्याङ्गीक्रियत इत्यर्थः । न तु ब्रह्मण इति तुशब्दार्थः । ननु भूतस्य कार्यशेषत्वाङ्गीकारे स्वातन्त्र्येण कथं शब्दार्थतेति, तत्राह - न चेति । फलार्थं शेषत्वाङ्गीकारमात्रेण शब्दार्थत्वभङ्गो नास्ति शेषत्वस्य शब्दार्थतायामप्रवेशादित्यर्थः ।

क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि क्रियानिर्वर्तनशक्तिमद्वस्तूपदिष्टमेव । क्रियार्थत्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य । न चैतावता वस्त्वनुपदिष्टं भवति ।

Ṭīkā: dvitīyamaṅgīkaroti - kriyārthatvaṃ tviti | tasya bhūtaviśeṣasya dadhyādeḥ kriyāśeṣatvaṃ phalamuddiśyāṅgīkriyata ityarthaḥ | na tu brahmaṇa iti tuśabdārthaḥ |

nanu bhūtasya kāryaśeṣatvāṅgīkāre svātantryeṇa kathaṃ śabdārthateti, tatrāha - na ceti | phalārthaṃ śeṣatvāṅgīkāramātreṇa śabdārthatvabhaṅgo nāsti śeṣatvasya śabdārthatāyāmapraveśādityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: kriyārthatve'pi kriyānirvartanaśaktimadvastūpadiṣṭameva | kriyārthatvaṃ tu prayojanaṃ tasya | na caitāvatā vastvanupadiṣṭaṃ bhavati |

The first part (literal meaning) was previously refuted; the second part—that an entity exists for a result—is now accepted. Brahman-knowledge (**brahma-jñāna**) can be **phalavat** (fruitful) **phalāya** (for the sake of fruit) even without **kriyā** connection. **Kriyā-nirvartana-śakti-mat-vastu** refers to an entity endowed with the power to accomplish or execute an action (**nirvartana** means completion or execution).

Dadhyādi gain (phalavat) status only through **kriyā-anvaya** (connection with action). Brahman's knowledge is fruitful svataḥ (inherently) – removal of sorrow, attainment of mokṣa, cessation of grief – without any ritual linkage.

Objection: The **pūrvapakṣin** (opponent) believes that whatever is a "thing" (**bhūta**) must be a "part of an action" (**kārya-śeṣa**). If it isn't, it is useless (**anarthaka**).

Siddhāntin: Even without ritual assignment (karmaviniyoga), **dadhi-śabda** or s**oma-śabda** conveys its meaning independently. If you do not use the word **dadhi** (curd) in a ritual, does the word lose its meaning? No. The knowledge of the object "curd" is attained as soon as the word is heard. The cognition (**jñāna**) arises regardless of later connection. Brahman likewise reveals its meaning svatantra (independently).

Accepting that something is a subordinate part for the sake of a fruit does not

destroy its status as a meaningful word. The "subordinacy" (**śeṣatva**) does not enter into the "meaning-bearing capacity" (**śabdārthatā**) of the word.

Vedic teaching of vastu need not always be kriyā-śeṣa (auxiliary to action) to be fruitful. This is the main Vedantic point.

Ritual Objects: Objects like **dadhi** and **soma** are mentioned in the **veda** specifically because they possess the power to fulfill a ritual action. Their purpose (**prayojana**) is their connection to that action.

Brahman: Unlike **dadhi**, **brahman** does not need to be linked to a physical ritual to be purposeful. It is purposeful in its own right through knowledge.

For specific entities like curd, their subordination to action (**kriyā-śeṣatva**) is accepted with the goal of attaining a fruit (**phala**). However, the word **tu** (but) in the text distinguishes **brahman** from this category. **brahman** is not fruitful merely by being joined to an action.

2. **“Meaninglessness” Due to Phala-Abhāva (Absence of Result)**

आनर्थक्यं फलाभाव इति पक्षं शङ्कते - यदीति । यद्यपि दध्यादि स्वतो निष्फलमपि क्रियाद्वारा सफलत्वादुपदिष्टं तथापि कूटस्थब्रह्मवादिनः क्रियाद्वाराभावात्तेन दृष्टान्तेन किं फलं स्यादित्यर्थः । भूतस्य साफल्ये क्रियैव द्वारमिति न नियमः, रज्ज्वाः ज्ञानमात्रेण साफल्यदर्शनादित्याह - उच्यत इति । तथैव । दध्यादिवदेवेत्यर्थः । दध्यादेः क्रियाद्वारा साफल्यं ब्रह्मणस्तु स्वत इति विशेषे सत्यपि वेदान्तानां सफलभूतार्थकत्वमात्रेण दध्याद्युपदेशसाम्यमित्यनवद्यम् ।

यदि नामोपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति, उच्यते — अनवगतात्मवस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव भवितुमर्हति । तदवगत्या मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारहेतोर्निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियत इत्यविशिष्टमर्थवत्त्वं क्रियासाधनवस्तूपदेशेन ।

Ṭīkā: ānarthakyaṃ phalābhāva iti pakṣaṃ śaṅkate - yadīti | yadyapi dadhyādi svato niṣphalamapi kriyādvārā saphalatvādupadiṣṭaṃ tathāpi kūṭasthabrahmavādinaḥ kriyādvārābhāvāttena dṛṣṭāntena kiṃ phalaṃ syādityarthaḥ |

The view of absence of result is taken up with a doubt from the opponent: If **brahman** is an established, static entity (**kūṭastha**), and it involves no action, what fruit could possibly come from knowing it? **Dadhyādi** are **svataḥ niṣphala** (inherently fruitless) but become fruitful through **kriyā**. Brahman has no **kriyā-dvāra** (door of action).

Although curd etc. are taught as fruitful through action despite being inherently fruitless, for those who speak of unchanging Brahman there is no door of action; so what fruit would there be by this example?

Ṭīkā: bhūtasya sāphalye kriyaiva dvāramiti na niyamaḥ, rajjvāḥ jñānamātreṇa sāphalyadarśanādityāha

Bhāṣya: anavagatātmavastūpadeśaśca tathaiva bhavitumarhati | tadavagatyā mithyājñānasya saṃsārahetornivṛttiḥ prayojanaṃ kriyata ityaviśiṣṭamarthavattvaṃ kriyāsādhanavastūpadeśena |

Analogy of the Rope: The text uses the example of a rope (**rajju**). Just by knowing a rope is a rope (and not a snake), the "fruit" of removing fear is attained. There is no action required other than the knowledge itself.

The teaching of the previously unknown Self (**ātman**) is capable of being fruitful in the same way as knowledge of the rope. The purpose of attaining this knowledge is the cessation of the cause of **saṃsāra** (which is **mithyā-jñāna** or false knowledge). This "meaningfulness" (**arthavatva**) is equal to (or even greater than) the utility found in ritual objects.

The Evidence of Prohibitions (Niṣedha) (Page 204)

इदानीं वेदान्तानां निषेधवाक्यवत्सिद्धार्थपरत्वमित्याह - अपि चेति । नञः प्रकृत्यर्थेन सम्बन्धात् हननाभावो नञर्थः, इष्टसाधनत्वं तव्यादिप्रत्ययार्थः, इष्टश्चात्र नरकदुःखाभावः, तत्परिपालको हननाभाव इति निषेधवाक्यार्थः । हननाभावो दुःखाभावहेतुरित्युक्तावर्थाद्धननस्य दुःखसाधनत्वधिया पुरुषो निवर्तते ।

अपि च 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इति चैवमाद्या निवृत्तिरुपदिश्यते । न च सा क्रिया । नापि क्रियासाधनम् ।

Ṭīkā: idānīṃ vedāntānāṃ niṣedhavākyavatsiddhārthaparatvamityāha

Bhāṣya: api ca 'brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ' iti caivamādyā nivṛttirupadiśyate | na ca sā kriyā | nāpi kriyāsādhanam |

The discussion shifts to how prohibitory sentences, such as "A Brahmin should not be killed," serve as evidence that the **veda** can be authoritative regarding a state of being or an established fact, rather than just an action.

- **Example: brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ** (A Brahmin must not be killed).
- **Logic:** This sentence does not tell you to "do" an action. It tells you to "abstain." If one holds that only action-oriented sentences are valid, then all negative commandments in the **veda** would become meaningless (**apramāṇa**).
- **Conclusion:** Just as a prohibition is meaningful by providing knowledge of what to avoid (without a positive act), the Upanishadic statements about **brahman** are meaningful by providing knowledge of the Truth.

Ṭīkā: nañaḥ prakṛtyarthena sambandhāt hananābhāvo nañarthaḥ,

The core argument is whether "not killing" is an action (**kriyā**) or simply the absence of an action.

In the sentence **brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ**, the negation (**na**) connects with the root meaning of the verb (**han** - to kill). The opponent argues that there must be some "action" involved, but the Vedāntin clarifies that the meaning is simply the absence of the act of killing.

The Six Meanings of Negation (Nañ)

To understand how a prohibition works, one must understand the particle of negation, **nañ**. There are six classical meanings associated with **nañ** in Sanskrit grammar and logic.

तत्सादृश्यमभावश्च तदन्यत्वं तदल्पता ।
अप्राशस्त्यं विरोधश्च नञर्थाः षट् प्रकीर्तिताः ||

tatsādṛśyamabhāvaśca tadanyatvaṃ tadalpatā |
aprāśastyaṃ virodhaśca nañarthāḥ ṣaṭ prakīrtitāḥ ||

1. **Similarity (Tat-sādṛśyam):** Example: **abrāhmaṇaḥ** (one who is like a Brahmin but is not, such as a **kṣatriya**).
2. **Absence (Abhāvaḥ):** Example: **ghaṭo nāsti** (the pot is not here). This indicates total non-existence.
3. **Difference (Tad-anyatvam):** Example: **aghaṭaḥ** (something other than a pot, like a cloth).
4. **Littleness/Paucity (Tad-alpatā):** Example: **anudarā kanyā** (a girl with such a small waist it is as if it doesn't exist).
5. **Unfitness/Unpraiseworthiness (Aprāśastyam):** Example: **akāla** (an improper time) or **akārya** (an unworthy act).
6. **Opposition/Contradiction (Virodhaḥ):** Example: **adharma** (the opposite of **dharma**) or **ajñāna** (the opposite of **jñāna**).

The Role of the Suffix and Negation

Ṭīkā: iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ tavyādipratyayārthaḥ, iṣṭaścātra narakaduḥkhābhāvaḥ, tatparipālako hananābhāva iti niṣedhavākyārthaḥ | hananābhāvo duḥkhābhāvaheturityuktāvarthāddhananasya duḥkhasādhanatvadhiyā puruṣo nivartate |

- The suffix **tavya** (in **hantavya**) usually implies that something is a means to a desired goal (**iṣṭa-sādhana**).
- In a prohibition, the "desired goal" is the **absence of the suffering of hell**.
- The protector of that [desired absence of hell-pain] is the non-killing; this is the meaning of the prohibitive sentence.
- Therefore, the sentence informs the person: "The act of killing leads to the 'undesired' (hell); thus, the absence of killing is the means to your 'desired' (avoiding hell)."

Refutation of the "Action" Theory in Prohibition

नात्र नियोगः कश्चिदस्ति, तस्य क्रियातत्साधनदध्यादिविषयत्वात् । न च हननाभावरूपा नञ्वाच्या निवृत्तिः क्रिया, अभावत्वात् । नापि क्रियासाधनम् । अभावस्य भावार्थाहेतुत्वाद्भावार्थासत्त्वाच्चेत्यर्थः । अतो निषेधशास्त्रस्य सिद्धार्थे प्रामाण्यमिति भावः । विपक्षे दण्डमाह - अक्रियेति ।

अक्रियार्थानामुपदेशोऽनर्थकश्चेत् , 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्यादिनिवृत्त्युपदेशानामानर्थक्यं प्राप्तम् । तच्चानिष्टम् ।

The **pūrvapakṣin** (opponent, specifically from the **Prabhākara** school of **mīmāṃsā**) argues that every Vedic sentence must impel a person toward a "new" action (**niyoga**). The opponent's possible objection here is: “Non-killing itself is a kriyā (action) in the form of abhāva (absence).”

Ṭīkā: nātra niyogaḥ kaściditi, tasya kriyātatsādhanadadhyādiviṣayatvāt | na ca hananābhāvarūpā nañvācyā nivṛttiḥ kriyā, abhāvatvāt | nāpi kriyāsādhanam | abhāvasya bhāvārthāhetutvādbhāvārthāsattvāccetyarthaḥ | ato niṣedhaśāstrasya siddhārthe prāmāṇyamiti bhāvaḥ |

Bhāṣya: akriyārthānāmupadeśo'narthakaścet , 'brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ' ityādinivṛttyupadeśānāmānarthakyaṃ prāptam | taccāniṣṭam |

- **Absence is not an Act:** There is no "command" (**niyoga**) here in the ritual sense because a command applies to a positive action or its means.
- **The State of Indifference (Audāsīnyam):** When a person hears "do not kill," they do not "do" a new action called "not killing." Instead, they simply desist from the impulse to kill. This state of desisting is called **audāsīnyam** (neutrality or indifference).
- **A-kriyā (Non-action):** If we considered "non-action" sentences to be useless, then all prohibitory sentences in the **veda** would become meaningless (**anarthaka**). An absence is not the cause of any positive entity, since it lacks positive existence.
- There is a contrast with parisaṃkhyā-vidhi (exclusive injunction): There the negation implies “do this instead”; here there is only pure prohibition, no alternative positive action.

Refuting the "Resolve" (Saṅkalpa) Theory (Page 205)

ननु स्वभावतो रागतः प्राप्तेन हन्त्यर्थेनानुरागेण नञ्सम्बन्धेन हेतुना हननविरोधिनी सङ्कल्पक्रिया बोध्यते, सा च नञर्थरूपा तत्राप्राप्तत्वाद्विधीयते, अहननं कुर्यादिति । तथा च कार्यार्थमिदं वाक्यमित्याशङ्क्य निषेधति - न चेति । औदासीन्यं पुरुषस्य स्वरूपं तच्च हननक्रियानिवृत्त्युपलक्षितं निवृत्त्यौदासीन्यं हननाभाव इति यावत् । तद्व्यतिरेकेण नञः क्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं न च शक्यमिति योजना ।

न च स्वभावप्राप्तहन्त्यर्थानुरागेण नञः शक्यमप्राप्तक्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं हननक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यव्यतिरेकेण ।

Ṭīkā: nanu svabhāvato rāgataḥ prāptena hantyarthenānurāgeṇa nañsambandhena hetunā hananavirodhinī saṅkalpakrīyā bodhyate, sā ca nañartharūpā tatrāprāptatvādvidhīyate, ahananaṃ kuryāditi | tathā ca kāryārthakamidaṃ vākyamityāśaṅkya niṣedhati

The opponent suggests that "not killing" actually means "the act of making a mental resolve to avoid killing." Therefore: ahananaṃ kuryāt iti (One should perform non-killing), the sentence becomes kāryārtha-vākyam (a sentence enjoining an action).

Siddhāntin provides a strong refutation.

Bhāṣya: na ca svabhāvaprāptahantyarthānurāgeṇa nañaḥ śakyamaprāptakriyārthatvaṃ kalpayituṃ hananakriyānivṛttyaudāsīnyavyatirekeṇa |

Ṭīkā: audāsīnyaṃ puruṣasya svarūpaṃ tacca hananakriyānivṛttyupalakṣitaṃ nivṛttyaudāsīnyaṃ hananābhāva iti yāvat | tadvyatirekeṇa nañaḥ kriyārthatvaṃ kalpayituṃ na ca śakyamiti yojanā |

- The Vedāntin responds that one cannot manufacture a new "action of resolve" where the scripture only intends to stop a natural impulse.
- The prohibition simply points to the **audāsīnyam** (the natural, passive state of the Self) which is characterized by the absence of the act of killing.

Mananam: Scripture as the Mirror of Knowledge

If a student cannot realize the truth of the Self or the meaning of a prohibition after such clear explanation, the text suggests they are as unresponsive as an inanimate object.

बोधेऽप्यनुभवो यस्य न कथंचन जायते ।
तं कथं बोधयेच्छास्त्रं लोष्टं नरसमाकृतिम् ॥ ३.१९॥

bodhe'pyanubhavo yasya na kathaṃcana jāyate |
taṃ kathaṃ bodhayecchāstraṃ loṣṭaṃ narasamākṛtim || 3.19||

This verse (cited in **Naiṣkarmya-siddhi** and **Pañcadaśī**) states: "If experience/awakening does not arise in a person by any means, how can the scripture enlighten him? He is merely a clod of earth (**loṣṭa**) in the shape of a man."

- **Siddha-vastu:** Just as a prohibition tells us about a state of "not doing" (an established state), the Upanishads tell us about **brahman** (an established entity).
- **No Ritual Required:** Knowledge of **brahman** does not require being joined to a ritual action to be fruitful. Its fruit is the immediate cessation of the cause of **saṃsāra** (ignorance).
- **Authoritative Nature:** If prohibitory sentences are valid despite lacking a positive command to act, then Vedāntic sentences regarding the nature of the Self are equally valid and authoritative.

9मुख्यार्थस्याभावस्य नञर्थत्वसम्भवे तद्विरोधिक्रियालक्षणाया अन्याय्यत्वात् निषेधवाक्यस्यापि कार्यार्थकत्वे विधिनिषेधभेदविप्लवापत्तेश्चेति भावः ।

Ṭīkā: vaiyāsikamukhyārthasyābhāvasya nañarthatvasambhave tadvirodhikriyālakṣaṇāyā anyāyyatvāt niṣedhavākyasyāpi kāryārthakatve vidhiniṣedhabhedaviplavāpatteśceti bhāvaḥ |

The argument is that when the primary meaning of "absence of action" (**kriyā-abhāva**) is possible and logical, one should not resort to **lakṣaṇā** (metaphorical/secondary meaning) such as "opposite action" (**virodha-kriyā**).

If a prohibition is interpreted as a command to do something else (e.g., "perform the act of not-killing"), the fundamental distinction between an injunction (**vidhi**) and a prohibition (**niṣedha**) would collapse (**bheda-viplava**). All sentences would essentially become **vidhis**, destroying the structural integrity of Vedic interpretation.

The Opponent’s Challenge: Why Only 'Absence'? (Page 205)

ननु तदभाववत्तदन्यतद्विरुद्धयोरपि नञः शक्तिः किं न स्यात् , अब्राह्मणः अधर्म इति प्रयोगदर्शनादिति चेन्न, अनेकार्थत्वस्यान्याय्यत्वादित्याह - नञश्चेति । गवादिशब्दानां तु अगत्या नानार्थकत्वम् , स्वर्गेषुवाग्वज्रादीनां शक्यपशुसम्बन्धाभावेन लक्षणानवतारात् । अन्यविरुद्धयोस्तु लक्ष्यत्वं युक्तम् , शक्यसम्बन्धात् । ब्राह्मणादन्यस्मिन् क्षत्रियादौ, धर्मविरुद्धे वा पापे ब्राह्मणाद्यभावस्य नञ्शक्यस्य सम्बन्धात् ।

नञश्चैष स्वभावः, यत्स्वसम्बन्धिनोऽभावं बोधयतीति ।

Ṭīkā: nanu tad abhāvavat tadanyatadviruddhayoḥ api nañaḥ śaktiḥ kiṃ na syāt , abrāhmaṇaḥ adharma iti prayogadarśanāt iti cenna, anekārthatvasya anyāyyatvāt

The opponent (**pūrvapakṣin**) questions the restrictive interpretation of **nañ** as mere "absence" (**abhāva**). They argue that since **nañ** is known to have multiple meanings in Sanskrit grammar and usage, why shouldn't "otherness" or "opposition" be considered here?

- **The Argument for Diversity:** If the **Siddhāntin** interprets the negation of an action as its absence, the opponent suggests that the meanings of "that which is different from it" (**tad-anyatva**) or "that which is opposed to it" (**tad-virodha**) are equally valid powers (**śakti**) of the particle **nañ**.
- **Examples in Usage:**
    - **Abrāhmaṇa**: This usually refers to someone similar to a **brāhmaṇa** (like a **kṣatriya**), not just the total absence of a person. This is an example of **sādṛśya** (similarity).
    - **Adharma**: This refers to that which is the opposite of **dharma**, signifying **virodha** (opposition/contradiction).

The Principle of Singular Meaning in the Veda

The **Siddhāntin** responds by asserting that unlike secular literature or storytelling, where multiple interpretations might be considered a sign of poetic depth, Vedic interpretation demands a singular, precise meaning (**ekārthatva**).

- **Against Anekārthatva:** Attributing multiple meanings (**anekārthatva**) to a single Vedic statement is considered a logical flaw (**anyāyya**). One should not "twist and turn" the text to extract varied meanings.
- **The Primary Nature of Nañ:**

Bhāṣya: nañaścaiṣa svabhāvaḥ, yat svasambandhino'bhāvaṃ bodhayati iti

The inherent nature (**svabhāva**) of the particle **nañ** is to reveal the absence (**abhāva**) of the entity or action with which it is connected. Its fundamental function is to manifest the non-existence of its correlate.

Resolving Multi-meaning Words: The Case of 'Gauḥ'

Ṭīkā: gavādiśabdānāṃ tu agatyā nānārthakatvam , svargeṣuvāgvajrādīnāṃ śakyapaśusambandhābhāvena lakṣaṇānavatārāt | anyaviruddhayostu lakṣyatvaṃ yuktam , śakyasambandhāt | brāhmaṇādanyasmin kṣatriyādau, dharmaviruddhe vā pāpe brāhmaṇādyabhāvasya nañśakyasya sambandhāt |

The opponent might argue that words like **gauḥ** (cow) have many meanings (earth, speech, vajra, etc.). The **Siddhāntin** clarifies that this is due to necessity (**agatyā**), not choice.

- **Necessity (Agatyā):** In cases where the primary meaning does not fit the context, one is forced to accept multiple meanings or metaphorical indications (**lakṣaṇā**).
- **The Logic of Lakṣaṇā:** For **lakṣaṇā** (indicative meaning) to work, there must be a "connection with the primary sense" (**śakya-sambandha**).
    - For example, words like **svarga** (heaven) or **vakra** (crooked) cannot indicate a "cow" because there is no inherent connection (**sambandha-abhāva**) between those concepts and the physical animal.
    - Where there *is* a connection, **lakṣaṇā** is permissible. In **abrāhmaṇa** (a non-Brahmin), the term refers to a **kṣatriya** because the **kṣatriya** possesses the "absence of being a Brahmin" (**brāhmaṇatva-abhāva**), which is the primary sense of **nañ**.

Categorization of Negation: Prasajya-pratiṣedha vs. Paryudāsa

The text distinguishes between two primary ways the negative particle **nañ** functions in relation to injunctions (**vidhi**).

Prasajya-pratiṣedha (Absolute Negation)

In this form, the prohibition is primary, and the mandate/action is secondary. The negation is directly connected to the verb (**kriyā**).

Quote:

> अप्राधान्यं विधेर्यत्र प्रतिषेधे प्रधानता ।
> प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधोऽसौ क्रियया सह यत्र नञ् ॥
> **aprādhānyaṃ vidheryatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā | prasajyapratiṣedho'sau kriyayā saha yatra nañ ||**

- **Explanation:** Where the mandate (**vidhi**) is subordinate and the prohibition (**pratiṣedha**) is dominant, it is **prasajya-pratiṣedha**. Here, **nañ** is construed with the verb.
- **Example: "kalañjaṃ na bhakṣayet"** (One should not eat **kalañja**). The intent is not to suggest eating something else, but simply to negate the act of eating **kalañja**. The focus remains entirely on the prohibition of the action itself.
- **Vedic Context:** In the sentence "**brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ**", the **nañ** functions as **prasajya-pratiṣedha**. It is a direct prohibition of the act of killing, not an exclusion intended to point toward another action.

Paryudāsa (Relative Negation/Exclusion)

In this form, the mandate is primary, and the negation is secondary. The negation is connected to a noun or a term other than the verb.

Quote:

> प्राधान्यं हि विधेर्यत्र प्रतिषेधेऽप्रधानता ।
> पर्युदासः स विज्ञेयो यत्रोत्तरपदेन नञ् ॥
> **prādhānyaṃ hi vidheryatra pratiṣedhe'pradhānatā |**
> **paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatra uttarapadena nañ ||**

- **Explanation:** In **paryudāsa**, the injunction to act is dominant. The negation merely qualifies what is excluded from that action.
- **Example: "abrāhmaṇam-ānaya"** (Bring a non-**brāhmaṇa**). The primary command is "to bring" (**ānaya**). The negation (**nañ**) identifies the person to be brought by excluding **brāhmaṇas**.

Linguistic Structure: Prakṛti and Pratyaya (Page 206)

प्रकृते च आख्यातयोगान्नञ्प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधक एव न पर्युदासलक्षकः इति मन्तव्यम् ।

The word **hantavya** (should be killed/is to be killed) is analyzed through its constituent parts to understand how negation applies to it.

- **Prakṛti (Root):** The root is **han** (to kill).
- **Pratyaya (Suffix):** The suffix is **tavya** (should be).

The Principle of Subordination

Ṭīkā: prakṛte ca ākhyātayogānnañprasajyapratiṣedhaka eva na paryudāsalakṣakaḥ iti mantavyam |

In linguistic analysis, the **prakṛti** (root) is considered subordinate (**upasarjana**/secondary) to the **pratyaya** (suffix).

- **Analogy with Knowledge:** This is compared to the term **vividiṣanti** (they desire to know), where the suffix (**san**) representing "desire" is primary, and the root (**vid** - to know) is secondary.
- **The Power of the Suffix:** The suffix **tavya** fundamentally denotes **iṣṭa-sādhanatva** (the quality of being a means to a desired goal).

Defining Iṣṭa-sādhanatva (Desirability) (Page 207)

यद्वा नञः प्रकृत्या न सम्बन्धः प्रकृतेः प्रत्ययार्थोपसर्जनत्वात् , प्रधानसम्बन्धाच्चाप्रधानानां किन्तु प्रकृत्यर्थनिष्ठेन प्रत्ययार्थेनेष्टसाधनत्वेन सम्बन्धो नञः, इष्टं च स्वापेक्षया बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धि यत्तदेव न तात्कालिकसुखमात्रम् , विषसंयुक्तान्नभोगस्यापि इष्टत्वापत्तेः ।

The central argument is how the negation (**nañ)** interacts with the "desirability" of an action.

Ṭīkā: yadvā nañaḥ prakṛtyā na sambandhaḥ prakṛteḥ pratyayārthopasarjanatvāt , pradhānasambandhāccāpradhānānāṃ kintu prakṛtyarthaniṣṭhena pratyayārtheneṣṭasādhanatvena sambandho nañaḥ, iṣṭaṃ ca svāpekṣayā balavadaniṣṭānanubandhi yattadeva na tātkālikasukhamātram , viṣasaṃyuktānnabhogasyāpi iṣṭatvāpatteḥ |

What is a True Iṣṭa (Desired Goal)?

A true **iṣṭa** is defined not just by immediate pleasure, but by its ultimate consequence.

- **Definition:** That which is not followed by a stronger undesirable consequence (**balavad-aniṣṭa-ananubandhi**) is a true **iṣṭa**.
- **Immediate vs. Resultant:** It is not merely **tātkālika-sukha** (immediate pleasure).
    - **Sāttvika Sukha:** Like poison at first, but nectar in the end (**agre viṣamiva pariṇāme amṛtopamam**).
    - **Rājasika Sukha:** Like nectar at first, but poison in the end (**agre amṛtopamaṃ pariṇāme viṣamiva**).
- The analogy of poisoned food (**Viṣa-saṃyukta-anna-bhoga**) illustrates this: while the food offers immediate gratification, it is not **Iṣṭa** because the resultant suffering is "stronger" (**Balavat**).
- **Pratyayārtha (Meaning of the Suffix):** The suffix **tavya** usually denotes "that which is a means to a desired goal" (**iṣṭa-sādhanatva**).
- **The Role of Negation:** The **nañ** negates this **iṣṭa-sādhanatva**. It informs the individual that although they might perceive killing as a means to a desired end (due to anger or

passion), it is actually a means to a "strong undesirable result" (**balavad-aniṣṭa-anubandhi**), such as falling into hell.
- **The Result of Knowledge:** When the Vedic prohibition reveals that killing leads to great suffering, the "delusion of desirability" (**iṣṭa-sādhanatva-bhrānti**) is destroyed.
-

Analysis of Prohibited Action

तथा च 'न हन्तव्यः' हननं बलवदनिष्टासाधनत्वे सति इष्टसाधनं न भवतीत्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: tathā ca 'na hantavyaḥ' hananaṃ balavadaniṣṭāsādhanatve sati iṣṭasādhanaṃ na bhavatītyarthaḥ |

An action like killing might seem to be a means to a desired end (**iṣṭa-sādhanatva**) due to passion (**rāga**) or delusion (**bhrānti**). However, because it leads to a "strong undesirable result" (**balavad-aniṣṭa-anubandhi**) such as hell (**naraka**), it cannot be considered a true **iṣṭa**.

The Logic of Viśiṣṭābhāva (Qualified Absence)

अत्र च 'हन्तव्यः' इति हनने विशिष्टेष्टसाधनत्वं भ्रान्तिप्राप्तमनूद्य नेत्यभावबोधने बलवदनिष्टसाधनं हननमिति बुद्धिर्भवति, हनने तात्कालिकेष्टसाधनत्वरूपविशेष्यसत्वेन विशिष्टाभावबुद्धेर्विशेषणाभावपर्यवसानात् । विशेषणं बलवदनिष्टासाधनत्वमिति तदभावो बलवदनिष्टसाधनत्वं नञर्थ इति पर्यवसन्नम् ।

The ṭīkā uses **Nyāya** (logic) to explain how the prohibition functions through the absence of qualifiers. There are three ways a qualified entity can be absent (**viśiṣṭābhāva**):

1. **Viśeṣaṇābhāva-prayukta:** Absence of the qualifier.
2. **Viśeṣyābhāva-prayukta:** Absence of the qualified object.
3. **Ubhayābhāva-prayukta:** Absence of both.

Application to "Na Hantavya"

Ṭīkā: atra ca 'hantavyaḥ' iti hanane viśiṣṭeṣṭasādhanatvaṃ bhrāntiprāptamanūdya netyabhāvabodhane balavadaniṣṭasādhanaṃ hananamiti buddhirbhavati, hanane tātkālikeṣṭasādhanatvarūpaviśeṣyasatvena viśiṣṭābhāvābuddherviśeṣaṇābhāvaparyavasānāt | viśeṣaṇaṃ balavadaniṣṭāsādhanatvamiti tadabhāvo balavadaniṣṭasādhanatvaṃ nañartha iti paryavasannam |

In the case of killing:

- **Viśeṣya (The Object): iṣṭa-sādhanatva** (Being a means to a desired end).
- **Viśeṣaṇa (The Qualifier): balavad-aniṣṭa-asādhanatva** (Not being a means to a strong undesirable result).

Technically, the prohibition functions through **Viśeṣaṇābhāva-prayukta-viśiṣṭābhāva** (the negation of a qualified entity due to the absence of the qualifier). While the act of killing

(**Viśeṣya**) might exist, its status as a "desired means" (**Viśeṣaṇa**) is negated because it is revealed to be a means to Naraka (hell). By destroying the illusion (**Bhrānti**) that the act is beneficial, the **Nañ** particle facilitates a cognitive shift from engagement to spiritual neutrality.

The Result: In the act of killing, the **viśeṣya** (immediate pleasure/desired end) might exist momentarily, but the **viśeṣaṇa** (safety from great harm) is absent. Therefore, there is a **viśeṣaṇābhāva-prayukta viśiṣṭābhāva**.

Defining Indifference (Audāsīnya) (Page 208)

तद्बुद्धिरौदासीन्यपरिपालिकेत्याह - अभावेति । चोऽप्यर्थः पक्षान्तरद्योती । प्रकृत्यर्थाभावबुद्धिवत्प्रत्ययार्थाभावबुद्धिरपीत्यर्थः । बुद्धेः क्षणिकत्वात्तदभावे सत्यौदासीन्यात्प्रच्युतिरूपा हननादौ प्रवृत्तिः स्यादिति, अत्राह - सा चेति । यथाग्निरिन्धनं दग्ध्वा शाम्यति एवं सा नञर्थाभावबुद्धिः हननादाविष्टसाधनत्वभ्रान्तिमूलं रागेन्धनं दग्ध्वैव शाम्यतीत्यक्षरार्थः । रागनाशे कुतः प्रच्युतिरिति भावः । यद्वा रागतः प्राप्ता सा क्रिया रागनाशे स्वयमेव शाम्यतीत्यर्थः । परपक्षे तु हननविरोधिक्रिया कार्येत्युक्तेऽपि हननस्येष्टसाधनत्वभ्रान्त्यनिरासात्प्रच्युतिर्दुर्वारा ।

अभावबुद्धिश्चौदासीन्यकारणम् । सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत्स्वयमेवोपशाम्यति ।

A common misunderstanding arises from the colloquial use of the word "indifferent" or "depressed" in modern languages like Hindi. In the context of the **Brahma Sūtra**, **audāsīnya** is a technical term with a precise Sanskrit meaning.

- **Not Sadness:** It does not mean sitting dejectedly or being "sad."
- **Transcendence:** The term implies "sitting above" (**ud-āsīna**) or being neutral and unaffected.
- **Gita Reference:** This is akin to the description in the **Bhagavad Gītā**:
  उदासीनवदासीनमसक्तं तेषु कर्मसु ।
  udāsīnavad-āsīnam-asaktaṃ teṣu karmasu |
  (Sitting as one indifferent, unattached to those actions.)
- **Authoritative Knowledge:** When one accepts the Vedic sentence (**pramāṇa**) as truth, the resulting **audāsīnya** is a state of being "upwards" and "away" from the reach of the prohibited impulse.

The primary function of a prohibitory sentence is to produce a specific cognition: the "cognition of absence" (**abhāva-buddhi**).

Ṭīkā: tadbuddhiraudāsīnyaparipāliketyāha

Bhāṣya: abhāvabuddhiśca audāsīnyakāraṇam

Ṭīkā: co'pyarthaḥ pakṣāntaradyotī | prakṛtyarthābhāvabuddhivatpratyayārthābhāvabuddhirapītyarthaḥ | buddheḥ kṣaṇikatvāttadabhāve satyaudāsīnyātpracyutirūpā hananādau pravṛttiḥ syāditi, atrāha - sā ceti |

The cognition of absence is the cause of indifference.

- **Mechanism:** When the mind realizes that an act (like killing) is not a means to a desired goal but a cause of great harm, the "absence" of desirability is established. This cognition naturally results in **audāsīnya**.
- **Dual Application:** This **abhāva-buddhi** applies to both the root meaning (**prakṛtyartha**) and the suffix meaning (**pratyayārtha**). Both the act and the supposed "desirability" of the act are negated.

The Analogy of the Burnt Fuel (Dagdha-indhana-agni)

How does this cognition stop the action? The ṭīkā provides a powerful analogy of fire and fuel.

Bhāṣya: sā ca dagdha indhanāgnivat svayam eva upaśāmyati |

Ṭīkā: yathāgnirindhanaṃ dagdhvā śāmyati evaṃ sā nañarthābhāvabuddhiḥ hananādāviṣṭasādhanatvabhrāntimūlaṃ rāgendhanaṃ dagdhvaiva śāmyatītyakṣarārthaḥ | rāganāśe kṛte pracyutiriti bhāvaḥ | yadvā rāgataḥ prāptā sā kriyā rāganāśe svayameva śāmyatītyarthaḥ |

And that [cognition/urge] extinguishes itself like a fire that has consumed its fuel.

- **Rāga as Fuel:** The urge to perform a prohibited act (like **hanana** or killing) is driven by **rāga** (passion/attachment). This **rāga** is the "fuel" (**indhana**).
- **Self-Extinction:** When the fire of the urge consumes the fuel of **rāga** through the realization provided by the **niṣedha**, the fire goes out on its own (**svayameva upaśāmyati**). You do not need a second act to stop the first; the destruction of the cause leads to the cessation of the effect.

The Problem of Momentariness (Kṣaṇikatva)

The opponent (**pūrvapakṣin**) raises a logical objection based on the duration of thoughts. If a cognition is momentary (**kṣaṇika**), how can it keep a person from acting in the long term?

School	Definition of Kṣaṇikatva	Process
Nyāya	Three-moment existence	1. Origin (utpatti), 2. Existence (sthiti), 3. Destruction (nāśa).
Buddhism	One-moment existence	The moment of origin is itself the moment of destruction.

The Objection: If the "cognition of prohibition" (abhāva-buddhi) is destroyed in the third moment (or the first), then in the subsequent moments, the person might "fall away" (pracyuti) from indifference and return to the prohibited action.

- **The Resolution:** The **Siddhāntin** argues that the **abhāva-buddhi** doesn't just block the thought; it destroys the **rāga** (passion) which is the root cause (**bhrānti-mūlam**).

When the desire is destroyed, how can there be a falling away (back into action)?

Once the delusion that "killing is beneficial" is burnt away, the person remains in a state of **audāsīnya** because the "fuel" for the impulse is gone.

Critique of the Opponent's "Positive Resolve"

Ṭīkā: parapakṣe tu hananavirodhikriyā kāryetyukte'pi hananasya iṣṭasādhanatva bhrāntyanirāsāt pracyutirdurvārā |

The opponent suggests that a prohibition is merely a command to perform a "contrary action" (**virodha-kriyā**). The **Siddhāntin** rejects this.

- **The Flaw in the Opponent's View:** If prohibition were just a "resolve to do the opposite," the underlying belief that the original act is "good" or "beneficial" (**iṣṭa-sādhanatva-bhrānti**) remains unaddressed.
- **The Risk of Relapse:** Like a child who stops crying for a toy when given a temporary distraction, the person would eventually return to the prohibited act once the "contrary resolve" weakens.
- **The Vedic Solution:** True Vedic prohibition (**niṣedha**) functions by removing the very desire for the act through the realization of its true, harmful nature. This leads to a permanent cessation (**śama**) rather than a temporary suppression.

The Conclusion of the Meaning of Negation (nañ) (Page 208)

तस्मात्तदभाव एव नञर्थ इत्युपसंहरति - तस्मादिति । भावार्थाभावेन तद्विषयककृत्यभावात्कार्याभावस्तच्छब्दार्थः ।

तस्मात्प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यमेव ‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इत्यादिषु प्रतिषेधार्थं मन्यामहे, अन्यत्र प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्यः ।

The discussion begins by establishing that the cessation of the act of killing is the intended goal.

Ṭīkā: tasmāttadabhāva eva nañartha ityupasaṃharati

Explanation: The conclusion (**upasaṃhṛti**) is that the meaning of the negative particle (**nañ**) is the absence of that action (**tadabhāva**), which specifically refers to the absence of killing (**hanana-abhāva**).

Bhāṣya: tasmāt prasaktakriyānivṛtti audāsīnyameva ‘brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ ityādiṣu pratiṣedhārthaṃ manyāmahe, anyatra prajāpativratādibhyaḥ |

Explanation: The meaning of the prohibition (**pratiṣedha**) in "**Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ**" is understood as a state of indifference (**audāsīnya**) resulting from the cessation of a previously impelled action (**prasakta-kriyā**).

- **Mechanism of Indifference:** Indifference (**audāsīnyam**) occurs when the underlying causes of action—namely attachment (**rāga**) or aversion (**dveṣa**) —are removed. Once these are neutralized, the tendency to move toward the action ceases.

A technical breakdown is provided regarding the word "**tasmāt**" and how it relates to the lack of "work" or "effect" (**kārya**).

Ṭīkā: bhāvārtha abhāvena tadviṣayakakṛtya abhāvāt kāryābhāvastacchabdārthaḥ |

Explanation: The word "**tat**" (in **tasmāt**) signifies the following logic: Since the meaning of the negative is an absence (**abhāva**), there is no positive object (**bhāva-artha**) to which an effort (**kṛti**) can be directed. Consequently, there is an absence of "**kārya**" (the thing to be done/accomplished).

Mananam: Two Modes of Connecting the Negative Particle (Nañ)

The interpretation of the prohibition depends on where the negative particle (**nañ**) is connected (**anvaya**). There are two primary ways to analyze this:

A. Connection with the Root Meaning (Prakṛtyartha-anvaya)

If the negation is applied to the root meaning of the verb (the act of killing, **hanana**):

- **Result:** The meaning becomes "**hananābhāva iṣṭasādhanam**".
- **Definition:** The absence of killing is the means to a desired goal (**iṣṭa-sādhana**).

B. Connection with the Suffix Meaning (Pratyayārtha-anvaya)

If the negation is applied to the suffix (the **tavya** suffix, which denotes potentiality or injunction):

- **Result:** The meaning becomes "**hananaṃ balavat aniṣṭasādhanatvaviśiṣṭa iṣṭasādhanatvābhāvavat**".
- **Definition:** The act of killing is characterized by the absence of being a means to a desired goal, specifically qualified by the fact that it is a means to a powerful undesired result (**balavat aniṣṭa-sādhana**).
- **Logic:** This follows the principle of **viśeṣaṇābhāva-prayukta-viśiṣṭābhāva** (the absence of the qualified entity due to the absence of the qualification).

The Nature of Action (Kārya) and Effort (Kṛti)

The definition of what constitutes an action that can be commanded is explained.

- **Criteria for Kārya:** For something to be considered a "**kārya**" (a task/work), it must satisfy two conditions:
    1. It must be achievable through effort (**kṛti-sādhya**).
    2. It must be a means to a desired end (**iṣṭa-sādhana**).
- **The Object of Effort:** Effort (**kṛti**) or volition (**yatna**) always takes a positive action (**bhāva-rūpa kriyā**) as its object.
- **Absence vs. Action:** Because the negative particle (**nañ**) signifies an absence (**abhāva**), it does not provide a positive action for the effort to grasp.
- **Conclusion on Effort:** Since there is no positive action, there is no effort-directed subject (**bhāva-viṣayaka kṛti**). Without effort (**kṛti-abhāva**), there is no "**kārya**" (work) or "**karma**" (action/duty). Therefore, where there is no **yatna-sādhyatva** (possibility of being accomplished by effort), no ritualistic or moral "work" exists.

The Core Definition of the Negative Particle (Nañ) (Page 208)

यद्वेत्युक्तपक्षे निवृत्त्युपलक्षितमौदासीन्यं यस्माद्विशिष्टाभावायत्तमेवेति व्याख्येयम् ।

Ṭīkā: yad vā iti uktapakṣe nivṛtti upalakṣitam audāsīnyaṃ yasmāt viśiṣṭābhāva āyattam eva iti vyākhyeyam |

The second perspective (**Yadvā**) presented defines the meaning of the negative particle as a specific type of absence.

- **Definition:** The meaning is **Nivṛttyupalakṣita-audāsīnya-viśiṣṭābhāva** (a qualified absence characterized by indifference, which is itself indicated by the act of cessation/desisting).
- **Logical Breakdown:** This is further explained as **Balavat-aniṣṭāsādhanatva-viśiṣṭa-iṣṭasādhanatv-ābhāva**.
    - This represents the absence of "being a means to a desired goal" (**Iṣṭasādhanatva**) when that goal is qualified by "not leading to strong undesired consequences" (**Balavat-aniṣṭāsādhanatva**).
    - Essentially, the negation points out that the action is not a "safe" or "pure" means to a desired end because it involves a powerful negative result.
- **Connection:** This interpretation arises when the negation (**Nañ**) is syntactically connected with the suffix (**Pratyaya**) of the verb. Under this view, the "qualified absence" (**Viśiṣṭābhāva**) itself becomes the primary meaning of the word **Nañ**.

The Nature of Indifference (Audāsīnya) vs. Cessation (Nivṛtti)

स्वतःसिद्धस्यौदासीन्यस्य नञर्थसाध्यत्वोपपादनार्थं निवृत्त्युपलक्षितत्वमिति ध्येयम् ।

Ṭīkā: svataḥsiddhasya audāsīnyasya nañarthasādhyatva upapādanārthaṃ nivṛtti upalakṣitatvam iti dhyeyam |

A crucial distinction is made between the natural state of the self and the effort required to stop an action.

- **Audāsīnya (Indifference):** This is described as **Svataḥsiddha** (self-established or innate). It means "doing nothing," which is the natural, effortless state of being. It is not something that needs to be "achieved" or "produced" (**Sādhya**) because it is already there.
- **Nivṛtti (Cessation):** Unlike indifference, cessation is **Sādhya** (to be accomplished). It is the active turning away from a potential action.
- **The Relationship:** Because **Audāsīnya** is innate, the term **Nivṛttyupalakṣita** (indicated by cessation) is used as an adjective. We use the act of desisting (**Nivṛtti**) to point toward the resulting state of natural indifference.

Therefore, we consider the meaning of prohibitions like "A **Brāhmaṇa** must not be killed" to result in the state of indifference characterized by the cessation of the act.

The Purpose of Prohibition: Redirecting the Will

The primary function of a prohibition is to halt a person who is already mentally prepared to act.

Prasakta-kriyā: This refers to an action toward which one is already inclined or "attached" due to personal desires (**Rāga**) or aversions (**Dveṣa**).

Explanation: The purpose of the negative particle is the cessation of an action that one was already prepared to perform.

The Rational Process: Through deliberation prompted by the prohibition, the individual realizes that the action lacks the quality of being a "means to a desired end without strong negative consequences."

- If a person realizes an act leads to **Balavat-aništa** (strong undesired harm), they will naturally not proceed.
- The negation clarifies that the perceived "benefit" is overshadowed by the harm, thus the inclination to act vanishes, leading to **Nivṛtti**.

The Context of the Vow (Prajāpati-vrata)

'तस्य बटोर्व्रतम्' इत्यनुष्ठेयक्रियावाचिव्रतशब्देन कार्यमुपक्रम्य 'नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्यम्' इति प्रजापतिव्रतमुक्तम् । अत उपक्रमबलात्तत्र नञ ईक्षणविरोधिसङ्कल्पक्रियालक्षणाङ्गीकृता ।

The ṭīkā provides a specific example of a religious vow taken by a student or initiate (**Baṭu**).

Ṭīkā: 'tasya baṭorvratam' iti anuṣṭheya kriyāvācivrataśabdena kāryam upakramya 'nekṣetodyantamādityam' iti prajāpativratamuktam |

Bhāṣya: anyatra prajāpativratādibhyaḥ |

Explanation: This refers to the specific religious observance (**Vrata**) of the **Baṭu** (student/initiate). The word **Vrata** here denotes an action that must be undertaken (**Anuṣṭheya-kriyā-vācī**). In the context of the **Prajāpati-vrata**, the negative commands are not merely about "not doing" but about the "resolve to act" in a specific way.

In the **Prajāpati-vrata**, several specific conditions are mentioned regarding the sun (**Āditya**) that the practitioner must not look at:

- **Udayam-ādityam:** The rising sun.
- **Astam yantam:** The setting sun.
- **Upaśiṣṭam:** The sun during an eclipse.
- **Vaṣmapratibimba:** The reflection of the sun in water.

- **Madhyama-nasat:** The sun when it is at the meridian (mid-day).

For one who has taken this vow, these are not just "don'ts"; they define the conduct of the **Vrata**.

Negation as an Active Resolve (Saṅkalpa)

Ṭīkā: ata upakramabalāt tatra naña īkṣaṇavirodhisaṅkalpakriyālakṣaṇāṅgīkṛtā |

In most prohibitions, **Nañ** (negation) implies the absence of an act. However, in the case of a **Vrata**, it implies a positive mental action.

Explanation: Due to the strength of the context (**Upakrama**)—the fact that this is a "vow"—the negation is accepted as indicating a **Saṅkalpa** (resolve).

- It is defined as **īkṣaṇa-virodhī-saṅkalpa**: A mental resolve that is the opposite of "looking."
- Instead of a mere absence of sight, it is the active commitment: "I shall not look at the sun." This resolve is the actual content of the vow.

The Meaning of Negation in Nouns and Compounds

एवमगौरसुरा अधर्म इत्यादौ नामधात्वर्थयुक्तस्य नञः प्रतिषेधवाचित्वायोगात् अन्यविरुद्धलक्षकत्वम् । एतेभ्यः प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्योऽन्यत्राभावमेव नञर्थं मन्यामह इत्यर्थः । दुःखाभावफलके नञर्थे सिद्धे निषेधशास्त्रमानत्ववद्वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि मानत्वमिति भावः ।

The ṭīkā extends this logic to other terms where the negative particle (**Nañ**) does not indicate a pure absence but rather something "other than" or "opposite to."

Ṭīkā: evamagaurasurā adharma ityādau nāmadhātvarthayuktasya naña pratiṣedhavācitvāyogāt anyaviruddhalakṣakatvam |

Explanation: In certain words, the negative particle cannot signify a simple prohibition. Instead, it indicates:

- **Anya (Otherness):** e.g., **Agauḥ** (not a cow). If something is not a cow, it is "other" than a cow (like a horse).
- **Viruddha (Opposite):** e.g., **Adharma** (unrighteousness). This is not just the "absence of **Dharma**," but the "opposite of **Dharma**."
- **Asurā:** Those who are not **Suras** (gods), often implying their opposites or a different class of beings.

General Rule vs. Exception

A clear boundary is drawn between these specific linguistic cases and general Vedic prohibitions.

Ṭīkā: etebhyaḥ prajāpativratādibhyo'nyatrābhāvameva nañarthaṃ manyāmaha ityarthaḥ |

Explanation: Apart from the specific case of the **Prajāpati-vrata**, we maintain that the primary meaning of the negative particle (**Nañ**) is indeed **Abhāva** (absence/negation).

In general scriptural prohibitions like "A **Brāhmaṇa** must not be killed" (**Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ**), the meaning remains a direct prohibition/negation rather than a "resolve" or an "opposite entity."

Validity of Vedānta as a Proof (Pramāṇa)

The final point connects the function of prohibitory scriptures to the validity of the **Upaniṣads** (**Vedānta**).

Ṭīkā: duḥkhābhāvaphalake nañarthe siddhe niṣedhaśāstramānatvavadvedāntānāṃ brahmaṇi mānatvamiti bhāvaḥ |

Explanation: * **Niṣedha-śāstra (Prohibitory Texts):** These are valid proofs because they lead to the "absence of suffering" (**Duḥkhābhāva**). By following "thou shalt not," one avoids the negative consequences of sinful acts.

- **Vedānta (The Final Knowledge):** In the same way, **Vedānta** is a valid proof (**Mānatvam**) regarding **Brahman**.
- **Conclusion:** Just as the "absence of suffering" is achieved through prohibitions, the "attainment of supreme bliss" (**Paramānanda-prāpti**) is achieved through the knowledge of **Brahman** provided by **Vedānta**.

Reconciling Vedānta with Mīmāṃsā Masters (Page 210)

तर्ह्यक्रियार्थानामानर्थक्यमिति सूत्रं किंविषयमिति, तत्राह - तस्मादिति । वेदान्तानां स्वार्थे फलवत्त्वाद्व्यर्थकथाविषयं तदित्यर्थः । यदपीत्यादि स्पष्टार्थम् ।

तस्मात्पुरुषार्थानुपयोग्युपाख्यानादिभूतार्थवादविषयमानर्थक्याभिधानं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

Ṭīkā: tarhyakriyārthānāmānarthakyamiti sūtraṃ kiṃviṣayamiti

The core of the debate is the **Mīmāṃsā Sūtra**: **Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād-anarthakyam-atadarthānām** (Since the Veda is for the sake of action, those parts which do not serve that purpose are meaningless).

- **The Mīmāṃsā View: Jaimini** accepted that if a sentence does not prompt a person toward action (**Kriyā**), it lacks purpose.
- **The Vedāntic Clarification:** The **Bhāṣyakāra** (Śaṅkara) clarifies that this "meaninglessness" does not apply to all non-action sentences, but only to those that are useless for the ultimate human goals (**Puruṣārtha**).

- **Grammatical Resolution (Vigraha): Ko viṣayaḥ yasya tat sūtram kim-viṣayam?** (What is the subject matter of that **Sūtra**?)
- **Context:** The question "What is the subject matter?" seeks to define the specific boundaries within which the "meaninglessness" of a sentence is declared by **Jaimini**.

Bhāṣya: tasmāt puruṣārthānupayogi upākhyānādi bhūtārthavādaviṣayam ānarthakyābhidhānaṃ draṣṭavyam || (pg.210)

Explanation: * The declaration of "meaninglessness" should be understood as referring to subjects like **Upākhyāna** (mere stories or legends) and **Bhūtārthavāda** (descriptions of past events) that do not serve any **Puruṣārtha** (Dharma, Artha, Kāma, or Mokṣa).

- If a story (e.g., "the gods went here, the demons went there") does not result in a religious duty or spiritual realization, it falls under this category of **ānarthakyam**.

The Three Types of Arthavāda

विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते।
भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः।।

virodhe guṇavādaḥ syādanuvādo'vadhārite| bhūtārthavādastaddhānādarthavādastridhā mataḥ||

To understand the context of **Bhūtārthavāda**, one must recognize the three-fold classification of **Arthavāda** (explanatory/praising remarks in the Vedas):

1. **Guṇavāda:** A statement that contradicts perceived reality (used figuratively).
2. **Anuvāda:** A statement that repeats what is already known through other means.
3. **Bhūtārthavāda:** A statement that describes a fact or event that is neither contradicted nor already known (e.g., historical accounts within the Veda).

The **Sūtra** in question targets those **Bhūtārthavādas** that are **Vyartha-kathā** (idle or useless chatter) because they have no connection to the spiritual or ritualistic progress of the individual.

The ṭīkā clarifies that there is no real conflict between the **Vedānta** position and the ancient masters like **Jaimini** or **Śabara Svāmī**.

Ṭīkā: vedāntānāṃ svārthe phalavatvādvyarthakathāviṣayaṃ tadityarthaḥ | yadapītyādi spaṣṭārtham |

Explanation:

- **Vedāntic** sentences (like **Tat Tvam Asi**) are not meaningless because they are **Svārthaphalavat** (possessing a fruit/result in their own right)—that fruit being **Mokṣa** (Liberation).

- The **Mīmāṃsā Sūtra** about "meaninglessness" targets only **Vyartha-kathā** (useless stories) where no human goal is achieved.
- Since **Vedānta** leads to the highest **Puruṣārtha**, it is exempt from the charge of being "non-action-oriented and therefore meaningless."

Conclusion: The conflict with **Śabara Svāmī** and **Jaimini** is resolved by showing that their critique was directed at "useless descriptions," not the "knowledge of **Brahman**."

The Critique of Bare Factual Statements (Vastumātra-kathana)

यदप्युक्तम् — कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशमन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रमुच्यमानमनर्थकं स्यात् 'सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती' इत्यादिवदिति, तत्परिहृतम् । 'रज्जुरियम् , नायं सर्पः' इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात् ।

The **Prābhākara** school of **Mīmāṃsā** argues that a sentence is only meaningful if it is connected to a command to act (**Kartavya-vidhi**).

Bhashya: yadapyuktam — kartavyavidhyanupraveśamantareṇa vastumātramucyamānamanarthakaṃ syāt 'saptadvīpā vasumatī' ityādivaditi, tatparihṛtam |

Explanation:

- **The Objection:** If the opponent argues that stating a mere fact (**Vastumātra**), such as "The earth has seven continents" (**Saptadvīpā vasumatī**), is "meaningless" (**Anarthakam**) because it doesn't tell the listener what to do. Without an "entry into a duty" (**Kartavyavidhy-anupraveśa**), words are supposedly useless, this is refuted now.
- **The Refutation:** This view is dismissed. Even a purely descriptive statement can be meaningful if it provides valuable knowledge.

Example from Poetry:

अस्त्युत्तरस्यां दिशि देवतात्मा हिमालयो नाम नगाधिराजः।
पूर्वापरौ तोयनिधी वगाह्य स्थितः पृथिव्या इव मानदण्डः॥

astyuttarasyāṃ diśi devatātmā himālayo nāma nagādhirājaḥ|
pūrvāparau toyanidhī vagāhya sthitaḥ pṛthivyā iva mānadaṇḍaḥ||

Explanation: This verse from **Kālidāsa's Kumārasambhava** describes the **Himālaya** as the "divine-souled king of mountains" in the north. This is a "bare statement of fact" (**Vastumātra-kathana**). It requires no action, yet it is profoundly meaningful as it provides a valid cognition of an existing entity.

Efficacy of Reality-Based Statements

The text provides the classic **Vedāntic** example to prove that knowledge of "what is" can directly solve a problem without needing "what to do."

Bhāṣya: ‘rajjuriyam , nāyaṃ sarpaḥ’ iti vastumātrakathane'pi prayojanasya dṛṣṭatvāt |

Explanation:

- **Context:** When a person is afraid of a rope, mistaking it for a snake, the statement "This is a rope, not a snake" is a bare factual statement.
- **Result:** No "action" is commanded. However, the "purpose is achieved" (**Prayojana-siddhaḥ**) because the fear and trembling of the person immediately cease upon the dawn of right knowledge.
- **Significance:** This proves that **Vastumātra-kathana** (factual description) can be as effective (if not more so) than **Vidhi** (commands).

The Core Dilemma: Persistent Worldliness (Saṃsāritva)

ननु श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनान्न रज्जुस्वरूपकथनवदर्थवत्त्वमित्युक्तम् ।

After silencing the **Mīmāṃsaka** logic, a more "stinging" question arises within the **Vedāntic** context regarding the actual experience of those who study the **Upaniṣads**.

Bhāṣya: nanu śrutabrahmaṇo'pi yathāpūrvaṃ saṃsāritvadarśanānna rajjusvarūpakathanavadarthavattvamityuktam |

Explanation:

- **The Term Śrutabrahma:** This refers to one who has "heard" or "studied" the truth of **Brahman** (**Śrutaṃ brahma yena saḥ**).
- **The Objection:** The opponent points out a visible contradiction. In the rope-snake example, the fear disappears *instantly*. However, we see people who have studied **Vedānta** and heard "**Tat Tvam Asi**" multiple times, yet they remain "worldly" (**Saṃsārī**).
- **The Observation:** They still suffer, feel pain, and act out of desires just as they did before their studies (**Yathā pūrvaṃ**).
- **The Conclusion:** Therefore, the opponent argues that the description of **Brahman** is *not* like the description of the rope. It does not seem to have "meaningfulness" (**Arthavattvam**) because the "snake" of **Saṃsāra** has not actually disappeared for the student.

Cessation of Worldliness: Hearing vs. Realization

श्रवणज्ञानमात्रात्संसारानिवृत्तावपि साक्षात्काराज्जीवत एव मुक्तिर्दुरपह्नवेति सदृष्टान्तमाह - अत्रोच्यत इत्यादिना । ब्रह्माहमिति साक्षात्कारविरोधादित्यर्थः ।

अत्रोच्यते — नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम् , वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मभावविरोधात् ।

Ṭīkā: śravaṇajñānamātrātsaṃsārānivṛttāvapi sākṣātkārājjīvata eva muktirdurapahnaveti sadṛṣṭāntamāha

The transition from worldly suffering (**Saṃsāra**) to liberation is not merely a change in information but a change in being.

- **Śravaṇa-jñāna-mātra:** For some, the mere hearing of the truth may trigger the cessation of **Saṃsāra**, but the opponent argues that this is rarely seen.
- **Sākṣātkāra (Direct Realization):** It is through direct realization that **Jīvanmukti** (liberation while alive) becomes **Durapahnava**—undeniable and irrefutable. You cannot argue away the experience of a liberated soul.

The Incompatibility of Knowledge and Worldliness

The core argument of the **Siddhānta** (the established conclusion) is that true knowledge and worldly suffering cannot coexist in the same locus.

Bhāṣya: nāvagatabrahmātmabhāvasya yathāpūrvaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ śakyaṃ darśayitum , vedapramāṇajanitabrahmātmabhāvavirodhāt |

Ṭīkā: brahmāhamiti sākṣātkāravirodhādityarthaḥ |

Explanation: Avagata-brahmātma-bhāva: One who has fully "apprehended" (**Avagata**) their nature as **Brahman** (**Brahmātma-bhāva**) cannot be shown to have the same worldliness (**Saṃsāritva**) they had before.

- **The Contradiction:** There is a fundamental opposition (**Virodha**) between the worldliness born of ignorance and the realization born of **Veda-pramāṇa** (scriptural authority). They are like light and darkness; they cannot occupy the same locus.

The Mechanism of Identification (Abhimāna)

न हि शरीराद्यात्माभिमानिनो दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव वेदप्रमाणजनितब्रह्मात्मावगमे तदभिमाननिवृत्तौ तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पयितुम् ।

Why does the "worldly person" suffer? The text identifies the root cause as **Dehābhimāna** (identification with the body).

Bhāṣya: śarīrādyātmābhimānino duḥkhabhayādimattvaṃ dṛṣṭamiti

Explanation: Suffering, fear, and anxiety are only observed where there is an identification with the body and senses. Without this "I-sense" in the physical/mental shell, suffering has no footing.

Bhāṣya: tasyaiva vedapramāṇajanitabrahmātmāvagame tadabhimānanivṛttau tadeva mithyājñānanimittaṃ duḥkhabhayādimattvaṃ bhavatīti śakyaṃ na kalpayitum |

Explanation: 1. **The Process: Veda-pramāṇa** generates the knowledge of **Brahman**. 2. **The Immediate Effect:** This knowledge results in **Abhimāna-nivṛtti** (the cessation of identification). 3. **The Result:** Since suffering and fear are caused by **Mithyā-ajñāna** (false knowledge/error), once that error is removed, it is impossible (**Na śakyam**) to imagine that the suffering would persist.

The True Purpose of Vedantic Study

Swamiji reminded a sharp correction to those who treat **Vedānta** as an academic exercise or a source of ego.

- **Cutting Identification:** The purpose of **Vedānta** is to "cut" the identification with the five sheaths (**Kośas**). It is not about how many books you have read or how well you can explain them to others.
- **The Trap of New Ego:** We do not study **Vedānta** to add "new" identifications (e.g., "I am a great scholar"). If we do, we are missing the point. The goal is **Anahaṃkāra** (ego-lessness).
- **Universal Identification:** Even a person with no wealth, youth, or status has **Dehābhimāna** ("I am this body"). **Vedānta** is the specific medicine for this universal ailment.

The Analogy of the Wealthy Man and the Monk

न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनो धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव प्रव्रजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति ।

To illustrate how the removal of identification removes suffering, the **Bhāṣya** provides a social analogy.

Bhāṣya: na hi dhanino gṛhasthasya dhanābhimānino dhanāpahāranimittaṃ duḥkhaṃ dṛṣṭamiti, tasyaiva pravrajitasya dhanābhimānarahitasya tadeva dhanāpahāranimittaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhavati |

Explanation:

- **The Householder:** A wealthy householder identifies with his house and cars. If they are stolen (**Dhanāpahāra**), he suffers immensely because of his **Dhanābhimāna** (identification with wealth).
- **The Monk (Pravrajita):** Suppose that same man takes **Sannyāsa** (renunciation). He is now a **Pravrajita**, free from the identification with that wealth. If that same house now burns down or is stolen, he does not suffer.
- **The Lesson:** The object (the house/body) might still undergo change or loss, but the suffering only belongs to the one who says, "This is mine" or "This is I."

Mananam: Reflections on Indirect vs. Direct Knowledge

In the **Bhāmatī** school of **Advaita Vedānta**, a distinction is made between the types of knowledge generated by different stages of practice.

- **Parokṣa Jñānam (Indirect Knowledge):** This is the knowledge gained through **Śravaṇam** (hearing) and **Mananam** (reflection). While it is not liberation, it has its own distinct utility.
- **Aparokṣa Jñānam (Direct Knowledge):** This is the realization that arises from **Nididhyāsanam** (profound meditation/contemplation).
- **The Utility of Indirect Knowledge:** Even if **Parokṣa Jñānam** does not result in immediate **Mokṣa**, it leads to the cessation of sinful tendencies (**Pāpa vṛtti**).

Analysis of the root Sad (Śadḷ)

The definition of the root **Sad** (from which 'Upanishad' is derived) is: **Śadnlru viśaraṇagatyavasādaneṣu**

- **Viśaraṇa (Destruction): Aparokṣa Jñānam** leads to the total destruction of ignorance (**Avidyā**).
- **Avasādana (Loosening): Parokṣa Jñānam** leads to **Śithilīkaraṇa**—the loosening or weakening of the bonds of **Saṃsāra**. Even if the world is not "destroyed" for the seeker, their attachment and intensity of reaction (**Rāga-Dveṣa**) are significantly reduced.

Evidence from the Pañcadaśī

Swamiji mentioned **Pañcadaśī** (Chapters 1 and 7) as a reference to validate the fruits of **Parokṣa Jñānam**.

> **परोक्षं ब्रह्मविज्ञानं शाब्दं देशिकपूर्वकम् ।**
> **बुद्धिपूर्वं कृतं पापं कृत्स्नं दहति वह्निवत् ॥**
> **parokṣaṃ brahmavijñānaṃ śābdaṃ deśikapūrvakam |**
> **buddhipūrvaṃ kṛtaṃ pāpaṃ kṛtsnaṃ dahati vahnivat ||**

- **Context:** This is Verse 63 of the first chapter.
- **Meaning:** Indirect knowledge of **Brahman**, gained through the words of the scriptures and the teachings of the Guru, burns away all sins committed intentionally, just as fire consumes fuel.
- **Seven Stages:** The **Pañcadaśī** (Chapter 7) describes seven stages of consciousness, where **Parokṣa** and **Aparokṣa** are treated as two distinct and necessary developments. The result of **Parokṣa Jñānam** is the eradication of sorrow to a certain extent. The result of **Aparokṣa Jñānam** is realization (Sākṣātkāra).

The Process of Sākṣātkāra (Realization)

Direct realization occurs only after the purification of the meanings of the terms within the **Mahāvākya**.

- **Padārtha Śodhanam (Purification of Terms):** Before the sentence "**Tat Tvam Asi**" (That Thou Art) can be understood, the meanings of **Tat** (That/God) and **Tvam** (Thou/Self) must be clarified.
- **The Shift in Identity: Tvam** should not evoke the body or the ego, but rather pure Consciousness (**Caitanya**).
    - If, upon hearing "**Aham**" (I), the mind presents "Consciousness" rather than a physical entity, then **Padārtha Śodhana** is complete.
- **The Realization:** One must realize: "I am not a 80kg lump of matter (**Dravya**); I am the nature of Light (**Prakāśa-svarūpa**), of Knowledge-alone (**Jñāna-mātra**)."

The Vivaraṇa School Perspective

The **Vivaraṇa** school offers a slightly different take on the nature of knowledge:

- They do not strictly separate **Parokṣa** and **Aparokṣa** in the same way as the **Bhāmatī** school.
- They argue that knowledge of the Self is always "Direct" (**Aparokṣa**) because the Self is always present.
- The distinction they make is between **Aparokṣa** and **Dṛḍha-Aparokṣa** (Firm/Steady Direct Knowledge). The reason a person still feels like a **Saṃsārī** is not a lack of knowledge, but a lack of *firmness* in that knowledge.

Nididhyāsana and the Cessation of Abhimāna

Nididhyāsana is defined as becoming "more alert" (**Satarka**) towards **Caitanya** (Consciousness).

The Role of Attention

- One must withdraw attention from the five sheaths (**Pañcakośa**) and the three states of consciousness (**Avasthātraya**—waking, dream, deep sleep).
- The focus must remain solely on the self as the Witnessing Consciousness.

The ultimate cause of suffering is not the existence of objects, but the identification with them.

The Analogy of Identification (Abhimāna)

The ṭīkā uses the example of a person wearing earrings to illustrate how pleasure and pain are tied to identification rather than the objects themselves.

न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव कुण्डलवियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति ।

Bhāṣya: na ca kuṇḍalinaḥ kuṇḍalitvābhimānanimittaṃ sukhaṃ dṛṣṭamiti tasyaiva kuṇḍalaviyuktasya kuṇḍalitvābhimānarahitasya tadeva kuṇḍalitvābhimānanimittaṃ sukhaṃ bhavati |

- **The Analogy:** A person wearing gold earrings (**Kuṇḍalī**) derives pleasure because of the identification ("I am the wearer of these earrings").
- **The Shift:** When the earrings are removed, the identification (**Abhimāna**) also vanishes. Consequently, the specific pleasure derived from that identification ceases to exist.
- **The Logic:** This demonstrates that happiness and suffering are products of **Abhimāna**. If the identification can be dropped instantly in a secular context, it suggests the same is possible regarding the body, though it requires rigorous practice (**Sādhanā**).

The Scriptural Basis for Bodilessness (Page 211-212)

तत्त्वविदो जीवन्मुक्तौ मानमाह - तदुक्तं श्रुत्येति ।

तदुक्तं श्रुत्या — 'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' (छा. उ. ८ । १२ । १) इति ।

Ṭīkā: tattvavido jīvanmuktau mānamāha

The primary defense against the **Pūrva Pakṣa** (who claims worldly suffering persists after hearing Vedanta) is the scriptural definition of the liberated state.

Bhāṣya: taduktaṃ śrutyā — 'aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ' (chā. u. 8 | 12 | 1) iti |

Definition: This **Śruti** (from the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad**) states that "Pleasure and pain do not touch one who is bodiless (**Aśarīra**)."

The Proponent's Argument: If an individual, through the hearing of the **Mahāvākya**, realizes "I am bodiless," then pleasure and pain can no longer affect them.

The State of the Knower: Whether the Knower appears happy or sad to an outside observer is irrelevant. Only the Knower knows their internal state of being **Aśarīra**. The Self was always bodiless—before, during, and after the hearing of the sentence.

Living Liberation (Jīvanmukti) vs. Death

जीवतोऽशरीरत्वं विरुद्धमिति शङ्कते - शरीर इति ।

शरीरे पतितेऽशरीरत्वं स्यात् , न जीवत इति चेत् , न; सशरीरत्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात् ।

The opponent argues that one can only be "bodiless" after the physical death of the body. The **Siddhānta** (established doctrine) refutes this by redefining "embodiment."

Ṭīkā: jīvato'śarīratvaṃ viruddhamiti

Bhāṣya: śarīre patite'śarīratvaṃ syāt , na jīvata iti cet, na; saśarīratvasya mithyājñānanimittatvāt |

- **The Objection:** How can a living person be bodiless? They argue that **Aśarīratva** only occurs when the body falls (**Śarīra-pāta**).
- **The Refutation:** The notion of the Self being "embodied" (**Saśarīratva**) is caused by false knowledge (**Mithyā-jñāna**).
- **Analogy of the Hall:** Just as one identifies with a seat in a hall as "mine" simply by sitting there and forming a mental connection (**Tādātmya**), the Self identifies with the body.
- **The Nature of the Error:** The body is gained through past **Karma**, but the suffering derived from it is due to the delusion (**Bhrānti**) that "I am this body."

The Relationship Between Self and Body

आत्मनो देहसम्बन्धस्य भ्रान्तिप्रयुक्तत्वात्तत्त्वधिया तन्नाशरूपमशरीरत्वं जीवतो युक्तमित्याह - नेत्यादिना ।

न ह्यात्मनः शरीरात्माभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम् ।

The connection between the **Ātman** and the body is analyzed as purely illusory.

Ṭīkā: ātmano dehasambandhasya bhrāntiprayuktatvāttattvadhiyā tannāśarūpamaśarīratvaṃ jīvato yuktam

- **Knowledge as Expression:** Knowledge (**Tattva-jñāna**) does not *create* the bodiless state. It only destroys the delusion of being embodied.
- **Analogy of the Pot:** In a dark room, a pot exists but is not seen. When light is brought, the pot is not "created"; it is merely "expressed" (**Abhivyakti**). Similarly, the **Ātman** is eternally unattached (**Asaṅga**) and bodiless; knowledge simply reveals this fact while the person is still alive (**Jīvataḥ**).

Bhāṣya: na hyātmanaḥ śarīrātmābhimānalakṣaṇaṃ mithyājñānaṃ muktvā anyataḥ saśarīratvaṃ śakyaṃ kalpayitum |

- **The Core Point:** Apart from the false identification (**Abhimāna**) of the Self with the body, there is no other way to prove that the **Ātman** has a body. The **Ātman** is never actually embodied.
- **Bhrānti-prayukta:** The relationship is "provoked by delusion."

Eternal and Uncaused Bodilessness

असङ्गात्मरूपं त्वशरीरत्वं तत्त्वधिया जीवतो व्यज्यत इत्याह - नित्यमिति ।

नित्यमशरीरत्वमकर्मनिमित्तत्वादित्यवोचाम ।

The final point emphasizes that this state is not a temporary achievement or a result of actions.

Ṭīkā: asaṅgātmarūpaṃ tvaśarīratvaṃ tattvadhiyā jīvato vyajyata iti

Bhāṣya: nityamaśarīratvamakarmanimittatvādityavocāma |

- **Nityam (Eternal):** I am bodiless at all times, in all conditions.
- **A-karma-nimitta (Uncaused by Action):** This Self is not achieved through rituals or physical acts. It is the inherent nature of the Self.
- **Conclusion:** The greatest wealth/asset of the individual is this eternal **Aśarīratva**. It is an "undecaying" property that has existed since time immemorial and will never be destroyed.

The Opponent's Position: The Reality of Embodiment

देहात्मनोः सम्बन्धः सत्य इति शङ्कते - तत्कृतेति । तन्नाशार्थं कार्यापेक्षेति भावः ।

तत्कृतधर्माधर्मनिमित्तं सशरीरत्वमिति चेत् ,

Ṭīkā: dehātmanoḥ sambandhaḥ satya iti

The **Pūrva Pakṣa** (represented here by **Nyāya**, **Vaiśeṣika**, and **Mīmāṃsā** thinkers) posits that the connection between the Self and the body is a factual, real relationship (**Satya-sambandha**).

- **The Argument of Karma:** They argue that embodiment (**Saśarīratva**) is caused by the merits and demerits (**Dharma** and **Adharma**) earned by the **Ātman**.
- **The Seat of Karma:** In the **Nyāya** view, **Dharma** and **Adharma** are qualities (**Guṇa**) that reside directly in the **Ātman**.
    - The **Mīmāṃsaka** view also maintains a direct causal link between the **Ātman** and these karmic forces.
- **The Cycle:** The **Ātman** performs actions, accumulates **Dharmādharmau**, and consequently acquires a body to experience the fruits of those actions.

Bhāṣya: tatkṛtadharmādharmanimittaṃ saśarīratvamiti cet ,

Explanation: If it is argued that embodiment (**Saśarīratva**) is caused by the **Dharma** and **Adharma** performed by the Self (**Ātman**)...

The Vedāntic Refutation: The Fallacy of Circularity

आत्मनः शरीरसम्बन्धे जाते धर्माधर्मोत्पत्तिः, तस्यां सत्यां सम्बन्धजन्मेत्यन्योन्याश्रयादेकस्यासिद्ध्या द्वितीयस्याप्यसिद्धिः स्यादिति परिहरति - नेत्यादिना ।

न । शरीरसम्बन्धस्यासिद्धत्वात् धर्माधर्मयोरात्मकृतत्वासिद्धेः, शरीरसम्बन्धस्य धर्माधर्मयोस्तत्कृतत्वस्य चेतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

The **Siddhānta** (Vedantic position) counters by stating that the very premise of a "real" connection is unproven (**Asiddha**) and logically flawed.

Bhāṣya: na | śarīrasambandhasyāsiddhatvāt dharmādharmayorātmakṛtatvāsiddheḥ, śarīrasambandhasya dharmādharmayostatkṛtatvasya cetaretarāśrayatvaprasaṅgāt |

Explanation: This cannot be, because the primary relationship between the **Ātman** and the **Śarīra** is itself unproven and unestablished.

Ṭīkā: ātmanaḥ śarīrasambandhe jāte dharmādharmotpattiḥ, tasyāṃ satyāṃ sambandhajanmetyanyonyāśrayādekasyāsiddhyā dvitīyasyāpyasiddhiḥ syāditi pariharati

The **Ṭīkā** elaborates on the logical failure of the opponent's "Real Connection" theory. If you claim that **Dharma** and **Adharma** cause the body, you fall into a circular trap:

1. **Requirement for Action:** To perform **Dharma** or **Adharma**, the **Ātman** must first be connected to a body (one cannot act without a body/senses).
2. **Requirement for Body:** To have a body-connection, the **Ātman** must have prior **Dharma** and **Adharma**.

Explanation: If the production of **Dharmādharmau** happens only *after* the body-Self connection is established, and the birth of that connection happens only *because* of **Dharmādharmau**, it creates a mutual dependency (**Anyonyāśraya**). Since the starting point cannot be established, neither can the second point.

The Analogy of the Floating Boats

Swamiji provided a vivid metaphor to explain why this circular logic fails to provide a stable foundation for reality.

- **The Scenario:** Imagine several boats floating in the Ganges. To keep a boat from drifting away in the current, it must be tied to a fixed post on the shore.
- **The Failure:** If one boat is tied to a second boat, and the second is tied to a third, but none of them are tied to the shore, they will all eventually drift away when the current increases.
- **The Application:**
    - **Boat A** = The Body-Self Connection.
    - **Boat B** = **Dharmādharmau** (Merit/Demerit).
    - If **A** depends on **B**, and **B** depends on **A**, without an independent, proven starting point, the entire argument "drifts away" as logically invalid (**Asiddha**).

Conclusion: Embodiment as Mithyā (Illusory) (Page 213)

नन्वेतद्देहजन्यधर्माधर्मकर्मण एतद्देहसम्बन्धहेतुत्वे स्यादन्योन्याश्रयः । पूर्वदेहकर्मण एतद्देहसम्बन्धोत्पत्तिः, पूर्वदेहश्च तत्पूर्वदेहकृतकर्मण इति बीजाङ्कुरवदनादित्वान्नायं दोष इत्यत आह - अन्धेति । अप्रामाणिकीत्यर्थः । न हि बीजादङ्कुरः ततो बीजान्तरं च यथा प्रत्यक्षेण दृश्यते तद्वदात्मनो देहसम्बन्धः पूर्वकर्मकृतः प्रत्यक्षः । नाप्यस्ति कश्चिदागमः । प्रत्युत 'असङ्गो हि' इत्यादिश्रुतिः सर्वकर्तृत्वं वारयतीति भावः । तत्र युक्तिमाह - क्रियेति । कूटस्थस्य कृत्ययोगान्न कर्तृत्वमित्यर्थः ।

अन्धपरम्परैषा अनादित्वकल्पना । क्रियासमवायाभावाच्चात्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Because the "Realist" schools cannot establish the beginning of this connection without logical fallacy, the Vedantic conclusion is strengthened:

1. The **Ātman** is never actually "in" the body in a real sense.
2. The sense of being "embodied" is due to **Mithyā-ajñāna** (Ignorance that is False).
3. Just as we might claim a seat in a hall as "mine" simply because we sat on it, we claim the body is "mine" or "I" merely through a mental association (**Tādātmya**).

The Fallacy of Mutual Dependence (Anyonyāśraya)

Ṭīkā: nanvetaddehajanyadharmādharmakarmaṇa etaddehasambandhahetutve syādanyonyāśrayaḥ | pūrvadehakarmaṇa etaddehasambandhotpattiḥ, pūrvadehaśca tatpūrvadehakṛtakarmaṇa iti bījāṅkuravadanāditvānnāyaṃ doṣa ityata āha

The discussion begins by addressing the logical hurdle of how a body and its actions (**Karma**) relate to one another.

- **The Objection from Siddhānta Pakṣa:** If the merit and demerit (**Dharmādharma**) generated by the current body are considered the cause of the *current* body's connection to the Self, it leads to **Anyonyāśraya** (mutual dependence or circular reasoning).
- **The Response from Pūrva Pakṣa (Bījāṅkura-nyāya):** To avoid this, the relationship is viewed as a chain. The **Dharmādharma** performed in a previous body causes the *current* body. This current body then performs actions that lead to the next body.
- **Nature of the Chain:** This is likened to the **Bījāṅkura-nyāya** (the logic of the seed and the sprout). Just as it is impossible to say whether the seed or the tree came first in an absolute sense, this cycle is **Anādi** (beginningless).
- **Elaboration:** Since the cycle is beginningless, the charge of a specific starting point's logical defect is nullified.

The Concept of "Blind Tradition" (Andha-Paramparā)

Bhāṣya: andhaparamparaiṣā anāditvakalpanā |

Ṭīkā: aprāmāṇikītyarthaḥ | na hi bījādaṅkuraḥ tato bījāntaraṃ ca yathā pratyakṣeṇa dṛśyate tadvadātmano dehasambandhaḥ pūrvakarmakṛtaḥ pratyakṣaḥ | nāpyasti kaścidāgamaḥ |

While the **Bījāṅkura** logic explains the mechanics of rebirth, the text delves deeper into the ontological reality of this connection.

- **The Critique:** The belief that the Self is truly connected to the body is described as **Andha-paramparā** (a blind tradition or a tradition of ignorance).
- **The Source of Connection:** This "tradition" is rooted in **Ajñāna** (ignorance). It is not a factual reality but a **Bhrānti-janya** (born of delusion) concept.
- **Interpretation:** The mutual dependence between the body-Self connection and **Dharmādharma** is an unauthorized, unproven assumption (**Aprāmāṇika**). Unlike the physical seed and sprout, which are **Pratyakṣa** (perceptible), the Self's connection to past **Karma** is neither seen nor truly supported by the ultimate intent of scripture.

If the Self-body connection is a delusion, why does the **Karmakāṇḍa** (ritualistic section of the Vedas) exist?

- **Adhyāropa (Superimposition):** The scriptures provide instructions on **Dharmādharma** and rituals based on the *assumed* connection the individual already believes in. It is a "translation" (**Anuvāda**) of the user's current state of ignorance to lead them toward higher discipline.
- **The Ultimate Truth:** In reality, there is no evidence (**Pramāṇa**) for a real connection between the **Ātman** and **Karma**. In fact, there is contrary evidence.

Ṭīkā: pratyuta 'asaṅgo hi' ityādiśrutiḥ sarvakartṛtvaṃ vārayatīti bhāvaḥ |

- **The Result of Practice:** If the **Ātman** is **Asaṅga** (unattached), why perform rituals? Rituals lead to **Citta-śuddhi** (purification of the mind). A peaceful and purified **Antaḥkaraṇa** (inner instrument/mind) is the necessary ground for **Vedānta-vidyā** (Self-knowledge) to manifest.

The Definition of Agency (Kartṛtva)

Ṭīkā: tatra yuktimāha - kriyeti | kūṭasthasya kṛtyayogānna kartṛtvamityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: kriyāsamavāyābhāvāccātmanaḥ kartṛtvānupapatteḥ |

Bhāṣya provides a technical definition of agency, primarily through the lens of **Nyāya** philosophy, to show why it cannot belong to the Self:

स्वोपादान गोचर अपरोक्ष ज्ञान चिकीर्षा कृतिमत्त्वम्
Svopādāna-gocara-aparokṣa-jñāna-cikīrṣā-kṛtimattvam|

Defining the "Doer": To be a "doer" (**Kartṛ**), one must have:

- **Aparokṣa-jñāna:** Direct knowledge of the material/tools (**Upādāna**).
- **Cikīrṣā:** The desire to act.
- **Kṛtimattvam:** The actual effort or volition.

Lack of Connection: Agency is impossible in the Self because of **Kriyā-samavāyābhāva**—the absence of an inherent relationship with action.

The Nature of the Self: The soul is **Kūṭastha** (unchanging/immovable). Since it cannot undergo change or effort (**Kṛti**), it cannot be a "doer."

Since the **Kūṭastha-ātman** lacks these modifications, it cannot possess **Kartṛtva**.

Agency by Proximity (Sannidhāna)

स्वतो निष्क्रियस्यापि कारकसन्निधिना कर्तृत्वमिति शङ्कां दृष्टान्तवैषम्येण निरस्यति - नेति । राजादीनां स्वक्रीतभृत्यकार्ये कर्तृत्वं युक्तं नात्मन इत्यर्थः ।

सन्निधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वमिति चेत् , न ।

A final doubt is raised: Can the Self be a "doer" simply by being near the body, much like a King?

- **The King Analogy:** A King is called a "doer" even if he doesn't physically fight in a battle. His mere **Sannidhāna** (presence/proximity) or command makes things happen through his subjects.
- **The Terminology:** In certain traditions, like **Śṛṅgerī**, the term **Mahāsannidhāna** is used for high authorities whose mere presence governs the function of the institution.

Bhāṣya: sannidhānamātreṇa rājaprabhṛtīnāṃ dṛṣṭaṃ kartṛtvamiti cet , na |

- **The Refutation:** Even this "agency by proximity" is insufficient to define the true nature of the **Ātman**, as the **Ātman** remains entirely **Niṣkriya** (actionless) and unattached, regardless of the activities of the **Kārakas** (factors of action) surrounding it.

Refuting the Analogy of the King (Page 214)

न धनदानाद्युपार्जितभृत्यसम्बन्धित्वात्तेषां कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः । न त्वात्मनो धनदानादिवच्छरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामिभावसम्बन्धनिमित्तं किञ्चिच्छक्यं कल्पयितुम् ।

This analogy fails because a king's agency is dependent on external factors—specifically his relationship with hired or bought servants (**Bhṛtya**).

Ṭīkā: svato niṣkriyasyāpi kārakasannidhinā kartṛtvamiti śaṅkāṃ dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyeṇa nirasyati - neti | rājādīnāṃ svakrītabhṛtyakārye kartṛtvaṃ yuktaṃ nātmana ityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: dhanadānādyupārjitabhṛtyasambandhitvātteṣāṃ kartṛtvopapatteḥ | na tvātmano dhanadānādivaccharīrādibhiḥ svasvāmibhāvasambandhanimittaṃ kiñcicchakyaṃ kalpayitum |

Explanation: A king's agency is mediated through wealth (**Dhana-dāna**) used to acquire servants who perform tasks. In the case of the **Ātman**, there is no such medium or "ownership" over the body that can be compared to a social or financial transaction.

Even if we call a King a "doer," it is only in a secondary or figurative sense (**Gauṇa**). This cannot be applied to the **Ātman** because there is no basis to establish a "master-servant" relationship (**Sva-svāmi-sambandha**) between the Self and the body/senses.

The Cyclical Nature of Body and Action (Bījāṅkura-Nyāya)

देहकर्मणोरविद्याभूमौ बीजाङ्कुरवदावर्तमानयोरात्मना सम्बन्धो भ्रान्तिकृत एवेत्याह - मिथ्येति ।

मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः सम्बन्धहेतुः ।

The text explores how the body and karma interact within the realm of ignorance.

Ṭīkā: dehakarmaṇoravidyābhūmau bījāṅkuravadāvartamānayorātmanā sambandho bhrāntikṛta eva

The Seed-Sprout Logic: The relationship between the body (**Deha**) and action (**Karma**) is like the seed and the sprout (**Bījāṅkura-nyāya**). The body leads to action, and action leads to a new body.

The Soil of Ignorance: This cycle occurs exclusively in the "soil of ignorance" (**Avidyā-bhūmi**).

Illusion of Connection: The perceived connection between the **Ātman** and this cycle of body-action is entirely **Bhrānti-kṛta** (created by delusion).

The Role of False Identification (Mithyābhimāna)

The direct cause of our worldly experience of joy and sorrow is **Mithyābhimāna**.

Bhāṣya: mithyābhimānastu pratyakṣaḥ sambandhahetuḥ |

Mithyābhimāna is the false identification or ego-sense that links the Self to the body and actions.

Direct Cause: This "delusion of relationship" is the direct (**Pratyakṣa**) cause of the experience of being a happy or sad individual. In reality, we have no connection to these states. The realization of this lack of connection is the path to transcending the cycle of **Avidyā**.

The Question of Sacrificial Agency (Yajamānatva)

ननु 'यजेत' इति विध्यनुपपत्त्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वमेष्टव्यमिति, तत्राह - एतेनेति । भ्रान्तिकृतेन देहादिसम्बन्धेन यागादिकर्तृत्वमाब्रह्मबोधाद्व्याख्यातमित्यर्थः ।

एतेन यजमानत्वमात्मनो व्याख्यातम् ।

A new topic is introduced regarding how the **Ātman**, which is essentially actionless, can be called a **Yajamāna** (one who performs a sacrifice).

An objection (**Pūrvapakṣa**) arises: If the **Ātman** is not truly a doer, then the commands found in the Vedas (like "One desiring heaven should perform sacrifice") would become meaningless.

Ṭīkā: nanu ‘yajeta’ iti vidhyanupapattyātmanaḥ kartṛtvameṣṭavyamiti

The Conflict: Scriptural injunctions such as **Agnihotraṃ juhuyāt** or **Svarga-kāmo yajeta** (One desiring heaven should sacrifice) require an agent. If the **Ātman** has no agency, these injunctive sentences (**Vidhi-vākya**) would fail to have an object or purpose (**Anupapatti**).

The Resolution: The agency required for these rituals is created by delusion (**Bhrāntikṛta**). The Vedas address the individual who thinks they are the body and the doer. This agency is valid within the realm of ignorance, allowing the ritualistic path to function until higher knowledge dawns.

Bhāṣya: etena yajamānatvamātmano vyākhyātam |

Explanation: By the same logic used to explain the **Ātman’s** general agency (**Kartṛtva**), its role as an agent of sacrifice is also explained. It is not an inherent property but a superimposed one.

The Duration of Delusion and Action

The text clarifies exactly how long this perceived connection between the Self and action lasts.

Ṭīkā: bhrāntikṛtena dehādisambandhena yāgādikartṛtvam ābrahmabodhāt vyākhyātam ityarthaḥ |

Scope of Agency: Whether it is performing a grand sacrifice (**Yāga**), or daily spiritual practices like **Pūjā** (worship), **Dhyāna** (meditation), or **Japa** (chanting), all are rooted in the **Bhrāntikṛta** relationship with the body (**Deha**).

The Time Limit: This state of "I am the doer" persists **Ābrahma-bodhāt**—until the direct realization of Brahman.

The Cycle of Transmigration: As long as **Brahma-jñāna** (knowledge of Brahman) does not dawn, the narrative of "I went here," "I met them," or "I am suffering in heaven or hell" continues, potentially for fifty lifetimes or more.

Mananam: Practical Tip: Meditative Shift

A seeker pursuant of liberation must stabilize the intellectual conviction that the Self is ever-free and disconnected from the body.

The Meditative Shift: We must conclude: "I have never had a relationship with this body, nor with any actions. I am **Nitya-mukta** (eternally free)."

We must analyze if any relationship like "Owner and Owned" (**Sva-svāmi-bhāva-sambandha**) is possible between the Self and the body. Logically, it is not. If we accept the relationship as real, we will inevitably experience minor pleasures and major sorrows. To end suffering, one must realize their "bodiless" nature even while appearing to have a body.

For one who realizes they are **Aśarīra** (bodiless/without identification), pleasure (**Priya**) and pain (**Apriya**) cannot touch them. If one considers themselves **Saśarīra** (embodied), the cessation of pleasure and pain is impossible.

The realization of the **Ātman** requires a shift in attention (**Dhyāna**) rather than just academic mastery.

The Bird Analogy: If a Guru points to a bird in a tree, the student must look where the Guru is pointing to see it. If the student keeps their eyes fixed on something else (**Anātman**), they will never see the bird (**Ātman**).

The Limitation of Memorization: Merely committing texts to memory (**Kaṇṭhastha**) is insufficient if the focus remains on the non-self.

The Purpose of Discipline: Because most seekers lack concentration (**Ekāgratā**), various forms of **Tapas** (austerity) and rituals are prescribed to keep them engaged until their attention can finally be redirected toward the Self.

The Prābhākara Perspective: Gauṇa vs. Mithyā (Page 214-215)

अत्राहुः । प्राभाकरा इत्यर्थः । भ्रान्त्यभावाद्देहसम्बन्धादिकं सत्यमिति भावः । भेदज्ञानाभावान्न गौण इत्याह - नेति । प्रसिद्धो ज्ञातो वस्तुनोर्भेदो येन तस्य गौणमुख्यज्ञानाश्रयत्व प्रसिद्धेरित्यर्थः । यस्य तस्य पुंसो गौणौ भवत इत्यन्वयः । शौर्यादिगुणविषयावित्यर्थः । तस्य त्विति । भेदज्ञानशून्यस्य पुंस इत्यर्थः । शब्दप्रत्ययाविति । शब्दः शाब्दबोधश्चेत्यर्थः ।

अत्राहुः — देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनः आत्मीये देहादावभिमानो गौणः, न मिथ्येति चेत् , न । प्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य गौणत्वमुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धेः । यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो वस्तुभेदः — यथा केसरादिमानाकृतिविशेषोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययभाङ्मुख्योऽन्यः प्रसिद्धः, ततश्चान्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्यशौर्यादिभिः सिंहगुणैः सम्पन्नः सिद्धः, तस्य पुरुषे सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतः । नाप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य । तस्य त्वन्यत्रान्यशब्दप्रत्ययौ भ्रान्तिनिमित्तावेव भवतः, न गौणौ ।

The **Prābhākara** school argues that the identification of the Self with the body is not a "delusion" (**Mithyā**) but a "figurative" or "secondary" usage (**Gauṇa**).

Ṭīkā: prābhākarā ityarthaḥ | bhrāntyabhāvāddehasambandhādikaṃ satyamiti bhāvaḥ |

Bhāṣya: atrāhuḥ — dehādivyatiriktasyātmanaḥ ātmīye dehādāvabhimāno gauṇaḥ, na mithyeti cet

Absence of Error (Bhrānti-abhāva): Prābhākara followers do not accept the existence of "error" (**Bhrānti**) as a positive entity. According to their theory of **Akhyāti** (non-apprehension), what is commonly called "error" is simply a failure to distinguish between two different cognitions.

The Mechanism of Confusion: Using the example of "This is silver" (**Idam rajatam**) when looking at a shell:

1. **Direct Perception:** You see the shell (**Śukti**) in front of you.
2. **Memory:** You remember silver seen previously in a shop (**Haṭṭastha-rajata**).
3. **Non-discrimination (Viveka-agraha):** The error arises because one fails to grasp the difference (**Bheda**) between the perceived shell and the remembered silver.

The Conclusion of Prābhākara: Since they deny the existence of a false object, they claim the relationship between the Self and the body is **Satyam** (real/true) but expressed figuratively.

Defining Figurative Usage (Gauṇa)

The **Siddhāntin** explains that for a statement to be "figurative" (**Gauṇa**), there must be a prior, well-known distinction between two objects.

Ṭīkā: bhedajñānābhāvānna gauṇa ityāha - neti | prasiddho jñāto vastunorbhedo yena tasya gauṇamukhyajñānāśrayatva prasiddheritytarthaḥ | yasya tasya puṃso gauṇau bhavata ityanvayaḥ | śauryādiguṇaviṣayāvityarthaḥ

Bhāṣya: na | prasiddhavastubhedasya gauṇatvamukhyatvaprasiddheḥ |

Requirement for Gauṇa: A figurative relationship can only be established when the difference between two things is already known (**Jñāta-vastu-bheda**).

Example: A father says of his son, "My son is my very Self" (**Putra mama ātmā**). Here, the father knows he and the son are physically distinct, yet he uses the word "Self" figuratively due to affection and shared duties.

The Lion-Man Analogy (Siṃha-mānavaka)

The text provides a classic example to illustrate the difference between primary (**Mukhya**) and secondary (**Gauṇa**) meanings.

Bhāṣya: yasya hi prasiddho vastubhedaḥ — yathā kesarādimāna ākṛtiviśeṣo'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siṃhaśabdapratyayabhāṅmukhyo'nyaḥ prasiddhaḥ

Primary Meaning: The word "Lion" (**Siṃha**) primarily refers to a creature with a specific form—having a mane (**Kesara**) and claws. This is established through **Anvaya-vyatireka** (presence and absence logic): where there is a mane, the word "Lion" applies; where there is no mane, it does not.

Secondary Meaning: When a boy (**Mānavaka**) is called a "Lion," it is because he possesses qualities like cruelty (**Kraurya**) or bravery (**Śaurya**).

Bhāṣya: tataścānyaḥ puruṣaḥ prāyikaiḥ krauryaśauryādibhiḥ siṃhaguṇaiḥ sampannaḥ siddhaḥ, tasya puruṣe siṃhaśabdapratyayau gauṇau bhavataḥ | nāprasiddhavastubhedasya |

- **Logic:** The "Lion-thought" regarding the boy is **Gauṇa** because the difference between a human and a lion is well-known. If the difference were not known, it would be a **Bhrānti** (delusion/mithyā), not a figurative usage.

The Distinction Between the Wise and the Ignorant

A critical distinction is made regarding who perceives the body-Self relationship as **Gauṇa** and who perceives it as **Mithyā**.

Category	Perception of the Body	Nature of the Relationship
Ajñānī (Ignorant)	Believes "I am the body."	**Mithyā** (Delusion)
Jñānī (Wise)	Uses "I" for the body in transaction while knowing the difference.	**Gauṇa** (Figurative)

The Ignorant (Ajñānī): Since the ignorant person does not know the distinction between the **Ātman** and the **Anātman** (non-self), their identification is **Mithyābhimāna** (false identification). They are not speaking figuratively; they genuinely believe they are the body.

The Wise (Jñānī): A realized soul may say, "I am going" or "I am eating." However, they do so knowing that the Self is actionless. For them, it is a **Gauṇa** usage for the sake of worldly transaction (**Vyavahāra**).

Ṭīkā: tasya tviti | bhedajñānaśūnyasya puṃsa ityarthaḥ | śabdapratyayāviti | śabdaḥ śābdabodhaścetyarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: tasya tvanyatrānyaśabdapratyayau bhrāntinimittāveva bhavataḥ, na gauṇau |

Explanation: When one thing is mistaken for another where the difference is not known (like the body for the Self in an ignorant person), it is caused by **Bhrānti** (delusion) and cannot be considered **Gauṇa**.

Mananam: Social and Linguistic Example

- **The Sky Analogy:** Just as a child and a scientist both say "The sky is blue," their underlying understanding differs. The child thinks the sky is literally blue (**Mithyā/Bhrānti**), while the scientist knows it is an optical effect but uses the word for convenience (**Gauṇa**).
- **Instruction vs. Transaction:** A Guru may use conventional language to interact with disciples, but when the time for instruction (**Upadeśa**) comes, they sharply distinguish between the two to remove the disciple's **Bhrānti**.
- **Prāmaṇya (Validity):** All worldly means of knowledge (**Pratyakṣa**, etc.) remain valid only as long as **Brahma-bodha** (Realization of Brahman) has not occurred. Once realization dawns, the "pot-ness" of the pot and the "body-ness" of the Self are sublated by the absolute reality of Brahman.

The Distinction Between Doubt (Saṃśaya) and Figurative Usage (Gauṇa) (Page 216)

संशयमूलौ तावुदाहरति - यथा मन्देति । यदा संशयमूलयोर्न गौणत्वं तदा भ्रान्तिमूलयोः किं वाच्यमित्याह - यथा वेति । अकस्मादिति । अतर्कितादृष्टादिना संस्कारोद्बोधे सतीत्यर्थः । निरुपचारेण गुणज्ञानं विनेत्यर्थः ।

यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयमित्यगृह्यमाणविशेषे पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ, यथा वा शुक्तिकायामकस्माद्रजतमिदमिति निश्चितौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ, तद्वद्देहादिसङ्घाते अहम् इति निरुपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययावात्मानात्माविवेकेनोत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम् ।

The text explores whether identification rooted in doubt or lack of clarity can ever be considered "figurative."

Ṭīkā: saṃśayamūlau tāvudāharati

Analysis of Doubt: If a thought or word is based on doubt (**Saṃśaya**), it cannot be **Gauṇa** (figurative). It remains **Mithyā** (false). For a usage to be figurative, one must have certain knowledge of both distinct objects.

Case Study: The Post and the Man (Sthāṇu-Puruṣa)

Bhāṣya: yathā mandāndhakāre sthāṇurayamityagṛhyamāṇaviśeṣe puruṣaśabdapratyayau sthāṇuviṣayau,

- **The Scenario:** In dim light (**Mandāndhakāra**), a person sees a wooden post (**Sthāṇu**) but fails to recognize its specific features. Consequently, they mistake it for a man (**Puruṣa**).

- **The Logic:** Even though the word "man" and the thought "man" are directed at a "post," this isn't a poetic metaphor. It is a straight-up error because the observer has not grasped the "post-ness" of the object.

Sudden Perception and Latent Impressions (Saṃskāra)

The text further examines the classic shell-silver analogy to show how internal impressions dictate false certainty.

Bhāṣya: yathā vā śuktikāyāmakasmādrajatamidamiti niścitau śabdapratyayau, Ṭīkā: atarkitādṛṣṭādinā saṃskārodbodhe satītyarthaḥ |

- **Akasmāt (Suddenness):** This refers to an "illogical" or "unexpected" perception.
- **Mechanism of Error:** It happens when past impressions (**Saṃskāra**) are triggered by unseen factors (**Adṛṣṭa**).
- **Absence of Sublimation (Nirupacāra):** In these moments, you don't think, "This shell is *like* silver." You think, "This *is* silver." This is **Nirupacāra** (direct/literal/non-figurative) identification. Because there is no "quality-based" comparison (**Guṇa-jñāna**), it is pure **Bhrānti** (delusion).

The "Goat-Herder" and the Scholar (Paṇḍita)

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तात्मवादिनामिति । देहात्मवादिनां तु प्रमेत्यभिमान इति भावः ।

आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पण्डितानामजाविपालानामिवाविविक्तौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः ।
तस्माद्देहादिव्यतिरिक्तात्मास्तित्ववादिनां देहादावहंप्रत्ययो मिथ्यैव, न गौणः ।

A significant point is made regarding the difference (or lack thereof) between a common laborer and a theoretical scholar when it comes to bodily identification.

Ṭīkā: dehātmavādināṃ tu prametyabhimāna iti bhāvaḥ |

Bhāṣya: tadvat dehādisaṅghāte aham iti nirupacāreṇa śabdapratyayāvātmānātmāvivekenotpadyamānau kathaṃ gauṇau śakyau vaditum | ātmānātmavivekināmapi paṇḍitānāmajāvipālānāmivāviviktau śabdapratyayau bhavataḥ | tasmāddehādivyatiriktātmāstitvavādināṃ dehādāvahaṃpratyayo mithyaiva, na gauṇaḥ

- **The Academic vs. The Realized:** Even those who are scholars (**Paṇḍita**) and can theoretically argue that "the Self is different from the body" are often no different from goat-herders (**Ajāpāla**) in practice.
- **The Reality of "I":** If a scholar says "I am tall" or "I am walking" without the constant, lived realization of the Self's distinctness, their identification is **Nirupacāra** (literal). They aren't being "figurative"; they are under the same **Aviveka** (non-discrimination) as the unlearned.

Note: As the text suggests, a scholar might have the vocabulary, but if he gets offended by a comment about his body, he's in the same boat as the goat-herder who doesn't know a lick of Sanskrit!

Except for the **Cārvāka** (materialists), most Indian darśanas claim to believe in a Self distinct from the body. However, the text argues that this "belief" is often just another layer of ego.

- **Mithyā-Abhimāna:** For those who *say* the Self is different but still feel "I am the body," this is **Mithyā** (false identification), not **Gauṇa**.
- **The Path to Brahmaniṣṭha:** Realization isn't about memorizing the book; it's about the constant **Cintana** (contemplation) that "I am the light that illumines this body, and I am not the body itself."
- **Firming the Vṛtti:** Without firming the **Brahmākāra-vṛtti** through constant practice, the knowledge remains "in the book" and not in the "being."

The State of Bodilessness (Aśarīratva) while Alive (Page 216)

तस्मान्मिथ्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात्सशरीरत्वस्य, सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषोऽशरीरत्वम् ।

The conclusion of this inquiry is the "bodilessness" status of the **Vidvān** (the Knower).

Bhāṣya: tasmānmithyāpratyayanimittatvātsaśarīratvasya, siddhaṃ jīvato'pi viduṣo'śarīratvam |

Jīvanmukti: The liberated soul is "bodiless" even while the body is alive. The ignorant person hopes to become bodiless after death; the wise person realizes they were never "with a body" to begin with.

The Scriptural Evidence: The text cites the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad** (4.4.7) regarding the "slough of a snake" (**Ahinirlvayanī**).

जीवन्मुक्तौ प्रमाणमाह - तथा चेति । तत्तत्र जीवन्मुक्तस्य देहे । यथा दृष्टान्तः अहिनिर्ल्वयनी सर्पत्वक् वल्मीकादौ प्रत्यस्ता निक्षिप्ता मृता सर्पेण त्यक्ताभिमाना वर्तते, एवमेवेदं विदुषा त्यक्ताभिमानं शरीरं तिष्ठति । अथ तथा त्वचा निर्मुक्तसर्पवदेवायं देहस्थोऽशरीरः विदुषो देहे सर्पस्य त्वचीवाभिमानाभावादशरीरत्वादमृतः प्राणितीति प्राणो जीवन्नपि ब्रह्मैव, किं तद्ब्रह्म तेजः स्वयञ्ज्योतिरानन्द एवेत्यर्थः । वस्तुतोऽचक्षुरपि बाधितचक्षुराद्यनुवृत्त्या सचक्षुरिवेत्यादि योज्यम् । इत्यनवद्यमिति । ब्रह्मात्मज्ञानान्मुक्तिलाभात्सिद्धं वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यम् , हितशासनाच्छास्त्रत्वं च निर्दोषतया स्थितमित्यर्थः ।

तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषया श्रुतिः — 'तद्यथाहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदं शरीरं शेते अथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव' (बृ. उ. ४ । ४ । ७) इति; 'सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव सवागवागिव समना अमना इव सप्राणोऽप्राण इव' इति च । स्मृतिरपि — 'स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा' (भ. गी. २ । ५४) इत्याद्या स्थितप्रज्ञस्य लक्षणान्याचक्षाणा विदुषः सर्वप्रवृत्त्यसम्बन्धं दर्शयति । तस्मान्नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम् । यस्य तु यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं नासाववगतब्रह्मात्मभाव इत्यनवद्यम् ॥

Bhāṣya: tathā ca brahmavidviṣayā śrutiḥ — 'tadyathāhinirlvayanī valmīke mṛtā pratyastā śayītaivamevedaṃ śarīraṃ śete athāyamaśarīro'mṛtaḥ prāṇo brahmaiva teja eva' (bṛ. u. 4 | 4 | 7) iti

The Analogy: Just as a snake sheds its skin and leaves it on an anthill, no longer identifying with it, the Knower of Brahman resides in the body but remains **Aśarīra** (bodiless), immortal, as Brahman, as pure Light (**Tejas**).

The text emphasizes that for a **Jñānī**, the state of being "disembodied" is eternal. The seeker must realize that the **Ātman** is forever free from the body and its associated afflictions.

- **Definition for the Ignorant:** The **Ajñānī** (ignorant) needs to understand that they are eternally disembodied.
- **Attributes of the Body:** Hunger, thirst, pleasure, pain, attachment (**Rāga**), aversion (**Dveṣa**), desire (**Kāma**), and anger (**Krodha**) belong to the body/mind complex and do not touch the **Ātman**.

The Analogy of the Snake's Slough

The **Bhāṣya** provides a profound Vedic illustration (from the **Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad**) to explain the state of a **Jñānī** living in a body.

- Just as a snake sheds its skin (**Ahinirlvayanī**) on an anthill (**Valmīka**), and once cast off (**Pratyastā**), the snake no longer identifies with it or cares for it, so too is the body of a **Jñānī**.
- **Aśarīratvam Defined:** True disembodiedness is not the physical dropping of the body (which only happens when **Prārabdha Karma** ends) but the complete cessation of "I-ness" (**Aham-buddhi**) in the body.
- **The State of the Knower:** The liberated soul is **Aśarīra** (bodiless), **Amṛta** (immortal), and **Prāṇa** (the vital force/Brahman itself).

The **Ṭīkā** provides precise linguistic and philosophical definitions for the terms used in the **Bhāṣya**.

Ṭīkā: yathā dṛṣṭāntaḥ ahinirlvayanī sarpatvak valmīkādau pratyastā nikṣiptā mṛtā sarpeṇa tyaktābhimānā vartate, evamevedaṃ viduṣā tyaktābhimānaṃ śarīraṃ tiṣṭhati |

- **Ahinirlvayanī:** Refers to **Sarpa-tvak** (the skin of the snake).
- **Mṛtā/Pratyastā:** The skin is "dead" or "discarded" because the snake has abandoned all identification (**Tyaktābhimāna**) with it.
- **Application to the Knower:** Similarly, the body of the **Vidvān** (knower) is "discarded" in the sense that the ego-attachment has been severed. The body continues to exist in the eyes of the world due to **Prārabdha**, but for the **Jñānī**, it is as irrelevant as the discarded snake skin.

The Conduct and Perception of a Jñānī

Ṭīkā: atha tathā tvacā nirmuktasarpavadevāyaṃ dehastho'śarīraḥ viduṣo dehe sarpasya tvacīvābhimānābhāvādaśarīratvādamṛtaḥ prāṇitīti prāṇo jīvannapi brahmaiva, kiṃ

tadbrahma tejaḥ svayañjyotirānanda evetyarthaḥ | vastuto'cakṣurapi bādhitacakṣurādyanuvṛtyā sacakṣurivetyādi yojyam |

A significant distinction is made between how a **Jñānī** perceives themselves versus how the world perceives them.

- **Worldly Interaction:** If one has the desire that "others should know I am a **Jñānī**," they are still an **Ajñānī**. The knower of the Truth has no such ego.
- **The Paradox of Action:** Even while performing activities like eating or teaching, the **Jñānī** remains detached.
    - **Bhāṣya** highlights that while the **Jñānī** might wear clothes for the cold or eat when hungry, there eventually comes a stage where they become totally indifferent to the body's maintenance.
- **Subtle vs. Gross Body:** While the snake skin represents the gross body (**Sthūla Śarīra**), the **Jñānī** is free from all three bodies (Gross, Subtle, and Causal). If one is free from the gross body but still identifies with the subtle body (**Sūkṣma Śarīra**), they will still experience the pain of insult or desire.

Scriptural Evidence for the Knower's State

The discourse links **Upaniṣadic** statements with the **Bhagavad Gītā** to define the **Sthitaprajña** (one steady in wisdom).

The "As If" Condition

Bhāṣya: sacakṣuracakṣuriva sakarṇo'karṇa iva savāgavāgiva samanā amanā iva saprāṇo'prāṇa iva’ iti ca |

Explanation: The **Jñānī** is described through paradoxes:

- **Achakṣuḥ** (without eyes) yet **Sachakṣuriva** (as if having eyes).
- **Amanā** (without mind) yet **Samanā** (as if having a mind).
- This indicates that while the organs function, the **Ātman** remains the non-doer. The **Ṭīkā** notes that these organs are "sublated" (**Bādhita**) by knowledge.

The Authority of Smṛti

Bhāṣya: smṛtirapi — ‘sthitaprajñasya kā bhāṣā’ (bha. gī. 2 | 54) ityādyā sthitaprajñasya lakṣaṇānyācakṣāṇā viduṣaḥ sarvapravṛttyasambandhaṃ darśayati |

The **Bhāṣya** refers to the **Smṛti** (specifically the **Gītā**) to describe the **Sthitaprajña Lakṣaṇa** (characteristics of the stable-minded). These descriptions show that the knower has no connection with worldly tendencies (**Pravṛtti**).

The essence of being a **Sthitaprajña** is not about being a "special person" performing actions, but about a shift in identity.

- **Not an Individual Actor**: A **Sthitaprajña** is not defined as a specific individual who is "doing" something.
- **The Real Meaning**: The true meaning of **Sthitaprajña** is **Brahman** itself.
- **The Realization**: Their fundamental understanding is "I am **Brahman**" (**Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi**). Because of this realization, there is no inherent connection to any **Pravṛtti** (activity).

The Concept of Bādhita-anuvṛtti (Sublated Persistence)

If a knower of **Brahman** has no connection to action, why do they appear to act? The commentary explains this through the lens of appearance versus reality.

- **External Appearance**: Any activity that is seen to be performed by a **Brahmavid** is merely a **Bāhya-pravṛtti** (external movement).
- **The Role of Ego**: To an observer, it might look like the wise one has an "ego" or "pride" regarding their actions, but this is a misconception.
- **Sublated Persistence**: These visible actions are categorized as **Bādhita-anuvṛtti** (the persistence of the sublated).
  Note: Just as a person might still see a mirage even after knowing there is no water, or a burnt rope retains its shape but cannot bind anything, the "actions" of a **Sthitaprajña** continue due to past momentum (**Prārabdha**) but are "sublated" (negated) by the knowledge of **Brahman**. They are appearances without the reality of "doership."

Refutation of Continued Worldliness (Saṃsāritva)

The opponent argues that even after studying **Vedānta**, a person remains a **Saṃsārī** (worldly being) because we see them engaging in **Manana** (reflection) and **Nididhyāsana** (meditation), which suggests that knowledge is a "work" or a "command" (**Vidhi**).

Bhāṣya: tasmānnāvagatabrahmātmabhāvasya yathāpūrvaṃ saṃsāritvam |

Once the identity between **Brahman** and the **Ātman** has been realized (**avagata-brahmātma-bhāva**), the individual no longer possesses the same worldly nature or state of bondage (**saṃsāritva**) that they had previously. The transition is ontological and absolute.

Bhāṣya: yasya tu yathāpūrvaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ nāsāvavagatabrahmātmabhāva ityanavadyam ||

If a person continues to behave and feel like a worldly being (**saṃsārī**) in all respects—attached to objects and subject to suffering—it is simply because they have *not* actually realized the state of **Brahman**. This statement is faultless (**anavadyam**) because it resolves the contradiction: if there is **saṃsāra**, there is no **jñāna** (knowledge); if there is **jñāna**, there is no **saṃsāra**.

Anavadyam translates to **nirduṣṭa**, meaning "faultless" or "without any defect."

Ṭīkā: brahmātmajñānān-muktilābhāt siddhaṃ vedāntānāṃ prāmāṇyam , hitaśāsanācchāstratvaṃ ca nirdoṣatayā sthitamityarthaḥ |

Because the knowledge of the identity of **Brahman** and **Ātman** leads directly to the attainment of **Mukti** (liberation), the status of **Vedānta** as a valid and authoritative source of knowledge (**prāmāṇya**) is firmly established.

A text is called **Śāstra** because it provides **śāsana** (instruction/governance) regarding one's **hita** (true welfare or ultimate good).

That which instructs and teaches what is beneficial is **Śāstra**. Just as the **Śāstra** is described as **nirduṣṭa** (flawless), the **Ācārya** (teacher) is also established as **nirduṣṭa**, serving as a perfect conduit for this liberating knowledge.

The Correction:

1. **Change in Being:** If one is still a **Saṃsārī** as before, they have simply **not understood** Brahman (**Na asau avagata-brahmātma-bhāvaḥ**).
2. **Manana and Nididhyāsana:** These are not separate commands to "do" something to get Brahman. They are auxiliaries (**Aṅga**) to **Śravaṇa** (hearing/authority) to remove doubts and erroneous understandings.
3. **Non-utility of Known Brahman:** A **Vidhi** (injunction) exists for something that needs to be achieved or used. Since Brahman is already the self and is the final fruit, there is no further "use" (**Viniyoga**) for it after it is known.

Mananam: The Nature of Knowledge and Ignorance

A crucial technical point is raised regarding how a mental modification (**Vṛtti**) can destroy ignorance.

The Problem: Every cognitive process—including the "I am Brahman" thought (**Brahmākāra-vṛtti**) and the physical body—exists within the sphere of **Avidyā**. How can a cause be destroyed by its own effect?

The Solution: It is not the mere **Vṛtti** (which is inert/material) that destroys ignorance, but the **Caitanya** (Consciousness) reflected in or limited by that specific **Vṛtti** (**Vṛtti-avacchinna-caitanya**).

Analogy of the Limiter (Avacchedaka):

- To destroy ignorance about a "Pot," you need consciousness channeled through a "Pot-shaped thought-wave" toward that specific ignorance.
- To destroy the root ignorance (**Mūlāvidyā**), you need the **Brahmākāra-vṛtti**.

Jñānam vs. Karma: **Karma** is born in **Avidyā** and keeps one within it. **Jñānam** is born in **Avidyā** but acts like a fire that consumes its own fuel (ignorance) and then itself subsides.

The Opponent's Argument: Brahman as a Subsidiary to Injunctions (Page 218)

ब्रह्मज्ञानमुद्दिश्य श्रवणवन्मननिदिध्यासनयोरप्यवान्तरवाक्यभेदेन विध्यङ्गीकारान्न ब्रह्मणो विधिशेषत्वमुद्देश्यज्ञानलभ्यतया प्राधान्यादित्याह - नेति । श्रवणं ज्ञानकरणवेदान्तगोचरत्वात्प्रधानम् , मननिदिध्यासनयोः प्रमेयगोचरत्वात्तदङ्गत्वम् , नियमादृष्टस्य ज्ञान उपयोगः सर्वापेक्षान्यायादिति मन्तव्यम् । तर्हि ज्ञाने विधिः किमिति त्यक्तः, तत्राह - यदि हीति । यदि ज्ञाने विधिमङ्गीकृत्य वेदान्तैरवगतं ब्रह्म विधेयज्ञाने कर्मकारकत्वेन विनियुज्येत तदा विधिशेषत्वं स्यात् । न त्ववगतस्य विनियुक्तत्वमस्ति, प्राप्तावगत्या फललाभे विध्ययोगादित्यर्थः ।

यत्पुनरुक्तं श्रवणात्पराचीनयोर्मननिदिध्यासनयोर्दर्शनाद्विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः, न स्वरूपपर्यवसायित्वमिति, तन्न । श्रवणवदवगत्यर्थत्वान्मननिदिध्यासनयोः । यदि ह्यवगतं ब्रह्मान्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत्तदा विधिशेषत्वम् । न तु तदस्ति, मननिदिध्यासनयोरपि श्रवणवदवगत्यर्थत्वात् ।

The **Pūrva Pakṣa** (opponent) argues that the knowledge of **Brahman** is not the final end but is merely a subsidiary to the actions of reflection and meditation.

Bhāṣya: yatpunaruktaṃ śravaṇāt parācīnayoḥ manananididhyāsanayoḥ darśanādvidhiśeṣatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ, na svarūpaparyavasāyitvam iti

The opponent claims that because we see commands for reflection (**Mantavyaḥ**) and meditation (**Nididhyāsitavyaḥ**) occurring after hearing (**Śravaṇa**), **Brahman** is merely a subsidiary to an injunction (**Vidhi-śeṣa**). Therefore, the purpose of **Vedānta** is not to establish the nature of **Brahman** itself, but to provide an object for the act of meditation.

The opponent's logic is that while **Śravaṇa** gives a conceptual understanding, the actual "attainment" or "upāsanā-like" practice of **Manana** and **Nididhyāsana** remains to be done. Thus, knowledge of **Brahman** is not meant for culminating in the realization of Its own true nature (**svarūpa-paryavasāyitvam**).

The Purpose of Manana and Nididhyāsana

The response clarifies that these two are not separate "actions" to attain something new, but are limbs of the same process of knowledge.

Ṭīkā: brahmajñānam uddiśya śravaṇavanmanananididhyāsanayoḥ api avāntaravākyabhedena vidhi aṅgīkārāt na brahmaṇo vidhiśeṣatvam uddeśyajñānalabhyatayā prādhānyāt

By accepting injunctions in the form of **avāntara-vākya** (subsidiary sentences) for **Śravaṇa**, **Manana**, and **Nididhyāsana** with the goal of **Brahma-jñāna**, **Brahman** does not become subsidiary to a command. The knowledge is the primary goal (**prādhānya**).

- **Mahāvākya vs. Avāntara-vākya:** The "Great Sentences" (like ***Tat Tvam Asi*****)** provide the direct identity. Sentences like "He is to be reflected upon" **(mantavyaḥ)** are **avāntara-vākya** (intermediary sentences) that support the primary realization.
- **Cognitive Unity**: Unlike ritualistic actions where a mantra is for knowledge and the performance of a sacrifice is for attainment (Heaven), here, **Śravaṇa**, **Manana**, and **Nididhyāsana** are all for the single purpose of **Jñānam** (knowledge/realization).

Ṭīkā: śravaṇaṃ jñānakaraṇavedāntagocaratvātpradhānam , mananananididhyāsanayoḥ prameyagocaratvāttadaṅgatvam ,

Śravaṇa is the primary limb (**Aṅgī**) and the instrument of valid knowledge (**Pramā-karaṇa**) regarding the **Vedāntic** texts. **Manana** and **Nididhyāsana** are subsidiary limbs (**Aṅga**) that focus on the object of knowledge (**Prameya**).

Types of Injunctions and Restrictive Rules (Niyama-vidhi)

The text explores why certain "commands" appear in the Upanishads if **Brahman** is already accomplished.

Ṭīkā: **niyamādṛṣṭasya jñāna upayogaḥ sarvāpekṣānyāyāditi mantavyam |**

The merit (**Adṛṣṭa**) generated by following a **Niyama-vidhi** (restrictive rule) is useful for knowledge, according to the **Sarvāpekṣā** logic (The "Requirement of All" principle).

- **Niyama-vidhi**: This is not a command to do something entirely new (**Apūrva-vidhi**), but a restriction. For example, "One should hear of the Self *only* through **Vedāntic** sentences." This generates a specific spiritual merit (**Niyamādṛṣṭa**) that aids in **Citta-śuddhi** (purification of the mind).
- **Sacrificial Acts**: Rituals like **Yajña**, **Dāna**, and **Tapas** (sacrifice, charity, penance) are used for the desire to know (**Vividiṣā**). They are "external aids" compared to the "internal aids" of **Manana** and **Nididhyāsana**.

Ṭīkā: tarhi jñāne vidhiḥ kimiti tyaktaḥ, tatrāha - yadi hīti | yadi jñāne vidhimaṅgīkṛtya vedāntairavagataṃ brahma vidheyajñāne karmakārakatvena viniyujyeta tadā vidhiśeṣatvaṃ syāt | na tvavagatasya viniyuktatvamasti, prāptāvagatyā phalalābhe vidhyayogādityarthaḥ |

Bhāṣya: yadi hyavagataṃ brahmānyatra viniyujyeta, bhavettadā vidhiśeṣatvam | na tu tadasti, mananānididhyāsanayorapi śravaṇavadavagatyarthatvāt |
Hypothetical Objection: Suppose we treat **Brahma-jñāna** as something enjoined, and suppose further that **Brahman** (already known from **Vedānta** sentences) is used in that enjoined knowledge as some **kāraka** (like an object or goal of an act). In that case **Brahman** would become a **vidhi-śeṣa**: something that exists as a remainder of, and subordinate to, a command.

Bhagavāna Ādi Śaṅkarācārya's response: For something already known and thereby obtained (**avagata, prāpta**), there is no further "assignment" possible; you cannot still use **vidhi** to connect it to an action. Once knowledge has delivered its fruit (**mokṣa**, the cessation of ignorance), **vidhi** loses relevance: there is no more place for an injunction about that same **Brahman** or that same knowledge.

Final Establishment: The Independence of the Science of Brahman

तस्मात् विध्यसम्भवात् । अतः शेषत्वासम्भवात् । सत्यादिवाक्यैर्लब्धज्ञानेनाज्ञाननिवृत्तिरूपफललाभे सतीत्यर्थः । सूत्रं योजयति - स्वतन्त्रमिति । एवं च सतीति । चोऽवधारणे ।

तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः सम्भवतीत्यतः स्वतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकं वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयादिति सिद्धम् । एवं च सति 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति तद्विषयः पृथक्शास्त्रारम्भ उपपद्यते ।

The final section justifies why a separate scripture (**Brahma-jñāna-śāstra**) is necessary, distinct from the study of rituals (**Dharma-jñāna**).

Bhāṣya: tasmānna pratipattividhiviṣayatayā śāstrapramāṇakatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ sambhavati

Therefore, it is not possible that **Brahman** is known by the scripture only as a subject of a command for meditation.

Ṭīkā: tasmāt vidhyasambhavāt | ataḥ śeṣatvāsambhavāt |

Because an injunction is impossible here, being a subsidiary to such an injunction is also impossible.

Bhāṣya: svatantrameva brahma śāstrapramāṇakaṃ vedāntavākyasamanvayāditi siddham |

It is established that **Brahman** is known independently through the scripture as its sole authority, owing to the consistent interpretation (**Samanvaya**) of the **Vedāntic** sentences.

Conclusion on the Separate Science:

Bhāṣya: evaṃ ca sati 'athāto brahmajijñāsā' iti tadviṣayaḥ pṛthakśāstrārambha upapadyate |

This being the case, the commencement of a separate scriptural text starting with the aphorism "Now, therefore, the inquiry into **Brahman**" is justified. Because **Brahman** is a "known object" (**Prameya**) that is fundamentally different from **Dharma** (ritual/merit), a separate investigation is required. This proves that the work of Sage **Vyāsa** is valid and necessary for the attainment of liberation.

Explanation: Because **Brahman** is not a supplement to actions, nor to the injunctions of worship (**upāsanā-vidhi**), and because all Vedantic statements find their ultimate synthesis (**samanvaya**) in **Brahman** alone, the commencement of a separate scripture—**Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā**—is logical and justified. **Brahman** is **Śāstra-pramāṇakam** (known only through the authority of scripture).

उक्तरीत्या ब्रह्मणः स्वातन्त्र्ये सत्येव भगवतो व्यासस्य पृथक्शास्त्रकृतिर्युक्ता, धर्मविलक्षणप्रमेयलाभात् । वेदान्तानां कार्यपरत्वे तु प्रमेयाभेदान्न युक्तेत्यर्थः ।

Ṭīkā: uktarītyā brahmaṇaḥ svātantrye satyeva bhagavato vyāsasya pṛthakśāstrakṛtiryuktā, dharmavilakṣaṇaprameyalābhāt | vedāntānāṃ kāryaparatve tu prameyābhedānna yuktetyarthaḥ |

Explanation: The **Ṭīkā** emphasizes that **Brahman** is an entity (**prameya**) entirely distinct from **Dharma**. If **Vedānta** were merely an extension of action, there would be no difference between the inquiry into **Dharma** and the inquiry into **Brahman**.

Refutation of Brahman as a "Mental Action"

ननु मानसधर्मविचारार्थं पृथगारम्भ इत्याशङ्क्याह - आरभ्यमाणं चेति । अथ बाह्यसाधनधर्मविचारानन्तरम् । अतो बाह्यधर्मस्य शुद्धिद्वारा मानसोपासनाधर्महेतुत्वात्परिशिष्टो मानसधर्मो जिज्ञास्य इति सूत्रं स्यादिति । अत्र दृष्टान्तमाह - अथेति । तृतीयाध्याये श्रुत्यादिभिः शेषशेषित्वनिर्णयानन्तरं शेषिणा शेषस्य प्रयोगसम्भवात्कः क्रतुशेषः को वा पुरुषशेषः इति विज्ञास्यत इत्यर्थः । एवमारभ्येत । नत्वारब्धम् , तस्मादवान्तरधर्मार्थमारम्भ इत्ययुक्तमिति भावः । स्वमते सूत्रानुगुण्यमस्तीत्याह - ब्रह्मेति ।

एवं च सति 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति तद्विषयः पृथक्शास्त्रारम्भ उपपद्यते । प्रतिपत्तिविधिपरत्वे हि 'अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा' इत्येवारब्धत्वान्न पृथक्शास्त्रमारभ्येत । आरभ्यमाणं चैवमारभ्येत — अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासेति,

‘अथातः क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयोर्जिज्ञासा’ (जै. सू. ४ । १। १) इतिवत् । ब्रह्मात्मैक्यावगतिस्त्वप्रतिज्ञातेति तदर्थो युक्तः शास्त्रारम्भः — ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति ।

The **Siddhantapakṣa** (proponent) argues that if the inquiry into **Brahman** is just an inquiry into a mental duty or meditation, it should have been included in the inquiry into **Dharma,** a separate scriptural text would not have been begun.

Bhāṣya: evaṃ ca sati ‘athāto brahmajijñāsā’ iti tadviṣayaḥ pṛthakśāstrārambha upapadyate | pratipattividhiparatve hi ‘athāto dharmajijñāsā’ ityevārabdhatvānna pṛthakśāstramārabhyeta |

Ṭīkā: vedāntānāṃ kāryaparatve tu prameyābhedānna yuktetyarthaḥ | nanu mānasadharmavicārārthaṃ pṛthagārambha ityāśaṅkyāha - ārabhyamāṇaṃ ceti |

The **Pūrvapakṣa** (opponent) argues that even if **Brahman** is not a physical action, it could be a **Mānasa-dharma** (mental duty/meditation), which should still fall under **Dharma**.

Siddantin replies:

- **Pratipatti-vidhi:** If **Brahman** were merely a subject of an injunction for realization or meditation (**pratipatti-vidhi**), it would have been initiated under the original inquiry into **Dharma** (**Athāto Dharma Jijñāsā**).
- **Synthesis of Injunctions:** Everything that falls under the category of an injunction (**vidhi**) was already synthesized in the inquiry into **Dharma**. Thus, no separate scripture would have been started.
- **Hypothetical Sūtra Structure:** If **Brahman** was simply the remaining "mental" part of ritual, the **Sūtra** would have been titled: "Now, therefore, the inquiry into the remaining **Dharma**."

Bhāṣya: ārabhyamāṇaṃ caivamārabhyeta — athātaḥ pariśiṣṭadharmajijñāseti, ‘athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthayorjijñāsā’ (jai. sū. 4 | 1| 1) itivat |

Comparison with Jaimini’s Style: In **Mīmāṃsā**, when a new but related topic starts (like in the fourth chapter), it is framed as a continuation:

- **Sūtra Style**: **Athāto kratvartha puruṣārthayorjijñāsā** — "Now the inquiry into the purpose of sacrifice and the purpose of man."

The Vyāsa Counter-Argument: Since **Bhagavān Vedavyāsa** did not use the word **pariśiṣṭa** (remainder) or frame it as a continuation, it is clear that **Brahma-vidyā** is not an **avāntara-dharma** (intermediate or secondary duty).

The **bhāṣya** cites the example of the fourth chapter of **Mīmāṃsā**, which begins with an inquiry into the "Purpose of the Sacrifice and the Purpose of Man" (**Athātaḥ Kratvārtha**

Puruṣārthayoḥ...). If **Brahman** was a supplement, a similar naming convention would have been followed. Since it was not, **Brahman** is a distinct subject.

The Sequence of Purification and Inquiry

Ṭīkā: atha bāhyasādhanadharmavicārānantaram | ato bāhyadharmasya śuddhidvārā mānasopāsanādharmahetutvātpariśiṣṭo mānasadharmo jijñāsya iti sūtraṃ syāditi | atra dṛṣṭāntamāha - atheti | tṛtīyādhyāye śrutyādibhiḥ śeṣaśeṣitvanirṇayānantaraṃ śeṣiṇā śeṣasya prayogasambhavātkaḥ kratuśeṣaḥ ko vā puruṣaśeṣaḥ iti vijñāsyata ityarthaḥ | evamārabhyeta | natvārabdham , tasmādavāntaradharmārthamārambha ityayuktamiti bhāvaḥ |

The **Ṭīkā** elaborates on why the word **atha** (now) implies a sequence after the purification of the mind.

- **Bāhya-dharma vs. Mānasa-upāsanā:** External rituals (**bāhya-dharma**) serve as the means for purification (**śuddhi**).
- Once the seeker has performed external duties and attained mental purity, they become eligible for **Mānasa-upāsanā** (mental meditation) and eventually **Brahma-jijñāsā**.
- **Mīmāṃsā Precedent:** Reference is made to the third chapter of **Mīmāṃsā**, which deals with **Śeṣa-śeṣitva** (the relationship between the principal and the subordinate). After deciding what is subordinate to what, the inquiry naturally moves to who uses those subordinates (**Kratu** or **Puruṣa**). If **Brahman** were such a subordinate, it would follow that logical flow—but it does not.

Independent Sovereignty of the Teacher

जैमिनिना ब्रह्म न विचारितमिति तज्जिज्ञास्यत्वसूत्रणं युक्तमित्यर्थः । वेदान्तार्थश्चेदद्वैतं तर्हि द्वैतसापेक्षविध्यादीनां का गतिरित्याशङ्क्य ज्ञानात्प्रागेव तेषां प्रामाण्यं न पश्चादित्याह - तस्मादिति । ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयप्रमातृबाधकत्वादित्यर्थः ।

तस्मात् अहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि चेतराणि प्रमाणानि । न ह्यहेयानुपादेयाद्वैतात्मावगतौ , निर्विषयाण्यप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्तीति ।

Ṭīkā: jaimininā brahma na vicāritamiti tajjijñāsyatvasūtraṇaṃ yuktamityarthaḥ |

A point was raised regarding the timeline of **Jaimini** (the student) writing his **Sūtras** before **Vyāsa** (the teacher).

- **Intentional Omission: Jaimini** did not discuss **Brahman** (**Jaimininā brahma na vicāritam**).
- **Teacher's Grace:** It is likely **Jaimini** deliberately left the highest subject (**Vedānta**) for his teacher, **Vedavyāsa**, to address, recognizing that the teacher's exposition would carry more weight and provide ultimate liberation.
- **Non-Overlapping Fields:** Because **Brahman** was not discussed in the **Pūrva Mīmāṃsā**, the **Sūtra** initiating **Brahma-jijñāsā** is both unique and necessary.

Ṭīkā: vedāntārthaścedadvaitaṃ tarhi dvaitasāpekṣavidhyādīnāṃ kā gatirityāśaṅkya jñānātprāgeva teṣāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ na paścādityāha

Bhāṣya: tasmāt ahaṃ brahmāsmītyetadavasānā eva sarve vidhayaḥ sarvāṇi cetarāṇi pramāṇāni |

If **Vedānta** is purely non-dual (**Advaita**), what happens to all the dualistic rules in the **Vedas**? The answer lies in the timeline of knowledge.

- **Vedāntārtha** (The meaning of **Vedānta**): Defined via the **Samāsa-vigraha** as **Vedāntasya arthaḥ** or **Vedāntānām arthaḥ**.
- **Temporal Authority:** Dualistic injunctions (**Dvaita-sāpekṣa vidhi**) are valid **before** the dawn of knowledge.
- **Ajñāna-kāla (The Era of Ignorance):** As long as one is in the state of ignorance (**ajñāna**), all Vedic rituals and rules are fully authoritative and must be followed. They are meant for the **ajñānī** (the one who perceives separation).

Ṭīkā: jñānasya prameyapramātṛbādhakatvādityarthaḥ |

The moment the realization "**Aham Brahmāsmi**" —"I am **Brahman**"—dawns, all worldly and Vedic means of knowledge (**pramāṇa**) reach their finality. They cease to have authority because their purpose (revealing the truth to a separate knower) has been fulfilled.

- **The Sublation of the Trio:** Knowledge acts as a sublater (**bādhaka**) of:
    1. **Prameya** (The object of knowledge).
    2. **Pramātṛ** (The knower/ego).
    3. **Pramāṇa** (The means of knowing).

Bhāṣya: na hyaheyānupādeyādvaitātmāvagatau , nirviṣayāṇyapramātṛkāṇi ca pramāṇāni bhavitumarhantīti |

Explanation: When the non-dual **Ātman** is realized, the means of knowledge become "objectless" (**nirviṣaya**) because there is no "other" to be known. The very status of being a "knower" (**pramātṛtva**) is sublated.

The Three Verses of Sūndara Pāṇḍya (Page 221)

The discussion concludes with three specific verses attributed to **Sundara Pāṇḍya**, an ancient **Ācārya** who may have been a **Pāṇḍya** King or a scholar in his court. These verses serve as a concluding summary (*upasaṃhāra*) of the preceding philosophical arguments.

Verse 1: Sublation of the Secondary and False Selves

ब्रह्म न कार्यशेषः, तद्बोधात्प्रागेव सर्वव्यवहार इत्यत्र ब्रह्मविदां गाथामुदाहरति - अपिचेति । सदबाधितं ब्रह्म पूर्वमात्मा विषयानादत्त इति सर्वसाक्ष्यहमित्येवंबोधे जाते सति पुत्रदेहादेः सत्ताबाधनात् मायामात्रत्वनिश्चयात्पुत्रदारादिभिरहमिति

स्वीयदुःखसुखभावत्वगुणयोगाद्गौणात्माभिमानस्य नरोऽहं कर्ता मूढ इति मिथ्यात्माभिमानस्य च सर्वव्यवहारहेतोरसत्वे कार्यं विधिनिषेधादिव्यवहारः कथं भवेत् , हेत्वभावान्न कथञ्चिद्भवेदित्यर्थः ।

अपि चाहुः —

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् ।
सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत् ॥

gauṇamithyātmano'sattve putradehādibādhanāt |
sadbrahmātmāhamityevaṃ bodhe kāryaṃ kathaṃ bhavet ||

Ṭīkā: sadabādhitaṃ brahma pūrvamātmā viṣayānādatta iti sarvasākṣyahamityevaṃbodhe jāte sati putradehādeḥ sattābādhanāt māyāmātratvaniścayātputradārādibhirahamiti svīyaduḥkhasukhabhāvatvaguṇayogādgauṇātmābhimānasya naro'haṃ kartā mūḍha iti mithyātmābhimānasya ca sarvavyavahārahetorasatve kāryaṃ vidhiniṣedhādivyavahāraḥ kathaṃ bhavet , hetvabhāvānna kathañcidbhaveditytarthaḥ |

Explanation:

- **Gauṇa-ātmā** (Secondary Self): Feeling one's son is oneself.
- **Mithyā-ātmā** (False Self): Identifying the body as the self. Once the realization "**Sadbrahma Ātmā Aham**" (I am the Reality, **Brahman**) arises, the attachments to the son and the body are sublated. One no longer suffers due to the joys or sorrows of the body or family.
- The term **Sat** refers to that which is **Abādhita** (never sublated or contradicted by time). The term **Brahma** signifies that which is **Pūrṇam** (infinite, full and complete).
- **The Witnessing Self:** The **Ātmā** is the one who perceives or "takes in" the objects (**Viṣayān ādatte**). Realization consists of the firm conviction: "I am the Witness of all (**Sarva-sākṣī Aham**)."
- **The Nature of Illusion:** Once this realization dawns, the reality of the son (**Putra**), the body (**Deha**), and even the spouse (**Dāra**) is sublated. They are determined to be **Māyā-mātra**—mere illusions, mental constructs, or errors of identification.
- **The Burden of Attachment:** Identification with the **Gauṇa-ātmā** (wife and children) leads to the transfer of emotions. Their happiness becomes "my" happiness; their suffering becomes "my" suffering (**Svīya-duḥkha-sukha-bhāktva**).
- **The Illusion of Agency:** Identification with the **Mithyā-ātmā** (the body) creates the notions of "I am a human," "I am the doer (**Kartā**)," or "I am ignorant (**Mūḍha**)."
- **The Cessation of Activity:** These two forms of "Self-identification" are the sole causes (**Hetu**) of all worldly behavior and religious injunctions. If these causes are revealed to be **Asat** (unreal), then the effects—namely, **Vidhi** (scriptural mandates) and **Niṣedha** (prohibitions)—can no longer apply. Without the "doer," no "doing" is possible.

Verse 2: Status of the Knower exists only before Knowledge

नन्वहं ब्रह्मेति बोधो बाधितः, अहमर्थस्य प्रमातुः ब्रह्मत्वायोगादित्याशङ्क्य प्रमातृत्वस्याज्ञानविलसितान्तःकरणतादात्म्यकृतत्वान्न बाध इत्याह - अन्वेष्टव्येति । 'य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकः सोऽन्वेष्टव्य' इति श्रुतेः ज्ञातव्यपरमात्मविज्ञानात्प्रागेवाज्ञानाच्चिद्धातोरात्मानः प्रमातृत्वं प्रमातैव ज्ञातः सन् पाप्मरागद्वेषमरणविवर्जितः परमात्मा स्यादित्यर्थः ।

अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात्प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।
अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥

anveṣṭavyātmavijñānātprākpramātṛtvamātmanaḥ |
anviṣṭaḥ syātpramātaiva pāpmadoṣādivarjitaḥ ||

Ṭīkā: nanvahaṃ brahmeti bodho bādhitaḥ, ahamarthasya pramātuḥ brahmatvāyogādityāśaṅkya pramātṛtvasyājñānavilasitāntaḥkaraṇatādātmyakṛtatvānna bādha ityāha

Explanation: The opponent argues that the statement "I am Brahman" is logically contradicted (**Bādhita**). Their reasoning is:

- The "I" (**Aham-artha**) refers to the **Pramātā** (the finite knower/subject).
- The **Pramātā** is by definition limited (**Parichinna**), whereas **Brahman** is infinite and unlimited.
- Therefore, a finite knower cannot be the infinite Brahman. If the "I" is the subject of knowledge, it cannot be the object of such a vast identity.

Siddhāntin's Explanation: The "Knower" is not the ultimate reality of the Self; it is a product of **Ajñāna** (Ignorance).

- **Vilasita (Cid-vilāsa):** The term **Vilasita** (or **Vilāsa**) here refers to the "play" or "effect/work" (**Kārya**) of ignorance. Just as a wave is a "play" of the ocean, the **Pramātā** is a play of ignorance.
- **Tādātmyakṛta:** The status of being a knower arises only because of the Self's false identification (**Tādātmya**) with the **Antaḥkaraṇa** (the internal organ/mind).
- **Resolution:** Once the ignorance is removed, the identification with the mind vanishes. When the mind-identification is gone, the "Knower" (the limited "I") disappears, leaving only the pure, non-dual **Brahman**. Thus, the realization is not contradicted (**bādhita**); rather, the false "I" is sublated to reveal the true "I."

This verse clarifies the timeline of "Knowership":

1. **Pre-Realization:** Before the knowledge of the "Self to be sought" (**Anveṣṭavya-ātmā**), the Self is perceived as a **Pramātā** (a limited knower/agent).
2. **Post-Realization:** Once the Self is "found" or "known" (**Anviṣṭa**), that very entity which appeared as a flawed **Pramātā** is revealed to be the Self, free from all sins and defects.

The commentary refers to the **Prajāpati Vidyā** in the 8th Chapter of the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad**.

Ṭīkā: ‘ya ātmāpahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyurviśokaḥ so'nveṣṭavya’ iti śruteḥ

Qualities of the Atman mentioned in the Śruti:

- **Apahata-pāpmā:** Free from sin.
- **Vijara / Vimṛtyu:** Beyond old age and death.
- **Viśoka:** Beyond grief.
- **Vijighatsa / Apipāsa:** Beyond hunger and thirst (the six physiological/psychological urges or **Ṣaḍ-ūrmi**).
- **Satya-kāma / Satya-saṃkalpa:** Of true desire and true resolve.

Ṭīkā: jñātavyaparamātmavijñānātprāgevājñānācciddhātorātmānaḥ pramātṛtvaṃ pramātaiva jñātaḥ san pāpmarāgadveṣamaraṇavivarjitaḥ paramātmā syādityarthaḥ |

Key Points:

- **Before Knowledge:** The **Cid-dhātu** (the element of Consciousness) appears as the **Pramātā** due to **Ajñāna** (Ignorance).
- **After Knowledge:** When that same "Knower" is truly understood through the lens of **Brahma-vidyā**, it is realized as the **Paramātmā**.
- **The Result:** All previous defects associated with the **Pramātā**—such as **Pāpa** (sin), **Rāga** (attachment), **Dveṣa** (aversion), and **Maraṇa** (death)—are discarded, for they belonged only to the internal organ (**Antaḥkaraṇa**) and never to the true Self.

The status of being a knower (**pramātṛtva**) belongs to the **Ātman** only before the realization of the sought-after **Ātman** (**anveṣṭavya-ātmā**). Once realized, the **Ātman** is seen as free from all sins, decay, and death, as described in the **Chāndogya Upaniṣad**.

Verse 3: Empirical vs. Absolute Validity

प्रमातृत्वस्य कल्पितत्वे तदाश्रितानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं कथमित्यत आह - देहेति । यथा देहात्मत्वप्रत्ययः कल्पितो भ्रमोऽपि व्यवहाराङ्गतया मानत्वेनेष्यते वैदिकैः, तद्वल्लौकिकमध्यक्षादिकमात्मबोधावधि व्यवहारकाले बाधाभावात् व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यमिष्यताम् , वेदान्तानां तु कालत्रयाबाध्यबोधित्वात्तत्त्वावेदकं प्रामाण्यमिति तुशब्दार्थः । आऽऽत्मनिश्चयात् । आऽऽत्मनिश्चयादित्याङ्मर्यादायाम् । प्रमातृत्वस्य कल्पितत्वेऽपि विषयाबाधात्प्रामाण्यमितिभावः ॥

देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वाऽऽत्मनिश्चयात्

dehātmapratyayo yadvatpramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ |
laukikaṃ tadvadevedaṃ pramāṇaṃ tvā"tmaniścayāt

A critical question arises: If the **Pramātā** (the knower/ego) is realized to be a mental construct (**Kalpita**), how can the means of knowledge (**Pramāṇa**), which depend on that knower, be considered valid?

The Dilemma: If "I" (the subject) am an illusion, then my eyes, ears, and even the scriptures (the instruments) must also be illusions. How can an illusory instrument lead to the Truth?

Explanation:

1. **The Analogy of Body-Identity:** Just as an ignorant person considers the notion "I am the body" (**Dehātma-pratyaya**) to be a valid fact for all practical purposes, all worldly means of knowledge are accepted as valid within their own sphere.
2. **Temporal Validity:** This validity remains intact **Ātma-niścayāt**—until the firm realization of the Self occurs. The term **Ātma-niścayāt** is used here in the sense of **Maryādā** (a boundary or limit).
3. **Laukika and Vaidika:** Not only worldly perception (**Pratyakṣa**) but also the ritualistic portion of the Vedas (**Karma-kāṇḍa**) is valid only so long as the self-identification with the body remains.

Ṭīkā: yathā dehātmatvapratyayaḥ kalpito bhramo'pi vyavahārāṅgatayā mānatveneṣyate vaidikaiḥ, tadvallaukikamadhyakṣādikamātmabodhāvadhi vyavahārakāle bādhābhāvāt vyāvahārikaṃ prāmāṇyamiṣyatām , Vyāvahārika

Prāmāṇyam (Empirical Validity): The perception of objects, the performance of rituals (like **Sandhyāvandana** or **Agnihotra**), and the distinctions of caste/lineage (**Gotra**) are functionally "real." They are not sublated during the state of ignorance.

- **Ātma-bodhāvadhi:** This validity lasts only until the dawn of Self-knowledge (**Ātma-bodha**). During the "transactional period" (**Vyavahāra-kāla**), there is an absence of contradiction (**Bādha-abhāva**), hence they are accepted as "true."

Ṭīkā: vedāntānāṃ tu kālatrayābādhyabodhitvāttattvāvedakaṃ prāmāṇyamiti tuśabdārthaḥ |

Distinguishing Vedānta:

- **Tattvāvedaka Pramāṇa:** Unlike worldly knowledge, Vedānta is the "Revealer of Reality."
- **Kālatraya-abādhya:** It provides knowledge of that which can never be sublated in the three periods of time (past, present, future).
- **Self-Sublation:** Once the knowledge of Brahman is attained, even the Vedāntic texts become "non-valid" (**Apramāṇa**) because the distinction between teacher, taught, and scripture disappears.

Just as the "I am the body" idea is treated as valid for daily transactions, all worldly and Vedic means of knowledge hold **Vyāvahārika Prāmāṇya** (empirical validity) until the final realization of the Self (**Ātma-niścaya**). Once the Self is known, these means of knowledge are recognized as having been superimposed

Sundara Pāṇḍya's Authority: These three verses are so profound that **Ādi Śaṅkarācārya** cited them to summarize the entire philosophy of sublation.

The State of Knowledge: After the **Brahmātmā-aikya** (Unity of Brahman and Self), only pure consciousness remains. The **Pramātā** (knower) is sublated along with the **Pramāṇa** (means) and **Prameya** (object).

The Purpose and Dedication of the Commentary

रामनाम्निपरे धाम्नि कृत्स्नाम्नायसमन्वयः ।
कार्यतात्पर्यबाधेन साधितः शुद्धबुद्धये ॥ ४ ॥

The commentator (**Ratnaprabhā-kāra**) explains the intent behind writing this **Ṭīkā** (commentary) on the **Catuḥsūtrī**. The essence is captured in a concluding verse or statement of purpose that identifies the ultimate goal of all inquiry.

Explanation:

- **Kṛtsna Āmnāya Samanvayaḥ:** The "harmony" or "synthesis" (**Samanvaya**) of the entire collection of Vedic scriptures (**Kṛtsna Āmnāya**) is found in the Name of **Rāma**.
- **Rāma Nāmni Pare Dhāmni:** The Name **Rāma** here is not merely a linguistic label but refers to the **Pare Dhāmni**—the Supreme Abode or the Ultimate Substratum (**Adhiṣṭhāna**). In the grammatical sense (**Bahuvrīhi** compound), it refers to that Supreme Reality whose very name/nature is **Rāma** (the one in whom all yogis delight).
- **Dhāmni:** Derived from the root **Dhāman**, it signifies the foundational support or the ground of all existence (**Brahman**).

A central theme of the **Catuḥsūtrī** is that the Vedas do not primarily aim at action, but at the revelation of the already-existent Reality.

- **Negation of Kārya:** This commentary establishes the **Samanvaya** (synthesis) by sublating (**Bādha**) the notion that the final purport (**Tātparya**) of the Vedas lies in "work" or "duty" (**Kārya/Karma**) or even "meditation" (**Upāsanā**) as a ritual act.
- **Jñāna-para:** Instead, it shows that the Vedas culminate in **Jñāna** (Pure Knowledge). **Brahman** is described as **Nirviśeṣa** (without attributes) and **Aśeṣī** (that which has no remainder or dependency).

The term **Śuddha-buddhi** carries a dual meaning regarding the purpose and the audience of this work:

1. **For the Pure-Hearted:** This commentary is written specifically for those who possess a "Pure Intellect" (**Śuddha Antaḥkaraṇa**), as they are the ones capable of grasping the non-dual truth.
2. **For the Sake of Purification:** The act of investigating this **Samanvaya** (the harmony of Brahman) is itself the means to achieve **Citta-śuddhi** (purification of the mind).

Final Summary of the Catuḥsūtrī

The conclusion of the **Catuḥsūtrī** marks a pivotal point in the **Brahmasūtras**. It confirms that:

- The entire Vedic tradition points toward one single reality: **Brahman**.
- This **Brahman** is identical to the Self (**Ātmā**).
- All empirical means of knowledge and religious duties are valid only until this identity is realized.
- Once realized, the "doer" and "knower" dissolve into the "Witness," leaving only the non-dual Bliss.

इति चतुःसूत्री समाप्ता । iti catuḥsūtrī samāptā |

This marks the formal end of the notes on the first four sūtras.

About The Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā

Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā , is a composition by Śrī Bhāratī Tīrtha Swāmī (the Guru of Vidyāraṇya Swāmī). It literally means - A garland (mālā) of logic (nyāya) connecting the sūtras of Vyasa (hence, Vaiyāsikam).

As a rule, a topic of inquiry has five components (avayava) - object (viṣaya), Doubt (saṃdeha), objection by an opponent (pūrvapakṣa), conclusion based on the principles of the philosophy propagated by the author, in this case - Advaita (siddhānta) and the connection (saṃgati) of the current topic to that or those preceding it.

In the Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā, for every topic (adhikaraṇa) of the [1]Brahmasūtra, there are two verses (ślokas). The two verses cover the five aspects of the topic.

एकोविषय संदेहपूर्वपक्षावभासकः| श्लोकोऽपरस्तुसिद्धान्तवादीसंगतयःस्फुटाः॥ २॥

ekoviṣaya saṃdehapūrvapakṣāvabhāsakaḥ . śloko'parastu siddhāntavādī saṃgatayaḥ sphuṭāḥ (2)

The first verse presents:

- Object (viṣaya)
- Doubt (saṃdeha)
- Opponent's objection (pūrvapakṣa)

The other verse contains the resolution of the object proposed by the opponent, in terms of Advaitic principles (siddhānta).

Based on the two verses, the author states that the connection (saṃgati) of the current topic to the preceding topic(s) can be clearly inferred by an attentive student/seeker.

Since the Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā was composed for the purpose of facilitating comprehension of the [2]Brahmasūtras by a student/seeker, it comprises the pair of ślokas for each adhikaraṇa of the Brahmasūtra, which number 192. However, due to some adhikaraṇas containing more than one part to a topic – each sub-topic referred to as varṇakam, and some adhikaraṇas dealing with more than one topic – the actual number of slokas in the Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā corresponding to the adhikaraṇas in the Brahmasūtra are as follows:

	Chapter (adhyāya)	**Samanvaya**				**Avirodha**				**Sādhana**				**Phala**			
of the Brahmasūtra	Sections (pāda)	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*
	Topics (adhikaraṇa)	11	7	13	8	13	8	17	9	6	8	36	17	14	11	6	7
	Sub-topics (varṇaka)	14	7	14	8	13	8	17	9	6	8	38	18	14	11	6	7
of Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā	ślokas	28	14	28	16	26	16	34	18	12	16	76	36	28	22	12	14

[1] The text, as a whole
[2] The aphorisms (sūtras) contained in the text - Brahmasūtra

Sources of the material presented in this text

- Brahmasūtra by Śrī Veda Vyāsa with commentary by Śrī Ādi Śaṅkarācārya and Ratnaprabhā notes by Śrī Rāmānanda

- Vidyānanda Vṛtti on the Brahmasūtra by Śrī Swāmī Vidyānanda Giri of Brahmavidyāpīṭh Kailās Āśram, Ṛṣikeś

- Discourse by Śrī Swāmī Bodhātmānanda Saraswati of Brahmavidyāpīṭh Kailās Āśram, Ṛṣikeś

- Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā by Śrī Bharati tirtha Mūni with Lalita Vyākhyā (Hindi) by Śrī Swāmī Vidyānanda Giri of Brahmavidyāpīṭh Kailās Āśram, Ṛṣikeś (https://archive.org/details/lNOG_vaiyasik-nyayamala-of-bharati-tirtha-muni-with-lalita-explanation-by-swami-vidya/page/n1/mode/2up)

- Brahmatattvaprakāśikā by Śrī Sadāśivendra Saraswati (https://archive.org/details/Brahmasutra_Vritti_Sadasivendra_Sarasvati_1909_SVV)

- Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā by Śrī Bharati tirtha Mūni with Satyānandīdīpika (Hindi) by Śrī Swāmī Satyānanda Saraswatī of Govindamaṭh, Vārānāsī (https://archive.org/details/VaiyasikaNyayaMalaHindi)

TRANSLITERATION CODA

Consonants					
velars	palatals	retroflexes	dentals	labials	Category
क k K	च c C	ट ṭ Ṭ	त t T	प p P	tenuis stops
ख kh Kh	छ ch Ch	ठ ṭh Ṭh	थ th Th	फ ph Ph	aspirated stops
ग g G	ज j J	ड ḍ Ḍ	द d D	ब b B	voiced stops
घ gh Gh	झ jh Jh	ढ ḍh Ḍh	ध dh Dh	भ bh Bh	breathy stops
ङ ṅ Ṅ (ng)	ञ ñ Ñ (nya)	ण ṇ Ṇ	न n N	म m M	nasal stops
ह h H	य y Y	र r R	ल l L	व v V	approximants
	श ś Ś	ष ṣ Ṣ	स s S		sibilants

Vowels			
Devanāgarī	Transcription		Category
अ	a	A	Monophthongs and syllabic liquids
आ	ā	Ā	
इ	i	I	
ई	ī	Ī	
उ	u	U	
ऊ	ū	Ū	
ऋ	ṛ	Ṛ	
ॠ	ṝ	Ṝ	
ऌ	ḷ	Ḷ	
ॡ	ḹ	Ḹ	
ए	e	E	diphthongs
ऐ	ai	Ai	
ओ	o	O	
औ	au	Au	
ं	ṃ	Ṃ	anusvara
ः	ḥ		visarga
ँ	~		chandrabindu
ऽ	'		avagraha

Chapter 1

Introduction

प्रणम्य परमात्मानं श्रीविद्यातीर्थरूपिणम् । वैयासिकन्यायमाला श्लोकैः संगृह्यते स्फुटम् ॥१॥

Saluting the absolute Self, of the form of Śrī [3]Vidyātīrtha; by the slokas of the Vaiyāsika Nyāyamālā, are summarized clearly – (1)

To propagate the tradition and with the desire for successful commencement and completion of the text – without any insurmountable obstacles, the author first offers obeisances to the absolute Self, of the conditioned form of the teacher.

एको विषयसंदेहपूर्वपक्षावभासकः । श्लोकोऽपरस्तु सिद्धान्तवादी संगतयः स्फुटाः ॥२॥

[4]First - the [5]subject, [6]doubt and [7]objection are illuminated; by the other śloka then, the [8]contexts of the principle-proponent are clarified. (2)

In this manner, each adhikaraṇa of the Brahmasūtras will be summarised; it now falls to the student/seeker to remember the summary in this way, for each sutra and remember the bases of reconciliation of the many apparently contraindicating mantras of the Upaniṣads. The purpose of such a recollection being two-fold:

1) Remember the contexts of the apparently contraindicated mantras and hence be clear about one's own comprehension of each of those mantras, depending on the context without falling into confusion regarding the seeing contraindication
2) Reinforce one's knowledge, understanding and abidance in the singular subject of all Upaniṣad mantras – The Self/Brahman – Saccidānanda

शास्त्रेऽध्याये तथा पादे न्यायसंगतयस्त्रिधा । शास्त्रादिविषये ज्ञाते तत्तत्संगतिरूह्यताम् ॥३॥

Among the [9]text, chapter and section – the [10]logical relationships are three-fold. Upon knowing the subject of the text [11]etc., the relationship between each of them will be comprehensible. (3)

A doubt-free and clear understanding of the text requires knowledge of the relationship among the purpose and content of the three – the whole text, each of the chapters comprising it and each of the sections contained in each of the chapters. The implication is that none of these components are stand-along items but inter-related and sequential. Hence, true comprehension and abidance will be possible only for one who is able to understand each of these components in relation to each of the other.

---

[3] Offering salutation to the teacher as the form of the absolute highest
[4] In the first śloka, of each adhikaraṇa
[5] Of the corresponding sūtra
[6] Regarding the subject of the corresponding sūtra
[7] To the proposition contained in the corresponding sūtra
[8] The resolution of the objection along with validating scriptural citations
[9] The term 'śāstra' is commonly understood as scripture but in this context, it refers to the referred principal text i.e. the Brahmasūtra
[10] For the purpose of understanding the purpose and content of the entire text
[11] The chapters and sections comprising it

शास्त्रं ब्रह्मविचाराख्यमध्यायाः स्युश्चतुर्विधाः । समन्वयाविरोधौ द्वौ साधनं च फलं तथा ॥४॥

The text composed for inquiry into [12]Brahman, has four chapters – samanvaya (regarding one), avirodha (indisputable) are two, and sādhana (abidance) and phalam (outcome) also [13]so. (4)

In the first chapter, it is detailed that the conclusion of all the Upaniṣad mantras is the singularity of Brahman. In the first, all objections to the singularity of Brahman are anticipated and resolved through logic, validated by scriptural declarations. In the third, that knowledge alone is the only means of Self-realisation is definitively established and in the final, fourth chapter, the outcome of the knowledge of Brahman is conclusively defined.

समन्वये स्पष्टलिङ्गमस्पष्टत्वेऽप्युपास्यगम् । ज्ञेयगं पदमात्रं च चिन्त्यं पादेष्वनुक्रमात् ॥५॥

In [14]samanvaya, [15]the clearly indicative[16], the [17]implicit indicative as being about the subject of worship and knowledge and [18]the term alone; thus, are the topics of inquiry in the sections, respectively. (5)

In the first chapter title Samanvaya, there are four sections. The first three deal with Upaniṣadic mantras of two types, respectively:

- Those that are clearly indicative of Brahman
- Those that are indirectly indicative of Brahman – as the object of worship
- Those that are indirectly indicative of Brahman – as an object of knowledge

The final, fourth section is an inquiry only into the various terms used to refer to the Brahman.

द्वितोये स्मृतितर्काभ्यामविरोधोऽन्यदुष्टता । भूतभोक्तृश्रुतेर्लिङ्गश्रुतेरप्यविरुद्धता ॥६॥

In the [19]second, non-contradiction[20] with the secondary scriptures and logic[21] and the defectiveness of the other[22]; non-opposition between elements and experiencer related scriptural declarations and [23]indicator declarations[24].

In the second chapter, there are four sections. In the first section, the opposition of the other schools of thought – Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika - to the Advaitic principle of singularity of Brahman is resolved through logic, validated by the scriptures. The second section then highlights the defects in the principles of those and [25]other schools of thought, with the intent of invalidating their opposition to the Advaitic principle. The third section deals with the mutual contradiction among Upaniṣadic mantras regarding (a) the elements (b) jīvas. The last section resolves the dissonance among Upaniṣadic mantras about the mental apparatus, known as the subtle body of jīvas.

---

[12] Primarily, never forget Brahman is the Self
[13] Two i.e. the other two
[14] The chapter named
[15] The first section is regarding
[16] Declarations of Brahman
[17] The second and third sections are regarding
[18] The third section
[19] Chapter, titled Avirodha
[20] Of the Advaitic principle of singularity of Brahman
[21] Of the other Vedāntic schools of thought
[22] Schools of thought
[23] The subtle body, because it is the indicator of the existence of Brahman as the Conscious
[24] “Are presented” is implied
[25] Buddhist, Jain and Paśupati

तृतीये विरतिस्तत्त्वंपदार्थपरिशोधनम् । गुणोपसंहृतिर्ज्ञानबहिरङ्गादिसाधनम् ॥७॥

In the [26]third, the topics is the sections are dispassion, investigation into the meaning of the terms 'that' and 'you', the dissolution of characteristics in knowledge and external bodily practises.

In the four sections of the third chapter, the focus is on the means of Self-realisation. First among them, discussed in the first section is the importance of dispassion, followed by a deep understanding of the terms 'that' and 'you' of the Mahāvākya – tat tvam asi – in order to develop firm conviction in the truth of the true oneness of apparent duality. The third chapter delves into the various methods of meditation upon the conditionings of Brahman, necessary for a novice student/seeker, who is unable to keep the thought on the characteristic-less-ness of Brahman. Thus, various supports – the elements, cosmic forms and individual aspects like the prana or mind – are provided in the Upaniṣads; the purpose and outcome of these are discussed in the third section. The last section finally reveals that the prior three – dispassion, knowledge and worship are all only instrumental in preparing one for realisation through only acceptance of the knowledge of the truth.

चतुर्थे जीवतो मुक्तिरुत्क्रान्तिर्गतिरुत्तरा । ब्रह्मप्राप्तिब्रह्मलोकाविति पादार्थसंग्रहः ॥८॥

In the [27]third, while living liberation[28], [29]transcendence, the journey beyond[30] and [31]Brahman-realisation or [32]Brahma-realm attainment; thus, is the summary of the purpose of the sections[33].

The final chapter throws light on the various possible outcomes, based on the activities of the student/seeker. The various outcomes described in the respective sections are

1. realising the truth while still living which [34]invalidates all other outcomes
2. death of the student/seeker who has not realised the truth while living
3. the journey after death
    a. the higher path for those who lived virtuously
    b. the lower path for the vicious
4. the nature of realisation, for those who have realised the truth; the attainment of a stay in the realm of the deity Brahma for those who attained the highest level of purity but were unable to accept the truth of the Self

ऊहित्वा संगतीस्तिस्रस्तथाऽवान्तरसंगतीः । ऊहेदाक्षेपदृष्टान्तप्रत्युदाहरणादिकाः ॥९॥

---

[26] Chapter, titled Sādhana
[27] Chapter, titled Phalam
[28] From transmigration i.e. being trapped in the cycle of birth and death
[29] Death
[30] Death i.e. depending on the nature of activities while alive – virtuous or vicious
[31] Don't forget – Self! 😊
[32] The conditioned deity, responsible for creation in each cycle and propagation of knowledge of the truth in the duration of each cycle
[33] Respectively, of this last chapter
[34] Because the realisation of truth and destruction of individuality are mutually exclusive and simultaneous like light and darkness; once the individual is thus metaphorically destroyed, there are no individual-related outcomes possible thereafter

Having comprehended the three types of[35] relationships; similarly, the relationships among the chapters and the sections themselves are to be understood on the basis of the objections, illustrations and counter-examples[36]

As described above, in each instance one should be able to relate the purpose of the text to the purpose contained in the chapter and meaning conveyed in the section. An example of this is – in the very first sutra – Athāto Brahmajigñāsā, it can be easily identified that:

1. the subject of text – Brahman
2. the subject of the chapter – regarding the one, Brahman
3. the subject of the section – curiosity about Brahman

are all related. In this manner, the same relatedness should be identified and remembered for each section and collectively, chapter.

Within each adhikaraṇa though, among the sutras several such relational components are available – the similarity of objections (e.g. proponents of each school of thought will have similar objections based on their principles), similarity of illustrations, similarity of counter-illustrations and contexts such as realness of the jīva, impossibility of oneness of jīva and Brahman, necessity of worship for realisation and so on. On these bases, the relatedness of the various sutras within and between sections can be understood to create a comprehensive understanding of the text and consequently, the Upaniṣads and ultimately the Advaita philosophy

पूर्वन्यायस्य सिद्धान्तयुक्तिं वीक्ष्य परे नये । पूर्वपक्षस्य युक्तिं च तत्राऽऽक्षेपादि योजयेत् ॥१०॥

Keeping in mind the Advaitin proposition/conclusion in the previous section, taking it to the objector's argument then, there as an objection[37] etc., it must be understood

An example of this process of making sense of the text is:

- In the commentary to the first sutra, it is declared that the inquiry into Brahman must be commenced (ब्रह्मविचारशास्त्रमारम्भणीयम्), due to the fact that there is doubt regarding Brahman (ब्रह्म संदिग्धत्वात्). The doubt referred to here is whether there is such an entity as Brahman or not.
- Then in the commentary to the second sutra, it is proposed that Birth etc. of creation is not an indicator of Brahman (जगज्जन्मादि ब्रह्मलक्षणं न भवति), due to the fact the birth etc. is a characteristic of creation (जन्मादेर्जगन्निष्ठत्वात्). The contention here is that, if one were to use creation to propose the existence of Brahman, it is unacceptable because to be born etc., is the characteristic of creation. Hence, there is no such entity as Brahman regarding which there can be a doubt.
- Therefore, relating the two contentions in the above manner, one can conclude that the latter is an objection to the former. The same applies to illustrations, counter-examples and arguments.

In this manner, the beads of each sutra must be connected within each section and the sections must be connected within each chapter and ultimately, all the chapters must be understood in relation to each other to gain a comprehensive and doubt-free knowledge of the Upaniṣads and consequently the Advaita philosophy

---

[35] Described thus far – among the text, chapters and sections
[36] "provided therein" is implied
[37] A doubt, question, counter-argument among others

अधिकरणम् – जिज्ञासाधिकरणम् सूत्रः – अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥१॥

अविचार्यं विचार्यं वा ब्रह्माध्यासानिरूपणात् । असन्देहाफलत्वाभ्यां न विचारं तदर्हति ॥११॥
अध्यासोऽहंबुद्धिसिद्धोऽसङ्गं ब्रह्म श्रुतीरितम् । सन्देहान्मुक्तिभावाच्च विचार्यं ब्रह्म वेदतः ॥१२॥

संगति (saṃgati)	**श्रुति** (śruti)	विचारविषय वेदान्तवाक्यैः स्वार्थनिर्णयाया अस्य अपेक्षणात्	vicāraviṣaya vedāntavākyaiḥ svārthanirṇayāyā asya apekṣaṇāt
	शास्त्रम् (śāstram)	विशेषतो ब्रह्मपरवाक्यतात्पर्यनिर्णायक न्याय सूचकत्वात्	viśeṣato brahmaparavākyatātparyanirṇāyaka nyāya sūcakatvāt
	अध्यायः (adhyāyaḥ)	सर्वे वेदान्ता ब्रह्मपरा इति समन्वय प्रतिपादनात्	sarve vedāntā brahmaparā iti samanvaya pratipādanāt
	पादः (pādaḥ)	स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां वाक्यानां विचार्यत्वात्	spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgānāṃ vākyānāṃ vicāryatvāt
	अधिकरणम् (adhikaraṇam)	प्राथम्यादस्याधिकरणस्य नाधिकरण संगतिः	prāthamyādasyādhikaraṇasya nādhikaraṇa saṃgatiḥ
विषयः (viṣayaḥ)		वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः	vedāntavākyavicāraḥ
संदेहः (saṃdehaḥ)		स किं विचार्यमविचार्यं वेति	avicāryaṃ vicāryaṃ vā
पूर्वपक्षः (pūrvapakṣaḥ)		ब्रह्माध्यासानिरूपणात् असन्देहाफलत्वाभ्यां ब्रह्म विचारं नार्हति	brahmādhyāsānirūpaṇāt asandehāphalatvābhyāṃ brahma vicāraṃ nārhati
सिद्धान्तः (siddhāntaḥ)		ब्रह्मासङ्गमिति श्रुतीरितम् तथापि अध्यासोऽहंबुद्धिसिद्धः अतो सन्देहान्मुक्तिभावाच्च ब्रह्म वेदतः विचार्यम्	brahmāsaṅgamiti śrutīritam tathāpi adhyāso'haṃbuddhisiddhaḥ ato sandehānmuktibhāvācca brahma vedataḥ vicāryam

Relationship of this sūtra with	**Scriptures**	Necessity[38] to determine the meaning of the declarations in Upaniṣads
	Text	Presents the logical and scriptural bases for determining the meaning of Brahman-related declarations in the [39]scriptures
	Chapter	Establishes that Brahman is the sole subject of Vedānta
	Section	Necessity of inquiry into the declarations which are directly indicative of Brahman
	Topic	Not applicable, due to being the first
Subject	Inquiry into the declarations of the Upaniṣads	
Doubt	Is inquiry, into Vedānta, required or not?	
Objection by opponent	Because there is not validity of superimposition on Brahman and due to being known as "I", there is no doubt regarding Brahman; nor is there any proof of an outcome from knowing Brahman hence, no inquiry is required	
Resolution by Advaitin	Though the scriptures declare that Brahman is unattached, the superimposition is known by its attachment to the intellect; therefore, there is a doubt regarding Brahman and liberation, as the outcome of realising Brahman. Hence, with Upaniṣads as the basis, there should be an inquiry into Brahman	

Note on the Pre-requisites for Inquiry

For the existence of a desire to know (*pratipitsā*), regarding the object of such desire – there must be:

1. **Doubt** (*saṃśayaḥ/sandeha*) 2. **Purpose** (*prayojana*)

That which is free from doubt and without purpose is not a subject of desire for knowledge for a wise person – Bhāmatī *(Yad asaṃdigdham aprayojanaṃ ca na tat prekṣāvat pratipitsā gocaraḥ)*

Example – the following do not require inquiry for the above reasons:

A pot, proximal to mind and senses (*samanaska indriya sannikṛṣṭa*), carries no doubt
Counting the teeth of a crow serves no purpose

[38] Append 'of the sūtra' here, for clarity
[39] Upaniṣads

अधिकरणम् – जन्माद्यधिकरणम्

सूत्रः – जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥२॥

लक्षणं ब्रह्मणो नास्ति किंवाऽस्ति नहि विद्यते । जन्मादेरन्यनिष्ठत्वात्सत्यादेश्चाप्रसिद्धितः ॥१३॥

ब्रह्मनिष्ठं कारणत्वं स्याल्लक्ष्म स्रग्भुजङ्गवत् । लौकिकान्येव सत्यादीन्यखण्डं लक्षयन्ति हि ॥१४॥

संगति (saṃgati)	**श्रुति** (śruti) **शास्त्रम्** (śāstram) **अध्यायः** (adhyāyaḥ) **पादः** (pādaḥ)	लक्षणद्योतिवेदान्तानां स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां लक्ष्ये ब्रह्मणि समन्वयोक्तिः	lakṣaṇadyotivedāntānāṃ spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgānāṃ lakṣye brahmaṇi samanvayoktiḥ
	अधिकरणम् (adhikaraṇam)	आक्षेप संगतिः - जिज्ञासितव्यस्य ब्रह्मणो लक्षणाभावेन स्वरूपस्यैवासिद्धेः कथं तस्य विचारविषयत्वम्	ākṣepa saṃgatiḥ - jigñāsitavyasya brahmaṇo lakṣaṇābhāvena svarūpasyaivāsiddheḥ kathaṃ tasya vicāraviṣayatvam
विषयः (viṣayaḥ)	*यतो वा इमानि भूतानि... (तै. उ. ३।१।१), सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म (तै. उ. २।१।१)* इत्यादि ब्रह्मणो लक्षणप्रतिपादक वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः	*yato vā imāni bhutāni…(Tai. U. 3.1.1), satyaṃ gñānamanantaṃ brahma (Tai. U. 2.1.1)* ityādi brahmaṇo lakṣaṇapratipādaka vedāntavākyavicāraḥ	
संदेहः (saṃdehaḥ)	किं श्रूयमाण जन्मसत्यादयः ब्रह्मणो लक्षणाऽस्ति न वेति	kiṃ śrūyamāṇa janmasatyādayaḥ brahmaṇo lakṣaṇāsti na veti	
पूर्वपक्षः (pūrvapakṣaḥ)	जन्मादेः जगन्निष्ठत्वेन ब्रह्मसंबन्धाभावाच्चापि सत्यादेश्च लोकसिद्धभिन्नार्थकानामेकब्रह्मलक्षणत्वाप्रसिद्धत्वा देवञ्च लक्षणाभावेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपासिद्ध्या मोक्षासिद्धिः	janmādeḥ jagannisṭhatvena brahmasaṃbandhābhāvāccāpi satyādeśca lokasiddhabhinnārthakānām ekabrahmalakṣaṇatvāprasiddhatvādevañca lakṣaṇābhāvena brahmasvarūpāsiddhyā mokṣāsiddhiḥ	
सिद्धान्तः (siddhāntaḥ)	प्रत्यक्षाद्युपस्थापितस्य जगतः जन्मादि यस्मात् ब्रह्मणो भवति तस्य तद्कारणत्वं तटस्थलक्षणम्। सत्यादिपदानामखण्डार्थत्वेन एकब्रह्मपर्यवसायितया लक्षणत्वसंभवात्सत्यादिकं स्वरूपलक्षणम्। तदेवं सर्वासु शाखासु लक्षणद्वयवाक्यानि जिज्ञास्ये ब्रह्मणि समन्वितानि तद्धिया मुक्तिरिति सिद्धम्।	pratyakṣādyupasthāpitasya jagataḥ janmādi yasmāt sarvagñātsarvaśakteḥ kāraṇādbhavati tasya tadkāraṇatvaṃ taṭasthalakṣaṇam । satyādipadānām akhaṇḍārthatvena ekabrahmaparyavasāyitayā lakṣaṇatvasaṃbhavāt satyādikaṃ svarūpalakṣaṇam । tadevaṃ sarvāsu śākhāsu lakṣaṇadvayavākyāni jigñāsye brahmaṇi samanvitāni taddhiyā muktiriti siddham।	

Relationship of this sūtra with	**Scriptures** **Text** **Chapter** **Section**	The reconciliation of the declarations of the Vedanta which reveal the indicative characteristics of Brahman, of whom the goal is clear indication of Brahman
	Topic	Objection: In the absence of indicative characteristics of the Brahman which was declared as that which is to be known, its very nature is unestablished; how then, can it be an object of inquiry?
Subject	Inquiry into *'truth knowledge infinity is Brahman' – Tai. U. 2.1.1*; *'from which these beings are born' – Tai. U. 3.1.1* and such, which declare the indicative characteristics of Brahman	
Doubt	Are the declared 'birth' 'truth' and such others, indicative characteristics of Brahman or not?	
Objection by opponent	'Birth' etc, being related to creation, are not associated with Brahman; and also 'truth' etc., being popularly known to have many different meanings, are not known to indicate the singular Brahman; in this way due to the absence of indicative characteristics, the nature of Brahman cannot be established; hence, liberation is also unestablished.	
Resolution by Advaitin	That from which, is the birth of the directly perceivable creation, is Brahman; by this reason, the birth etc. of creation is the [40]circumstantially indicative characteristic of Brahman. The term 'truth' etc., in their indivisible meaning culminate in indicating the singular Brahman; hence, they are the indicative characteristic of the nature of Brahman. That, in this way, in all branches (of the Upaniṣads), declarations of the characteristics of these two types, reconcile with the Brahman, which is to be known; from which knowledge is realisation; thus, is established	

[40] Like the garland-snake is indicative of the garland, only when the snake appears as a garland; similarly, creation is indicative of Brahman, only till creation is perceived as its dualistic-form

अधिकरणम् – शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम् सूत्रः – शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥३॥

प्रथम वर्णकः

(शष्ठि तत्पुरुष समासरूपेण / explanation of 'śāstrayoni' as a compound of the sixth [relational] case)

न कर्तृ ब्रह्म वेदस्य किं वा कर्तृ न कर्तृ तत् । विरूप नित्यया वाचेत्येवं नित्यत्ववर्णनात् ॥१५॥

कर्तृ निःश्वसिताद्युक्तेर्नित्यत्वं पूर्वसाम्यतः । सर्वावभासिवेदस्य कर्तृत्वात्सर्वविद्भवेत् ॥१६॥

संगति (saṃgati)	**श्रुति** (śruti)	वेदान्तवाक्यस्य स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गस्य वेदकर्तरि समन्वयोक्तिः	vedāntavākyasya spaṣṭabrahmaliṅgasya vedakartari samanvayoktiḥ
	शास्त्रम् (śāstram)		
	अध्यायः (adhyāyaḥ)		
	पादः (pādaḥ)		
	अधिकरणम् (adhikaraṇam)	आक्षेप संगतिः - वेदस्य नित्यत्वाद् ब्रह्मणः सर्वहेतुत्वेन सर्वज्ञत्वं नास्ति	ākṣepa saṃgatiḥ - vedasya nityatvād brahmaṇaḥ sarvahetutvena sarvajñatvaṃ nāsti
विषयः (viṣayaḥ)	*अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरसः (बृ. उ. २।४।१०)* इत्यादि वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः		*asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitametadyadṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo'tharvāṅgirasaḥ (Bṛ. U. 2.4.10)* ityādi vedāntavākya vicāraḥ
संदेहः (saṃdehaḥ)	एतद्वाक्ययं ब्रह्मणो वेदकर्तृत्वेन सर्वज्ञत्वं साधयति न वेति		etadvākyayaṃ brahmaṇo vedakartṛtvena sarvagñatvaṃ sādhayati na veti
पूर्वपक्षः (pūrvapakṣaḥ)	*वाचा विरूप नित्यया (ऋ. ८।७५।६)* इति वेदस्य नित्यत्वश्रवणात्तत्कर्तृत्वेन ब्रह्मणो सर्वज्ञत्वं न साधयतीति		*vācā virūpa nityayā (Ṛ. 8.75.6)* iti vedasya nityatvaśravaṇāt tatkartṛtvena sarvagñatvaṃ na sādhayatīti
सिद्धान्तः (siddhāntaḥ)	प्रतिसर्गं पूर्वसाम्यतः वेदस्य नित्यता तस्माद्वेदोत्पत्ति श्रुत्यनुरोधेन श्रुतेर्नित्यत्वमर्थवादम्। सर्वजगद्व्यवथावभासि वेदस्याप्रयत्नेनैव निःश्वासवद् लीलान्यायेन संभावितस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म अतोऽस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सिद्धम्।		pratisargaṃ pūrvasāmyataḥ vedasya nityatā tasmād vedotpatti śrutyanurodhena śruternityatvam arthavādam। sarvajagadvyavathāvabhāsi vedasyāprayatnenaiva niḥśvāsavad līlānyāyena saṃbhāvitasya yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ brahma ato'sya sarvajñatvaṃ siddham।

Relationship of this sūtra with	**Scriptures**	Reconciliation of the Vedantic statements of clearly indicative characteristics of Brahman with the authorship of the Vedas
	Text	
	Chapter	
	Section	
	Topic	Objection: Due to the Vedas being eternal[41], Brahman - by not being the [42]cause of everything - is not omniscient
Subject	Inquiry into *'of this infinite being, exhalation, is this Ṛg veda, Yajur veda, Sāma veda and [43]Atharvāṅgirasaḥ' (Bṛ. U. 2.4.10)* and such other declarations of the Vedas	
Doubt	Does this statement establish Brahman, through being the creator of Vedas[44], as omniscient or not?	
Objection by opponent	*'speech, [45]Virupa, by the eternal'[46] (Ṛ. 8.75.6)*; thus, being the declaration of the Vedas; omniscience of Brahman, by being its creator, cannot be established	
Resolution by Advaitin	creation is, in every cycle, congruent with the preceding - thus is the eternality of the Vedas; therefore, the eternality of Vedas based on the declarations about the origin are eulogistic. The Vedas, which illuminate the arrangement of the entire creation, emerge from Brahman – as effortlessly as exhalation, as play; hence, the omniscience of Brahman is established.	

[41] Append 'hence, not created' here, for clarity
[42] Or source, since Brahman is absolutely without-activity
[43] Another way of referring to Atharva veda
[44] Because Vedas serve as the blueprint for the entire creation in each cycle
[45] The name of the sage performing a fire ritual, as described in the context
[46] Read the citation as '{I} Virupa, by the eternal speech {the vedas}', for clarity

अधिकरणम् – शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणम् सूत्रः – शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥३॥

द्वितीय वर्णकः

(बहुव्रीहि समासरूपेण / explanation of 'śāstrayoni' as a exocentric compound)

अस्त्यन्यमेयताऽप्यस्य किंवा वेदैकमेयता। घटवत्सिद्धवस्तुत्वाद्ब्रह्मान्येनापि मीयते ॥१७॥

रूपलिङ्गादिराहित्यान्नास्य मान्तरयोग्यता । तं त्वौपनिषदेत्यादौ प्रोक्ता वेदैकमेयता ॥१८॥

संगति (saṃgati)	**श्रुति** (śruti)	ब्रह्मणो प्रमाणान्तरागम्यत्व समन्वयोक्तिः	brahmaṇo pramāṇāntarāgamyatva samanvayoktiḥ
	शास्त्रम् (śāstram)		
	अध्यायः (adhyāyaḥ)		
	पादः (pādaḥ)		
	अधिकरणम् (adhikaraṇam)	एकफलकत्व संगतिः – ब्रह्मनिर्णयार्थं लक्षणप्रमाण प्रस्तुतिः	ekaphalakatva saṃgatiḥ – brahmanirṇayārthaṃ lakṣaṇapramāṇa prastutiḥ
विषयः (viṣayaḥ)	*तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि... (बृ. उ. ३।९।२६)* इत्यादि वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः		*taṃ tvaupaniṣadaṃ puruṣaṃ pṛcchāmi... (Bṛ. U. 3.9.26)* ityādi vedāntavākya vicāraḥ
संदेहः (saṃdehaḥ)	तत्किं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्यत्वं समर्पयति न वेति		tatkiṃ brahmaṇaḥ śāstraikasamadhigamyatvaṃ samarpayati na veti
पूर्वपक्षः (pūrvapakṣaḥ)	ब्रह्मणो घटादिवत्सिद्धवस्तुत्वेन न केवलं शब्दगम्यं यथा कार्यलिङ्गेनैव लाघवात् कर्तुरेकस्य सर्वज्ञस्य ब्रह्मणः सिद्धिः		brahmaṇo ghaṭādivatsiddhavastutvena na kevalaṃ śabdagamyaṃ yathā kāryaliṅgenaiva lāghavāt karturekasya sarvajñasya bahmaṇaḥ siddhiḥ
सिद्धान्तः (siddhāntaḥ)	ब्रह्मणो सिद्धवस्तुत्वेऽपि रूपादिलिङ्गराहित्यान्न प्रत्यक्षादि गम्यत्वम्। विचित्र प्रपञ्चस्य प्रासादादिव एककर्तृता बाधात् सर्वज्ञेन अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात् च लाघवता अनुपपत्तिः।		brahmaṇo siddhavastutve'pi rūpādiliṅgarāhityānna pratyakṣādi gamyatvam। vicitra prapañcasya prāsādādiva ekakartṛtā bādhāt sarvajñena anyonyāśrayatvāt ca lāghavatā anupapattiḥ।

Relationship of this sūtra with	**Scriptures**	The reconciliation of the inaccessibility of Brahman by other means of knowledge
	Text	
	Chapter	
	Section	
	Topic	Singularity of outcome: The goal of both indicative characteristics and valid means of knowledge is the definitive comprehension of Brahman
Subject	Inquiry into *'that, of you, Upaniṣadic being, I ask' (Bṛ. U. 2.4.10)* and such other declarations of the Vedas	
Doubt	Does this statement submit that Brahman is correctly knowable only through the scriptures or not?	
Objection by opponent	Brahman, like a pot etc., being a self-evident entity is not correctly knowable only through the scriptures; as indicated by the [47]effect, through the principle of parsimony, Brahman is established as the omniscient singular creator	
Resolution by Advaitin	While Brahman is self-evident, due to the absence of characteristics like form etc., it is not knowable through the means of direct perception and such others. Due to the impossibility of a single creator for the manifold creation, as illustrated in the cases of [48]buildings etc., and the mutual [49]exclusivity with omniscience; the principle of parsimony is not applicable.	

[47] Creation i.e. creation also is a means of knowing Brahman; not just the scriptures
[48] Where no single person is able to performs all the activities required in the construction of the entire building
[49] Where there is single-subject expertise, there cannot be omniscience and vice versa

अधिकरणम् – समन्वयाधिकरणम् सूत्रः – तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥४॥

प्रथम वर्णकः

वेदान्ताः कर्तृदेवादिपरा ब्रह्मपरा उत । अनुष्ठानोपयोगित्वात्कर्त्रादिप्रतिपादकाः ॥१९॥
भिन्नप्रकरणात् लिंगषट्काच्च ब्रह्मबोधकाः । सति प्रयोजनेऽनर्थहानेऽनुष्ठनतोऽत्र किम् ॥२०॥

संगति (saṃgati)	**श्रुति** (śruti) **शास्त्रम्** (śāstram) **अध्यायः** (adhyāyaḥ) **पादः** (pādaḥ)	सर्वात्मत्वादिस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयोक्तिः	sarvātmatvādispaṣṭabrahmaliṅgānāṃ brahmaṇi samanvayoktiḥ
	अधिकरणम् (adhikaraṇam)	आक्षेप संगतिः – *आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम् (जै. सू. १।२।१)* इति शास्त्रस्यान्यपरत्वान्न ब्रह्मप्रमाणकत्वमतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यम्	ākṣepa saṃgatiḥ – āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām (Jai. sū. 1.2.1) iti śāstrasyānyaparatvānna brahmapramāṇakatvam ato vedāntānāmānarthakyam
विषयः (viṣayaḥ)	सर्वे वेदान्ता विचारविषयाः		sarve vedāntā vicāraviṣayāḥ
संदेहः (saṃdehaḥ)	ते किं कर्मशेषकर्त्रादिपराः उत नित्यसिद्धब्रह्मपरा इति		te kiṃ karmaśeṣakartrādiparāḥ uta nityasiddhabrahmaparā iti
पूर्वपक्षः (pūrvapakṣaḥ)	हेयोपादेयशून्यसिद्धवस्तुब्रह्मपरत्वे निष्प्रयोजनत्व सापेक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् कर्मापेक्षितकर्तृस्वरूपदेवतादि प्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं समानप्रकरणात् उपासनाविधिशेषत्वं वा वेदान्तानामभ्युपेयत्वम्		heyopādeyaśūnyasiddhavastubrahmaparatve niṣprayojanatvasāpekṣatvaprasaṅgāt karmāpekṣita kartṛsvarūpadevatādiprakāśanenakriyāvidhiśeṣatvaṃ samānaprakaraṇātupāsanāvidhiśeṣatvaṃ vā vedāntānāmabhyupeyatvam
सिद्धान्तः (siddhāntaḥ)	सम्यक्तातपर्यवत्त्वेन वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि संबन्धात् सः नित्यसिद्धब्रह्मपराः न कर्त्रादिपराः भिन्न प्रकरणस्थत्वात्। न च प्रकरणाभेदादुपासनाविधिपरा इति साम्प्रतं तत्त्वमस्यादीनां विधिविधुराणां बहुलम् उपलब्धेः। नापि निष्प्रयोजनमनर्थन्वृत्तेः प्रयोजनस्य सम्भवात्। न हि सापेक्षत्वम् रूपादिहीनस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरागम्यत्वेन वेदान्तानां सपेक्षत्वासम्भवात्। तस्मादुपक्रमादिलिङ्गैः वेदान्ता ब्रह्मपरा एवेति सिद्धम्।		samyaktātaparyavattvena vedāntānāṃ brahmaṇi saṃbandhāt saḥ nityasiddhabrahyaparāḥ na kartrādiparāḥ bhinna prakaraṇasthatvāt। na ca prakaraṇābhedādupāsanā vidhiparā iti sāmprataṃ tattvamasyādīnāṃ vidhividhurāṇāṃ bahulam upalabdheḥ। nāpi niṣprayojanamanarthanivṛtteḥ prayojanasya sambhavāt। na hi sāpekṣatvam rūpādihīnasya brahmaṇaḥ pramāṇāntarāgamyatvena vedāntānāṃ sapekṣatvāsambhavāt। tasmādupakramādiliṅgaiḥ vedāntā brahmaparā eveti siddham।

Relationship of this sūtra with	**Scriptures** **Text** **Chapter** **Section**	The reconciliation of Brahman with the clear characteristics of Brahman, such as its being the Self of all.
	Topic	Objection: *'of the Vedas, due to being outcome-based action; futile it is, if not so' (Jai. sū. 1.2.1)* thus, due to the scriptures focussing on other matters, it is not a valid authority on Brahman; hence, Vedānta is without purpose
Subject	Inquiry into all of Vedanta	
Doubt	Are they focussed on the performers, as a part of the rituals; or on the ever-evident Brahman?	
Objection by opponent	As focussed on the evident-Brahman, which can neither be taken up nor renounced, there is a situation of futility and dependence[50]; rather, it is appropriate for Vedānta to be either part of action-injunctions highlighting its focus on the required performer or the divinity of his true nature; or in a similar context, as a part of the injunction to worship	
Resolution by Advaitin	As the well-defined essence, due to the relationship between Vedānta and Brahman, it is focussed on the ever-evident Brahman and not on the performer etc., they being contextually separate. Nor just due to similarity of context, is it right to say that it is focussed on worship-injunctions, as is seen in 'that you are' and such other many, which are devoid of injunctions. Neither is it futile due to disaster-removal being its purpose. Nor verily, is there dependence[51], of the without-characteristics Brahman being unknowable through any other valid means, dependence is impossible. Hence, on the basis of commencement and such other [52]metrics, Vedānta is focussed on Brahman alone; thus, is established	

[50] Append 'of Vedānta' here, for clarity
[51] Append 'on anything else to realise it' here, for clarity
[52] The six metrics – commencement-conclusion (upakramaḥ-upasaṃhāraḥ), distinctiveness (apūrvatā), outcome (phalaṃ), repetition (abhyāsaḥ), comprehension (upapattiḥ) and eulogy (arthavādaḥ)

अधिकरणम् – समन्वयाधिकरणम् सूत्रः – तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥४॥

द्वितीय वर्णकः

प्रतिपत्तिं विधित्सन्ति ब्रह्मण्यवसिता उत । शास्त्रत्वात्ते विधातारो मननादेश्च कीर्तनात् ॥२१॥

नाकर्तृतन्त्रेस्ति विधिः शास्त्रत्वं शंसनादपि । मननादेः पुरा बोधात् ब्रह्मण्यवसितास्ततः ॥२२॥

संगति (saṃgati)	**श्रुति** (śruti) **शास्त्रम्** (śāstram) **अध्यायः** (adhyāyaḥ) **पादः** (pādaḥ)	सर्वात्मत्वादिस्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयोक्तिः	sarvātmatvādispaṣṭabrahmaliṅgānāṃ brahmaṇi samanvayoktiḥ
	अधिकरणम् (adhikaraṇam)	प्रसङ्ग संगतिः – प्रसङ्गाद् ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रैकप्रमणकत्वं तु यूपादिवद् विधिशेषतया एवेति एकदेशीमतानुयायिः समर्प्यति	prasaṅg saṃgatiḥ – prasaṅgād brahmaṇaḥ śāstraikapramaṇakatvaṃ tu yūpādivad vidhiśeṣatayā eveti ekadeśīmatānuyāyiḥ samarpyati
विषयः (viṣayaḥ)	वेदान्ते प्रतिपत्तिविधिर्नियोगः विचारः		vedānte pratipattividhirniyogaḥ vicāraḥ
संदेहः (saṃdehaḥ)	वेदान्ताः प्रतपत्तिविधिविषयतया ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति उत स्वातन्त्र्येणेति		vedāntāḥ pratapattividhiviṣayatayā brahma pratipādayanti uta svātantryeṇeti
पूर्वपक्षः (pūrvapakṣaḥ)	प्रवृत्त्यादिलिङ्गाभावेन सिद्धे शक्तिग्रहायोगात्फलाभावाच्च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरत्वेनैव शास्त्रत्वेन वेदान्तैः मननादि विधिशेषतयैव ब्रह्मसमर्पकम्		pravṛttyādiliṅgābhāvena siddhe śaktigrahāyogāt phalābhāvācca pravṛttinivṛttiparatvenaiva śāstratvena vedāntaiḥ mananādividhiśeṣatayaiva brahmasamarpakam
सिद्धान्तः (siddhāntaḥ)	स्वार्थे फलवत्त्वे सति नियोज्यविधुरत्वात् प्रवृत्तेः शक्तिग्रहे लिङ्गत्वे निर्बन्धाभावाच्चापि मोक्षस्य अनुष्ठेयकर्मफल विलक्षणत्वात् हितशासनाद् वेदान्तानामपि शास्त्रत्वञ्च सिद्धब्रह्मपरत्वम्		svārthe phalavattve sati niyojyavidhuratvāt pravṛtteḥ śaktigrahe liṅgatve nirbandhābhāvāccāpi mokṣasya anuṣṭheyakarmaphala vilakṣaṇatvāt hitaśāsanād vedāntānāmapi śāstratvañca siddhabrahmaparatvam

Relationship of this sūtra with	**Scriptures** **Text** **Chapter** **Section**	The reconciliation of Brahman with the clear characteristics of Brahman, such as its being the Self of all.
	Topic	Contextual: Continuing the notion that scriptures alone are the valid means of knowledge of Brahman, like the sacrificial post, it is only so as a component of injunctions; is submitted by the [53]partial Advaitin.
Subject	Inquiry into contemplation as an injunction in Vedānta	
Doubt	Does Vedanta make Brahman known as a subject of an injunction to contemplate or [54]independently?	
Objection by opponent	Due to the absence of indicators to perform, non-association between word and object and also absence of outcome in the case of the [55]established, [56]its identity as a scripture being based on adherence of action or inaction; Brahman is offered only as a component of inunctions to contemplation and so on, by Vedānta	
Resolution by Advaitin	There being an absence of association with injunction and compulsion of indicators and meanings associated with action due to [57]itself being an outcome; liberation being different from the outcomes of stipulated actions and finally due to being a source of instructions regarding the right, it is established that Vedanta is a scripture which is focussed on Brahman	

[53] One who accepts only certain principles but not the entire philosophy
[54] Independent of all injunctions
[55] Brahman, the absolute truth
[56] Vedānta's
[57] The knowledge as an object, knowing as a process and knower as an outcome are all Brahman alone